# Hereditary Structural Completeness over K4: Rybakov's Theorem Revisited 

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## Abstract

A deductive system is said to be structurally complete if its admissible rules are derivable, and moreover is hereditarily structurally complete if all its finitary extensions are structurally complete. Citkin (1997) established a characterisation of hereditarily structurally complete intermediate logics and Rybakov (1995) gave a characterisation for transitive modal logics. Both their proofs are difficult in their own way, however recently Bezhanishvili and Moraschini (2019) gave a self-contained proof of Citkin's result based on Esakia duality. The aim of this project is to do the same for Rybakov's result using a duality for modal algebras. In doing so we will identify and correct for an error in Rybakov's characterisation.

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## Chapter 1

## Introduction

In deductive systems, a rule is said to be admissible if the tautologies of the system are closed under its applications and derivable if the rule itself holds in the system [24]. Whilst every derivable rule is admissible, whether the converse holds varies between deductive systems. As one might expect, this converse holds in the classical propositional calculus (CPC), but it fails for many non-classical systems including the intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) [5]. This gap has motivated an in depth study in the criteria for admissibility. In 1975 Friedman [16] posed the problem of determining if it was decideable that a given rule is admissible for IPC or not. Rybakov undertook an extensive study on the criteria of admissibility (for example [28, Chapter 3]), including solving Friedman's problem [27]. Building on the the work of Ghilardi on unification [17], the problem of finding bases for admissible rules was solved for IPC by Iemhoff [19] and independently by Rozière [26]. Jeřábek [20] obtained similar results for modal and Łukasiewicz logics.

A classical problem in the area is to determine which deductive systems share with CPC the property of all admissible rules being derivable, that is are structurally complete. Prucnal [23] showed that all finitary extensions of the implicative fragment of IPC are structurally complete and a similar result that all finitary extensions of Gödel-Dummet logic are structurally complete was obtained by Dzik and Wroński [13]. One outcome from these investigations was a suggestion that even if a full characterisation of the structurally complete modal and intuitionistic logics was out of reach, it might be possible to precisely characterise the hereditarily structurally complete (HSC) systems, those which are not only structurally complete themselves but whose finitary extensions are too. This proved a fruitful question, Citkin [12] produced a characterisation for intermediate logics, and Rybakov [29,28] did so for transitive modal logics. Both these characterisations take a similar form. In Citkin's case, an intermediate logic is hereditarily structurally complete if and only if the variety of Heyting algebras associated with it omits five finite algebras [12]. In Rybakov's case, a transitive modal logic is hereditarily structurally complete if and only if it is not included in the logic of a list of 20 frames (see section 4.1 or [28, pg 274] for the list of frames).

However, both these milestone results are difficult in their own way. A detailed version of Citkin's proof has only been published in Russian [11] and the proof Rybakov gives is difficult, working with a construction of so-called characterising models and free algebras [29]. Recently, Bezhanishvili and Moraschini [5] gave a new proof of Citkin's theorem. Their approach utilises two different theories. First is the theory of algebraic logic. Using techniques from this field, it is possible to identify so-called algebraizable logics, those which have an associated class of algebras in which various algebraic properties reflect logical properties of interest [6].

Intermediate logics are just such a logic, they are algebraizable with the variety of Heyting algebras as their associated class of algebras [5]. Second is the theory of Esakia duality. Esakia duality, like Stone duality, formalises a link between a class of algebras and class of order-topological spaces, in this case Heyting algebras and Esakia spaces. Together, these two theories enable the question of which intermediate logics are hereditarily structurally complete to be investigated through both algebraic and topological methods.

Notably a similar framework exists for modal logics; modal logic is algebraizable with the variety of modal algebras their associated class of algebras [15]. Then, modal algebras are themselves are linked by Jónnson-Tarski duality to the class of modal spaces. This provides the motivation of this project, to do for Rybakov's result what Bezhanishvili and Moraschini did for Citkin's and investigate HSC modal logics through this duality. A benefit of this approach is that, in contrast to Rybakov's original proof, we avoid having to work with free algebras and characterising models, instead relying on results from universal algebra in combination with the duality to complete the proof.

This is not the sole benefit to this approach. Utilising the results from universal algebra illuminates a mistake in Rybakov's characterisation. The list of frames given by Rybakov is too restrictive, including the frame $F_{3}^{\prime}$ but there are HSC modal logics included in the logic of that frame. Our aim then is more than to simply provide a new proof of Rybakov's characterisation, but to correct this error establishing an adjusted characterisation using our algebraic and topological methods. Our adjustment illustrates that the area of HSC transitive modal logics is more complex than originally thought, with a new group of logics determined to be HSC.

Our work is organised as follows. In chapter 2 we introduce the first theory central to our main task - Jónsson-Tarski duality. We also undergo some extensive study of transitive spaces. In chapter 3 we introduce the other important theory for our project - algebraic logic. The theory of algebraic logic describes a precise relationship between logic and algebra and we'll explain how this lets us recast our central question into characterising the primitive varieties of K4-algebras. We will further reduce this problem by establishing a necessary and sufficient condition for any variety to be primitive and discuss how in the modal case the logic-algebra relationship can be further extended to incorporate topology. Once the theoretical basis is in place, in chapter 4 we introduce Rybakov's characterisation and explain where the mistake lies. We then give our adjusted characterisation. The proof of our new characterisation is quite technical, so before proceeding with the proof itself we give an overview of strategy (refer to section 4.2.1 for this overview). We then give the first direction of the characterisation, proving that primitive varieties of K4-algebras must omit the algebras in the new characterisation (lemma 4.2). The other harder direction is split across chapters 5 and 6 . In chapter 5 we work through a series of results describing the structure of algebras in our interested varieties, culminating in a precise description of their non-trivial, finitely generated subdirectly irreducible members (theorem 5.11). Finally, we complete the proof of the main theorem in chapter 6 (theorem 6.3 and corollary 6.4).

A brief note on notation. Throughout our work we will be working with transitive relational structures for which a pictorial representation is especially helpful. We will adopt the same notation as Rybakov in [28]. As all our diagrams refer to
transitive relations, much like Hasse diagrams we will not draw transitive arrows. We will use $\bullet$ to denote a reflexive point, o for an irreflexive point and $\odot$ for a point that may be reflexive or irreflexive. We also use $*$ to denote an arbitrary finite collection of points all of whom relate to each other (when the collection is just a single point this can be reflexive or irreflexive, otherwise all these points are obviously reflexive). For example in the following:

$A$ represents the set $\{x, y, z\}$ under either the relation:

$$
R:=\{(x, x),(x, y),(x, z),(y, z),(z, z)\} \text { or } R^{\prime}=\{(x, y),(x, z),(y, z),(z, z)\} .
$$

$B$ represents the family of relational structures where for $n, m \in \omega$ we have:

$$
C=\left\{c_{i}: 1 \leq i \leq n\right\} \text { and } D=\left\{d_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq m\right\} .
$$

We consider the set $C \cup D$ under the relation:

$$
R:=C^{2} \cup D^{2} \cup\left\{\left(c_{i}, d_{j}\right): 1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq j \leq m\right\} .
$$

## Chapter 2

## Jónsson-Tarski Duality

Just as the study of Boolean and Heyting algebras is aided by their (order-)topological representations known as Stone duality and Esakia duality, we can study modal algebras through the Jónsson-Tarski duality. In this chapter we properly introduce modal algebras and their topological dual, modal spaces. We'll then give the duality between them and expand on this a little, before embarking on some extensive study of transitive modal spaces.

### 2.1 The Duality

We begin by introducing our two structures and the duality between them.

### 2.1.1 Algebra

The algebraic structures we are interested in are modal algebras. Here we briefly recall the definition of modal algebras, assuming a familiarity with Boolean algebras and standard algebraic notions such as subalgebras, quotient algebras, direct product and so on. We'll also recall some basic properties of transitive modal algebras, known as K4-algebras. For a more detailed study the reader may consult [10, Section 7.5].

Definition 2.1. A modal algebra is a structure $(A, \wedge, \vee, \neg, \perp, \top, \square)$ where $\square$ is a unary function on $A$ such that:
(i) $(A, \wedge, \vee, \neg, \perp, \top)$ is a Boolean algebra;
(ii) $\forall a, b \in A \square(a \wedge b)=\square a \wedge \square b$;
(iii) $\square$
$\square \top=T$.

Equivalently,is a unary operation such that $\square(a \rightarrow b)=\square a \rightarrow \square b$ and $\square \top=T$. We define an operator $\diamond$ dual to $\square$ as $\diamond:=\neg \square \neg$.

A modal homomorphism between two modal algebras $A$ and $B$ is a Boolean homomorphism $f: A \rightarrow B$ satisfying $\forall a \in A f(\square a)=\square f(a)$. We let MA denote the category of modal algebras with modal homomorphisms.

A modal algebra is called a K4-algebra iff $\forall a \in A, \square a \leq \square \square a$ and an S4-algebra iff it is a K4-algebra and moreover $\forall a \in A \square a \leq a$. We let K4-A and S4-A denote the full subcategory of MA consisting of K4-algebras and S4-algebras respectively.

Our work is entirely focused on K4-algebras, and there are a number of basic properties and concepts associated with them.

There is a useful extension of the $\square$ and $\diamond$ operators. Given $A \in K 4-A$ and $a \in A$ we define:

$$
\square^{+} a:=a \wedge \square a, \diamond^{+} a:=a \vee \diamond a .
$$

A filter $F$ of a K4-algebra $A$ is a non-empty set $F \subseteq A$ such that:
(i) If $a \in F$ and $a \leq b$ then $b \in F$;
(ii) If $a, b \in F$ then $a \wedge b \in F$.

A filter $F$ is called a modal (or open) filter iff $\forall a \in A$ if $a \in F$ then $\square a \in F$.
Let $a \in A$. The smallest modal filter containing $a$ is the set:

$$
\uparrow \square^{+} a=\left\{b \in A: \square^{+} a \leq b\right\}
$$

A modal filter $F$ is principal iff $\exists a \in A: F=\uparrow \square^{+} a$.
A congruence of a K4-algebra $A$ is an equivalence relation $\theta$ on $A$ such that $\forall a, b, c, d \in$ A:
(i) If $(a, b) \in \theta$ and $(c, d) \in \theta$ then $(a \wedge c, b \wedge d) \in \theta$;
(ii) If $(a, b) \in \theta$ and $(c, d) \in \theta$ then $(a \vee c, b \vee d) \in \theta$;
(iii) If $(a, b) \in \theta$ then $(\neg a, \neg b) \in \theta$;
(iv) If $(a, b) \in \theta$ then $(\square a, \square b) \in \theta$.

We say a congruence $\sim$ of $A$ is completely $\wedge$-irreducible in the congruence lattice of $A$ iff for any collection of congruences $\left\{\theta_{i}\right\}_{i \in I}$ of $A$ if $\theta=\bigcap_{i \in I} \theta_{i}$ then $\exists i \in I$ such that $\theta=\theta_{i}$.

We say a congruence $\theta$ is $\wedge$-irreducible in the congruence lattice of $A$ iff for any congruences $\theta_{1}$ and $\theta_{2}$ of $A$ if $\theta_{1} \wedge \theta_{2}=\theta$ then either $\theta_{1}=\theta$ or $\theta_{2}=\theta$.

We say that $A$ is subdirectly irreducible or SI (finitely subdirectly irreducible or FSI) iff the identity relation is completely $\wedge$-irreducible ( $\wedge$-irreducible) in the congruence lattice of $A$.

Lemma 2.2. The lattice of modal filters of a K4-algebra is isomorphic to the lattice of its congruences.
Proof. The isomorphism is given by $F \mapsto \theta_{F}$ with

$$
\theta_{F}:=\left\{(a, b) \in A^{2}:(a \rightarrow b) \wedge(b \rightarrow a) \in F\right\}
$$

And in reverse, $\theta \mapsto F_{\theta}:=\top / \theta$.
Letting $A \in K 4-A, B \subseteq A$ and $c \in A \backslash\{T\}$, we say that $c$ is an opremum of $B$ iff $\forall a \in B \backslash\{\top\} \square^{+} a \leq c$, i.e. $c \in \uparrow \square^{+} a$. This need not be unique.

Theorem 2.3. (Rautenberg's Criterion)
Let $A \in K 4-A$. $A$ is SI iff $A$ has an opremum. Moreover $A$ is FSI iff every finite subset of $A$ has an opremum.

Proof. See [25].
On top of the familiar algebraic constructions, we also make occasional use of another known as a relativisation. (See [3] for more details).

Letting $a \in A$ we define the set $A_{a}:=\{x \in A: x \leq a\}$ and given $x, y \in A_{a}$ we let:

$$
x \vee_{a} y:=x \vee y, \neg_{a} x:=a \wedge \neg x \text { and } \square_{a} x:=a \wedge \square(a \rightarrow x)
$$

Then, $\left(A_{a}, \vee_{a}, \neg_{a}, a, \perp, \square_{a}\right)$ is a modal algebra called the relativisation of $A$ by $a$.

### 2.1.2 Topology

We now introduce the topological structure central to our investigation. We assume a familiarity with rudimentary topological notions such as open, closed and clopen sets, continuous maps, basis and so on. For a more detailed study the reader may consult [10, Chapter 8].

Our topological structure is an expansion of Stone spaces.
Definition 2.4. A Stone space is a topological space $\mathcal{X}=(X, \tau)$ such that:
(i) $\mathcal{X}$ is compact, i.e. every open cover of $X$ has a finite sub-cover;
(ii) $\mathcal{X}$ is Hausdorff, i.e. $\forall x, y \in X$ such that $x \neq y \exists U, V \in \tau$ such that $x \in U$, $y \in V$ and $U \cap V=\varnothing$;
(iii) $\mathcal{X}$ has a basis of clopens.

We will use $X^{*}$ to denote the set of clopen subsets of $X$.
We now list some basic well-known properties of Stone spaces.
Lemma 2.5. Let $\mathcal{X}$ be a Stone space. The following hold:

1. $\forall x, y \in X$ such that $x \neq y$ there exists $U \in X^{*}$ such that $x \in U$ and $y \notin U$. This property is known as Stone separation.
2. $\forall x \in X,\{x\}$ is closed.
3. The topology of a finite Stone space is necessarily discrete, and any finite set equipped with the discrete topology is a Stone space.

Proof. $\mathcal{X}$ having a basis of clopens implies $1, \mathcal{X}$ being Hausdorff implies 2 , and 2 implies 3.
Definition 2.6. A frame (or Kripke frame) is a pair $(X, R)$ where $X$ is a set and $R \subseteq X^{2}$ a relation on $X$. For $x \in X$ we define:

$$
R[x]:=\{y \in X: x R y\} \text { and } R^{-1}[x]:=\{y \in X: y R x\} .
$$

We extend this for $U \subseteq X$ by:

$$
R[U]:=\bigcup_{x \in U} R[x] \text { and } R^{-1}[U]:=\bigcup_{x \in U} R^{-1}[x] .
$$

A modal space (or descriptive Kripke frame) is a triple $\mathcal{X}=(X, \tau, R)$ where $(X, R)$ is a frame, $(X, \tau)$ is a Stone space and $R \subseteq X^{2}$ is such that:
(i) $R[x]$ is closed for all $x \in X$;
(ii) $R^{-1}[U]$ is clopen for all clopen $U \subseteq X$.

Equivalently $R[x]$ is closed for all $x \in X$ and $\square U:=\{x \in X: R[x] \subseteq U\}$ is clopen for all clopen $U \subseteq X$.

A $p$-morphism or bounded morphism between two frames is a map $f: X \rightarrow Y$ such that $f\left[R_{X}[x]\right]=R_{Y}[f(x)]$ for every $x \in X$.

We let MS denote the category of modal spaces with continuous p-morphisms.

A modal space is called a transitive space iff its relation is transitive and a quasiordered space iff its relation is reflexive and transitive. We let TS and QS denote the full subcategory of MS consisting of transitive spaces and quasi-ordered spaces respectively.

Once again, we will focus exclusively on transitive spaces. Later we will substantially develop the theory of transitive spaces, but for now we recall some basic properties and concepts.

Given $\mathcal{X} \in T S$, we say elements $x, y \in X$ are comparable iff either $x R y, y R x$ or $x=y$. Otherwise, we say $x$ and $y$ are incomparable, denoted $x \| y$.

Given $\mathcal{X} \in T S$, we say an element $x \in X$ is isolated iff $\{x\}$ is open. Recalling that in Stone spaces all finite sets are closed, we immediately have that $x$ is isolated iff $\{x\}$ is clopen.

We can define a similarly useful extension of the relation in a transitive space. Letting $Y \subseteq X$ we define:

$$
R^{+}[Y]=Y \cup R[Y] .
$$

Note that for $x \in X$ by lemma $2.5\{x\}$ is closed and by the definition of a transitive space $R[x]$ is closed, so $R^{+}[X]$ is closed.

We say $x \in \mathcal{X}$ is a root iff $X=R^{+}[x]$ and $\mathcal{X}$ is rooted iff it has a root.
We say $Y \subseteq X$ is an upset iff for all $y \in Y, R[y] \subseteq Y$, i.e. it is closed under $R$. The smallest upset containing $Y$ is $R^{+}[Y]$.

A modal subspace ( $M$-subspace) of $\mathcal{X}$ is a closed upset of $\mathcal{X}$ equipped with the subspace topology and the restricted relation, and is itself a modal space.

Notably, given $x \in X$ the set $R^{+}[x]$ is closed and clearly an upset, and thus forms an $M$-subspace of $\mathcal{X}$ when equipped with the subspace topology.

We say an equivalence relation $E$ on $\mathcal{X}$ is a modal equivalence iff $\forall x, y, \in X$ :
(i) If $x E y \& x R z$ then $\exists w \in X$ such that $y R w \& z E w$;
(ii) If $x \notin y$ then $\exists U$ clopen such that $x \in U, y \notin U$ and $U$ is a union of equivalence classes of $E$.

We then denote by $\mathcal{X} / E$ the modal space $\left(X / E, \tau_{E}, R_{E}\right)$ where $\tau_{E}$ is the quotient topology and $R_{E}$ is defined by:

$$
[x] R_{E}[y] \text { iff } \exists x E x^{\prime}, y E y^{\prime}: x^{\prime} R y^{\prime} .
$$

The map $x \mapsto[x]$ is a continuous p-morphism and for any continuous p -morphism $f: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ the relation $\operatorname{ker}(f):=\left\{\left(x, x^{\prime}\right) \in X^{2}: f(x)=f\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right\}$ is a modal equivalence.

Letting $\mathcal{X}_{1}, \ldots, \mathcal{X}_{n}$ be modal spaces, we denote by ${\underset{i}{i=1}}_{n}^{\mathcal{X}_{i}}$ the modal space obtained by taking the disjoint union of the $X_{i}$ endowed with the disjoint topology and under the disjoint relation.

A subframe of $\mathcal{X}$ is a clopen set equipped with the subspace topology and restricted relation. It is itself a modal space [3].

### 2.1.3 Duality

With the two structures introduced we can give the central bridging result between them.

Theorem 2.7 (Jónsson-Tarski Duality).
The category MA is dually equivalent to the category MS. Moreover this duality restricts to a dual equivalence between the categories K4-A \& TS and S4-A \& QS respectively.
Proof. We give just a sketch of the proof. The functors $(-)_{*}: M A \leftrightarrow M S:(-)^{*}$ that establish this equivalence are defined as follows.

Given $A \in M A$, we denote its set of ultrafilters filters by $A_{*}$ and define the map $\varphi: A \rightarrow \mathcal{P}\left(A_{*}\right)$ by $\varphi(a):=\left\{F \in A_{*}: a \in F\right\}$. Then, $\left(A_{*}, \tau, R\right)$ is a modal space, where $\tau$ is the topology with clopen basis $\varphi[A]$ and $F R F^{\prime}$ iff $\forall a \in A$ if $\square a \in F$ then $a \in F^{\prime}$. We call $R$ the dual of $\square$. Note we use $A_{*}$ to denote the modal space and the underlying set of ultrafilters interchangeably. For a modal homomorphism $f: A \rightarrow B$ we define $f_{*}: B_{*} \rightarrow A_{*}$ by $f_{*}(F):=f^{-1}(F)$.

Given $\mathcal{X} \in M S, \mathcal{X}^{*}=\left(X^{*}, \square\right)$ is a modal algebra where $X^{*}$ is the Boolean algebra of clopens of $\mathcal{X}$ and $\square U:=\{x \in X: R[x] \subseteq U\}$. Note that $\Delta U=R^{-1}[U]$. For a continuous p-morphism $f: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ we define $f^{*}: \mathcal{Y}^{*} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^{*}$ by $f^{*}(U):=f^{-1}(U)$.

### 2.2 Specifying the duality

Let us spell out some specific consequences of our duality of categories.
Given $A \in K 4-A$ the isomorphism $A \cong\left(A_{*}\right)^{*}$ is given by $\varphi$ and given $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ the isomorphism $\mathcal{X} \cong\left(\mathcal{X}^{*}\right)_{*}$ is given by $\psi: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow\left(\mathcal{X}^{*}\right)_{*}$ where $\psi(x):=\left\{U \in \mathcal{X}^{*}:\right.$ $x \in U\}$.

Lemma 2.8. The following hold:
(i) Given $A \in K 4-A$, if $G \subseteq A$ is a modal filter then $G_{+}=\bigcap_{a \in G} \varphi(a)$ is a closed upset of $A_{*}$.
(ii) Given $\mathcal{X} \in T S$, if $B \subseteq X$ is a closed upset then $B^{+}=\bigcap_{x \in B} \psi(x)$ is a modal filter of $\mathcal{X}^{*}$.

Moreover $\varphi(G)=\left(G_{+}\right)^{+}$and $\psi(B)=\left(B^{+}\right)_{+}$.
Proof. (i); As each $\varphi(a)$ is clopen, $G_{+}$is clearly closed. Letting $F \in G_{+}$and $F R F^{\prime}$, then if $a \in G$ as $G$ is a modal filter $\square a \in G$. As $F \in G_{+} G \subseteq F$, so $\square a \in F$ and then $F R F^{\prime}$ implies $a \in F^{\prime}$ and $F^{\prime} \in \varphi(a)$. Therefore, $F^{\prime} \in G_{+}$and $G_{+}$is an upset.
(ii); Let $U, V \in B^{+}$. Then $\forall x \in B$ we have $U, V \in \psi(x)$ so $x \in U \cap V$ and $U \cap V \in B^{+}$, and if $U \in B^{+}$and $U \subseteq V$, then $\forall x \in B$ we have $U \in \psi(x)$ so $x \in U \subseteq V$ and $V \in B^{+}$. Therefore, $B^{+}$is a filter. If $U \in B^{+}$then letting $x \in B$, we have $U \in \psi(x)$ so $x \in U$. As $U$ is an upset $R[x] \subseteq U$ and so $x \in \square U$ and $\square U \in B^{+}$. Therefore, $B^{+}$is a modal filter.

The moreover follows from the definitions and $\varphi$ and $\psi$ being isomorphisms in their categories.

Lemma 2.9. The following hold:
(i) A K4-algebra $A$ is $\mathrm{SI} \operatorname{iff} \operatorname{Int}\left(\left\{F \in A_{*}: F\right.\right.$ is a root $\left.\}\right) \neq \varnothing$.
(ii) A K4-algebra $A$ is FSI iff $A_{*}$ is rooted.

Proof. (i); This is established in a more general setting in [31]. It is worth noting the partial result that for $F \in A_{*}, F$ is a root iff $\forall a \neq T, \uparrow \square^{+} a \nsubseteq F$.
(ii); Suppose $A_{*}$ is rooted, i.e. $A_{*}=R^{+}[F]$ for $F \in A_{*}$. We first claim that $\forall a \in A: a \neq \mathrm{T} \square^{+} a \notin F$. Let $a \neq \mathrm{T}$, then $\neg a \neq \perp$ so $\exists F^{\prime} \in A_{*}: \neg a \in F^{\prime}$, i.e. $a \notin F^{\prime}$. Now $F^{\prime} \in\{F\} \cup R[F]$ so either $a \notin F$ and so $\square^{+} a \notin F$ or $a \notin F^{\prime}$ with $F R F^{\prime}$ and then $\square a \notin a$ and so again $\square^{+} a \notin F$.

Now, for any finite subset $B \subseteq A$, letting $b_{1}, \ldots b_{n} \in B \backslash\{T\}$ we have $\square^{+} b_{i} \notin F$. Consider:

$$
c:=\bigvee_{1 \leq n} \square^{+} b_{i} .
$$

As $F$ is prime $c \notin F$ and so $c \neq T$. Moreover $\forall 1 \leq i \leq n \square^{+} b_{i} \leq c$, so $c$ is an opremum for $B$. Therefore, every finite subset $B \subseteq A$ has an opremum and by Rautenberg's criterion $A$ is FSI.

Suppose $A$ is FSI. Again by Rautenberg's criterion every finite subset of $A$ has an opremum. We claim $\forall a, b \in A$ if $\left(\square^{+} a\right) \vee\left(\square^{+} b\right)=\top$ then either $a=\top$ or $b=\top$. We proceed by contraposistion, let $a, b \neq T$. Then, $\exists c \neq T$ which is an opremum for $\{a, b\}$, i.e. such that $\square^{+} a \leq c$ and $\square^{+} b \leq c$. Then, $\left(\square^{+} a\right) \vee\left(\square^{+} b\right) \leq c<\top^{+}$ and in particular $\left(\square^{+} a\right) \vee\left(\square^{+} b\right) \neq \top$. This naturally extends to finite collections of elements. Now we can consider:

$$
B:=\downarrow\left\{\left(\square^{+} a_{1}\right) \vee \ldots \vee\left(\square^{+} a_{n}\right) \in A: n \in \omega, a_{i} \neq \top\right\} .
$$

This is an ideal and moreover $T \notin B$ as otherwise $T=\left(\square^{+} a_{1}\right) \vee \ldots \vee\left(\square^{+} a_{n}\right)$ so from above $\exists 1 \leq i \leq n: a_{i}=\top$ which is a contradiction.

Therefore, by the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras $\exists F \in A_{*}:\{\top\} \subseteq F$ and $F \cap B=\varnothing$. In particular $\forall a \neq \top \square^{+} a \notin F$, so $\uparrow \square^{+} a \nsubseteq F$ and $F$ is a root for $A_{*}$.

Lemma 2.10. The following hold:
(i) There is a dual lattice isomorphism $\sigma$ between the lattice of congruences of $A \in K 4-A$ and lattice of M -subspaces of $A_{*}$ such that for any congrunence $\theta$ of $A, \sigma(\theta) \cong(A / \theta)_{*}$ and for any M-subspace $Y$ of $A_{*}, Y^{*} \cong A / \sigma^{-1}(Y)$.
(ii) There is a dual lattice isomorphism $\rho$ between subalgebras of $A \in K 4-A$ and modal equivalences on $A_{*}$ such that for any sub-algebra $B$ of $A, B_{*} \cong A_{*} / \rho(B)$ and for any modal equivalence $E$ on $A_{*}, \rho^{-1}(E) \cong\left(A_{*} / E\right)^{*}$.
(iii) There is a dual lattice isomorphism between relativisations of $A \in K 4-A$ and subframes of $A_{*}$ given by $\varphi$ and such that for any $\left.a \in A, \varphi(a) \cong\left(A_{a}\right)_{*}\right)$ and for any clopen $Y \subseteq A_{*}, Y^{*} \cong A_{\varphi^{-1}(Y)}$
(iv) The disjoint union of finitely many transitive spaces $\mathcal{X}_{1}, \ldots, \mathcal{X}_{n}$ is isomorphic to the dual of the direct product of the K4-algebras $\mathcal{X}_{1}^{*}, \ldots, \mathcal{X}_{n}^{*}$.

Proof. (i); The isomorphism is given by:

$$
\sigma(\theta):=\left\{F \in A_{*}: F_{\theta} \subseteq F\right\} \text { and } \sigma^{-1}(Y):=\theta_{\varphi^{-1}[Y]} .
$$

Checking this is a dual lattice isomorphism is straightforward. Then $\sigma(\theta) \cong(A / \theta)_{*}$ is witnessed by $G \mapsto\left\{[a] \in A / \theta: \exists a^{\prime} \in G:\left(a, a^{\prime}\right) \in \theta\right\}$ and $Y^{*} \cong A / \sigma^{-1}(Y)$ is witnessed by $Y \cap \varphi(a) \mapsto[a]$. Checking these are isomorphisms in their categories is straightforward.
(ii); The isomorphism is given by:

$$
F \rho(B) F^{\prime} \text { iff } F \cap B=F^{\prime} \cap B .
$$

$\rho^{-1}(E)=\{a \in A: \varphi(a)$ can be written as a union of equivalence classes of $E\}$.
Checking this is a dual lattice isomorphism is mostly straightforward with the exception of checking condition (i) for $\rho(B)$ being a modal equivalence, which we'll present. We let $F, F^{\prime}, G \in A_{*}: F \cap B=F^{\prime} \cap B$ and $F R G$. We must show $\exists G^{\prime} \in$ $A_{*}: F^{\prime} R G^{\prime}$ and $G \cap B=G^{\prime} \cap B$. Note that $F \cap B=F^{\prime} \cap B$ and $F R G$ means $\forall b \in B \square b \in F^{\prime}$ implies $b \in G$. As $B$ is closed under $\wedge$, so too is $G \cap B$ and so $\uparrow\left\{a \wedge b \in A: \square a \in F^{\prime}, b \in G \cap B\right\}$ is a filter. As $G$ is a prime filter of $A, G \cap B$ is a prime filter of $B$ and so $B \backslash G$ is a prime ideal of $B$ and $\downarrow B \backslash G$ is an ideal of $A$. We claim that the filter and ideal are disjoint, then by the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras $\exists G^{\prime} \in A_{*}:\left\{a \in A: \square a \in F^{\prime}\right\} \subseteq G^{\prime}, G \cap B \subseteq G^{\prime}$ and $B \backslash G \cap G^{\prime}=\varnothing$, i.e. $F^{\prime} R G^{\prime}$ and $G \cap B=G^{\prime} \cap B$.

For the claim, suppose $\exists a \in A: \square a \in F^{\prime}, b \in G$ and $d \notin G$ such that $a \wedge b \leq r \leq$ $d$. Then $a \wedge b \leq a \wedge d$ so $a=a \wedge(\neg b \vee b)=(a \wedge \neg b) \vee(a \wedge b) \leq(a \wedge \neg b) \vee(a \wedge d)=$ $a \wedge(\neg b \vee d)=a \wedge(b \rightarrow d) \leq b \rightarrow d$. In other words $a \leq b \rightarrow d$, therefore $\square a \leq \square(b \rightarrow d)$ and $\square(b \rightarrow \bar{d}) \in F^{\prime}$. Finally $b \rightarrow d \in B$ and so from our note $b \rightarrow d \in G$, but $b \in G$ so this implies $d \in G$ which is a contradiction.

Then, $B_{*} \cong A_{*} / \rho(B)$ is witnessed by $G \mapsto\left\{F \in A_{*}: F \cap B=G\right\}$ and $\rho^{-1}(E) \cong$ $\left(A_{*} / E\right)^{*}$ by $a \mapsto\left\{[F] \in A_{*} / E:[F] \subseteq \varphi(a)\right\}$. Again, checking these are isomorphisms in their categories is mostly straightforward, aside from checking that the first is continuous. This requires establishing the non-trivial claim that if $a \notin B$ then $\varphi(a)$ is not closed under $\rho(B)$, i.e. $\exists F, F^{\prime} \in A_{*}: a \in F, a \notin F^{\prime}$ and $F \cap B=F^{\prime} \cap B$. We do this in two constructions. Firstly, $\downarrow(\downarrow a \cap B)$ is an ideal of $A$ disjoint from $\uparrow a$, so by the prime filter theorem $\exists F \in A_{*}: a \in F$ and $a \notin \uparrow(F \cap B)$. Secondly, we consider $\uparrow(F \cap B)$ as a filter of $A$ and $\downarrow\{a \vee b \in A: b \notin F, b \in B\}$ as an ideal of $A$. Similar reasoning to the claim above establishes these are disjoint, then using the prime filter theorem again gives the desired $F^{\prime}$.
(iii); See [3, Prop 4.5].
(iv); The isomorphism is $\chi: \bigsqcup_{i=1}^{n} X_{i} \rightarrow\left(\prod_{i=1}^{n} X_{i}^{*}\right)_{*}$ by:

$$
\chi(x, j):=\left\{\left(U_{i}\right) \in \prod_{i=1}^{n} X_{i}^{*}: x \in U_{i}\right\} .
$$

Again, checking the various claims is straightforward.

### 2.3 Advanced Transitive Spaces

The theory of transitive spaces is a rich area in its own right, and drawing on these results will prove immensely helpful as we work towards our main result.

Our first result is an extension of Stone Separation. For those familiar with Esakia spaces it is an analog to the Priestly Separation axiom.

Lemma 2.11 (Modal Separation).
Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ and $x, y \in X: y \notin R^{\omega}[x]$. Then $\exists U: U$ is a clopen upset and $x \in U$, $y \notin U$.

Proof. We have $y \in X \backslash R^{\omega}[x]$ which is open as $R^{+}[X]$ is closed. As $\mathcal{X}$ is a Stone space, it has a basis of clopens and so there is a collection of clopens $\left\{U_{i}\right\}_{i \in I}$ such that:

$$
X \backslash R^{+}[x]=\bigcup_{i \in I} U_{i} .
$$

In particular there is a clopen $U^{\prime}$ such that $y \in U^{\prime} \subseteq X \backslash R^{\omega}[x]$. Now, $R^{-1}\left[U^{\prime}\right]$ is clopen, and so $R^{-\omega}\left[U^{\prime}\right]$ is a clopen downset containing $y$. Therefore, taking $U:=$ $X \backslash R^{-\omega}\left[U^{\prime}\right]$ we have $x \in U, y \notin U$ where $U$ is a clopen upset as required.

A very useful concept in transitive frames is the cluster. Let $(X, R)$ be a transitive frame. A cluster $C$ of $X$ is a set of mutually comparable elements, or a single irreflexive element. If $C$ has exactly one element we say it is improper, otherwise it is proper and if $C$ is the singleton containing a single irreflexive element we call it degenerate.

Let $(X, R)$ be a transitive frame and $C$ and $D$ be clusters of $X$. We say that $C$ sees $D$ iff $\exists x \in C, \exists y \in D: x R y$ or $C=D$. One can view this 'seeing relation' as the reflexive and anti-symmetric closure of $R$, and it is easy to see that the clusters of $X$ under $R^{\prime}$ form a poset.

### 2.3.1 Reductions

As we noted earlier, the topology of finite Stone spaces and by extension finite modal spaces is in a sense trivialised. This helps give a characterisation for the existence of a surjective continuous $p$-morphisms between finite modal spaces. This is a generalisation of the similar characterisation in the case of Esakia spaces found in [4, lemma 3.1.6, 3.1.7].

Lemma 2.12. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ be finite.
(i) Let $C=\left\{c_{i} \in X: 1 \leq i \leq n\right\}$ and $D=\left\{d_{i} \in X: 1 \leq i \leq m\right\}$ be distinct clusters of $X$ with $m \leq n$ such that:
(a) $D \operatorname{sees} C$.
(b) $C$ is non-degenerate.
(c) $\forall x \in X \backslash(C \cup D) x \in R[C]$ iff $x \in R[D]$.

Pictorially:


We define the binary relation $E$ on $X$ :

$$
E:=\left\{\left(c_{i}, d_{i}\right),\left(d_{i}, c_{i}\right) \in X^{2}: 1 \leq i \leq m\right\} \cup\left\{(u, u) \in X^{2}: u \in X\right\} .
$$

That is, $E$ is an equivalence relation that pairs each element of $D$ to a unique element of $C$ whilst all other elements relate only to themselves.
Then $E$ is a modal equivalence and we call the canonical map $f: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$ an $\alpha$-reduction.
(ii) Let $C=\left\{c_{i} \in X: 1 \leq i \leq n\right\}$ and $D=\left\{d_{i} \in X: 1 \leq i \leq n\right\}$ be distinct clusters of $X$ of the same size such that:
(a) $C$ and $D$ do not see each other.
(b) $C$ is degenerate iff $D$ is degenerate.
(c) $\forall x \in X \backslash(C \cup D) x \in R[C]$ iff $x \in R[D]$.

Pictorially:


We define the binary relation $E$ on $X$ :

$$
E:=\left\{\left(c_{i}, d_{i}\right),\left(d_{i}, c_{i}\right) \in X^{2}: 1 \leq i \leq n\right\} \cup\left\{(u, u) \in X^{2}: u \in X\right\} .
$$

That is, $E$ is an equivalence relation that pairs off the elements of $C$ and $D$ whilst all other elements relate only to themselves.
Then $E$ is a modal equivalence and we call the canonical map $f: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$ a $\beta$-reduction.
(iii) Let $x, x^{\prime} \in X$ be distinct elements in the same cluster, i.e. $x \neq x^{\prime}, x R x^{\prime}$ and $x^{\prime} R x$. Pictorially:


We define the binary relation $E$ on $X$ :

$$
E:=\left\{\left(x, x^{\prime}\right),\left(x^{\prime}, x\right) \in X^{2}\right\} \cup\left\{(u, u) \in X^{2}: u \in X\right\} .
$$

That is, $E$ is the smallest equivalence relation on $X$ such that $x E x^{\prime}$.
Then $E$ is a modal equivalence and we call the canonical map $f: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$ a $\gamma$-reduction.

Proof. In each case $E$ trivially fulfils condition (ii) for being a modal equivalence as $\mathcal{X}$ is finite and so have the discrete topology. Condition (i) follows straightforwardly from the conditions in each case.

Lemma 2.13. Let $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{Y}$ be finite transitive spaces. Suppose there exists a surjective continuous $p$-morphism $f: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ which identifies exactly two points. Then there is a $\alpha, \beta$ or $\gamma$-reduction $f_{E}: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$ such that $\mathcal{X} / E \cong \mathcal{Y}$.

Proof. Let $u, v \in X: u \neq v$ and $f(u)=f(v)$. Note that $\forall x, y \in X$ if $x \notin\{u, v\}$ and $f(x)=f(y)$ then $x=y$. Either $u$ and $v$ are in the same cluster or they are not. If they are in the same cluster, we can by lemma 2.12 consider the $\gamma$-reduction $f_{E}: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$.

Now suppose that $u$ and $v$ are in different clusters, we let $C$ be the cluster containing $u$ and $D$ be the cluster containing $v$. As $f$ is a $p$-morphism we have $f[R[u]]=$ $R[f(u)]=R[f(v)]=f[R[v]]$. Now, let $x \in X$ such that $x \notin\{u, v\}$ and suppose $x \in R[C]$. In particular $x \in R[u]$ so $f(x) \in f[R[u]]=f[R[v]]$ and $\exists y \in X: f(x)=$ $f(y)$ and $y \in R[v]$. Since $x \notin\{u, v\}$ we have $x=y$ and therefore $x \in R[v]$ and by extension $x \in R[D]$. This holds symmetrically for $x \in R[D]$ so we have $x \in R[C]$ iff $x \in R[D]$. In particular, this implies that $C=\{u\}$ and $D=\{v\}$ and $\forall x \in X \backslash(C \cup D)$ $x \in R[C]$ iff $x \in R[D]$.

Moreover, if $u \in R[C]$ then in particular $u \in R[u]$ and $f(u) \in f[R[u]=f[R[v]]$ so $\exists y \in X: f(u)=f(y)$ and $y \in R[v]$. If $y \notin\{u, v\}$ then from above $y=u$ and we have a contradiction, so $y \in\{u, v\}$. Therefore, either $u \in R[v]$ and $u \in R[D]$ or $v \in R[v]$ and $v \in R[D]$.

As $C$ and $D$ are distinct clusters at least one does not see the other. We may assume w.l.o.g that $C$ does not see $D$. Then, either $D$ sees $C$ or $D$ does not see $C$. If $D$ sees $C$ then $u \in R[D]$ which from above implies either $u \in R[C]$ or $v \in R[C]$ but the latter is impossible as $C$ does not see $D$. Therefore $u \in R[C]$ and $C$ is nondegenerate. Therefore, from lemma $2.12 C$ and $D$ fulfill the conditions to define a $\alpha$-reduction $f_{E}: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$.

Finally suppose $D$ does not see $C$, so $C$ and $D$ do not see each other. Now if $C$ is degenerate then in particular $u \notin R[C]$ and as $D$ does not see $C v \notin R[C]$ which from the above constraint implies $v \notin R[D]$ and $D$ is degenerate. Symmetrically, if $D$ is degenerate then $C$ is degenerate. So $C$ is degenerate iff $D$ is degenerate. Therefore, from lemma 2.12 C and $D$ fulfil the conditions to define a $\beta$-reduction $f_{E}: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$.

In each of the possible cases we have a defined modal equivalence $E$ and some reduction map $f: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$. To finish the base case we must find in each case an isomorphism $g: \mathcal{X} / E \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ such that $f_{E} \circ g=f$. We define $g$ the same way in all cases, by $g([x])=f(x)$. This is well defined as letting $x, x^{\prime} \in X: x E x^{\prime}$, either $x \notin\{u, v\}$ and so $x=x^{\prime}$ and $f(x)=f\left(x^{\prime}\right)$ or $x \in\{u, v\}$ and so $x^{\prime} \in\{u, v\}$ and $f(x)=f\left(x^{\prime}\right)$. Checking $g$ is an isomorphism is straightforward.

Lemma 2.14. Let $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{Y}$ be finite modal spaces. There exists a surjective continuous $p$-morphism from $\mathcal{X}$ to $\mathcal{Y}$ iff there is a finite sequence of $\alpha, \beta$ and $\gamma$-reductions
$\left\langle f_{i}: Z_{i} \rightarrow Z_{i+1}\right\rangle_{i=1}^{n}$ such that $\mathcal{X}=Z_{1}$ and $Z_{n+1} \cong \mathcal{Y}$, i.e. $\mathcal{X}$ can be transformed into $\mathcal{Y}$ be a finite sequence of $\alpha, \beta$ and $\gamma$-reductions.

Proof. The if direction is almost immediate, simply take the composition of the sequence of reductions and the final isomorphism as the desired map.

For the only if direction: letting $f: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$, as $X$ and $Y$ are finite, $f$ identifies some finite number $k \in \omega$ of points in $X$. We proceed by induction on the number of points $f$ identifies. We may assume that $k \geq 2$ as otherwise $f$ is an isomorphism and we are done immediatly. The base case of $k=2$ is just lemma 2.13.

Inductive Step: Let $n \in \omega$ and suppose $\forall 2 \leq k<n$ that if $g$ is a surjective continuous $p$-morphism between finite modal spaces identifying $k$ points we can find a sequence of reductions as described. We let $f: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ identify $n$ points. We claim that we can find a reduction $f_{E}: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$ such that $E \subseteq \operatorname{ker}(f)$. Given such a reduction, we again want to define a map $g: \mathcal{X} / E \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ such that $f_{E} \circ g=f$, which we do by taking $g([x]):=f(x)$. This is well defined as $E \subseteq \operatorname{ker}(f)$, and it is easy to check that $g$ is a surjective continuous $p$-morphism that identifies less points than $f$. Applying the induction hypothesis to $g$ and adjoining our $f_{E}$ reduction then gives the desired sequence of reductions.

It remains to prove the claim, and we proceed through a series of cases. Firstly, either $\exists u, v \in X$ such that $u$ and $v$ are in the same cluster and $f(u)=f(v)$ or not. If we can find two such points, then by lemma 2.12 we can consider the $\gamma$-reduction $f_{E}: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$ and as $f(u)=f(v)$ we have $E \subseteq \operatorname{ker}(f)$ as required.

So now suppose that $\forall u, v \in X$ if $f(u)=f(v)$ then $u$ and $v$ are in distinct clusters. As $Y$ is finite we can consider a maximal cluster $B$ in $Y$ such that $\exists y \in B$ : $\left|f^{-1}(y)\right| \geq 2$. Our second distinction is whether $B$ is a degenerate cluster or not. If it is degenerate, then letting $x, x^{\prime} \in f^{-1}[B]: x R x^{\prime}$ we have $f\left(x^{\prime}\right) \in f[R[x]]=R[f(x)]$ so $f(x) R f\left(x^{\prime}\right)$ but $f(x), f\left(x^{\prime}\right) \in B$ contradicting $B$ being degenerate. Therefore, $R \subseteq f^{-1}[B]^{2}=\varnothing$, i.e. the pre-image of $B$ is an anti-chain of irreflexive points. As $\left|f^{-1}[B]\right| \geq 2$ we can choose $u, v \in f^{-1}[B]: u \neq v$ and consider the clusters $C=\{u\}$ and $D=\{v\}$. These do not see each other and both are degenerate. Finally, letting $x \in X \backslash(C \cup D)$ and supposing $x \in R[C]$ then $f(x) \in f[R[u]]=$ $R[f(u)]]=R[B]=R[f(v)]]=f[R[v]]$ so $\exists x^{\prime} \in X: v R x^{\prime}$ and $f(x)=f\left(x^{\prime}\right)$. As $u R x$ we have that $x \notin f^{-1}[B]$ but $x \in R[B]$ so by the maximality of $B x=x^{\prime}$ and in fact $x \in R[v]=R[D]$. Therefore, from lemma 2.12 we can consider the $\beta$-reduction $f_{E}: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$ defined from $C$ and $D$. Note that as $f(u)=f(v)$ we have $E \subseteq \operatorname{ker}(f)$ as required.

Now suppose that $B$ is not degenerate. As $X$ is finite we can consider the maximal clusters $C_{i}$ of $X$ such that $f\left[C_{i}\right] \cap B=\varnothing$. Let $x_{i} \in C_{i}$ be such that $f\left(x_{i}\right) \in B$.

We claim that $f$ restricted to a given maximal cluster $C_{i}$ is a bijection. Consider $y \in B$. As $f$ is surjective $\exists x^{\prime} \in X: f\left(x^{\prime}\right)=y$. Now as $y \in B$ and $B$ is not degenerate $f\left(x_{i}\right) R y$ and so $f\left(x^{\prime}\right) \in R[f(x)]=f[R[x]]$. Therefore, $\exists x^{\prime \prime} \in X: f\left(x^{\prime \prime}\right)=y$ and $x_{i} R x^{\prime \prime}$ and the maximaility of $C_{i}$ implies that $x^{\prime \prime} \in C_{i}$. So, every point in $B$ is mapped to by some point in $C_{i}$. Moreover, as $x_{i}, x^{\prime \prime} \in C_{i}$ is such that $x_{i} R x^{\prime \prime} C_{i}$ is not a degenerate cluster.

Then, letting $x \in C_{i} x_{i} R x$ which as $f$ is a $p$-morphism implies $f\left(x_{i}\right) R f(x)$ and similarly $x R x_{i}$ we have $f(x) R f\left(x_{i}\right)$, that is $f(x) \in B$. So every point in $C_{1}$ maps into $B$ and moreover, as $\forall u, v \in X$ if $f(u)=f(v)$ then $u$ and $v$ belong to different clusters,
each point in $C_{1}$ must map to a distinct point in $B$. So $f$ restricted to the maximal cluster $C_{i}$ is indeed a bijection onto $B$.

Our final distinction is whether there is one or multiple maximal clusters. Suppose there is more than one such cluster, let $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ be two of them. As we just established $f$ restricted to either $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ is a bijection onto $B$, so in particular $\left|C_{1}\right|=|B|=\left|C_{2}\right|$. They are also both non-degenerate and from the maximality condition on the $C_{i}$ they do not see each other. Now, let $x \in X \backslash\left(C_{1} \cup C_{2}\right)$ and suppose $x \in R\left[C_{1}\right]$. Now $f(x) \in f\left[R\left[C_{1}\right]\right]=R\left[f\left[C_{1}\right]\right]=R[B]$, and $x \in R\left[C_{1}\right] \backslash C_{1}$. So by the maximality of $C_{1} f(x) \notin B$. Therefore we have $f(x) \in R[B] \backslash B$ which by the maximality of $B$ implies that $\forall x^{\prime} \in X$ if $f\left(x^{\prime}\right)=f(x)$ then $x=x^{\prime}$. Now, $f(x) \in f\left[R\left[C_{1}\right]\right]=R\left[f\left[C_{1}\right]\right]=R\left[f\left[C_{2}\right]\right]=f\left[R\left[C_{2}\right]\right]$ so $\exists x^{\prime} \in X$ such that $C_{2}$ sees $x^{\prime}$ and $f\left(x^{\prime}\right)=f(x)$. Then, as we just noted $f(x)=f\left(x^{\prime}\right)$ implies $x=x^{\prime}$ and in fact $x \in R\left[C_{2}\right]$. Symmetrically we get that if $x \in R\left[C_{2}\right]$ then $x \in R\left[C_{1}\right]$.

Therefore, from lemma 2.12 we can consider the $\beta$-reduction $f_{E}: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$ defined from $C$ and $D$. Note that from $f$ restricted to both $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ being a bijection onto $B$, we have $E \subseteq \operatorname{ker}(f)$ as required.

Finally then, we assume that there is just one such maximal cluster $C$. This means that $\forall x \in X$ if $f(x) \in B$ then $x \in R^{-1}[C]$. Again, $f$ resricted to $C$ is a bijection onto $B$ and $C$ is not degenerate. Now, as $\exists y \in B: f^{-1}[y] \mid \geq 2 f^{-1}[B] \nsubseteq C$ and so from the maximality of $C f^{-1}[B] \cap R^{-1}[C] \backslash C \neq \varnothing$ and we can again consider a maximal cluster $D$ in $f^{-1}[B] \cap R^{-1}[C] \backslash C$. Let $x_{d} \in D: f\left(x_{d}\right) \in B$. Obviously $D$ sees $C$. If $|D|>1$ then $D$ is not degenerate and letting $x \in D x_{d} R x$ and $x R x_{d}$ and as $f$ is a $p$ morphism this implies $f\left(x_{d}\right) R f(x)$ and $f(x) R f\left(x_{d}\right)$ so $f(x) \in B$. Again, as $\forall u, v \in X$ if $f(u)=f(v)$ then $u$ and $v$ belong in different clusters each point in $D$ must map to a distinct point in $B$. Therefore $|D| \leq|B|=|C|$. If $|D|=1$ then again each point in $D$ maps to a distinct point in $B$ and $|D| \leq|C|$. So in all cases each point in $D$ maps to a distinct point in $B$ and $|D| \leq|B|$. Finally, as $D$ sees $C R[C] \subseteq R[D]$. Moreover, letting $x \in X: x \in R[D]$ then $f(x) \in f[R[D]]=R[f[D]]=R[B]$. If $f(x) \in B$ then $x \in R^{-1}[C]$ and by the maximality of $D x \in C \cup D$. If $f(x) \in R[B] \backslash B$ then by the maximality of $B \forall x^{\prime} \in X$ if $f\left(x^{\prime}\right)=f(x)$ then $x=x^{\prime}$ and as $f(x) \in f[R[D]]=$ $R[f[D]]=R[f[C]]=f[R[C]] \exists x^{\prime} \in X$ such that $C$ sees $\mathrm{x}^{\prime}$ and $f\left(x^{\prime}\right)=f(x)$, so $x^{\prime}=x$ and $x \in R[C]$. In particular $\forall x \in X \backslash(C \cup D) x \in R[C]$ iff $x \in R[D]$.

Therefore, from lemma 2.12 we can consider the $\alpha$-reduction $f_{E}: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X} / E$ defined from $C$ and $D$. Note that from $f$ restricted to $C$ being bijection onto $B$ and $f$ restricted to $D$ being injective, we have $E \subseteq \operatorname{ker}(f)$ as required. This completes the proof of the claim.

### 2.3.2 Modal Equivalences

Next we turn to a group of results that define a useful concept and describe common modal equivalences related to them.

Somewhat naturally, when studying transitive spaces the focus is often on the behaviour of clusters rather than points. However, at times we can effectively ignore them thanks to the following.

Lemma 2.15. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$. Define a binary relation $E$ on $X$ by $x E y$ iff $x$ and $y$ are mutually comparable or $x=y$, i.e. $E$ identifies elements in the same cluster. Then $E$ is a modal equivalence.

Proof. That $E$ is an equivalence relation is clear, so we must check conditions $(i)$ and (ii) for being a modal equivalence.

For (i); let $u E v$ and $u R w$. Then, either $u=v$ and so $v R w$ or $u R v$ and $v R u$ so $v R w$. In both cases, $v R w$ and then $w E w$ so we may take $w$ as witness.

For (ii); suppose $u \notin v$, then $u \neq v$ and either $u \mathbb{R} v$ or $v R u$. If $u R v$ then $v \notin R^{\omega}[u]$ so by modal separation $\exists U: U$ is a clopen upset, $u \in U$ and $v \notin U$. Then, if $w \in U$ and $w E t$, either $w=t$ and $t \in U$ or $w R t$ and so $t \in U$. So $U$ is closed under $E$, i.e. it is a union of $E$-classes, and we may take $U$ as witness. If $v R u$ the case is symmetric.

Another frequently useful equivalence is the following:
Lemma 2.16. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$. Let $U \subseteq X$ be a clopen upset such that $\forall x \in U R[x] \neq \varnothing$, and define a binary relation $E$ on $X$ by $x E y$ iff $x=y$ or $x, y \in U$, i.e. $E$ is the smallest equivalence relation identifying points in $U$. Then $E$ is a modal equivalence.

Proof. That $E$ is an equivalence relation is clear, so we must check conditions $(i)$ and (ii) for being a modal equivalence.

For (i); let $u E v$ and $u R w$. If $u=v$ then $v R w$ and $w E w$ so we may take $w$ as witness. If $u \neq v$, then $u, v \in U$ and as $U$ is an upset $w \in U$. Then $R[v] \neq \varnothing$ so letting $t \in R[v]$ again as $U$ is an upset $t \in U$ and $w E t$ so we may take $t$ as witness.

For (ii); let $u E v$, then $u \neq v$ and at least one of $u, v \notin U$. If both $u, v \notin U$, as $X$ is a Stone space $\exists V: V$ is clopen, $u \notin V$ and $v \in V$. Then $X \backslash(U \cup V)$ is clopen with $u \in X \backslash(U \cup V)$ and $v \notin X \backslash(U \cup V)$. Now, if $w \in X \backslash U \cup V$ and $w E t$ as $w \notin U$ $w=t$ so $t \in X \backslash U \cup V$. Therefore $X \backslash(U \cup V)$ is closed under $E$ and separates $u$ and $v$ as required.

If exactly one of $u$ or $v$ are in $U$, either $u \in U$ and $v \notin U$ or $u \in X \backslash U$ and $v \notin X \backslash U . U$ is an $E$-class so certainly a union of them, and moreover $X \backslash U$ is a union of $E$-classes, so we either $U$ or $X \backslash(U \cup V)$ separates $u$ and $v$ as required.

In reality, this lemma is a particular case of a broad group of equivalences. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ and $\left\{U_{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{n}$ be a finite collection of pairwise disjoint clopen subsets of $X$. We say this collection is an M-partition of $X$ iff $\forall 1 \leq i, j \leq n$ if $u, v \in U_{i}$ and $u R w$ then $\exists t \in U_{j}: v R t$ if $w \in U_{j}$ and $v R w$ otherwise.

Lemma 2.17. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ and $\left\{U_{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{n}$ be an $M$-partition of $X$. Define a binary relation $E$ on $X$ by $x E y$ iff $u=v$ or $\exists 1 \leq i \leq n: u, v \in U_{i}$, i.e. $E$ is the smallest equivalence relation that identifies points within each $U_{i}$. Then $E$ is a modal equivalence.

Proof. That $E$ is an equivalence relation follows easily from the $U_{i}$ being pairwise disjoint.

For (i); let $u E v$ and $u R w$. If $u=v$ then as usual we can simply take $w$ as witness. If $u \neq v$ then $u, v \in U_{i}$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$. If $w \in U_{j}$ for some $1 \leq j \leq n$ then by the definition of an $M$-partition $\exists t \in U_{j}: v R t$. Then $w E t$ so we may take $w$ as witness. If $w \notin U_{j} \forall 1 \leq j \leq n$ then by the definition of an $M$-partition $v R w$ and we may take $w$ as witness.

For (ii); let $u \mathbb{E} v$. If $u \in U_{i}$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$ then $v \notin U_{i}$ where $U_{i}$ is clopen and an $E$-class so separates $u$ and $v$ as required. If $v \in U_{i}: 1 \leq i \leq n$ then $u \in X \backslash U_{i}$, $v \notin X \backslash U_{i}$ and this too is clopen and a union of $E$-classes so separates $u$ and $v$ as required. If $\forall 1 \leq i \leq n u, v \notin U_{i}$ then $u \neq v$ and so by Stone separation $\exists V: V$ is clopen, $u \in V$ and $v \notin V$. We define:

$$
U=: V \cup \bigcup_{i=1}^{n} U_{i}
$$

Then we have $u \in U, v \notin U$ and $U$ is clopen and a union of $E$-classes so separates $u$ and $v$ as required.

Another useful concept is that of depth, and it too comes with an associated modal equivalence.

Let $(X, R)$ be a transitive frame. We define the depth of $x$ as the maximal number of clusters in maximal chains of clusters rooted at $x$, including the cluster containing $x$. If there there is no such maximal (or an infinite chain of clusters rooted at $x$ ) we say that it is $\omega$-deep. We use $d(x) \in \omega \cup\{\omega\}$ to denote the depth of $x$. The depth of $X$ is $d(X):=\max \{d(x) \in \omega \cup\{\omega\}: x \in X\}$ if this exists and $d(X):=\omega$ otherwise.

We define $S l_{n}(X):=\{x \in X: d(x)=n\}$ and $S l_{\omega}(X)$ similarly. We also define $S_{n}(X):=\bigcup_{m \leq n} S L_{n}(X)$.

Remarks. There are some basic properties of depth worth bearing in mind.

1. If $d(x)=n \in \omega$ and $x R y$ then $d(y) \leq n$ and if $d(y)=n$ then $y R x$.
2. If $d(x)=n \in \omega$ then $\forall m<n \exists y \in X: x R y$ and $d(y)=m$.

Lemma 2.18. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ and suppose that:
(a) $\forall x, y \in S l_{\omega}(X)\left\{n \in \omega: R[x] \cap S l_{n}(X) \neq \varnothing\right\}=\left\{n \in \omega: R[y] \cap S l_{n}(X) \neq \varnothing\right\}$;
(b) $\forall n \in \omega$ either $\forall x \in S l_{n}(X) x R x$ or $\forall x \in S l_{n}(X) x \mathbb{R} x$;
(c) $\forall n \in \omega \operatorname{Sl}_{n}(X)$ is clopen.

We define the binary relation $E$ on $X$ by $x E y$ iff $d(x)=d(y)$. Then $E$ is a modal equivalence.

Proof. We would like to simply say that because by (c) the $S l_{n}(X)$ form a pairwise disjoint collection of clopens and moreover by (b) form an $M$-partition the result follows immediatly from lemma 2.17. However, the collection of sets we are taking is possibly infinite so technically may not form a genuine $M$-partition and we have to adjust slightly. Clearly $E$ is an equivalence relation.

For $(i)$; letting $u E v$ and $u R w$ if $d(u)=n=d(v)$ for $n \in \omega$ then as $u R w d(w) \leq n$. If $d(w)=n$ then $w E v$ and $w R u$ so $u R u$. Then by (b) $v R v$ and we may take $v$ as witness. If $d(w)<n=d(v)$ then $\exists t \in S l_{d(w)}(X): v R t$ so $w E t$ and we may take $t$ as witness. If $d(u)=d(v)=\omega$ then either $d(w)=n \in \omega$ or $d(w)=\omega$. If the former then by (a) $\exists t \in S l_{d(w)}(X): v R t$, then $w E t$ and we may take $t$ as witness.

Suppose the latter, we need to show that $\exists t \in S l_{\omega}(X): v R t$, as in that case $w E t^{\prime}$ and we may take $t$ as witness. Suppose for contradiction that $R[v] \cap S l_{\omega}(X)=\varnothing$, then $R[v] \subseteq \bigcup_{n \in \omega} S l_{n}(X)$ and is closed. By (c) each $S l_{n}(X)$ is clopen, so this is an open cover for $R[v]$, and so by compactness there is some finite subcover of $R[v]$. Thus, $\exists n \in \omega: R[v] \subseteq S l_{n}(X)$ but then $d(v)=n+1$ which is a contradiction.

For (ii); suppose $u \notin v$. Then by the definition of $E$ either $d(u) \in \omega$ and $d(v) \neq$ $d(u)$ or $d(u)=\omega$ and $d(v) \in \omega$. If the former, then $u \in S l_{d(u)}(X)$ and $v \notin S l_{d(u)}(X)$. This is clopen by (c) and an $E$-class so separates $u$ and $v$ as required. If the latter then $u \in X \backslash S l_{d(v)}(X)$ and $v \notin X \backslash S l_{d(v)}(X)$. This is also clopen by (c) and a union of $E$-classes so separates $u$ and $v$ as required.

### 2.3.3 Finitely Generated Spaces

The consideration of finitely generated members in a class of algebras is a frequent technique in the study of that class. As a result understanding the dual spaces to finitely generated algebras is quite helpful. Fortunately, these spaces have been extensively studied (for example see [10, Section 8.6]). For the sake of completion, we will present these results and their proofs in full detail.

Let $\mathcal{X} \in M S$. We say that $\mathcal{X}$ is finitely generated iff $\mathcal{X}^{*}$ is finitely generated as a modal algebra, i.e. $\exists U_{1}, \ldots, U_{n} \in \mathcal{X}^{*}$ such that every clopen subset of $X$ is expressible in terms of $U_{1}, \ldots, U_{n}$ using $\cap, \cup, \backslash$ and $\square$. We say that $\mathcal{X}$ is $n$-generated for some natural number $n$ to mean that $\mathcal{X}$ is finitely generated by a collection of $n$ elements.

The key result for understanding finitely generated spaces is the colouring theorem. Letting $A \in M A$ and $g_{1}, \ldots g_{n} \in A$, for each $x \in A_{*}$ we define $\operatorname{col}(x):=\left\langle j_{j}\right\rangle_{i=1}^{n}$ where:

$$
j_{i}= \begin{cases}0 & \text { if } g_{i} \notin x \\ 1 & \text { if } g_{i} \in x\end{cases}
$$

Theorem 2.19 (Colouring Theorem).
Let $A \in M A$ and $g_{1}, \ldots, g_{n} \in A$. The following are equivalent:
(i) $A$ is generated by $g_{1}, \ldots, g_{n}$;
(ii) For every proper surjective continuous $p$-morphism $f: A_{*} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ there exist points $u, v \in A_{*}: f(u)=f(v)$ and $\operatorname{col}(u) \neq \operatorname{col}(v)$;
(iii) For every proper modal equivalence $E$ of $A_{*}$ there exists an $E$-class containing points of different colours.
Proof. This result and its proof are an adaptation of the Esakia space equivalent in [4, Theorem 3.1.5]. The relationship between modal equivalences and surjective continuous $p$-morphisms gives the equivalence of (ii) and (iii) immediately. As such, we will just cover (i) iff (iii).

Suppose $A$ is generated by $g_{1}, \ldots, g_{n}$ and $E$ is a proper modal equialence of $A_{*}$. From lemma $2.10 \rho^{-1}(E)$ is a proper subalgebra of $A$ and as $A$ is generated by $g_{1}, \ldots, g_{n} \exists i \leq n: g_{i} \notin \rho^{-1}(E)$. From the definition of $\rho^{-1}(E)$, this means $\varphi\left(g_{i}\right)$ is not a union of $E$-classes and therefore not closed under $E$. That is $\exists u, v \in A_{*}: u E v$, $g_{i} \in u$ and $g_{i} \notin v$, therefore $u$ and $v$ are in the same $E$-class and $\operatorname{col}(u) \neq \operatorname{col}(v)$.

Conversely, suppose $A$ is not generated by $g_{1}, \ldots g_{n}$. Let $B$ be the subalgebra of A generated by $g_{n}, \ldots g_{n}$, i.e. $B=\left\langle g_{1}, \ldots, g_{n}\right\rangle$. Then $B$ is a proper subalgebra of $A$ and by lemma $2.10 \rho(B)$ is a proper modal equivalence of $A_{*}$. Letting $[u]$ be a $\rho(B)$ class, $\forall v \in[u] u \rho(B) v$, i.e. $u \cap B=v \cap B$. So $\forall 1 \leq i \leq n, g_{i} \in u$ iff $g_{i} \in v$ and $\operatorname{col}(u)=\operatorname{col}(v)$. Therefore, we have found a proper modal equivalence which has only monochrome equivalence classes.

The colouring theorem helps establish some useful insights into the structure of finitely generated transitive spaces.

Lemma 2.20. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ be $n$-generated. Let $C$ be a cluster in $X$, then $|C| \leq 2^{n}$.
Proof. We will prove that each element in a given cluster $C$ must have a unique colour, then as there are $2^{n}$ colours $|C| \leq 2^{n}$.

Suppose for contradiction that $u, v \in X: u \neq v$ and $u$ and $v$ are in the same cluster, i.e. $u R v, v R u$ and $\operatorname{col}(u)=\operatorname{col}(v)$. We consider the relation:

$$
E:=\{(u, v),(v, u)\} \cup\left\{(x, x) \in X^{2}: x \in X\right\} .
$$

That is the smallest equivalence relation identifying $u$ and $v$. We claim this is a modal equivalence.

For (i); letting $x, y \in X: x E y$ and $x R z$ either $x=y$ and the case is trivial or we are considering $u E v$ and $u R w$ or $v E u$ and $v R w$. Then either $v R u R w$ and $w E w$ or $u R v R w$ and $w E w$.

For (ii); let $x, y \in X: x \notin y$. Either $x=u, y \neq v, x=v, y \neq u, x \neq v, y=u$, $x \neq u, y=v$ or $x, y \notin\{u, v\}$. If $x=u$ and $y \neq v$, we apply Stone separation to $v$ and $y$ to find a clopen $U_{v}^{y}$ such that $v \in U_{v}^{y}$ and $y \notin U_{v}^{y}$ and also to $x$ and $y$ to find a similar clopen $U_{x}^{y}$. Then $U_{x}^{y} \cup U_{v}^{y}$ is clopen and closed under $E$ so seperates $x$ and $y$ as required. The other cases where $x$ or $y \in\{u, v\}$ are similar.

Suppose $x, y \notin\{u, v\}$, then we apply Stone separation to $x$ with $u, v$ and $y$ in turn to find clopens $U, V$ and $W$ such that $x \in U, V$ and $W$ whilst $u \notin U, v \notin V$ and $y \notin W$. Then $U \cap V \cap W$ is clopen and a union of $E$ classes so separates $x$ and $y$ as required.

Thus, $E$ is a proper modal equivalence, but as $\operatorname{col}(u)=\operatorname{col}(v)$ all its equivalence classes are monochrome, contradicting the colouring theorem.

The next result concerns finitely generated spaces of finite width. Letting $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ and $x \in X$ we define the width of $x$ as the maximal number of points in a maximal anti-chain in $R^{+}[x]$. If there is no maximal anti-chain, (or an anti-chain with infinitely many points) we say $x$ has width $\omega$. Then, the width of $X$ is the maximal width of its elements should that exists, and $\omega$ otherwise. Moreover, letting $A \in M A$ we define the width of $A$ as the width of $A_{*}$.

Lemma 2.21. Let $\mathcal{X} \in M S$ be such that it contains no infinite anti-chains. Then every infinite non-descending sequence of distinct points in $X$ contains an infinite ascending subsequence. More precisely, let $\left\langle x_{n}\right\rangle_{n \in \omega}$ be an infinite sequence such that:
(i) $\forall i, j \in \omega i \neq j$ implies $x_{i} \neq x_{j}$;
(ii) $\forall i, j \in \omega$ if $i<j$ then $x_{j} \mathbb{R} x_{i}$.

Then, there exists a sub-subsequence $\left\langle x_{i_{n}}\right\rangle_{n \in \omega}$ such that $\forall n, m \in \omega$ if $n<m$ then $x_{i_{n}} R x_{i_{m}}$.

Proof. This is a specification of [10, lemma 10.33]. Let $\left\langle x_{n}\right\rangle$ be such a sequence. First, observe that $\exists i \in \omega: X_{i}=\left\{x_{j}: j>i \& x_{i} R x_{j}\right\}$ is infinite, as otherwise by defining $i_{0}=0$ and $i_{k+1}=\max \left(\left\{i_{k}\right\} \cup\left\{i: x_{i} \in X_{i_{k}}\right\}\right)$, we find $x_{i_{0}}, x_{i_{1}}, \ldots$ that form an infinite anti-chain.

Now, let $x_{i_{0}}$ be the first $i \in \omega: X_{i}$ is infinite. Then supposing $x_{i_{n}}$ has been defined where $X_{i_{n}}$ is infinite, let $x_{i_{n+1}}$ be the first point in the infinite non-descending chain $X_{i_{n}}$ with infinite $X_{i_{n+1}}$. Then $\left\langle x_{i_{n}}\right\rangle_{n \in \omega}$ is an infinite ascending sequence.

Theorem 2.22. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ be finitely generated and of finite width. Then $X$ contains no infinite ascending chains.

Proof. This is a specification of [10, Theorem 10.34]. From the duality, letting $A \in$ $M A$ be such that $A_{*} \cong \mathcal{X}$, we work on $A_{*}$ as opposed to $\mathcal{X}$. Let $g_{i}$ be the generate $A$.

We will call a point $x \in A_{*}$ deep iff there is an infinite ascending chain of distinct points in $A_{*}$ starting at $x_{0}$. Our goal is to prove $A_{*}$ has no deep points. Suppose for contradiction that $A_{*}$ has a deep point. Then for $x \in A *$ we define:

$$
U_{x}:=\{u \in R[x]: u \text { is not deep }\} .
$$

We call a deep point static iff $\forall y \in R[x]$ deep $U_{x}=U_{y}$. We claim that $A_{*}$ contains a deep static point. Consider some deep point as $x_{0}$. If $x_{0}$ is static we are done. If not, then $\exists x_{1} \in A_{*}: x_{0} R x_{1}, x_{1}$ is deep and $U_{x_{0}} \neq U_{x_{1}}$. As $x_{0} R x_{1}, U_{x_{1}} \subseteq U_{x_{0}}$, so $U_{x_{1}} \subset U_{x_{0}}$ and $x_{1} \mathbb{R} x_{1}$. Then, either $x_{1}$ is static or not. Continuing in this way, if $A_{*}$ contains no static points we find $x_{0} R x_{1} R x_{2} \ldots$ such that $U_{x_{0}} \supset U_{x_{1}} \supset U_{x_{2} \ldots .}$. Then we consider $y_{i} \in U_{x_{i}} \backslash U_{x_{i+1}}$. Each of these points is not deep, if $i>j$ then $y_{j} \in U_{x_{j}}$ and $y_{j} \notin U_{x_{j+1}}$. So $x_{j+1} R y_{i}$, and $j+1 \leq i$ so $y_{i} \in U_{x_{j+1}}, x_{j+1} R y_{i}$ and $y_{i} R y_{j}$.

Thus, we have a non-descending sequence $\left\langle y_{i}\right\rangle_{i \in \omega}$ in $R^{+}[x]$. As $A_{*}$ is of finite width $R^{\omega}[x]$ contains no infinite anti-chains, thus by 2.21 our non-descending sequence has an infinite ascending sub-sequence contradicting that all the $y_{i}$ are not deep. So $A_{*}$ contains a deep static point $x$.

Letting $x R x_{1} R x_{2} \ldots$ be an infinite ascending chain starting at $x$, we note that $\forall n \in$ $\omega x_{n}$ is deep and if $x_{n} R y$ such that $y$ is deep, then $x R y$ so $U_{x_{n}}=U_{x}=U_{y}$, so $x_{n}$ is static. We also define for $y \in X$ the set

$$
V_{y}:=\left\{\operatorname{col}(z) \in 2^{n}: y R z \text { and } z \text { is deep }\right\} .
$$

We say a deep point is stationary iff $\forall y R z: z$ is deep $V_{y}=V_{z}$. As if $y R z V_{z} \subseteq V_{y}$ and each $V_{y}$ is finite, every infinite ascending chain contains a stationary point, so in particular $\exists n \in \omega: x_{n}$ is stationary. So we have found a static and stationary point.

We now argue by induction that $\forall U \subseteq A_{*}$ clopen, that $\forall y, z \in R\left[x_{n}\right]: y$ and $z$ are deep and $\operatorname{col}(y)=\operatorname{col}(z)$ that $y \in U$ iff $z \in U$.

Base Case: $U=\varphi\left(g_{i}\right)$. Then, letting $y, z \in R\left[x_{n}\right]$ as above, $\operatorname{col}(y)=\operatorname{col}(z) y \in U$ iff $g_{i} \in y$ iff $g_{i} \in z$ iff $z \in U$.

Induction step: $\cap$ and $\backslash$ are trivial, so let $U=\square V=\{u \in X: R[u] \subseteq V\}$, where $V$ is clopen and has the property. Letting $y, z \in R\left[x_{n}\right]$ be deep and $\operatorname{col}(y)=\operatorname{col}(z)$, if $y \in U$ then $y \in \square V$ so $R[y] \subseteq V$. Letting $w \in R[z]$ either $w$ is not deep and $w \in U_{z}=U_{x_{n}}=U_{y}$ so $y R w$ and $w \in V$ or $w$ is deep, so $\operatorname{col}(w) \in V_{z}=V_{x_{n}}=V_{y}$, so $\exists v \in R[y]: v$ is deep and $\operatorname{col}(w)=\operatorname{col}(v)$. Both $w, v \in R\left[x_{n}\right]$, so by induction $w \in V$ iff $v \in V . v \in R[y] \subseteq V$ so $w \in V$. Either way $w \in V$ so $R[z] \subseteq V$ and $z \in U$. If $z \in U$ the case is symmetric.

Finally, $x_{n}$ sees infinitely many deep points, so $\exists y, z \in R\left[x_{n}\right]: y \neq z, y$ and $z$ are deep and $\operatorname{col}(y)=\operatorname{col}(z)$. But then $\forall U \subseteq X$ clopen $y \in U$ iff $z \in U$ contradicting Stone separation.

Another useful property of finitely generated transitive spaces is how well regulated their points of finite depth are. These results are adaptions of similar results established for Esakia spaces in [4, Chapter 3].

Given $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ and two clusters $C$ and $D$ of $X$, we recall that $C$ sees $D$ iff $\exists x \in$ $C, \exists y \in D: x R y$ or $C=D$ and that the clusters of $X$ under the seeing relation form a poset.
Lemma 2.23. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$, then $X$ contains maximal clusters.
Proof. We aim to apply Zorn's lemma, so let $\left\langle C_{\alpha}\right\rangle_{\alpha \in I}$ be an $R^{\prime}$-chain of clusters in $X$ indexed by an arbitrary set $I$. We may assume w.l.o.g that they are distinct. Moreover, note that letting $x^{\prime} \in C$ and $y^{\prime} \in D: C R^{\prime} D$ where $C$ and $D$ are distinct clusters then $\exists x \in C, \exists y \in D: x R y$ and so $x^{\prime} R x R y R y^{\prime}$ and $x^{\prime} R y^{\prime}$. So, letting $x_{\alpha} \in C_{\alpha}$ we obtain an $R$-chain $\left\langle x_{\alpha}\right\rangle_{\alpha \in I}$ of $X$. Then, if $x \in X$ is an upper bound for $\left\langle x_{\alpha}\right\rangle$ then letting $\alpha \in I x_{\alpha} R x$ so $C_{\alpha} R^{\prime}[x]$, i.e. the cluster containing $x$ is an upper bound for the cluster chain. So, it is sufficient to show that every strict $R$-chain in $X$ has an upper bound.

From our duality we may consider the $A \in K 4-A: A_{*} \cong \mathcal{X}$, then it is sufficient to check that every $R$-chain in $A_{*}$ has an upper bound. Let $\left\langle F_{\alpha}\right\rangle_{\alpha \in I}$ be a strict chain of prime filters in $A_{*}$ and consider:

$$
F^{\prime}:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \omega}\left\{a \in A: \square a \in F_{\alpha}\right\} .
$$

Letting $a, b \in F^{\prime} \square a \in F_{\alpha}$ and $\square b \in F_{\beta}$ for $\alpha, \beta \in I$. Taking $\gamma=\max \{\alpha, \beta\}+1$, $\alpha, \beta<\gamma$ so $F_{\alpha} R F_{\gamma}$ and $F_{\beta} R F_{\gamma}$. Then $\square a \leq \square \square a$ so $\square \square a \in F_{\alpha}$ and $\square a \in F_{\gamma}$, similarly $\square b \in F_{\gamma}$. So $\square(a \wedge b)=\square a \wedge \square b \in F_{\gamma}$ and so $a \wedge b \in F^{\prime}$. If $a \in F^{\prime}$ and $a \leq b$ then $\square a \in F_{\alpha}: \alpha \in I$ and $\square a \leq \square b$ so $\square b \in F_{\alpha}$ and $b \in F^{\prime}$. So $F^{\prime}$ is a filter of $A$. Moreover, if $\square \perp \in F_{\alpha}$ for some $\alpha \in I$ then $\perp \in F_{\alpha+1}$ which is a contradiction. So $\perp \notin F^{\prime}$.

Thus, by the prime filter theorem for Boolean algebras $\exists F \in A_{*}: F^{\prime} \subseteq F$. Then letting $\square a \in F_{\alpha} a \in F^{\prime}$ so $a \in F$, so $F_{\alpha} R F$ and $F$ is an upper bound for the chain as required.

Corollary 2.24. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ and $Y \subseteq X$ be clopen. Then $Y$ contains $R^{\prime}$ maximal clusters.

Proof. This is an immediate consequence of applying lemma 2.23 to the sub-frame $Y$. This can also be checked directly via the correspondence of sub-frames and relativisations. The proof proceeds as above except we use lemma 2.10 to find $a \in A$ such that $Y=\varphi(a)$ and then take a chain of primes filters within $\varphi(a)$. Finally, we must much check the filter $F^{\prime}$ defined in the previous proof also contains $a$ and so is still within $\varphi(a)$.

Letting $\mathcal{X} \in T S$, we say a point $x \in X$ is maximal iff $\forall y \in X$ if $x R y$ then either $y R x$ or $y=x$, i.e. $x$ belongs to an $R^{\prime}$ maximal cluster. We define $\max (X)$ as the set of maximal points of $X$.

Lemma 2.25. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ be finitely generated and consist only of improper clusters. Then letting $\max (X)$ is finite and clopen.

Proof. From the duality, letting $A \in K 4-A: A_{*} \cong \mathcal{X}$ we will work on $A_{*}$ as opposed to $\mathcal{X}$. Let $g_{1}, \ldots, g_{n}$ generate $A$. We first check finiteness. Letting $x, y \in \max \left(A_{*}\right) \cap$ $\left\{u \in A_{*}: u R u\right\}$, we consider the relation:

$$
E:=\{(x, y),(y, x)\} \cup\left\{(u, u) \in A_{*}^{2}: u \in A_{*}\right\} .
$$

That is, the smallest equivalence relation $E$ on $A_{*}: x E y$. We claim $E$ is a modal equivalence.

For (i); if $u E v$ and $u R w: u, v \notin\{x, y\}$ then $u=v$ so $v R w$ and we may take $w$ as witness. For $x E y$ and $x R z$, as $x \in \max \left(A_{*}\right) z R x$ and $x$ and $z$ are in the same clusters. $A_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters so $x=z$ Then $y R y$ and $y E x$ so we may take $y$ as witness. The case when $y E x$ and $y R z$ is symmetric.

For (ii); if $u \notin v$ then if $u \in\{x, y\}$ then $v \notin\{x, y\}$. We apply Stone separation on $x$ and $v$ and $y$ and $v$ to find clopens $U_{x}^{v}$ and $U_{y}^{v}$ respectively, then $u \in U_{x}^{v} \cap U_{y}^{v}$ and $v \notin U_{x}^{v} \cup U_{y}^{v}$ which is clopen and a union of $E$ classes so seperates $u$ and $v$ as required. If $u \notin\{x, y\}$ and $v \in\{x, y\}$ we use the compliment of $U_{x}^{u} \cup U_{y}^{u}$, and if $u, v \notin\{x, y\}$ then apply Stone separation to $u$ and $v$ and then $U_{u}^{v} \cup U_{x}^{v} \cup U_{y}^{v}$ is clopen and a union of $E$-classes so seperates $u$ and $v$ as required.

So $E$ is a proper modal equivlaence, and so by the colouring theorem has a class containing points of different colours. The only non-singular $E$-class is $\{x, y\}$ so $\operatorname{col}(x) \neq \operatorname{col}(y)$. So any reflexive maximal points in $A_{*}$ have different colours, and there are only $2^{n}$ different colours and so $\max \left(A_{*}\right) \cap\left\{u \in A_{*}: u R u\right\}$ is finite. We can similarly consider $\max \left(A_{*}\right) \cap\left\{u \in A_{*}: u \mathbb{R} u\right\}$, running the same proof as above, except that when considering $x E y$ or $y E x$ for condition (i) as $x, y \in$ $\max \left(A_{*}\right) \cap\left\{u \in A_{*}: u \mathbb{R} u\right\}$ we have $R[x]=\varnothing=R[y]$ so the case is trivial. Then $\max \left(A_{*}\right)=\left(\max \left(A_{*}\right) \cap\left\{u \in A_{*}: u R u\right\}\right) \cup\left(\max \left(A_{*}\right) \cap\left\{u \in A_{*}: u \mathbb{R} u\right\}\right)$ so $\max \left(A_{*}\right)$ is finte.

Next we check clopenness. Consider the element $g \in A$ defined by:

$$
g:=\bigwedge_{i=1}^{n}\left(\left(g_{i} \rightarrow \square g_{i}\right) \wedge\left(\neg g_{i} \rightarrow \square \neg g_{i}\right)\right) .
$$

We will prove that $\varphi(g)=\max \left(A_{*}\right)$. If $x \in \max \left(A_{*}\right)$ then for each $1 \leq i \leq n$ either $g_{i} \in x$ or $\neg g_{i} \in x$. If $g_{i} \in x$ then $x \in \varphi\left(\neg g_{i} \rightarrow \square \neg g_{i}\right)$ and as $x \in \max \left(A_{*}\right)$ and $A_{*}$ consists only of improper clusters $R[x]=\{x\}$ or $\varnothing$ so $R[x] \subseteq \varphi\left(g_{i}\right)$, giving $x \in \square \varphi\left(g_{i}\right)=\varphi\left(\square g_{i}\right)$. Thus, $x \in \varphi\left(g \rightarrow \square g_{i}\right)$ and $x \in \varphi(g)$. If $\neg g_{i} \in x$ then symmetrically $x \in \varphi(g)$, and so $\max \left(A_{*}\right) \subseteq \varphi(g)$.

Now, let $x \in A_{*}: x \in \varphi(g)$. We define the sets $J$ and $J^{\prime}$ and the element $\eta \in A$ by:

$$
\begin{gathered}
J:=\left\{g_{i} \wedge \square g_{i} \in A: g_{i} \in x\right\} \text { and } J^{\prime}:=\left\{\neg g_{i} \wedge \square \neg g_{i} \in A: \neg g_{i} \in x\right\} . \\
\eta:=\bigwedge J \wedge \bigwedge J^{\prime} .
\end{gathered}
$$

Consider $\varphi(\eta)$. This is clopen, it is also an upset; letting $u \in \varphi(\eta)$ and $u R v$ then letting $g_{i} \wedge \square g_{i} \in J u \in \varphi(\eta)$ implies $\square g_{i} \in u$ so $g_{i} \in v$ and letting $w \in A_{*}: v R w$ $u R w$ so again $g_{i} \in w$ so $\square g_{i} \in v$. Similarly for $\neg g_{i} \wedge \square \neg g_{i} \in J^{\prime}$. So $\eta \in v$ and $v \in \varphi(\eta)$.

It is also monochrome; letting $u \in \varphi(\eta)$ for each $1 \leq i \leq n$ either $g_{i} \in x$ and so $g_{i} \wedge \square g_{i} \in J$ and $g_{i} \wedge \square g_{i} \in u$ so $g_{i} \in u$ or $\neg g_{i} \in x$ and $\neg g_{i} \in u$, so $\operatorname{col}(u)=\operatorname{col}(x)$.

Finally, $x \in \varphi(\eta)$, as letting $g_{i} \wedge \square g_{i} \in J$, then $g_{i} \in x$ and as $g \in x g_{i} \rightarrow \square g_{i} \in x$ so $\square g_{i} \in x$ and $g_{i} \wedge \square g_{i} \in x$. Similarly if $\neg g_{i} \wedge \neg \square g_{i} \in J^{\prime}$ then $\neg g_{i} \wedge \square \neg g_{i} \in x$, so $\eta \in x$ and $x \in \varphi(\eta)$.

So $\varphi(\eta)$ is a clopen upset, by lemma 2.16 we can consider the modal equivalence $E$ identifying points within it. Then the only possibly non-singleton $E$-class of this equivalence is $\varphi(\eta)$ itself, which is monochrome. So all the $E$-classes are monochrome and by the colouring theorem $E$ cannot be proper, i.e. all $E$-classes are singletons. Then, as $x \in \varphi(\eta), \varphi(\eta)=\{x\}$. Finally, as $\varphi(\eta)$ is an upset, $\forall y \in A_{*}$ if $x R y$ then $y \in \varphi(\eta)$ so $y=x$, i.e. $x \in \max \left(A_{*}\right)$ and we have $\varphi(g) \subseteq \max \left(A_{*}\right)$.

Corollary 2.26. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ be finitely generated. Then $\max (X)$ is finite and clopen.
Proof. We consider the modal equivalence on $\mathcal{X}$ induced by lemma 2.15 identifying points in the same cluster. Then $\mathcal{X} / E \in T S$ and is also finitely generated, by lemma $2.10(\mathcal{X} / E)^{*}$ is isomorphic to a subalgebra of $\mathcal{X}^{*}$ and so is finitely generated as a K4-algebra. It also consists of only improper clusters, so applying lemma 2.25, $\max (X / E)$ is finite and clopen. Then $\max (X)$ is the inverse image of $\max (X / E)$ and so is clopen and contains finitely many clusters. Then, by 2.20 these clusters are themselves finite, so $\max (X)$ is also finite.

We can extend this result beyond the maximal points in a finitely generated transitive space to all its points of finite depth.

Theorem 2.27. Let $\mathcal{X} \in T S$ be finitely generated. Then, $\forall n \in \omega S l_{n}(X)$ is finite and $S_{n}(X)$ is clopen. Moreover, $\forall n \in \omega \operatorname{Sl}_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ is clopen.

Proof. We proceed by induction on $n$, again letting $A \in K 4-A$ be such that $A_{*} \cong \mathcal{X}$ we work on $A_{*}$ instead. We let $g_{1}, \ldots, g_{k}$ generate $A$. As $S l_{1}\left(A_{*}\right)=\max \left(A_{*}\right)$ the base case is just corollary 2.26 , so let $n \in \omega: \forall m \leq n S l_{m}\left(A_{*}\right)$ is finite and $S_{m}\left(A_{*}\right)$ is clopen. Consider the clopen subset $A_{*} \backslash S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ and from lemma 2.10 let $A_{n} \in$ K4-A be the corresponding relativisation of $A$. We claim that $A_{n_{*}}$ is finitely generated.

If so, then by corollary $2.26 \max \left(A_{n_{*}}\right)$ is finite and clopen. Letting $x \in S l_{n+1}\left(A_{*}\right)$, $x \notin S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ and letting $x R y: y \in A_{n_{*}}$ then as $y \in A_{n_{*}} d(y) \geq n+1$ and as $x R y$ $d(y) \leq n+1$ so $d(y)=n+1$ and $y R x$. So either $y R x$ or $y=x$, i.e. $x \in \max \left(A_{n_{*}}\right)$. If $x \notin S l_{n+1}\left(A_{*}\right)$ then either $x \in S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ and so $x \notin A_{n_{*}}$ or $d(x)>n+1$. As by theorem $2.22 A_{*}$ has no infinitely ascending chains we have $\forall k<d(x) R[x] \cap S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right) \neq \varnothing$ so $\exists y \in S l_{n+1}\left(A_{*}\right): x R y$ and $y \mathbb{R} x$. Then $y \in A_{n_{*}}$ and so $x \notin \max \left(A_{n_{*}}\right)$. Together, this means $S l_{n+1}\left(A_{*}\right)=\max \left(A_{n_{*}}\right)$, and so is finite and clopen. Then $S_{n+1}\left(A_{*}\right)=$ $S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right) \cup S l_{n+1}\left(A_{*}\right)$ and so is also clopen completing the induction.

It remains to prove the claim. As $S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ is clopen $\exists a \in A: \varphi(a)=S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$, moreover as $S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ is finite and clopen, it has a finite number of subsets all of which are clopen as well. In particular, its upsets are clopen, so letting $\left\{U_{j}\right\}_{j=1}^{m}$ be those upsets, we let $a_{j} \in A: \varphi\left(a_{j}\right)=U_{j}$.

We consider two collections of elements; first we define the elements of $A$ :

$$
g_{i}^{\prime}:=a \vee g_{i} \text { and } g_{k+j}^{\prime}:=a \vee \square\left(a \rightarrow a_{j}\right)
$$

. Second, we let $g_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, g_{k+m}^{\prime \prime}$ be the corresponding elements of $A_{n}$, i.e. $g_{i}^{\prime \prime} \in A_{n}$ : $\varphi\left(g_{i}^{\prime \prime}\right)=\varphi\left(g_{i}^{\prime}\right) \cap A_{n_{*}}$. These new elements define their own colouring of $A_{n_{*}}$, letting $x \in A_{n_{*}}$ we'll use $\operatorname{col}(x)$ to denote its colour by the $g_{i}$ and $\operatorname{col} l_{n}(x)$ the colour by $g_{i}^{\prime \prime}$. We claim that the $g_{i}^{\prime \prime}$ generate $A_{n_{*}}$.
Note, letting $x, y \in A_{n_{*}}$ if $\operatorname{col}_{n}(x)=\operatorname{col}_{n}(y)$ then, if $g_{i} \in x, g_{i}^{\prime} \in x$ so $g_{i}^{\prime} \in y$ and then $y \in A_{n_{*}}$ means $y \notin S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ so $a \notin y$. So $g_{i} \in y$. Similarly, if $g_{i} \in y$ then $g_{i} \in x$, so $\operatorname{col}(x)=\operatorname{col}(y)$.

Now, suppose $A_{n_{*}}$ is not generated by the $g_{i}^{\prime \prime}$, then by the colour theorem there is a proper modal equivalence $E$ of $A_{n_{*}}$ such that all $E$-classes are monochrome.

We define a relation $Q$ on $A_{*}$ as follows:

$$
Q:=E \cup\left\{(u, u) \in A_{*}^{2}: u \in S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)\right\} .
$$

That is, the smallest equivalence relation on $A_{*}$ containing $E$. We claim this is a modal equivalence.

For (i); letting $x Q y$ and $x R z$, if $x$ or $y \in S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ then $x=y$ so $y R z$ and we may take $z$ as witness. If $x, y \in A_{n_{*}}$ then $x E y$. Now, if $z \in A_{n_{*}}$ as $E$ is a modal equivalence on $A_{n_{*}} \exists v \in A_{n_{*}}: y R v$ and $z E v$. Then $z Q v$ and we may take $v$ as witness. If $z \notin A_{n_{*}}$ either $y R z$ so or $y \mathbb{R} z$. If, $y \mathbb{R} z$ then moreover $z \neq y$ (as $y \in A_{n_{*}}$ ) and so by modal separation there is a clopen upset $U: y \in U, z \notin U . U \cap S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ is an upset contained in $S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ so equals $U_{j}$ for some $1 \leq j \leq m$. Letting $u \in S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right): y R u$ then $u \in U$ so $u \in U_{j}$, therefore $y \in \square \varphi\left(a \rightarrow a_{j}\right)=\varphi\left(\square\left(a \rightarrow a_{j}\right)\right)$, i.e. $g_{n+j}^{\prime} \in y$. Therefore, $g_{n+j}^{\prime \prime} \in y$.

By contrast, $x R z, z \in S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ and $z \notin U$ so $z \notin U_{j}$, i.e. $x \notin \varphi\left(\square\left(a \rightarrow a_{j}\right)\right.$ Moreover, $x \notin S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ means $a \notin x$ so $g_{n+j}^{\prime} \notin x$ and so $g_{n+j}^{\prime \prime} \notin x$. So $\operatorname{col}_{n}(x) \neq \operatorname{col}_{n}(y)$, contradicting that $x E y$. So, we must have $y R z$ and then again we may take $z$ as witness.

For (ii); letting $x \oslash y$, if $x \in S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ then $x \neq y$, we apply Stone separation to find a clopen $U \subseteq A_{*}$ separating $x$ and $y$, then $U \cap S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ is clopen, a union of $Q$-classes and separates $x$ and $y$ as required. If $y \in S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ the case is symmetric. If $x, y \notin S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$, then $x \notin y$ so there is a clopen subset $U \subseteq A_{n_{*}}$ separating $x$ and $y$ which is a union of $E$-classes. Then $U \cap A_{n_{*}}$ is a clopen subset of $A_{*}$ and a union of $Q$ classes so separates $x$ and $y$ as required.

So $Q$ is a modal equivalence, and is proper as $E$ was proper. Then $\forall x, y \in A_{*}$ : $x Q y$, if $x$ or $y \in S_{n}\left(A_{*}\right)$ then $x=y$ and $\operatorname{col}(x)=\operatorname{col}(y)$ and if $x, y \in A_{n_{*}}$ then $x E y$ so $\operatorname{col}_{n}(x)=\operatorname{col}_{n}(y)$ and $\operatorname{col}(x)=\operatorname{col}(y)$ as we noted earlier. So $Q$ is a proper modal equivalence of $A_{*}$ which is monochrome by the $g_{i}$ colouring. Thus, by the colouring theorem $A_{*}$ is not generated by the $g_{i}$ which is a contradiction.

This completes our study of transitive spaces, along with our presentation of Jónsson-Tarski duality. Having introduced the both K4-algebras and transitive spaces and their basic properties, . We also highlighted a number of dual properties that we will frequently use in the main investigation (lemmas $2.9 \& 2.10$ ). To aid our main investigation we greatly expanded our understanding of transitive spaces. We've provided a number of useful tools for our proof work, including a separation axiom (lemma 2.11), an alternative way to think about surjective maps between finite transitive spaces in the form of reductions (lemma 2.14) and a group of important modal equivalences we can use to simply spaces we are working with (lemmas 2.15, 2.16, $2.17 \& 2.18$ ). We also have a much better understanding of the behaviour of finite transitive spaces, establishing that they are conversely well founded (lemma 2.20 \& theorem 2.22) and how their elements of finite depth behave (theorem 2.27).

## Chapter 3

## Algebraic Logic

The core theory that enables investigations like ours is the tight relationship one can establish between logic and algebra.

### 3.1 Algebraic Modal Logic

### 3.1.1 Universal Algebra

The central idea of algebraic logic is to use the tools of universal algebra to investigate logic. In universal algebra, we abstract away from particular algebraic structures such as rings or modal algebras and consider an algebra as a set accompanied by a collection of constant terms and operators. We will give a brief introduction to the concepts most relevant for our primary investigation. For a more detailed study, the reader may consult $[1,9,18]$.

Definition 3.1. A language, or signature, is a collection $\mathcal{L}$ of function symbols each with an associated arity. We call function symbols with arity 0 constants.

An $\mathcal{L}$-algebra is a set $A$ accompanied by an element of the set for each constant in $\mathcal{L}$ and a function from $A$ to $A$ for each function symbol in $\mathcal{L}$ with the same arity. We frequently use $A$ to refer to an algebra and its underlying set interchangeably.

An $\mathcal{L}$-morphism is a map between two $\mathcal{L}$-algebras that respects the terms and operators of $\mathcal{L}$.

Given a set of variables $P$, we define the term algebra for $\mathcal{L}$ as follows.
We define the set of terms over $P$ as the least set $F m_{\mathcal{L}}(P)$ such that:
(i) $P \subseteq F m_{\mathcal{L}}(P)$;
(ii) If $c$ is a constant in $\mathcal{L}$ then $c \in \operatorname{Fm}_{\mathcal{L}}(P)$;
(iii) If $\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n} \in F m_{\mathcal{L}}(P)$ and $f$ is a function symbol in $\mathcal{L}$ with artiy $n$, then $f\left(\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right) \in \operatorname{Fm}_{\mathcal{L}}(P)$.

Then, the term algebra is the unique algebra with underlying set $F m_{\mathcal{L}}(P)$ accompanied by a basic $n$-ary operation $f^{\prime}$ defined, for every $\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n} \in F m_{\mathcal{L}}(P)$, as

$$
f^{\prime}\left(\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right):=f\left(\varphi_{1}, \ldots, \varphi_{n}\right) .
$$

We frequently shorten this to simply $F m$ when $\mathcal{L}$ and $P$ are understood.
Definition 3.2. Am $\mathcal{L}$-equation is an expression of the form $\epsilon \approx \delta$ where $\epsilon, \delta \in$ $F m_{\mathcal{L}}(P)$.

We say that a $\mathcal{L}$-algebra $A$ satisfies an equation $\epsilon \approx \delta$ iff $h(\epsilon)=h(\delta)$ for all $\mathcal{L}$-morphisms $h: F m \rightarrow A$. We denote this $A \models \epsilon \approx \delta$.

Given a class of $\mathcal{L}$-algebras $\mathcal{A}$, we define the equational consequence relation relative to $\mathcal{A},=_{\mathcal{A}}$, as follows. Let $\Theta \cup\{\epsilon \approx \delta\}$ be a set of equations. Then $\Theta \models_{\mathcal{A}} \epsilon \approx$ $\delta$ iff $\forall A \in \mathcal{A}$ and all $\mathcal{L}$-morphisms $h: F m \rightarrow A$ if $\forall \varphi \approx \psi \in \Theta h(\varphi)=h(\psi)$ then $h(\epsilon)=h(\delta)$.

A variety is a class of algebras $\mathcal{A}$ that is equationally definable, that is there is a set of equations $\Theta$ such that for any algebra $A$ we have that $A \in \mathcal{A}$ iff $A \models \epsilon \approx \delta$ for all $\epsilon \approx \delta \in \Theta$.

Given a class of algebras $\mathcal{A}$ we denote by $\mathbb{V}(\mathcal{A})$ the least variety containing $\mathcal{A}$.
An alternative way to look at varieties is through class operations. We denote by $\mathbb{I}, \mathbb{H}, \mathbf{S}, \mathbb{P}$ and $\mathbb{P}_{U}$ the class operators of closure under isomorphism, homomorphic images, subalgebras, direct products and ultraproducts respectively. We assume direct products and ultra products of empty families of algebras are trivial algebras.

Theorem 3.3 (Birkhoff's Theorem).
A class of algebras $\mathcal{A}$ is a variety iff it is closed under $\mathbb{H}, \mathrm{S}$ and $\mathbb{P}$.
Proof. See [10, Theorem 7.79].
Theorem 3.4 (Tarski's Theorem).
Given a class of algebras $\mathcal{A}, \mathbb{V}(\mathcal{A})=\mathbb{H S P}(\mathcal{A})$.
Proof. See [10, Theorem 7.8].
We can generalise this set up slightly further.
Definition 3.5. A quasi-equation is an expression of the form

$$
\Phi=\bigwedge_{i \leq n} \varphi_{i} \approx \psi_{i} \rightarrow \epsilon \approx \delta .
$$

Note that an equation $\epsilon \approx \delta$ can be effectively identified with the quasi-equation $\varnothing \rightarrow \epsilon \approx \delta$.

We say that an $\mathcal{L}$-algebra satisfies a quasi-equation $\Phi=\bigwedge_{i \leq n} \varphi_{i} \approx \psi_{i} \rightarrow \epsilon \approx \delta$, denoted $A=\Phi$, iff for all $\mathcal{L}$-morphisms $h: F m \rightarrow A$ if for all $1 \leq i \leq n h\left(\varphi_{i}\right)=h\left(\psi_{i}\right)$ then $h(\epsilon)=h(\delta)$.

Given a class of algebras $\mathcal{A}$ we say that $\Phi$ is valid in $\mathcal{A}$ iff $\left\{\varphi_{i} \approx \psi_{i}: i \leq n\right\} \not \models_{\mathcal{A}}$ $\epsilon \approx \delta$.

A quasi-variety is a class of algebras $\mathcal{A}$ that is quasi-equationally definable, that is there is a set of quasi-equations $\Theta$ such that for any algebra $A$ we have that $A \in \mathcal{A}$ iff $A \models \Phi$ for all $\Phi \in \Theta$.

Given a class of algebras $\mathcal{A}$, we denote by $\mathrm{Q}(\mathcal{A})$ the quasi-variety containing $\mathcal{A}$
Theorem 3.6 (Maltsev's Theorem).
A class of algebras is a quasi-variety iff it is closed under $\mathbb{I}, S, \mathbb{P}$ and $\mathbb{P}_{U}$.
Proof. See [9, Theorem V2.25].
Theorem 3.7. Give a class of algebras $\mathcal{A}, \mathrm{Q}(\mathcal{A})=\mathbb{I S P P}_{U}(\mathcal{A})$.
Proof. See [9, Theorem V2.25].
An important property of varieties for our investigation is that of being primitive. This is because, as we will formalise shortly, being primitive is an 'algebraic counterpart' to hereditary structural completeness.

A class $M \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ is a sub-variety or subquasi-variety of $\mathcal{A}$ iff $M$ is a variety or quasivariety. A variety $\mathcal{A}$ is said to be primitive iff every subquasi-variety $M$ of $\mathcal{A}$ is a variety.

### 3.1.2 Logic

In our context we start with a very abstract notion of a logic, that of consequence relations and deductive systems. The advantage of this very abstract framing is that we can give a very precise correspondence between finitary deductive systems and quasi-varieties of algebras. Again, here we give a only brief overview of this process. For a more detailed study, the reader may consult $[6,15]$.
Definition 3.8. Given a set $A$ a consequence relation on $A$ is a relation $\vdash \subseteq \mathcal{P}(A) \times A$ such that for every $X \cup Y \cup\{x\} \subseteq A$ :
(i) If $x \in X$ then $X \vdash x$;
(ii) If $\forall y \in Y X \vdash y$ and $Y \vdash x$ then $X \vdash x$.

Then, given a signature $\mathcal{L}$ and set of variables $P$, a deductive system is a consequence relation of $F m$ such that for any $\mathcal{L}$-morphism $\sigma: F m \rightarrow F m, \forall \Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m$ if $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ then $\sigma[\Gamma] \vdash \sigma(\varphi)$. We call $\mathcal{L}$-morphisms like $\sigma$ substitutions and consequence relations with the above property are called substitution invariant.

A deductive system $\vdash$ is finitary iff $\forall \Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m$, if $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ then $\exists \Delta \subseteq \Gamma$ which is finite and such that $\Delta \vdash \varphi$.

Given a set of formulas in at most two variables $\Delta(x, y)$ and a set of equations $\Theta \cup\{\epsilon \approx \delta\}$ we define:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\Delta(\epsilon \approx \delta):=\{\varphi(\epsilon, \delta): \varphi(x, y) \in \Delta(x, y)\} \\
\Delta[\Theta]:=\bigcup_{\epsilon \approx \delta \in \Theta} \Delta(\epsilon \approx \delta)
\end{gathered}
$$

Similarly, given a set of equations in at most one variable $\tau(x)$ and $\Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m$, we define:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\tau(\varphi):=\{\epsilon(\varphi) \approx \delta(\varphi): \epsilon(x) \approx \delta(x) \in \tau(x)\} \\
\tau[\Gamma]:=\bigcup_{\varphi \in \Gamma} \tau(\varphi)
\end{gathered}
$$

Definition 3.9. A finitary deductive system $\vdash$ is said to be algebraizable iff there exists a quasi-variety $\mathcal{A}$, a set of equations $\tau(x)$ and set of formulas $\Delta(x, y)$ such that for all sets of equations $\Theta \cup\{\epsilon \approx \delta\}$ and sets of formulas $\Gamma \cup\{\varphi\}$ :
Alg1 $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ iff $\tau[\Gamma] \models_{\mathcal{A}} \tau(\varphi)$;
Alg2 $\Delta[\Theta] \vdash \Delta(\epsilon, \delta)$ iff $\Theta \models_{\mathcal{A}} \epsilon \approx \delta$;
Alg3 $\varphi \dashv \vdash \Delta[\tau(\varphi)]$;
$\operatorname{Alg} 4 \epsilon \approx \delta=\|=_{\mathcal{A}} \tau[\Delta(\epsilon, \delta)]$.
Equivalently, when $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ iff $\tau[\Gamma] \models_{\mathcal{A}} \tau(\varphi)$ and $x \approx y=\models_{\mathcal{A}} \tau[\Delta(x, y)]$ [6, Corollary 2.9].

We call $\mathcal{A}$ an equivalent algebraic semantics (EAS) for $\vdash$. Every algebraizable finitary deductive system has a unique equivalent algebraic semantics [6, Theorem 2.15].

For example, IPC is a finitary deductive system for $\mathcal{L}=\{\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, \top, \perp\}$ and has the variety of Heyting algebras as its EAS under $\tau(x)=\{x \approx \top\}$ and $\Delta(x, y)=$ $\{x \rightarrow y, y \rightarrow x\}[5]$.

Of course, we are specifically interested in modal logic. Briefly recalling the basic set up, a normal modal logic (NML) is a set of formulas $\lambda$ in signature ( $\wedge, \vee \neg, \square, T)$ such that:
(i) $\lambda$ contains all the classical tautologies.
(ii) $\square(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow(\square p \rightarrow \square q) \in \lambda$ for all propositional variables $p$ and $q$.
(iii) $\lambda$ is closed under Modus Ponens, necessitation ( $\varphi \in \lambda$ implies $\square \varphi \in \lambda$ ) and substitution.

The least NML is called $K$, and given $\varphi \in F m$ we use $K+\varphi$ to denote the least NML containing $\varphi$, e.g. $K 4=K+\square p \rightarrow \square \square p$ and $S 4=K 4+\square p \rightarrow p$.

In the basic set up NMLs are identified with sets of formulas, but we wish to view them as finitary deductive systems. There are at least two ways to define a finitary deductive system given a NML $\lambda$, which are as follows.

Definition 3.10. Let $\lambda$ be a normal modal logic.
We define the finitary deductive system $\lambda_{g}$ by $\forall \Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m \Gamma \vdash_{\lambda_{g}} \varphi$ iff $\varphi$ is derivable from $\Gamma$ using the theorems of $\lambda$ and the inference rules Modus Ponens and necessitation.

We define the finitary deductive system $\lambda_{l}$ by $\forall \Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m \Gamma \vdash_{\lambda_{l}} \varphi$ iff $\varphi$ is derivable from $\Gamma$ using the theorems of $\lambda$ and the inference rule Modus Ponens.

Our focus is on $\lambda_{g}$ precisely because it has an EAS witnessed by a variety of modal algebras whilst this is not the case for $\lambda_{l}$ [6, Corollary 5.6].

Theorem 3.11 (Algebraic Modal Logic).
Let $\lambda$ be a normal modal logic. Then $\vdash_{\lambda_{g}}$ is algebraizable with EAS:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\mathcal{A}_{\lambda}=\left\{A \in M A: \forall \varphi \in \lambda, \models_{A} \varphi \approx \top\right\} ; \\
\tau(x)=\{x \approx \top\} \text { and } \Delta(x, y)=\{x \rightarrow y, y \rightarrow x\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

Moreover, $\mathcal{A}_{K_{g}}=$ MA, $\mathcal{A}_{K 4_{g}}=$ K4-A and $\mathcal{A}_{S 4_{g}}=$ S4-A.
Proof. See [15, Examples 2.17, Proposistion 3.15].
Going forward we'll suppress a lot of this notation and talk of a normal modal $\operatorname{logic} \lambda$ to refer to the finitary deductive system $\lambda_{g}$. We will also say that a normal modal logic $\lambda$ has EAS $\mathcal{A}$ to refer to $\lambda_{g}$ having EAS $\mathcal{A}_{\lambda}, \tau(x)$ and $\Delta(x, y)$.

### 3.1.3 Hereditary Structural Completeness \& Primitive Varieties

The correspondence between logic and algebra becomes useful because properties of logical systems frequently have natural and well understood algebraic mirrors. This is the framework for our project.

Let $\vdash$ be a deductive system. A deductive system $\vdash^{\prime}$ in the same language is said to be an extension of $\vdash$ iff for every $\Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m$ if $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ then $\Gamma \vdash^{\prime} \varphi$.

A rule is an expression of the form $\Gamma \triangleright \varphi$ where $\Gamma \cup\{\varphi\}$ is a finite subset of $F m$.

Definition 3.12. A rule $\Gamma \triangleright \varphi$ is said to be admissible in $\vdash$ iff for all substitutions $\sigma$ if $\forall \gamma \in \Gamma \vdash \sigma(\gamma)$ then $\vdash \sigma(\varphi)$.

A rule $\Gamma \triangleright \varphi$ is said to be derivable in $\vdash \mathrm{iff} \Gamma \vdash \varphi$.
Accordingly we say that $\vdash$ is structurally complete (SC) iff every rule that is admissible in $\vdash$ is also derivable in $\vdash$ and $\vdash$ is hereditarily structurally complete (HSC) iff every finitary extension of $\vdash$ is structurally complete.

Remarks. Hereditary structural completeness is sometimes defined as the property that every axiomatic extension of $\vdash$ is structurally complete. This is equivalent to our given definition by theorem 3.2 in [24].

The critical comparison for our purposes is the following two theorems.
Theorem 3.13. Let $\vdash$ be a algebraizable finitary deductive system with variety $\mathcal{A}$ as its EAS.

The lattice of axiomatic extensions of $\vdash$ is dually isomorphic to that of subvarieties of $K$.

Proof. Included in [5, Section 2].
Theorem 3.14. Let $\vdash$ be a algebraizable finitary deductive system with variety $\mathcal{A}$ as its EAS.
$\vdash$ is hereditarily structurally complete iff $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive.
Proof. Included in [5, Section 2].
As axiomatic extensions of K4 have EAS witnissed by K4-A, the task of characterising hereditarily structurally complete axiomatic extensions of K 4 is equivalent to that of characterising primitive sub-varieties of K4-A.

To this end, we will employ some standard results from universal algebra. These will allow us to give a sufficient and necessary condition for a variety to be primitive which centre around the algebraic property of being weakly projective. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety. An algebra $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$ iff for every $B \in \mathcal{A}$, if $A \in \mathbb{H}(B)$ then $A \in \mathbb{I S}(B)$.

Our necessary condition for a variety to be primitive is straightforward.
Lemma 3.15. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a primitive variety with finite signature. The finite non-trivial FSI members of $\mathcal{A}$ are weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$.

Proof. See [5, lemma 2.1].
Establishing our sufficient condition requires a little more work. We start with sufficiency condition for varieties with the additional property of being locally finite. A variety is said to be locally finite when its finitely generated members are finite.

Theorem 3.16. A locally finite variety $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive iff its finite, non-trivial FSI members are weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$.

Proof. See [5, Theorem 2.2].
As explored by Bezhanisvhili and Moraschini [5], in the case of intermediate logics and Esakia spaces theorem 3.16 is sufficient for the broader characterisation because primitive varieties of Heyting algebras are locally finite. In our main investigation we will be working with varieties that are not necessarily locally finite. Therefore, we need to establish a more general version of theorem 3.16 and for this
we need a small amount of additional theory. First, there is another mirror of properties between logic and algebra.

Given an algebra $A$ and elements $c, d \in A$ we denote the smallest congruence of $A$ identifying $c$ and $d$ as $\operatorname{Cong}_{A}(c, d)$. We say that a variety $\mathcal{A}$ has equationally definable principal congruences (EDPC) iff there is a finite set of equations $\Phi(x, y, z, w)$ such that $\forall A \in \mathcal{A}$ and $\forall a, b, c, d \in A(a, b) \in \operatorname{Cong}_{A}(c, d)$ iff $A \models \Phi(a, b, c, d)$.

Lemma 3.17. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety with EDPC witnessed by $\Phi(x, y, z, w)$. Then letting $\Theta \cup\{\varphi \approx \psi, \epsilon \approx \delta\}$ be a set of equations; $\Theta, \varphi \approx \psi=_{\mathcal{A}} \epsilon \approx \delta$ iff $\Theta=_{\mathcal{A}} \Phi(\varphi, \psi, \epsilon, \delta)$.

Proof. See [7, Def 3.11, Theorem 5.4].
A finitary deductive system $\vdash$ has a deduction detatchment theorem (DDT) iff there exists a finite set of formulas $\mathrm{I}(\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{y})$ such that for every set of formulas $\Gamma \cup\{\varphi, \psi\}$, $\Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi$ iff $\Gamma \vdash I(\varphi, \psi)$.

Theorem 3.18. Let $\vdash$ be a algebraizable finitary deductive system with variety $\mathcal{A}$ as its EAS. $\vdash$ has a DDT iff $\mathcal{A}$ has EDPC.

Proof. See [7, Theorem 5.5].
Whilst the varieties of K4-algebras we will work with can fail to be locally finite, they all have EDPC. In fact this is a property of any variety of K4-algebras.

Lemma 3.19. Every variety of K4-algebras has EDPC.
Proof. Discussed in detail in [8]. In particular, theorem 5.4 and the examples discussed on page 597 imply our lemma.

We also make use of another way to think about hereditary structural completeness. We say that a variety $\mathcal{A}$ has the finite model property (FMP) iff for any equation $\epsilon \approx \delta$ such that $\mid \vDash_{\mathcal{A}} \epsilon \approx \delta$ there exists a finite algebra $A \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $A \not \vDash \epsilon \approx \delta$.

We denote free countably generated algebra of a variety as $F_{\mathcal{A}}(\omega)$.
Lemma 3.20. Let $\vdash$ be a algebraizable finitary deductive system with variety $\mathcal{A}$ as its EAS.
(i) $\vdash$ is SC iff $\mathcal{A}=\mathbb{Q}\left(F_{\mathcal{A}}(\omega)\right)$;
(ii) $\vdash$ is HSC iff for all subvareities $M$ of $\mathcal{A}, M=\mathrm{Q}\left(F_{M}(\omega)\right)$.

Proof. For (i) see [24, Theorem 6.4]. From our earlier remark, $\vdash$ is HSC iff all its axiomatic extensions are SC. Then, (ii) follows by (i) and theorem 3.14.

Lemma 3.21. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety with the FMP and EDPC, and let $\mathcal{A}_{\text {FinSI }}$ be the class of finite, SI members of $\mathcal{A}$. Then $\mathcal{A}=\mathbb{Q}\left(\mathcal{A}_{\text {FinsI }}\right)$

Proof. As $\mathcal{A}_{\text {FinSI }} \subseteq \mathcal{A}$, the inverse inclusion is immediate. For $\subseteq$; as $\mathbb{Q}\left(\mathcal{A}_{\text {FinSI }}\right)$ is a quasi-variety it is quasi-equationally definable, so it is sufficient to show that if a quasi-equation fails in $\mathcal{A}$ it also fails in $\mathcal{A}_{\text {FinSI }}$. Repeated application of lemma 3.17 makes it is sufficient to consider a single premise quasi-equation.

Let $\varphi \approx \psi \rightarrow \alpha \approx \delta$ be a quasi equation failing in $\mathcal{A}$, i.e. $\exists A \in \mathcal{A}$ and $h: F m \rightarrow$ $A: h(\varphi)=h(\psi)$ and $h(\alpha) \neq h(\beta)$. Then, $(h(\alpha), h(\beta)) \notin \operatorname{Cong}_{A}(h(\varphi), h(\psi))$ and so by EDPC $\not \vDash_{A} \Phi(h(\varphi), h(\psi), h(\alpha), h(\beta))$, and in particular $\not \models_{\mathcal{A}} \Phi(\varphi, \psi, \alpha, \beta)$. Then, as
$\mathcal{A}$ has FMP, and as a variety is generated by its SI elements, we can find $B \in \mathcal{A}_{\text {FinSI }}$ and $h^{\prime}: F m \rightarrow B$ such that $\not \models_{B} \Phi\left(h^{\prime}(\varphi), h^{\prime}(\psi), h^{\prime}(\alpha), h^{\prime}(\beta)\right)$, and so by EDPC again $\left(h^{\prime}(\alpha), h^{\prime}(\beta)\right) \notin \operatorname{Cong}_{B}\left(h^{\prime}(\varphi), h^{\prime}(\psi)\right)$.

Now, every congruence of $B$ is an intersection of completely $\cap$-irreducible congruences, therefore there is a completely $\cap$-irreducible congruence $\theta$ of $B$ such that $\operatorname{Cong}_{B}\left(h^{\prime}(\varphi), h^{\prime}(\psi)\right) \subseteq \theta$ and $\left(h^{\prime}(\alpha), h^{\prime}(\beta)\right) \notin \theta$. Then $B / \theta \in \mathcal{A}_{\text {FinSI }}$, and this alongside the quotient map composed with $h^{\prime}$ witness that $\varphi \approx \psi \vDash_{\mathcal{A}_{\text {FinsI }}} \alpha \approx \beta$.

We can now establish our alternative to theorem 3.16 and sufficiency condition for a variety being primitive.

Theorem 3.22. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety with EDPC and such that all its sub-varieties have FMP. If the finite, non-trivial FSI members of $\mathcal{A}$ are weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$ then $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive.

Proof. By lemma 3.20 and theorem 3.14 it is sufficient to check that for all subvarieties $M$ of $\mathcal{A}$ that $M=\mathbb{Q}\left(F_{M}(\omega)\right)$. So let $M$ be a sub-variety of $\mathcal{A}$, by assumption $M$ has EDPC and FMP. As $F_{M}(\omega) \in M, \mathbb{Q}\left(F_{M}(\omega)\right) \subseteq M$ immediately.
For the other inclusion; by lemma $3.21, M=\mathbb{Q}\left(M_{\text {FinSI }}\right)$. Then, letting $A \in M_{\text {FinSI }}$, as $A$ is finite it is countably generated and in particular $A \in \mathbb{H}\left(F_{M}(\omega)\right) \subseteq M \subseteq \mathcal{A}$. $A$ is finite and SI (and in particular FSI) and therefore by assumption weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$. Therefore, $A \in \mathbb{I S}\left(F_{M}(\omega)\right)$, which gives $M=\mathbb{Q}\left(M_{F i n S I}\right) \subseteq \mathbb{Q}\left(F_{M}(\omega)\right)$ as required.

Putting our two conditions together in the context of K4-algebras reduces the problem of characterising their primitive varieties to the following.

Lemma 3.23. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety of K4-algebras.
(i) If $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive then the finite, non-trivial, FSI members of $\mathcal{A}$ are weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$.
(ii) Suppose all sub-varieties of $\mathcal{A}$ have the FMP. If the finite, non-trivial FSI members of $\mathcal{A}$ are weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$ then $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive.

Proof. (i) is exactly lemma 3.15 whilst (ii) follows from theorem 3.22 and lemma 3.19.

### 3.2 Order-Topological Semantics for Modal Logic

The theory established so far is essentially sufficient for our project. As K4 is algebrized by the variety K4-A, to characterise the hereditary structurally complete transitive modal logics it is sufficient to characterise the primitive varieties of K4algebras. In a moment we will begin to undertake that task with our modal duality doing a lot of the heavy lifting.

However, in the modal case we can say a little more about the relationship between logic, algebra and topology. This is because we can give a direct ordertoplogical semantics for NMLs, one which lines up with the picture already described and provides some additional context to neatly tie up the main theory. This semantics is a generalisation of the familiar Kripke semantics for modal logic (hence the alternative naming for modal spaces as descriptive Kripke frames), which we briefly recall here. For more detail see [10, Section 8] and [3].

Definition 3.24. Let $(X, R)$ be a frame, $x \in X$ an element of the frame and $V: P \rightarrow$ $\mathcal{P}(X)$ a valuation on the frame. Given a modal formula $\varphi \in F m$ we define the truth of $\varphi$ at $x$ under $V$, denoted $x, V \mid=\varphi$ inductively as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& x, V \models p \text { iff } x \in V(P) . \\
& x, V \models \psi \wedge \lambda \text { iff } x, V \models \psi \text { and } x, V \models \lambda . \\
& x, V \models \psi \vee \lambda \text { iff } x, V \models \psi \text { or } x, V \models \lambda . \\
& x, V \models \neg \psi \text { iff } x, V \not \models \psi . \\
& x, V \models \square \psi \text { iff } \forall y \in X: x \operatorname{Ry} y, V \models \psi . \\
& x, V \models \diamond \psi \text { iff } \exists y \in X: x R y \text { and } y, V \models \psi .
\end{aligned}
$$

Then, given a modal space $\mathcal{X}$ and recalling that $X^{*}$ denotes the set of clopen subsets of $X$, we define a consequence relation for $\mathcal{X}, \neq \mathcal{X}$, by $\forall \Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m, \Gamma \models \mathcal{X}$ $\varphi$ iff for all valuations $V: P \rightarrow X^{*}$ if $\forall x \in X \forall \gamma \in \Gamma, x, V \models \gamma$ then $\forall x \in X x, V \models \varphi$.

Letting $\lambda$ be a NML and $\mathcal{X} \in M S$, we say that $\mathcal{X}$ is a $\lambda$-space iff $\forall \Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m$ if $\Gamma \vdash_{\lambda} \varphi$ then $\Gamma \not \models_{\mathcal{X}} \varphi$.

Then, the natural relationship one would hope for holds.
Theorem 3.25. Let $\lambda$ be an NML with EAS $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{X} \in M S$. Then $\mathcal{X}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ iff $\mathcal{X}$ is a $\lambda$-space.

Proof. The basic idea is that a valuation on a modal space $\mathcal{X}$ induces a modal homomorphism from $F m$ to $\mathcal{X}^{*}$ and vice versa.

Let $\mathcal{X} \in M S$ and let $V: P \rightarrow X^{*}$. We define $h_{V}: F m \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^{*}$ by:

$$
h_{V}(\varphi):=\{x \in X: x, V \models \varphi\} .
$$

We claim this is a modal homomorphism. The $\wedge, \vee$ and $\neg$ cases are trivial, for $\square \varphi$; $x \in h_{V}(\square \varphi)$ iff $x, V \models \square \varphi$ iff $\forall y \in R[x] y, V \models \varphi$ iff $\forall y \in R[x] y \in h_{V}(\varphi)$ iff $R[x] \subseteq h_{V}(\varphi)$ iff $x \in \square h_{V}(\varphi)$.

Conversely, given $h: F m \upharpoonright P \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^{*}$, we define $V_{h}: F m \rightarrow X^{*}$ by $V_{h}:=h \upharpoonright P$. This is clearly a valuation on $\mathcal{X}$, moreover by induction we can check that $\forall \varphi \in F m$ $h(\varphi)=\{x \in X: x, V=\varphi\}$. The base case is simply the definition of $V_{h}$ and $x, V \models p$ for $p \in P$, the inductive step on $\wedge, \vee$ and $\neg$ is trivial. For $\varphi=\square \psi ; x \in h(\square \psi)$ iff $x \in \square h(\psi)$ iff $\forall y \in R[x] y \in h(\psi)$ iff $\forall y \in R[x] y, V \models \psi$ iff $x, V \models \square \psi$.

Now, let $\Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m$. Suppose there is a modal homomorphism $h: F m \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ such that $\forall \gamma \in \Gamma h(\gamma)=X$ but $h(\varphi) \neq X$. Then $V_{h}: P \rightarrow X^{*}$ is a valuation on $\mathcal{X}$ such that $\forall x \in X \forall \gamma \in \Gamma x, V_{h}=\gamma$ but $\exists x \in X: x, V_{h} \not \vDash \varphi$. Conversly, if $V: P \rightarrow X^{*}$ is a valuation on $\mathcal{X}$ such that $\forall x \in X \forall \gamma \in \Gamma x, V \vDash \gamma$ but $\exists x \in X: x, V \not \vDash \varphi$ then $h_{V}: F m \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ is a modal homomorphism such that $\forall \gamma \in \Gamma h_{V}(\gamma)=X$ but $h_{V}(\varphi) \neq X$. That is, $\forall \Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m, \Gamma \approx \top \models_{\mathcal{X}} \varphi=\top$ iff $\Gamma \models \mathcal{X} \varphi$.

So finally, let $\mathcal{X} \in M S$. Suppose $\mathcal{X}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$, then $\forall \Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m: \Gamma \vdash_{\lambda} \varphi$ we have $\Gamma \approx \top \models_{\mathcal{X}^{*}} \varphi \approx \top$ and therefore $\forall \Gamma \cup\{\varphi\} \subseteq F m: \Gamma \vdash_{\lambda} \varphi$ we have $\Gamma \models_{\mathcal{X}} \varphi$, i.e. $\mathcal{X}$ is а $\lambda$-space.

Suppose $\mathcal{X}$ is a $\lambda$-space. From theorem $3.11 \mathcal{X}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ iff $\forall \varphi \in F m: \vdash_{\lambda} \varphi \models_{\mathcal{X}^{*}} \varphi$. Letting $\varphi \in F m: \vdash_{\lambda} \varphi$ then as $\mathcal{X}$ is a $\lambda$-space we have $=_{\mathcal{X}} \varphi$ and therefore $=_{\mathcal{X} *} \varphi$ as required.

This alongside the duality allows us to convert the entire preceding section from a discussion about the relationship between normal modal logics and their algebraic modes to one about the relationship between normal modal logics $\lambda$ and their $\lambda$ spaces. In particular, we can re-frame the question of characterising HSC normal modal logics once more.

Corollary 3.26. Every normal modal logic $\lambda$ is sounds and complete with respect to its class of $\lambda$-spaces.

Proof. Follows from theorem 3.11 and 3.25.
We say that a NML $\lambda$ has the finite model property (FMP) iff for any $\varphi \in F m$ if there is a $\lambda$-space $\mathcal{X}$ with $\not \vDash_{\mathcal{X}} \varphi$ then there is a finite $\lambda$-space $\mathcal{Y}$ such that $\notin \mathcal{Y} \varphi$.

We say that a modal space $\mathcal{X}$ is weakly projective for a NML $\lambda$ iff for every $\lambda$ space $\mathcal{Y}$, if $\mathcal{X}$ is a closed upset of $\mathcal{Y}$ then there is a surjective continuous $p$-morphism $f: \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$.

Corollary 3.27. Let $\lambda$ be a logic extending K4.
(i) If $\lambda$ is HSC then the finite, non-trivial rooted $\lambda$-spaces are weakly projective for $\lambda$.
(ii) Suppose all the axiomatic extensions of $\lambda$ have FMP. Then, if the finite, nontrivial, rooted $\lambda$-spaces are weakly projective for $\lambda$, then $\lambda$ is HSC.

Proof. This is simply a translation of lemma 3.23 using theorem $3.25 \& 3.18$ and lemmas 2.9 \& 2.10 .

With this we have all the requisite background theory for our main task. Through the notion of algebraizable logics and its application to modal logic (definition 3.9, theorem 3.11) we have re-characterised the problem of determining which transitive modal logics are hereditarily structurally complete to the problem of determining which varieties of K4-algebras are primitive (theorem 3.14). We have also gone some way into reducing that task providing both a necessary (3.15) and sufficient (3.22) condition for being primitive. This sets the stage for our main investigation, where we will look to solve this algebraic problem using Jónsson-Tarski duality as an aid. However, we have also given a direct order-topological semantics for transitive modal logics (3.24) which fits in neatly with the rest of the theory (3.25). This provides a different framing of the problem, one which avoids any reference to algebra (3.27).

## Chapter 4

## Understanding the Problem

With the relevant background theory covered, we now turn to our central question - when is a variety of K4-algebras primitive?

### 4.1 Rybakov's Characterisation of HSC logics over K4

Our starting point is the characterisation given by Rybakov for HSC logics over K4 [28, Theorem 4.5].

Rybakov's Theorem In order for a modal logic $\lambda$ over K4 to be HSC, it is necessary and sufficient that $\lambda$ not be included in any of the logics $\lambda\left(F_{i}\right): 1 \leq i \leq 13$ and $\lambda\left(F_{3}^{\prime}\right)$.


$F_{8}$
$F_{11}$

$F_{9}$

$F_{12}$

$F_{10}$

$F_{13}$

Remarks. In the case of $i \in\{2,5,6,7,8,9\}$ the root of the frame can be either reflexive or irreflexive and so $F_{i}$ represents two frames. When we say that $\lambda$ is not included in the logic $\lambda\left(F_{i}\right)$, this is shorthand for saying that $\lambda$ is not included in the logic of the reflexive version of the frame $F_{i}$ and $\lambda$ is not included in the logic of the irreflexive version of the frame.

Rybakov discusses hereditary structural completeness as a property of a logic $\lambda$, that is a set of formulas. To make sense of derivability, which is sensitive to the postulated inference rules for the logic, Rybakov always assumes those rules to be modus ponens and necessitation [28, pg 477]. As explained in the previous chapter, this lines up with our focus on $\lambda_{g}$.

Rybakov defines HSC for a logic $\lambda$ as every logic $\lambda^{\prime}$ extending $\lambda$ being structurally complete. Translating to the deductive system terminology, this means Rybakov is following the axiomatic extension version of HSC as explained in definition 3.12.

Each of the transitive frames above is naturally a transitive space under the discrete topology.

Bearing this in mind and our work in the previous chapter, we can put Rybakov's characterisation into terms more amenable to our investigation:

Claim Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety of K4-algebras. Then $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive iff $\mathcal{A}$ omits $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq$ $i \leq 13$ and $\left(F_{3}^{\prime}\right)^{*}$.

However, it is not our aim to prove this. By re-framing the problem in algebraic terms we illuminate a mistake in Rybakov's characterisation regarding $F_{3}^{\prime}$.

Theorem 4.1. The variety generated by $\left(F_{3}^{\prime}\right)^{*}$ is primitive.
Proof. Let $A=\left(F_{3}^{\prime}\right)^{*}$, so $A_{*} \cong F_{3}^{\prime}$. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be the variety generated by $A$, i.e. $\mathcal{A}=$ $\operatorname{HSP}(A)$. First, we recall that a variety generated by a finite collection of finite algebras is locally finite [1, Theorem 3.49], so $\mathcal{A}$ is locally finite. Thus, by theorem 3.16,
to show $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive it is sufficient to show that each finite non-trivial FSI member of $\mathcal{A}$ is weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$. We start with a structural claim:

Claim: Letting $\mathcal{A}_{\omega}$ denote the class of finite members of $\mathcal{A}$, then $\forall B \in \mathcal{A}_{\omega} B$ is finite with $d\left(B_{*}\right) \leq 3$ and $\forall x \in B_{*}$ :
(a) If $d(x)=1$ then $R[x]=\{x\}$;
(b) If $d(x)=2$ then $R[x]=\{y\}$ for some $y \in B$ such that $d(y)=1$;
(c) If $d(x)=3$ then $R[x]=\{y, z\}$ for some $y, z \in B$ such that $d(y)=2, d(z)=1$ and $R[y]=\{z\}$.

That is $B_{*}$ is a disjoint union of a finite collection of spaces, each of which has as underlying frame a tree of depth 3 where the element of depth 1 is reflexive and all other elements are irreflexive. For example:


Now, $\mathcal{A}_{\omega}=\mathbb{H S P}_{\omega}(A)$ where $\mathbb{P}_{\omega}$ denotes the operation of taking finite products. From lemma 2.10 we know that $\mathbb{H}$ is dual to $\mathbb{M}$, the operation of taking $M$-subspaces, $S$ to $Q$, the operation of taking quotients of modal equivalences and $\mathbb{P}_{\omega}$ to $\mathbb{U}_{\omega}$, the operation of taking finite disjoint unions. So, letting $S$ be the set of finite transitive spaces of depth at most 3 satisfying conditions (a), (b) and (c), to establish our claim it is sufficient to check $S=\mathbb{M Q U}_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)$. We will use $a, b$ and $c$ to denote the element of depth 3,2 and 1 in $A_{*}$ respectively.

For $\subseteq$ : Let $\mathcal{X} \in S$. If $X$ has no elements of depth 1 then $X=\varnothing$ and $\mathcal{X} \in$ $\mathbb{M Q U}_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)$. Suppose $X$ has elements of depth 1 , indeed for now assume that $X$ has exactly one element of depth 1 which we denote by $z$. Now, if $X$ has no elements of depth 2 then $X=\{z\}$, and by (a) $z R z$, i.e., $X$ is a single reflexive point. This is an $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$, so $\mathcal{X} \in \mathbb{M Q U}_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)$.

Suppose $X$ has elements of depth 2. As $X$ is finite we may list them $\left\{y_{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{n}$. Note that $\forall y_{i} \in X$ by (b) $R\left[y_{i}\right]=\{z\}$. Then, for each $1 \leq i \leq n$ we list any elements of depth 3 in $X$ that see $y_{i}$ as $\left\{x_{j_{i}}\right\}_{j=1}^{n_{i}}$. If there are no such elements, we will take $n_{i}=1$ and add a placeholder $x_{1_{i}}$. using our example above, we would have the following labels for the elements of $X$ and add a placeholder element $x_{1_{n-1}}$ :


Then we define the following:

$$
J:=\bigcup_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\left(j_{i}\right) \in \omega: 1 \leq j_{i} \leq n_{i}\right\} ; \mathcal{Y}:=\coprod_{\left(i, j_{i}\right) \in n \times J} A_{*} .
$$

That is $\mathcal{Y}$ is the disjoint union of $n \times|J|$ copies of $A_{*}$. Note that by definition $\mathcal{Y} \in$ $\mathbb{U}_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)$ and by construction $\mathcal{Y} \in S$.

We then define $E$ on $\mathcal{Y}$ as follows:
(i) $\left(c,\left(i, j_{i}\right)\right) E\left(c,\left(i^{\prime}, j_{i^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right)\right) \forall\left(i, j_{i}\right),\left(i^{\prime},\left(j_{i^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right) \in n \times J\right.$;
(ii) $\left(b,\left(i, j_{i}\right)\right) E\left(b,\left(i^{\prime}, j_{i^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right)\right)$ iff $i=i^{\prime}$;
(iii) $\left(a,\left(i, j_{i}\right)\right) E\left(a,\left(i^{\prime}, j_{i^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right)\right)$ iff $i=i^{\prime}$ and $j=j^{\prime}$.

That is we identify all elements of depth 1 together and for each $1 \leq i \leq n$ we identify all the elements of depth 2 with index $i \in n$ together. Each element of depth 3 is in its own singleton equivalence class. This is clearly an equivalence relation, we moreover claim it is a modal equivalence. As we are working with finite spaces condition (ii) is trivial. For condition (i); Let $u, v, w \in Y$ such that $u E v$ and $u R w$. Either $d(u)=1, d(u)=2$ or $d(u)=3$. If $d(u)=1$ then $d(v)=1$ and $w E v$. Moreover $v R v$ so we may take $v$ itself as witness. If $d(u)=2$ then $d(v)=2, u$ and $v$ have the same index $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $v R v$. Now $d(u)=2$ with $u R w$ so because $\mathcal{Y} \in S$ we have $R[u]=\{w\}$ with $d(w)=1$. Similarly, $R[v]=\{t\}$ for some $t \in Y$ such that $d(t)=1$, then $v R t$ and $w E t$ so we may take $t$ as witness. Finally, if $d(u)=3$ then $u=v$ so $v R w$ and we may take $w$ as witness.

Therefore $\mathcal{Y} / E \in \mathbb{Q U}_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)$. We then consider the closed upset of $\mathcal{Y} / E$ :

$$
Z:=\bigcup_{R^{-1}\left[y_{i}\right] \neq \varnothing} R\left[a,\left(i, j_{i}\right)\right] .
$$

That is we cut out the singleton equivalence classes $\left[a,\left(i, j_{i}\right)\right]$ where $n_{i}=1$ was a placeholder. Letting $\mathcal{Z}$ be the $M$-subspace with underlying set $Z, \mathcal{Z} \in \mathbb{M Q U}_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)$. Moreover, the construction demonstrates that the map $z \mapsto\left[c,\left(1,1_{1}\right)\right], y_{i} \mapsto\left[b,\left(i, j_{1}\right)\right]$ and $x_{j_{i}} \mapsto\left[a\left(i, j_{i}\right)\right]$ is an isomorphism from $\mathcal{X}$ to $\mathcal{Z}$, so $\mathcal{X} \in \mathbb{M Q U}_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)$.

In the case that $\mathcal{X}$ has more than one element of depth 1 , letting $\left\{z_{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{n}$ be those elements, for each $z_{i}, R^{-1}\left[z_{i}\right]$ is a closed upset with exactly one element of depth 1 , and so the $M$-subspace with it as underlying set is in $S$ and moreover is also in $\mathbb{M Q U}_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)$ by the argument above. Then $\mathcal{X} \cong \coprod_{i=1}^{n} R^{-1}\left[z_{i}\right]$, so $\mathcal{X} \in \operatorname{MQU}_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)$.

For $\supseteq$ : Inspecting $A_{*}$ it is clear that $A_{*}$. To conclude we must check $S$ is closed under our three operations. Let $\mathcal{X} \in S$.

Let $\mathcal{Y}$ be an $M$-subspace of $\mathcal{X}$. Then $Y \subseteq X$ is a closed upset. As $\mathcal{X}$ is finite and $d(X) \leq 3, \mathcal{Y}$ is also finite and as it is an upset $d(Y) \leq 3$ and moreover $\forall x \in Y$ $R_{Y}[x]=R_{X}[x]$ and so $\mathcal{Y}$ immediately satisfies conditions (a) (b) and (c). So $\mathcal{Y} \in S$.

Let $E$ be a modal equivalence on $\mathcal{X}$. First, we quickly note that $X / E$ is finite. Now, consider $x \in X . R_{E}[x]=\left\{[u] \in X / E: \exists x E x^{\prime}, u E u^{\prime}: x^{\prime} R u^{\prime}\right\}$ and moreover as $E$ is a modal equivalence if $[u] \in R_{E}[x]$ then $\exists u^{\prime \prime} E u^{\prime} E u: x R u^{\prime \prime}$.

Now, if $d(x)=1, R[x]=\{x\}$ so $u^{\prime \prime}=x,[x]=[u]$ and $R_{E}[x]=\{[x]\}$. Note also that $d([x])] 1$.

If $d(x)=2, R[x]=\{y\}: d(y)=1$. Then $u^{\prime \prime}=y$ and $[u]=[y]$. So $R_{E}[x]=\{[y]\}$. Now, either $x E y$ or $x E y$. If $x E y$ then $R_{E}[x]=\{[x]\}$ and $d([x])=1$. If $x E y$ then $[y] \neq[x]$ and $R_{E}[x]=\{[y]\}$. We just noted that $d(y)=1$ implies $d([y])=1$ and so $d([x])=2$.

If $d(x)=3$ then $R[x]=\{y, z\}, d(y)=2, d(z)=1$ and $R[y]=\{z\}$. So $u^{\prime \prime}=y$ or $u^{\prime \prime}=z$ and $R_{E}[x] \subseteq\{[y],[z]\}$. If $y E z$ then $R_{E}[x]=\{[y]\}$ and as in the previous case we have either $R_{E}[x]=\{[x]\}$ and $d([x])=1$ or $R_{E}[x]=\{[y]\}, d([y])=1$ and $d([x])=2$. If $y E z, R_{E}[x]=\{[y],[z]\}$. Moreover, as $y R z$ from the previous case we have $R_{E}[y]=\{[z]\}, d([z])=1$ and $d([y])=2$. If $x E y$ then as $E$ is a modal equivalence $\exists w \in X: y R w$ and $y E w$. Then $x R w$ so $w=y$ or $z$. As $y E z w \neq z$, so $w=y$ and $y R y$, but $R[y]=\{z\}$ so we have a contradiction. So $x E y$. If $x E z$ then again $\exists w \in X: w E y$ and $z R w$, then $x R w$ so $w=y$ or $z$. $y E z$ so $w \neq z$ but as $d(z)=1$ $R[z]=\{z\}$ so we have a contradiction. So $x \mathbb{E z}$. So $[x],[y]$ and $[z]$ are all distinct and $d([x])=3$.

This exhausts the possibilities for $d(x)$, so $\forall[x] \in X / E d([x]) \leq 3, d(X / E) \leq 3$ and in every case conditions (a), (b) and (c) held, so $\mathcal{X} / E \in S$.

Let $\{\mathcal{X}\}_{i=1}^{n} \subseteq S$. Let $(x, j) \in \breve{L}_{i=1}^{n} X_{i}$. Then $\mathcal{X}_{j} \in S$ and $x \in X_{j}$. If $d(x, j)=1$ then $d(x)=1, R_{j}[x]=\{x\}$ and so $R[x, j]=\{(x, j)\}$. If $d(x, j)=2$ then $d(x)=2$, $R_{j}[x]=\{y\}: d(y)=1$ and so $R[x, j]=\{(y, j)\}: d(y, j)=1$ and if $d(x, j)=3$ then $R_{j}[x]=\{y, z\}: d(y)=2, d(z)=1$ and $R[y]=\{z\}$ and so $R[x, j]=\{(y, j),(x, j)\}:$ $d(y, j)=2, d(z, j)=1$ and $R[y, j]=\{z, j\}$. So $\bigsqcup_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{X}_{j} \in S$. This completes the proof of the claim.

Now, let $B \in \mathcal{A}$ be finite, non-trivial and FSI. $B \in \mathcal{A}_{\omega}$, therefore lemma 2.9 and the claim together imply that $B_{*}$ is one of the following frames:


Letting $C \in \mathcal{A}: B \in \mathbb{H}(C)$, as $B$ is finite there exists a subalgebra $D$ of $C$ which is finitely generated and such that $B \in \mathbb{H}(D)$. If $B \in \mathbb{I S}(D)$ then $B \in \mathbb{I S}(C)$, so to check that $B$ is weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$ it is enough to establish $B \in \mathbb{I S}(D)$. As $D$ is finitely generated and $\mathcal{A}$ is locally finite, $D$ is finite, so $D \in \mathcal{A}_{\omega}$. Now we have three cases:
(i); As $B \in \mathbb{H}(D)$, by lemma $2.10, B_{*}$ is an $M$-subspace of $D_{*}$ and so $D_{*}$ has an element of depth 3 . Now, $d\left(D_{*}\right) \leq 3$ so $D_{*}$ satisfies condition (a) in lemma 2.18 trivially and is finite so satisfied condition (c) trivially as well. Letting $x \in D_{*}$, if $x \in S l_{1}\left(D_{*}\right)$ then $R[x]=\{x\}$ and $x R x$, if $x \in S l_{2}\left(D_{*}\right)$ then $R[x]=\{y\}$ so $x R x$ and if $x \in \operatorname{Sl}_{3}\left(D_{*}\right)$ then $R[x]=\{y, z\}$ so again $x \mathbb{R} x$. So $D_{*}$ satisfied condition (b) of lemma 2.18. So, letting $E$ be the modal equivalence identifying points at the same depth, as
$D_{*}$ has an element of depth 3 we have that $D_{*} / E \cong B_{*}$ and so $D_{*} \rightarrow B_{*}$.
(ii); $D_{*}$ has an element of depth 2 . As above we may take the modal equivalence $E$ identifying points at the same depth on $D_{*}$. Then, either $D_{*}$ has no elements of depth $3, D_{*} / E \cong B_{*}$ and so $D_{*} \rightarrow B_{*}$, or it does have an element of depth 3. Then we obtain $B_{*}$ from $D_{*} / E$ by applying an $\alpha$-reduction and so again $D_{*} \rightarrow B_{*}$.
(iii); $D_{*}$ has an element of depth 1 . Once more we take the modal equivalence $E$ identifying points at the same depth on $D_{*}$. This time, $D_{*}$ either has an element of depth 3 , has no elements of depth 3 and an element of depth 2 or only elements of depth 1 . In the first two cases we obtain $B_{*}$ from $D_{*} / E$ by applying $\alpha$-reductions, and in the third $D_{*} / E \cong B_{*}$, so in all cases $D_{*} \rightarrow B_{*}$.

In all cases $D_{*} \rightarrow B_{*}$ and so $B \in \mathbb{I S}(D)$ and we are done.

### 4.2 A New Characterisation of HSC logics over K4

With theorem 4.1 we know there are primitive varieties that include $\left(F_{3}^{\prime}\right)^{*}$ and we need to adjust the characterisation. This is not as simple as just dropping $F_{3}^{\prime}$ from the characterisation. Whilst that frame, along with a family of frames like it, should be in the characterisation its presence in Rybakov's characterisation was preventing a large collection of genuinely problematic algebras from appearing. Moreover, as we will make precise in the next section, whilst in isolation frames of this family are not problematic together they can present a problem.

In addition to those already introduced, the following frames and spaces will play a special role in our considerations:


$$
F_{14}
$$


$F_{17}$

$F_{15}$


H

Remarks. The frame $G_{n}$ where $n \in \omega$ refers to a reflexive point preceded by a chain of $n$ irreflexive points and $\left|G_{n}\right|=n+1 . G_{\omega}$ is the transitive space $(\mathbb{N} \cup\{\omega\}, \tau, R)$ where:

$$
R[x]= \begin{cases}\mathbb{N} \cup\{\omega\} & \text { if } x=\omega \\ \{m \in \mathbb{N}: m<x\} & \text { if } x \in \mathbb{N} \\ \{0\} & \text { if } x=0\end{cases}
$$

Also, $\tau$ is the one-point compactification of $\mathbb{N}$, i.e. $U \subseteq \mathbb{N} \cup\{\omega\}$ is clopen iff $U$ is any finite subset of $\mathbb{N}$ exlcuding $\omega$ or $U=U^{\prime} \cup\{\omega\}$ where $U^{\prime}$ is a cofinite subsets of $\mathbb{N}$.

Our characterisation for primitive varieties of K4-algebras and the main theorem of this project becomes:

Theorem (Primitive Varieties of K4-algebras).
Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety of K4-algebras. Then $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive iff $\mathcal{A}$ omits $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $\exists n>0: \mathcal{A}$ omits $G_{n}^{*}$.

Once established, in line with our discussions in chapter 3 this gives our characterisation of HSC transitive modal logics.

Corollary (Hereditarily Strucutrally Complete Logics over K4).
Let $\lambda$ be a normal modal logic with equivalent algebraic semantics $\mathcal{A}$. The following are equivalent:
(i) $\lambda$ is HSC.
(ii) $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive.
(iii) For all $1 \leq i \leq 17 F_{i}$ is not a $\lambda$-space and $\exists n>0$ such that $G_{n}$ is not a $\lambda$-space.

### 4.2.1 The Proof Strategy

The proof of our characterisation for primitive varieties of K4-algebras is quite technical and fairly dense. In an effort not to miss the forest for the trees, we should take a moment now to comment on our overall proof strategy and plan for the rest of our investigation.

In the previous chapter we used the theory of algebraic logic alongside results from universal algebra to establish a necessary and sufficient condition for a variety of K4-algebras to be primitive (lemma 3.23). This forms the backbone of our proof strategy. First we establish that primitive varieties of K4-algebras must omit the given algebras as otherwise they violate the necessary condition. Second we establish that any variety of K4-algebras omitting the given algebras satisfies the sufficient condition and is therefore primitive. In each case, we employ JónnsonTarski to tackle these algebraic problems using topological methods. The first task is straightforward and covered in the next section (lemma 4.2). To show that a primitive variety $\mathcal{A}$ omits one of the barred algebras $A$ we argue that we can, through the operations of disjoint union and quotient, construct form $A$ a finite, non-trivial FSI algebra which is not weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$.

The second task is much more involved. Our sufficiency condition means that given a variety $\mathcal{A}$ omitting the given algebras we need to establish two things, that
all its sub-varieties have the FMP and that all the finite, non-trivial FSI members of the variety are weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$. In both cases, the bulk of the work lies in establishing a detailed description of the structure of the finitely generated, non-trivial SI members of the varieties (theorem 5.11). This is the focus of chapter 5. The idea is to establish a group of results that in each case demonstrate a particular frame substructure never appears in our interested spaces. These results then drive the proof of the description.

A helpful comparison for this part of our investigation is the work done by Bezhanishvili and Moraschini in [5, Section 6] where they attempt to do the same for intermediate logic and Esakia spaces. Each of the frame substructure proofs follow a similar pattern. In each case, we assume the substructure does appear in a space whose dual is in one of our varieties. Then by taking $M$-subspaces and quotients we eventually recover one of our barred spaces, this implies via lemma 2.10 that the dual of the barred space is in the variety which is a contradiction. Whilst Bezhanishvili and Moraschini only had to consider finite spaces, we cannot make that restriction. Accounting for this changes the timbre of the proofs a little, forcing us to repeatedly find clopen subsets to work with in place of individual points, but the ideas are very similar.

We can also compare the wider strategy to establish the desired description. The three central results (lemmas $5.6,5.7 \& 5.8$ ) that drive the proof of the main theorem are the same three structural results that Bezhanishvili and Moraschini establish (lemmas 6.4, 6.8 \& 6.10 respectively). However, because our spaces are built from frames rather than posets we have to worry about clusters and irreflexive points. Whilst clusters can be effectively ignored throughout via lemma 2.15, irreflexive points are more problematic, even making the work done within each proof markedly more difficult. As such, we start with some results to better understand how irreflexive points behave in our spaces (lemmas $5.3 \& 5.4$ ). Once the three central results are established, we need a few more results related to irreflexive points (lemmas $5.9 \& 5.10$ ) before we are then in position to establish our description of the structure of dual spaces to finitely generated, non-trivial SI algebras in our varieties.

Once that detailed description of the finitely generated, non-trivial SI members is in place we will be in position to complete the proof of our characterisation in chapter 6 . Recall that our aim was to establish given any variety omitting the given algebras all its sub-varieties have the FMP and all its finite, non-trivial FSI members are weakly projective. For the FMP result, because any sub-variety must omit all algebras that its larger variety does, it is sufficient to check that any variety $\mathcal{A}$ omitting the given algebras has the FMP (theorem 6.1). We do this through a variation on K . Fine's drop point technique [14, Theorem 4], we take an algebra $A \in \mathcal{A}$, which we can assume is finitely generated, non-trivial and SI, that invalidates a given formula. Our assumptions mean the dual space $A_{*}$ has the structure described by theorem 5.11 and based on this we demonstrate how to construct a finite $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$ such that its dual algebra also invalidates the given formula.

Finally we give the weakly projective result. Our description of the finitely generated, non-trivial SI members of a variety $\mathcal{A}$ omitting the given algebras has as a corollary a description of the finite, non-trivial and FSI members of $\mathcal{A}$ (corollary 5.12). Given such an algebra $A \in \mathcal{A}$ we can reduce the problem of it being weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$ to demonstrating that if $A_{*}$ is a closed upset of $B_{*}$ where $B \in \mathcal{A}$ is finitely
generated then there is a surjective continuous $p$-morphism $f: B_{*} \rightarrow A_{*}$. With our description we can do this recursively, collapsing $B_{*}$ into the elements of $A_{*}$ of depth 0 , then depth 1 and so on.

It is interesting to compare our work to Rybakov's own proof strategy in his original characterisation [29]. Much of our work is quite similar, in particular there is a clear mirror between our structural work in chapter 5 and similar results from Rybakov in [29, Section 3]. We both put some controls on irreflexive points (lemmas 5.1, 5.3 \& 5.4 for us vs lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 for Rybakov [29]), a width criteria (lemma 5.6 vs lemma 3.3) and how clusters relate to each other (lemmas 5.7 \& 5.8 vs lemma 3.4). This is used to give the desired description (theorem 5.11 vs lemma 3.6 \& corollary 3.8). As one would expect, the description itself is quite similar with the differences arising in line with our adjusted characterisation; we allow for some additional behaviour amongst irreflexive points beyond solely being the root (as Rybakov requires). Rybakov also establishes that the logics $\lambda$ omitting his frames have the FMP using K. Fine's drop point technique (theorem 6.1 vs lemma 3.9).

However, when it comes to how these results are used to complete the proof of the characterisation there is a sharp differences in the approaches. As discussed, we use results in universal algebra to complete the sufficient direction of the characterisation via our weakly projective result (lemma 6.2). By contrast, Rybakov reduces the problem to showing that every FSI modal algebra in $\mathcal{A}$ is a subalgebra of some free algebra of finite rank in $\mathcal{A}$, where $\mathcal{A}$ is the equivalent algebraic semantics of a logic omitting his frames (theorem 2.2). To prove this, he relies on the construction of a sequence of $n$-characterising models $\mathrm{Ch}_{n}(\lambda)$ for a logic $\lambda$ over K4 (lemma 4.3). This difference also appears in the necessary direction, where again our focus is on the notion of weak projectivity (lemma 4.2) whereas Rybakov employs the $n$ characterising models, reducing the problem to showing that there is no $p$-morphism from $C h_{\lambda\left(F_{i}\right)}(k)$ for all $k \in \omega$ onto some rooted generated subframe $E$ of the $F_{i}$, where $F_{i}$ is one of his given frames.

### 4.3 The First Direction

One direction of our main theorem can be established relatively easily via lemma 3.15.

Lemma 4.2. Primitive varieties of K4-algebras omit $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$.

Proof. Supposing $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive, by lemma 3.15 all its finite, non-trivial FSI memebrs are weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$. Therefore, to show $\mathcal{A}$ omits some algebra $A$ it is sufficient to show that if $A \in \mathcal{A}$ then there is a finite, non-trivial FSI member of $\mathcal{A}$ that is not weakly projective. This is the plan for each of the $F_{i}$ and $F_{i}^{\prime}$, following the proof strategy of lemma 5.1 in [5].

For $i \in\{1,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,14,15$; consider the following frames:

$X_{4}$

$X_{7}$

$X_{10}$

$X_{15}$

Where relevant, we insist the $\odot$ points within a frame match, i.e. they are either both reflexive or both irreflexive. First, observe that each $F_{i}$ is an $M$-subspace of $X_{i}$ so by lemma $2.10 F_{i}^{*} \in \mathbb{H}\left(X_{i}^{*}\right)$. Second, by inspection we can see that there is no way to reduce each $X_{i}$ to $F_{i}$ by $\alpha, \beta$ or $\gamma$ reductions, so by lemma 2.14 there is no surjective continuous $p$-morphism from $X_{i}$ to $F_{i}$ and in turn by lemma 2.10, $F_{i}^{*} \notin \mathbb{I S}\left(X_{i}^{*}\right)$. By contrast, we can reduce the disjoint union $F_{i} \amalg F_{i}$ to $X_{i}$ and so once more by lemma 2.10, $X_{i}^{*} \in \mathbb{I S} \mathbb{P}\left(F_{i}^{*}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{A}$. Thus, $X_{i}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}, F_{i}^{*} \in \mathbb{H}\left(X_{i}^{*}\right)$ but $\left.F_{i}^{*} \notin \mathbb{I S} X_{i}^{*}\right)$, so $F_{i}^{*}$ is not weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$ but is finite, non-trivial and FSI (from lemma 2.9 and $F_{i}$
rooted).
For $i \in\{2,3,11,12,13,16,17\}$; consider the following frames:

$$
X_{13}=X_{17}
$$

Then, $X_{i}$ is an $M$-subspace of $F_{i}$ so $X_{i}^{*} \in \mathbb{H}\left(F_{i}^{*}\right) \subseteq \mathcal{A}$. By inspection we cannot reduce $F_{i}$ to $X_{i}$ and so $X_{i}^{*} \notin \mathbb{I} S\left(F_{i}^{*}\right)$. So $X_{i}^{*}$ is finite, non-trivial and FSI but not weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$.

Now we need to show that $\mathcal{A}$ omits $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Consider $G_{1}$ which is a $M$-subspace of $G_{\omega}$ so $G_{1} \in \mathbb{H}\left(G_{\omega}\right)$. Now, let $f: G_{\omega} \rightarrow G_{1}$ be a $p$-morphism. Then, $f[R[\omega]]=f[\mathbb{N} \cup\{\omega\}]$. Letting $y$ be the maximal reflexive element of $G_{1}$ and $x$ its irreflexive root, either $f(\omega)=y$ or $f(\omega)=x$. If the latter, then $x \in f[\mathbb{N} \cup\{\omega\}]$ but $R[f(\omega)]=R[x]=\{y\}$ and so $R[f(\omega)] \neq f[R[\omega]]$ contradicting $f$ being a $p$ morphism. So $f(\omega)=y$, and then $f[\mathbb{N} \cup\{\omega\}]=f[R[\omega]]=R[f(\omega)]=R[y]=\{y\}$, so $f$ is not surjective. Thus, there is no surjective continuous $p$-morphism from $G_{\omega}$ to $G_{1}$ and once again $G_{1}^{*} \notin \mathbb{I} S\left(G_{\omega}^{*}\right)$. Now, $G_{1}^{*}$ finite, non-trivial and FSI so must be weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$, and so as $G_{1}^{*} \in \mathbb{H}\left(G_{\omega}^{*}\right)$ and $G_{1}^{*} \notin \mathbb{I} S\left(G_{\omega}^{*}\right)$ we have that $\mathcal{A}$ must omit $G_{\omega}^{*}$.

Now, each $G_{n}$ is a closed upset of $G_{\omega}$, so by lemma $2.10 G_{n}^{*} \in \mathbb{H}\left(G_{\omega}^{*}\right)$, in fact it is easy to check that $f_{n}: G_{\omega}^{*} \rightarrow G_{n}^{*}$ by $U \mapsto U \cap G_{n}$ is the resulting surjective homomorphism.

Consider a Fm-equation $\epsilon \approx \delta$ such that $\not \vDash_{G_{\omega}^{*}} \epsilon \approx \delta$. Then $\exists h: F m \rightarrow G_{\omega}^{*}$ : $h(\epsilon) \neq h(\delta)$. We assume w.l.o.g that $h(\epsilon) \nsubseteq h(\delta)$ i.e. $\exists x \in \mathbb{N} \cup\{\omega\}: x \in h(\epsilon)$ and $x \notin h(\delta)$. If $x=n \in \mathbb{N}$ then we can consider $G_{n}^{*}$, and $x \in h(\epsilon) \cap G_{n}$ but $x \notin h(\delta) \cap G_{n}$, i.e. $f_{n} \circ h: F m \rightarrow G_{n}^{*}: f_{n}(h(\epsilon)) \neq f_{n}(h(\delta))$ and $\not \vDash_{G_{n}^{*}} \epsilon \approx \delta$. If $x=\omega$, then $\omega \in h(\epsilon)$ and so from the topology on $G_{\omega}$ we get $h(\epsilon) \cap \mathbb{N}$ is cofinite in $\mathbb{N}$. Also, $\omega \notin h(\delta)$, so again from the topology on $G_{\omega}$ we get $h(\delta)$ is a finite subset of $\mathbb{N}$. So, we can find $n \in \omega: n \in h(\epsilon)$ and $n \notin h(\delta)$ and proceeding as before we obtain $\not \vDash_{G_{n}^{*}} \epsilon \approx \delta$. That is, if $\not \models_{G_{\omega}^{*}} \epsilon \approx \delta$ then $\exists n \in \omega: \not \vDash_{G_{n}^{*}} \epsilon \approx \delta$.

Finally, recall that as a variety $\mathcal{A}$ is equationally definable. Let $\Theta$ be a set of defining equations for $\mathcal{A}$, then as it omits $G_{\omega}^{*} \exists \epsilon \approx \delta \in \Theta: \not \vDash_{G_{\omega}^{*}} \epsilon \approx \delta$, which from above implies $\exists n \in \omega: \not \vDash_{G_{n}^{*}} \epsilon \approx \delta$. Then $G_{n}^{*} \notin \mathcal{A}$ as required.

This completes the necessary direction of our main result. We have now identified the mistake in Rybakov's original characterisations (theorem 4.1) and provided a new corrected characterisation. Our main task is to establish the new characterisations, with the first and more straightforward direction already provided (lemma 4.2).

## Chapter 5

## Structural Results

In this chapter we are going to start describing the dual frame structure to the algebras in the varieties we are interested in. This culminates in a detailed description of the dual spaces to finitely generated, non-trivial SI members of those varieties.

### 5.1 Handling Irreflexive Points

We start with three lemmas related to the behaviour of irreflexive points. These are not only important structural results in their own right, but will also make the remainder of our work far easier by allowing us to control for where irreflexive points in our spaces appear.

Lemma 5.1. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Let $A \in \mathcal{A}$.
Then, either the maximal points of $A_{*}$ are reflexive or $A_{*}$ is an anti-chain of irreflexive points.

Proof. Suppose that $A_{*}$ is not an anti-chain of irreflexive points, i.e. $R \neq \varnothing$ and that $A_{*}$ has maximal irreflexive points, i.e. $\exists x \in A_{*}: R[x]=\varnothing$.

First, we suppose $\exists y \in A_{*}: \forall z \in R^{+}[y], R[z] \neq \varnothing$. Then $y \in R^{+}[y]$ so $R[y] \neq \varnothing$ and $y \neq x$. Let $\mathcal{X}$ be the $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$ with underlying set $R^{+}[x] \cup R^{+}[y]=$ $\{x\} \cup R^{+}[y]$, by lemma $2.10 \mathcal{X} \in \mathcal{A}$. Now, $\varnothing$ is a clopen in $\mathcal{X}$ and so $\square \varnothing=\{z \in$ $X: R[z]=\varnothing\}=\{x\}$ by the assumption on $y$. So $\{x\}$ is clopen as and moreover so is its complement $R^{+}[y]$. Then $R^{+}[y]$ is an upset with $\forall z \in R^{+}[y] R[z] \neq \varnothing$, so a small adaption of lemma 2.16 let us consider the modal equivalence $E$ identifying all points in $R^{+}[y]$. Then, again by lemma 2.10, $(\mathcal{X} / E)^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$, so me may w.l.o.g assume $E$ is the identity on $X$, i.e. $R^{+}[y]=\{y\}$ and $X$ is the following frame is isomorphic to $F_{11}$. So $F_{11}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.

$$
\text { - } x \circ y
$$

So, now suppose $\forall y \in A_{*} \exists z \in R^{+}[y]: R[z]=\varnothing$. Next, we suppose $\exists y \in$ $A_{*}: R[y] \neq \varnothing$ and $\forall z \in R^{+}[y] \backslash\{y\} R[z]=\varnothing$. Then, we consider the $M$-subspace $\mathcal{X}$ with underlying set $R^{+}[y]$. Then, once more $\varnothing$ is clopen in $\mathcal{X}$, so $\square \varnothing=R^{+}[y] \backslash\{y\}$ is clopen and an upset. We claim that the relation $E$ identifying all points in $R^{+}[y] \backslash\{y\}$ is a modal equivalence. Condition (ii) holds from it being clopen, for (i), if $u E v$ then either $u=y=v$ so if $u R w, v R w$ as well or $u, v \in R^{+}[y] \backslash\{y\}$ and so $R[u]=\varnothing=R[v]$ and the condition holds trivially. Then, assuming w.l.o.g that $E$ is the identity on $X$
then $X$ is the following frame isomorphic to $F_{2}$ which is a contradiction.


So, now we may suppose that firstly $\forall y \in A_{*} \exists z \in R^{+}[y]: R[z]=\varnothing$ and secondly either $R[y]=\varnothing$ or $\exists z \in R^{+}[y] \backslash\{y\}: R[z] \neq \varnothing$. We define $E$ on $A_{*}$ by:

$$
E:=\left\{(u, v) \in A_{*}^{2}: R[u]=\varnothing=R[v]\right\} \cup\left\{(u, v) \in A_{*}^{2}: R[u], R[v] \neq \varnothing\right\} .
$$

We claim this is a modal equialvance. For $(i)$ in the definition of a modal equivalence; let $u E v$ and $u R w$, then $R[u] \neq \varnothing$ and so $R[v] \neq \varnothing$. Then, by our conditions $\exists t_{1} \in R^{+}[v]: R\left[t_{1}\right]=\varnothing$ and $\exists t_{2} \in R^{+}[v] \backslash\{v\}: R\left[t_{2}\right] \neq \varnothing$. As $R[v] \neq \varnothing, t_{1} \neq v$, so $v R t_{1}$. Then, either $R[w]=\varnothing$ so $v R t_{1}$ and $w E t_{1}$ as required, or $R[w] \neq \varnothing$ so $v R t_{2}$ and $w E t_{2}$ as required. For (ii); once more $\varnothing$ is clopen in $A_{*}$ and so $\square \varnothing=\left\{z \in A_{*}\right.$ : $R[z]=\varnothing\}$ is clopen, meaning it or its complement will separate any $u \notin v$ as required. Now, $R \neq \varnothing$ means that $\exists y \in A_{*}: R[y] \neq \varnothing$, which by assumption sees a point sees a point $z: R[z]=\varnothing$. Therefore, assuming w.l.o.g that $E$ is the identity on $A_{*}, A_{*}$ is the following frame isomorphic to $F_{2}$ which is again a contradiction.


As hinted at in the proof itself, there is a useful consequence of this first lemma.
Corollary 5.2. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Let $A \in \mathcal{A}$.

If $R \neq \varnothing$, then the maximal points of $A_{*}$ are reflexive and $\forall x \in A_{*} R[x] \neq \varnothing$.
In almost all of our work to follow we will be working with spaces where $R \neq \varnothing$, and we will routinely use this corollary without direct reference to find a point in $R[x]$.

Lemma 5.3. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Let $A \in \mathcal{A}$ and $x \in A_{*}: x \not \subset x x$. Then:
(i) $R^{-1}[x]$ is well founded and any ascending chain in $R^{-1}[x]$ is finite.
(ii) $R^{-1}[x]$ is conversely well founded and any descending chain in $R^{-1}[x]$ is finite.
(iii) $\forall y \in R^{-1}[x], y \not R y$.

Proof. Suppose not, so we have $A \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $\exists x \in A$ for which either (i), (ii) or (iii) fails. Firstly, by lemma 2.15 we may consider $\left(A_{*} / E\right)^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ where $E$ is the modal equivalence identifying all elements in the same cluster. Note that if (i) fails in $A_{*}$ then it also does so in $A_{*} / E$, similarly for (ii) and (iii). So w.l.o.g we may assume $E$ is the identity on $A_{*}$, i.e. $A_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters.

Now, $R[x]$ is closed and non-empty, with $x \notin R[x]$. Letting $z \in R[x]$ again as $x \mathbb{R} x$, $x \notin R^{+}[z]$. So, by applying modal separation, we find a clopen upset $U_{z}^{x}$ containing
$z$ and omitting $x$. Then, $R[x] \subseteq \bigcup_{z \in R[x]} U_{z}^{x}$, and by compactness $\exists\left\{z_{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{m} \subseteq R[x]$ such that $R[x] \subseteq \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} U_{z_{i}}^{x}$. Letting $U^{\prime}$ be that union, we have $U^{\prime}$ a clopen upset and $R[x] \subseteq U^{\prime}$. Then $R^{-1}\left[U^{\prime}\right]$ is a clopen downset, making $X \backslash R^{-1}\left[U^{\prime}\right]$ a clopen upset and finally $U=U^{\prime} \cup X \backslash R^{-1}\left[U^{\prime}\right]$ a clopen upset. Note that $x \notin U^{\prime}$ and considering $u \in R[x] \subseteq U^{\prime}$ we see $x \in R^{-1}\left[U^{\prime}\right]$, so $x \notin U$, and as $u \in U, U \neq \varnothing$.

Next, we consider:

$$
V:=\left(A_{*} \backslash U\right) \backslash R^{-1}\left[A_{*} \backslash U\right] .
$$

This too is clopen, moreover $x \notin U$, and as $R[x] \subseteq U^{\prime} \subseteq U, x \notin R^{-1}\left[A_{*} \backslash U\right]$, so $x \in V$. Letting $z_{1}, z_{2} \in V$, then $z_{2} \in A_{*} \backslash U$ and $z_{1} \notin R^{-1}\left[A_{*} \backslash U\right]$ so $z_{1} R z_{2}$, so $V$ consists of an anti-chain of irreflexive points. Furthermore, letting $z_{1} \in V$ and $z_{1} R z_{2}, z_{2} \notin V$, i.e. either $z_{2} \in U$ or $z_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[A_{*} \backslash U\right]$. However, as $z_{1} R z_{2}$ and $z_{1} \notin R^{-1}\left[A_{*} \backslash U\right]$ we have $z_{2} \notin R^{-1}\left[A_{*} \backslash U\right]$ and so $z_{2} \in U$. That is, $\forall z \in V$, $R[z] \subseteq U$.

We also consider:

$$
W:=U \cup A_{*} \backslash\left(V \cup R^{-1}[V]\right) .
$$

We claim that $W$ and $V$ form an $M$-partition of $A_{*}$. From their definitions we immediately see they are both clopen and disjoint. Then, $W$ is the union of two upsets and so is itself an upset and trivially satisfies the $M$-partition condition. Then, letting $u, v \in V$ and $u R w$, then $w \in W$ and letting $t \in R[v], t \in W$ and so we may take it as witness for the $M$-partition condition.

So, by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence $E$ identifying points within $W$ and $V$. By lemma $2.10,\left(\mathcal{A}_{*} / E\right)^{*} \in \mathcal{X}$ and so we may w.l.o.g assume that $E$ is the identity on $A_{*}$, i.e. $W$ is a singleton and $V=\{x\}$. We let $T$ denote the unique element in $W$. Moreover, consider $u \in A_{*}: u \notin\{T, x\}$. Then $u \notin W$ and $u \notin V$. As $u \notin W$ we get $u \notin U$ and $u \in V \cup R^{-1}[V]$, then $u \notin V$ in fact $u \in R^{-1}[V]$, i.e. $u R x$. So $A_{*}=\{\top, x\} \cup R^{-1}[x]$.

We now make a case distinction, either $\exists z \in A_{*}: 1<d(z)<\omega$ and $z R z$ or not. We start with the former, and let $z \in A_{*}$ be of minimal depth such that $z R z$ and consider the $M$-subspace $\mathcal{X}$ with underlying set $X=R^{+}[z]$. Note that as $S l_{2}\left(A_{*}\right)=$ $\{x\}, d(z)>2$. Now, condition (a) of lemma 2.18 holds trivially. For (b); $S l_{d(z)}(X)=$ $\{z\}, S l_{1}(X)=\{T\}$ and $S l_{2}(X)=\{x\}$. Then, letting $1<k<d(z)$, by the minimality of $d(z), \forall u \in S l_{k}(X) u R u$, giving condition (b).

For (c); we already have $S l_{1}(X)=\{T\}$ and $S l_{2}(X)=\{x\}$ are clopen. Assuming that $S l_{k-1}(X)$ is clopen for $1<k<d(z)$, then again by the minimality of $d(z) \forall u \in$ $S l_{k}(X) \cup S l_{k-1}(X) u \mathbb{R} u$. Therefore, we can make the identifications:

$$
\begin{gathered}
R^{-1}\left[S l_{k-1}(X)\right]=\{u \in X: d(u) \geq k\} ; \\
R^{-1}\left[R^{-1}\left[S l_{k-1}(X)\right]\right]=\{u \in X: d(u)>k\} ; \\
S l_{k}(X)=\{u \in X: d(u) \geq k\} \backslash\{u \in X: d(u)>k\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

As $S l_{k-1}(X)$ is clopen, the first two sets are clopen and in turn $S l_{k}(X)$ s clopen. So, by induction $\forall k<d(z) S l_{k}(X)$ is clopen, and finally $S l_{d(z)}(X)=X \backslash S_{d(z)-1}(X)$ and so is clopen, giving condition (c).

So, applying lemma 2.18 we may assume w.l.o.g that $S l_{k}(X)$ is a singelton $\forall k \leq$ $d(z)$, i.e. $X$ is the following frame.


Then, we can reduce $X$ to $F_{3}$ through a series of $\alpha$ - reduction, so $F_{3}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.

So now suppose that $\forall z \in A_{*}: 1<d(z)<\omega$ that $z \mathbb{R} z$. Letting $n \in \omega$ be such that $\mathcal{A}$ omits $G_{n}^{*}$, we claim that $S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right)=\varnothing \forall k \geq n+1$. Suppose that $S l_{n+1} \neq \varnothing$, because $\forall z \in A_{*}: 1<d(z)<\omega z \mathbb{R} z$, we can easily repeat the argument from the previous case to establish that $S_{n+1}\left(A_{*}\right)$ is clopen, and so a $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$, and that conditions (a), (b) and (c) of lemma 2.18 hold. So, applying the lemma we may w.l.o.g assume each $S l_{k}\left(S_{n+1}\left(A_{*}\right)\right): k \leq n+1$ is a singleton, and then $S_{n+1}\left(A_{*}\right) \cong G_{n} \notin \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction. Then, letting $k \geq n+1, S l_{n+1}\left(A_{*}\right)=\varnothing$ implies $S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right)=\varnothing$.

Now, if (i) fails for $A, R^{-1}[x]$ contains an infinite descending chain $\left\langle x_{k}\right\rangle_{k \in \omega}$, but as $S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right)=\varnothing$ for all $k \geq n+1$ and $x_{k} \notin S l_{k^{\prime}}\left(A_{*}\right)$ for all $k^{\prime}<k$ we get that $d\left(x_{k}\right)=\omega$ for all $k \geq n+1$. In particular $S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \neq \varnothing$. If (ii) fails for $A$, then $R^{-1}[x]$ contains an infinite ascending chain, and so all points in that chain have depth $\omega$ and $S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \neq \varnothing$. If (iii) fails, then $\exists y \in R^{-1}[x]: y R y$, which by assumption implies $d(y)=\omega$, so once more $S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \neq \varnothing$. So, in all cases $S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \neq \varnothing$.

Now, letting $k \geq n+1, S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right)=\varnothing$ implies that $S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \cap A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right)\right]=$ $S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \neq \varnothing$. Thus, we may consider the least $m \in \omega$ such that $S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \cap A_{*} \backslash$ $R^{-1}\left[S l_{m+1}\left(A_{*}\right)\right] \neq \varnothing$. Note that as $A_{*}=\{\top, x\} \cup R^{-1}[x]$ we have $m \geq 1$. Moreover, the minimality of $m$ means that $\forall k<m S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \cap A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right)\right]=\varnothing$, i.e. $S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \subseteq R^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right)\right]$.

Now take a $z \in S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \cap A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[S l_{m+1}\left(A_{*}\right)\right]$ and consider the $M$-subspace $\mathcal{X}$ with underlying set $X=R^{+}[z]=\left(R^{+}[z] \cap S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)\right) \cup S_{m}\left(A_{*}\right)$. Letting $u, v \in X$ : $d(u)=d(v)=\omega$, as $u, v \in R^{+}[z], u, v \notin R^{-1}\left[S l_{m+1}(X)\right]$ and so $\forall m+1 \leq k \leq n+1$ $u, v \notin R^{-1}\left[S l_{k}(X)\right]$, i.e. $\forall m+1 \leq k \leq n+1 R[u] \cap S l_{k}(X)=\varnothing=R[v] \cap S l_{k}(X)$. Additionally, as $u, v \in S l_{\omega}(X)$ as noted above $\forall k \leq m u, v \in R^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right)\right]$, i.e. $\forall k \leq m R[u] \cap S l_{k}(X) \neq \varnothing \neq R[v] \cap S l_{k}(X)$. So condition (a) of lemma 2.18 holds. Conditions (b) and (c) hold in familiar fashion to our previous cases, so once more by lemma 2.18 we may consider the resulting modal equivalence $E$ and the quotient space $\mathcal{X} / E$. The elements of $\mathcal{X} / E$ are $S l_{k}(X): k \leq m$ and $S l_{\omega}(X)$.

As $z \in S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right)$ and $z \notin R^{-1}\left[S l_{m+1}\left(A_{*}\right)\right]$, we must have an infinite ascending chain starting from $z$, which is contained in $X$. Letting $z^{\prime}$ be in that chain, $z^{\prime} \in X$ and it too has an infinite ascending chain starting from it in $X$ so $z^{\prime} \in S l_{\omega}(X)$. So then $[z]=S l_{\omega}(X)=\left[z^{\prime}\right]$ and as $z R z^{\prime} S l_{\omega}(X) R_{E} S l_{\omega}(X)$. Each $S l_{k}(X): 2<k<m$
consisted only of irreflexive points, $S l_{k}(X) \mathbb{R}_{E} S l_{k}(X)$. Finally, as $\forall k \leq m S l_{\omega}\left(A_{*}\right) \subseteq$ $R^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right)\right]$ we have $S l_{\omega}(X) R_{E} S l_{k}(X)$. Putting this all together, we obtain $X / E$ is the following frame.


Again, this can be reduced to $F_{3}$ via $\alpha$-reductions, giving a contradiction.
Lemma 5.4. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Let $A \in \mathcal{A}$ and $x \in \mathcal{A}_{*}: x \mathbb{R} x$. Then, if $y \in A_{*}: y R x$ then $\forall z \in A_{*}: y R z, z$ and $x$ are comparable.

Proof. Suppose not, so we have $A \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $\exists x, y, z \in A: x R x y R x, y R z$ and $x \| z$. By lemma 5.3, $R^{-1}[x]$ is conversely well founded, noting $y \in\left\{u \in R^{-1}[x]\right.$ : $\left.\exists v \in A_{*}: u R v \& x| | v\right\}$, we can assume $y$ is maximal with this property. By lemma 2.15 we may w.l.o.g assume that $A_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters. Taking the $M$-subspace $R^{+}[y]$ we may w.l.o.g assume $y$ is the root of $A_{*}$, then the maximality of $y$ means that $\forall u \in A_{*} \backslash\{y\}$ if $u R x$ then $\forall v \in R[u] x$ and $v$ are comparable.

Now, $R[x]$ is closed and non-empty, with $x \notin R[x]$. Letting $z^{\prime} \in R[x]$, again as $x \mathbb{R} x, x \notin R^{+}\left[z^{\prime}\right]$, so applying modal separation we find a clopen upset $U_{z^{\prime}}^{x}$ containing $z^{\prime}$ and omitting $x$. Moreover, as $x \| z z \notin R^{+}\left[z^{\prime}\right]$, applying modal separation gives a clopen upset $U_{z^{\prime}}^{z}$ containing $z^{\prime}$ and omitting $z$. Then, $R[x] \subseteq \underset{z^{\prime} \in R[x]}{\bigcup} U_{z^{\prime}}^{x} \cap U_{z^{\prime}}^{z}$, and by compactness $\exists\left\{z_{i}^{\prime}\right\}_{i=1}^{n} \subseteq R[x]$ such that $R[x] \subseteq \bigcup_{i=1}^{n} U_{z^{\prime}}^{x} \cap U_{z^{\prime}}^{z}$. Letting $U$ be that union, we have a clopen upset $U$ such that $R[x] \subseteq U, x \notin U$ and $z \notin U$. By lemma 2.16 we may assume w.l.o.g that this is a singleton, i.e. letting $T$ be its sole element we have $T$ is isolated and maximal in $A_{*}, T \neq z$ and $R[x]=\{T\}$. We make our first case distinction, either $\exists u \in A_{*}: x \| u$ and $u R T$ or not.

Case 1: If there is such a $u$, then $y R u$ and $x \| u$ so we may assume that $u=z$. Now, $A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}[T]$ is a clopen upset, and as $T$ is maximal in $A_{*},\{T\}$ is also an upset. So $A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}[T] \cup\{T\}$ is a clopen upset, then by lemma 2.16 and $x, y, z \in R^{-1}[T]$ we may w.l.o.g assume the set is a singleton, i.e. $A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}[\top] \cup\{\top\}=\{\top\}$ and $A_{*}=R^{-1}[\mathrm{~T}]$. Now, consider the set:

$$
V:=\left(A_{*} \backslash\{\top\}\right) \backslash R^{-1}\left[A_{*} \backslash\{\top\}\right] .
$$

It is easy to check that $V=\left\{u \in A_{*} \backslash\{T\}: R[u]=\{T\}\right\}$ which implies $x \in V$ and that $V$ consists of an anti-chain of irreflexive points. Additionally $V$ is clopen as $\top$ is isolated. We make a second case distinction, either $V=\{x\}$ or not.

Case 1a: If $V \neq\{x\}$, then letting $u \in V: u \neq x$ we have $u R T, x \| u$ and $y R u$, so we can again assume $u=z$. Firstly, we consider $A_{*} \backslash\left(V \cup R^{-1}[V]\right)$ which is an
upset, is clopen because $V$ is clopen, and contains $T$. Then applying lemma 2.16 once more we may w.l.o.g assume the set is a singleton, i.e. $A_{*} \backslash\left(V \cup R^{-1}[V]\right)=\{T\}$ and $A_{*}=\{\top\} \cup V \cup R^{-1}[V]$.

Applying modal separation to $x$ and $z$ to obtain $U_{x}^{z}$, we let $A=V \cap U_{x}^{z}$ and $B=V \cap\left(A_{*} \backslash U_{x}^{z}\right)$. These are clearly clopen and pairwise disjoint as they partition $V$, and moreover as $\forall u \in A \cup B=V R[u]=\{T\}$ they form an $M$-partition. So, by lemma 2.17 we may assume w.l.o.g they are singletons, i.e. $\{x\}$ and $\{z\}$ are clopen, $V=\{x, z\}$ and $A_{*}=\{T, x, z\} \cup R^{-1}[x, z]$. Notably, by lemma 5.3 the only reflexive point in $A_{*}$ is $T$ and $d(y)<\omega$. The maximality assumption on $y$ then gives that the underlying frame of $A_{*}$ is the following. Then, by repeatedly applying $\alpha$-reductions we can reduce $A_{*}$ to $F_{15}$, thus $F_{15}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.


Case 1b: Suppose $V=\{x\}$, then $x$ is isolated and $\forall u \in A_{*} \backslash\{T, x\}, R[u] \backslash\{T\} \neq$ $\varnothing$. Now, consider the set

$$
U:=A_{*} \backslash\left(R^{-1}[x] \cup\{\top, x\}\right) .
$$

Note that $z \in U$ and by definition $A_{*}=\{\top, x\} \cup U \cup R^{-1}[x]$. We claim that $U$ is an $M$-partition, it is clopen as $\{T\}$ and $\{x\}$ are both clopen. Then, let $u, v \in U$ and $u R w$, note $u, v \in A_{*} \backslash\{T, x\}$. Either $w=T$ or not, if $w=\top$ then $v R T$ so $v R w$. If $w \neq T$, then as $u k x w \neq x$ and $w R x$, so $w \in U$. Now, letting $t \in R[v]: t \neq \mathrm{T}$, we again have $v R x$ so $t \neq x$ and $t R^{x} x$, so $t \in U$, and we may take it as witness. So, by lemma 2.17 we may assume w.lo.g that $U$ is a singelton, i.e. $U=\{z\}$ and $A_{*}=\{T, x, z\} \cup R^{-1}[x]$. Again, by lemma 5.3, every point in $R^{-1}[x]$ is irreflexive, and $d(y)<\omega$. Finally, the maximality assumption on $y$ then gives that the underlying frame of $A_{*}$ is the following:


Then, by repeatedly applying $\alpha$-reductions, we can reduce $A_{*}$ to $F_{15}$, thus $F_{15}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.

Case 2: $\forall u \in A_{*}$ if $x \| u$ then $u \mathbb{R} T$. In particular $z \mathbb{R} T$. We consdier the set

$$
U:=A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}[\mathrm{~T}] .
$$

Note that $z \in U$ and by definition $A_{*}=R^{-1}[T] \cup U$. Then, by our assumption if $u R T$ then it is comparable to $x$ and as $R[x]=\{\top\}$ this further implies $u \in\{T, x\} \cup$ $R^{-1}[x]$. Additionally, $\{T, x\} \cup R^{-1}[x] \subseteq R^{-1}[\top]$, so we have $R^{-1}[\top]=\{\top, x\} \cup$ $R^{-1}[x]$ and $A_{*}=\{T, x\} \cup U \cup R^{-1}[x]$. Now $U$ is is clopen as $T$ is isolated and is an upset. So, by lemma 2.16 we may w.l.o.g assume it is a singelton, i.e. $U=\{z\}$ and $A_{*}=\{\top, x, z\} \cup R^{-1}[x]$. Then, by corollary 5.2 and lemma 5.3 we get that $z R z$, every point in $R^{-1}[x]$ is irreflexive and $d(y)<\omega$. Finally, the maximality assumption on $y$ then gives that the underlying frame of $A_{*}$ is the following:


Then, by repeatedly applying $\alpha$-reductions, we can reduce $A_{*}$ to $F_{14}$, thus $F_{14}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.

Corollary 5.5. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Let $A \in \mathcal{A}$ and $x \in \mathcal{A}_{*}: x \mathbb{R} x$. Then, $R^{-1}[x] \cup\{x\}$ is a tree of irreflexive point of finite depth.

Proof. Assume for the moment that $R[x]=\{\top\}$ for some $T \in A_{*}$. Then, from lemma $5.3 R^{-1}[x] \cup\{x\}$ has finite depth, and from lemma 5.4 we have that for any $n>2$ and $u \in S l_{n}\left(A_{*}\right) \cap R^{-1}[x]$ that $u \mathbb{R} u$ and $\forall 2<k<n \exists!v \in S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right): u R v$, i.e. $R^{-1}[x] \cup\{x\}$ is a tree of irreflexive points of finite depth.

Now, dropping the assumption that $[x]=\{T\}$, just as in the proof of lemma 5.3 we find a clopen upset $U: R[x] \subseteq U$. We take the induced modal equivalence from lemma 2.16. Considering $A_{*} / E$, we have $\left(A_{*} / E\right)^{*} \in \mathcal{A}, R_{E}[[x]]=U$ and $S l_{2}\left(A_{*} / E\right)=\{[x]\}$. From our previous consideration we have the required structure for $A_{*} / E$. Then as $E$ only identified points in $R[x], R^{-1}[x]$ has the same structure in $A_{*}$ as $R_{E}^{-1}[[x]]$ does in $A_{*} / E$.

### 5.2 Three Central Results

With some control over irreflexive points we can now prove the three central structural results that drive the main theorem of this chapter. The first is of particular importance and relates to another important concept when working with transitive frames - width.

Let $(X, R)$ be a transitive frame. We define the width of an element $x \in X$ as the maximal number of points in a maximal anti-chain of points in $R^{+}[x]$. If there is no maximal anti-chain, or an anti-chain with infinitely many points we say that $x$ is $\omega$-wide and use $w(x) \in \omega \cup\{\omega\}$ to denote the width of $x$. The width of $X$ is $w(X)=\max \{w(x) \in \omega \cup\{\omega\}: x \in X\}$ if this exists, and $w(X)=\omega$ otherwise.

Given a K4-algebra $A$, we say $A$ has width equal to $A_{*}$.
Lemma 5.6. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Then $\forall A \in \mathcal{A}, w(A) \leq 2$.

Proof. Suppose not, that is suppose $\exists A \in \mathcal{A}$ with width $>2$. We make the following claim:
Claim: $\exists B \in \mathcal{A}: B_{*}$ is rooted and has three incomparable, isolated points $x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}$ such that either:
(i) $x_{1}, x_{2} \& x_{3}$ are maximal and $B_{*}=R^{-1}\left[x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right]$;
(ii) $B_{*}$ has a maximum $T$ that is isolated and $B_{*} \backslash\{T\}=R^{-1}\left[x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right]$;
(iii) $B_{*}$ has an isolated point $T: x_{1} R T, x_{2} R T, \top$ and $x_{3}$ are maximal, $B_{*} \backslash\{\top\}=$ $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right]$ and $R^{-1}[T] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] \subseteq R^{-1}\left[x_{1}, x_{2}\right]$.

As $A$ has width $>2$ we can find $\perp, x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3} \in A_{*}$ such that $\perp R x_{1}, \perp R x_{2}, \perp R x_{3}$ and $x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}$ are all incomparable. As ever, by considering the $M$-subspace $R^{+}[\perp]$ of $A_{*}$ we may assume w.l.o.g that $\perp$ is the root of $A_{*}$, and by lemma 2.15 may assume $A_{*}$ consists only of improper clusters.

Let $u \in A_{*}: u \mathbb{R} u$, then either $\perp=u$ or $\perp R u$. We have that $\perp R x_{1}, \perp R x_{2}$ and $\perp R x_{3}$, therefore by lemma $5.4 u$ is comparable with $x_{1}, x_{2}$ and $x_{3}$. In particular $u \notin\left\{x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right\}$ and therefore $x_{1} R x_{1}, x_{2} R x_{2}$ and $x_{3} R x_{3}$. Moreover, as $x_{1} R x_{1}$ and $u \mathbb{R} u$ by lemma $5.3 x_{1} \mathbb{R} u$ so in fact $u R x_{1}$. Similarly, $u R x_{2}$ and $u R x_{3}$, that is $u \in R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right]$. As $u$ was arbitrary, the only irreflexive points in $A_{*}$ belong to $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right]$.

As $x_{1}, x_{2}$ and $x_{3}$ are incomparable, we may by modal separation find clopen upsets $U_{i}$ for $i \in\{1,2,3\}$ such that $x_{i} \in U_{j}$ iff $i=j$. We then define the following sets:

$$
\begin{aligned}
U & :=\left(U_{1} \cap U_{2}\right) \cup\left(U_{1} \cap U_{3}\right) \cup\left(U_{2} \cap U_{3}\right) . \\
V_{i} & := \begin{cases}U_{i} \backslash R^{-1}[U] & \text { if } x_{i} \notin R^{-1}[U] \\
U_{i} \cap R^{-1}[U] \backslash U & \text { if } x_{i} \in R^{-1}[U]\end{cases}
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that the $V_{i}$ are clopen and $x_{i} \in V_{j}$ iff $i=j$. As we are choosing 2 options for 3 sets at least two will match, so we may w.l.o.g assume either:
(a) $V_{1}=U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}[U]$ and $V_{2}=U_{2} \backslash R^{-1}[U]$ or
(b) $V_{1}=U_{1} \cap R^{-1}[U] \backslash U$ and $V_{2}=U_{2} \cap R^{-1}[U] \backslash U$.

First assume (a) holds. If $u \in V_{1}$ then $u \in U_{1}$ and $u \notin U$, so by the definition of $U$ $u \notin U_{2}$ and $u \notin U_{3}$. This in turn implies $u \notin V_{2}$, so $V_{1} \cap V_{2}=\varnothing=V_{1} \cap U_{3}$. Similarly, $V_{2} \cap U_{3}=\varnothing$. Therefore $V_{1}, V_{2} \& U_{3}$ are all disjoint clopen upsets of $A_{*}$. We further define:

$$
W:=U_{3} \cup A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1} \cup V_{2} \cup U_{3}\right] .
$$

$W$ is a clopen upset still disjoint from $V_{1}$ and $V_{2}$. Therefore, $V_{1}, V_{2}$ and $W$ form a collection of pairwise disjoint clopen sets, and as each is an upset they moreover
form an $M$-partition. By lemma 2.17 we can consider the modal equivalence $E$ that identifies points within those sets and consider $\left(A_{*} / E\right)^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$.

We claim that $A_{*} / E$ satisfies case (i). Note that $x_{1} \in V_{1}, x_{2} \in V_{2}$ and $x_{3} \in W$ so each set really is an element of $A_{*} / E$, whilst $\perp$ is not in any of them so $[\perp]=$ $\{\perp\} \in A_{*} / E$. As $V_{1}, V_{2}$ and $W$ were clopen in $A_{*}$ they are isolated in $A_{*} / E$, and as they were upsets in $A_{*}$ they are maximal in $A_{*} / E$. Moreover as each is maximal they are all incomparable. Letting $u \in A_{*}$, then either $u \in R^{-1}\left[V_{1} \cup V_{2} \cup U_{3}\right]$ and then $[u] \in R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{1}, V_{2}, W\right]$ or $u \notin R^{-1}\left[V_{1} \cup V_{2} \cup U_{3}\right]$ and then $u \in W$ and $[u]=W$. So $A_{*} / E=R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{1}, V_{2}, W\right]$ and $A_{*} / E$ satisfies case (i).

Now assume (b) holds, we consider:

$$
V^{+}:=A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1} \cup V_{2} \cup V_{3}\right] .
$$

$V^{+}$is clopen. Moreover, supposing $u \in U \backslash V^{+}$then as $u \notin V^{+}$we have $u \in R^{-1}\left[V_{i}\right]$ for some $1 \leq i \leq 3$ and so $\exists v \in V_{i}: u R v$. Then, $u \in U$ and $U$ is an upset so $v \in U$ and $U \cap V_{i} \neq \varnothing$ which is a contradiction. Therefore, $U \subseteq V^{+}$. We already have that $V_{1}, V_{2}$ and $V_{3}$ are pairwise disjoint and as every element in $U$ is reflexive $V_{1} \cup V_{2} \cup V_{3} \subseteq R^{-1}\left[V_{1} \cup V_{2} \cup V_{3}\right]$ so $\forall 1 \leq i \leq 3 V^{+} \cap V_{i}=\varnothing$. Thus, $\left\{V_{1}, V_{2}, V_{3}, V^{+}\right\}$ is a collection of pairwise disjoint clopen sets. We claim moreover that they form an $M$-partition. As $V^{+}$is an upset the $M$-partition conditions holds for it immediately.

For $V_{i}$ : Let $u, v \in V_{i}$ and $u R w$. Now, $u \in U_{i}$ which is an upset so $w \in U_{i}$. If $w \in V_{i}$ then as $v \in V_{i} \subseteq U_{i}$ we have $v R v \in V_{i}$ and so we may take $v$ itself as witness. If $w \notin V_{i}$ then $V_{i} \neq U_{i} \backslash R^{-1}[U]$ (as the latter is an upset and $u \in V_{i}$ ) and instead $V_{i}=U_{i} \cap R^{-1}[U] \backslash U$. We have $w \in U_{i}$ and $w \notin V_{i}$. If $w \notin V^{+}$then $w \in R^{-1}\left[V_{j}\right]$ for $j \in\{1,2,3\}$, so $\exists t \in V_{j}: w R t$. Then $u R w R t$ so $t \in U_{i}$, and moreover $j=i$ as otherwise we have $t \in U, u R t$ and $u \notin R^{-1}[U]$ which is a contradiction. But then, $t \in R^{-1}[U]$ and so $w \in R^{-1}[U]$ and $w \notin U$, i.e. $w \in V_{i}$ which is a contradiction. So, $w \in V^{+}$. Then as $v \in V_{i}=U_{i} \cap R^{-1}[U] \backslash U$ we have $\exists t \in U \subseteq V^{+}: v R t$ which we may take as witness.

So, again we consider by lemma 2.17 the resulting space $A_{*} / E$ and the elements $V_{1}, V_{2}, V_{3}, V^{+} \in A_{*} / E$. They are all isolated as they were clopen in $A_{*}$. The $V_{i}$ are also incomparable; let $u \in V_{i}$ and $v \in V_{j}: u R v$, then $u \in U_{i}$ implies $v \in U_{i}$ so $v \in U \subseteq V^{+}$and $v \notin V_{j}$ which is a contradiction. Now, suppose $u \notin V^{+}$, then $u \in R^{-1}\left[V_{1} \cup V_{2} \cup V_{3}\right]$ and so $u R v: v \in V_{i}$ for some $1 \leq i \leq 3$. Therefore, $[u] \in R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{1}, V_{2}, V_{3}\right]$, that is $A_{*} / E=\left\{V^{+}\right\} \cup R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{1}, V_{2}, V_{3}\right]$.

If $V^{+}$is the maximum of $A_{*} / E$ then case (ii) holds, so suppose it is not the maximum. By (b), $x_{1} \in V_{1}=U_{1} \cap R^{-1}[U] \backslash U$ and so $\exists u \in U \subseteq V^{+}: x_{1} R u$, so $V_{1} R_{E} V^{+}$. Similarly, $V_{2} R_{E} V^{+}$. Now, if $V_{3}=U_{3} \cap R^{-1}[U] \backslash U$ then again $V_{3} R_{E} V^{+}$, but then as $A_{*} / E=\left\{V^{+}\right\} \cup R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{1}, V_{2}, V_{3}\right]$ this would make $V^{+}$the maximum of $A_{*} / E$, so instead $V_{3}=U_{3} \backslash R^{-1}[U]$ and so an upset of $A_{*}$ and maximal in $A_{*} / E$. Similarly, $V^{+}$ is an upset of $A_{*}$ so is maximal in $A_{*} / E$. Finally, if $R_{E}^{-1}\left[V^{+}\right] \cap R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{3}\right] \subseteq R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{1}, V_{2}\right]$ then case (iii) holds, so again suppose it does not. We define:

$$
W_{1}:=R_{E}^{-1}\left[V^{+}\right] \cap R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{3}\right] \backslash R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{1}, V_{2}\right] ; W_{2}:=\left\{V^{+}\right\} \cup A_{*} / E \backslash R^{-1}\left[V^{+}\right] .
$$

$W_{1}$ and $W_{2}$ are disjoint clopen subsets, by our assumption $W_{1} \neq \varnothing$ and moreover we claim they form an $M$-partition. $W_{2}$ is an upset so the condition holds trivially. Letting $[u],[v] \in W_{1}$ and $[u] R_{E}[w]$, if $[w] \in W_{1}$ then we have $v R v$ so $[v] R_{E}[v] \in W_{1}$
and we may take $[v]$ itself as witness. If $[w] \notin W_{1}$, as $[u] R_{E}[v]$ and $[u] \in W_{1}$ we have $[w] \notin R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{1}, V_{2}\right]$, so then either $[w] \mathbb{R}_{E} V^{+}$and $[w] \in W_{2}$ or $[w] \mathbb{R}_{E} V_{3}$ so then $[w]=V^{+} \in W_{2}$. So $[w] \in W_{2}$ and $[v] R_{E} V^{+} \in W_{2}$ so we may take it as witness.

Once more, in line with lemma 2.17 we can consider the modal equivalence $E^{\prime}$ on $A_{*} / E$ identifying points within $W_{1}$ and $W_{2}$. We now aim to show that $Y=$ $\left(A_{*} / E\right) / E^{\prime}$ satisfies case (ii) with $W_{1},\left[V_{1}\right]=\left\{V_{1}\right\},\left[V_{2}\right]=\left\{V_{2}\right\}$ and $W_{2}$ respectively. As each was clopen in $A_{*} / E$ they are isolated in $Y$. That $\left[V_{1}\right]$ and $\left[V_{2}\right]$ are incomparable is immediate from $V_{1}$ and $V_{2}$ being incomparable in $A_{*} / E$. Then $W_{1} \cap R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]=\varnothing$ so $W_{1} R_{Y}\left[V_{1}\right]$, if $\left[V_{1}\right] R_{Y} W_{1}$ then $V_{1} R_{E}[u]$ for some $[u] \in W_{1}$, then $[u] R_{E} V_{3}$ so $V_{1} R_{E} V_{3}$ which is a contradiction. So $\left[V_{1}\right]$ and $W_{1}$ are incomparable, and similarly $\left[V_{2}\right]$ and $W_{1}$ are incomparable. Now, letting $[S] \in Y \backslash\left\{W_{2}\right\}$, then $S \in A_{*} / E \backslash\left\{V^{+}\right\}$so $S R_{E} V_{1}, V_{2}$ or $V_{3}$. If the first two then $[S] R_{Y}\left[V_{i}\right] R_{Y} W_{2}$, if $S R_{E} V_{3}$, we note that $V_{3}, V^{+} \in W_{2}$ so $\left[V_{3}\right]=\left[V^{+}\right]=W_{2}$ and $[S] R_{Y} W_{2}$. Thus $W_{2}$ is the maximum of $Y$. Finally, if $[S] \in Y \backslash\left\{W_{2}\right\}$ then $S \notin W_{2}$ and so $S R_{Y} W_{2}$ and $S \in R_{E}^{-1}\left[V_{1}, V_{2}, V_{3}\right]$, if $S R_{E} V_{1}$ or $S R_{E} V_{2}$ then $[S] R_{Y}\left[V_{1}\right]$ or $[S] R_{Y}\left[V_{2}\right]$, if $S R_{E} V_{3}$ and $S R_{E} V_{1}$ and $S R_{E} V_{2}$ then $S \in W_{1}$ so $[S] R_{Y} W_{1}$, so $Y \backslash\left\{W_{2}\right\}=R_{Y}^{-1}\left[\left[V_{1}\right],\left[V_{2}\right], W_{1}\right]$ as required.

This completes the proof of the claim, so we have $B \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $B_{*}$ contains one of the following substructures where each $x_{i}$ and $T$ is isolated:

(iii)

We may still by lemma 2.15 assume that $B_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters. Moreover, as $x_{1}, x_{2}$ and $x_{3}$ are isolated, the set $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right]$ is clopen. Then, from corollary 2.24 we can take a maximal cluster in the set, which as $B_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters is in fact a maximal point $p$ in the set. Of course, $p$ sees $x_{1}, x_{2}$ and $x_{3}$ and by considering the $M$-subspace of $B_{*}$ rooted at $p$, we can assume w.l.o.g $\perp=p$ and $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right]=\{\perp\}$. Note, just as we established earlier that the only irreflexive points of $A_{*}$ could be in $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right]$, we can check this also holds for $B_{*}$, i.e. the only irreflexive point in $B_{*}$ is possibly $\perp$. Now,
we define the following clopen sets:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
W_{1}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, x_{3}\right] ; & \\
W_{2}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{1}, x_{3}\right] ; \\
W_{3}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{1}, x_{2}\right] ; & \\
W_{4}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] ; \\
W_{5}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] ; & \\
W_{6}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] .
\end{array}
$$

These are clearly pairwise disjoint, and from claim A we have:

$$
B_{*}=\bigcup_{i=1}^{6} W_{6} \cup\{\perp, \top\}
$$

We claim moreover that they are an $M$-partition. So, let $u, v \in W_{i}$ and $u R w$ with:
$\mathrm{i}=1$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, x_{3}\right]$ and so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, x_{3}\right]$. Then, either $w R x_{1}$ and so $w \in W_{1}$, and $v R x_{1} \in W_{1}$ so we may take $x_{1}$ as witness, or $w=T$ and $v R T$.
$\mathrm{i}=2$; As the $i=1$ case.
$\mathrm{i}=3$; As the $i=1$ case, except we note that if $w=\mathrm{T}$ as $u \in W_{3}$ we must be in a case for $B_{*}$ where $x_{3} R T$ so $v R T$ as needed.
$\mathrm{i}=4$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right]$. Thus, $w \in W_{1}, W_{2}, W_{4}$ or $w=T$ and we have $v R x_{1} \in W_{1}, v R x_{2} \in W_{2}, v R v \in W_{4}$ and $v R T$ for witnesses.
$\mathrm{i}=5$; As the $i=4$ case.
$\mathrm{i}=6$; As the $i=6$ case.
Then, as ever by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence identifying the points within these sets and assume w.l.o.g it is the identity on $B_{*}$. Now, whilst $x_{1} \in W_{1}, x_{2} \in W_{2}$ and $x_{3} \in W_{3}$ and so this amounts to assuming $W_{1}, W_{2}$ and $W_{3}$ are singletons, each of $W_{4}, W_{5}$ and $W_{6}$ may or may not be empty, i.e. may or may not exist as elements of $B_{*}$. Combining with the three possible substructures of $B_{*}$ listed earlier, and eliminating some via isomorphism, this leaves us with the following possible underlying frames for $B_{*}$ :


$\odot \perp$

(c)

$\odot \perp$
(e)

(g)

$\odot \perp$
(i)
(d)

(f)

(h)

$\odot \perp$
(j)


Finally, using $\alpha, \beta$ and $\gamma$-reductions, we can reduce each of these as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
(a) \mapsto F_{7,}(b) & \mapsto F_{5}(c) \mapsto F_{9,}(d) \mapsto F_{8^{\prime}}(e) \mapsto F_{5}(f) \mapsto F_{5}(g) \mapsto F_{6,}(h) \mapsto F_{5,} \\
(i) & \mapsto F_{6,}(j) \mapsto F_{6,}(k) \mapsto F_{8,}(l) \mapsto F_{6,}(m) \mapsto F_{6,}(n) \mapsto F_{8}
\end{aligned}
$$

. Thus, in all cases we have $F_{i}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ for some $1 \leq i \leq 17$ which is a contradiction.
Lemma 5.7. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Then $\forall A \in \mathcal{A}, A_{*}$ does not contain the following substructure:


Proof. Suppose not, let $A \in \mathcal{A}$ have the substructure described above which we label as follows:


We make the following claim:
Claim: $\exists B \in \mathcal{A}: B_{*}$ is rooted and contains the substructure witnessed by four elements $x_{1}, x_{2}, y_{1}, y_{2}$ such that either:
(i) $x_{2} \& y_{2}$ are maximal with $B_{*}=R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y_{2}\right]$
(ii) $B_{*}$ has a maximum element $T$ that is isolated, $x_{2}$ and $y_{2}$ are isolated and $B_{*}=$ $\{T\} \cup R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y_{2}\right]$
(iii) $B_{*}$ has an isolated point $T: x_{2} R T$ and $y_{1} R T, T \& y_{2}$ are maximal and $B_{*}=$ $\{T\} \cup R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y_{2}\right]$
As ever, by lemma 2.15 and taking an $M$-subspace we may assume that $A_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters and is rooted by $\perp$. Also note, that letting $u \in A_{*}: u \mathbb{R} u$ then either $\perp=u$ or $\perp R u$. Now, $\perp R x_{1}$ and $\perp R y_{1}$ and $x_{1} \| y_{1}$ so by lemma 5.4, $u$ is comparable with $x_{1}$ and $y_{1}$. In particular $u \notin\left\{x_{1}, y_{1}\right\}$ and so $x_{1} R x_{1}$ and $y_{1} R y_{1}$. Then, by lemma $5.3 x_{1} R u$ and $y_{1} R u$, so in fact $u R x_{1}$ and $u R y_{1}$. That is, the only irreflexive points in $A_{*}$ belong to $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right]$.

Now, by modal separation, we can find clopen upsets $U_{1}$ and $V_{1}$ such that $x_{1} \in$ $U_{1}$ and $y_{1}, y_{2} \notin U_{1}$ and $y_{1} \in V_{1}$ and $x_{1}, x_{2} \notin V_{1}$. Either $U_{1} \cap V_{1}=\varnothing$ or not.

Suppose $U_{1} \cap V_{1}=\varnothing$; We can also find by modal separation clopen upsets $U_{2}, V_{2}$ such that $x_{2} \in U_{2}$ and $x_{1}, y_{2} \notin U_{2}$ and $y_{2} \in V_{2}$ and $x_{2}, y_{1} \notin V_{2}$. Now $U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ is a clopen upset and $x_{2} \in U_{1} \cap U_{2}$. Similarly, $y_{2} \in V_{1} \cap V_{2}$. Moreover, as $U_{1} \cap V_{1}=\varnothing$ $\left(U_{1} \cap U_{2}\right) \cap\left(V_{1} \cap V_{2}\right)=\varnothing$. Therefore, $U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ and $V_{1} \cap V_{2}$ are clopen and disjoint and as they are also upsets they easily form an $M$-partition.

So, by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence $E$ identifying points within those sets. As $U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ was clopen in $A_{*}$ it is isolated in $A_{*} / E$, and as it was an upset it is maximal in $A_{*} / E$. Similarly, $V_{1} \cap V_{2}$ is an isolated maximal point of $A_{*} / E$. Then we have $\perp, x_{1}, y_{1} \notin U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ or $V_{1} \cap V_{2}$, so $[\perp]=\{\perp\},\left[x_{1}\right]=\left\{x_{1}\right\},\left[x_{2}\right]=$ $\left\{x_{2}\right\} \in A_{*} / E$ and together with $U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ and $V_{1} \cap V_{2}$ witness the substructure (that $\left[x_{1}\right] R_{E} U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ and so on is clear, then we note that if $x_{1} R z \in V_{1} \cap V_{2}$ then $z \in U_{1}$ so $U_{1} \cap V_{1} \neq \varnothing$, so $\left[x_{1}\right] \mathbb{R}_{E} V_{1} \cap V_{2}$ and similarly $\left.\left[y_{1}\right] \mathbb{R}_{E} U_{1} \cap U_{2}\right)$.

Finally, letting $u \in A_{*}$, by lemma $5.6 A_{*}$ has width $\leq 2$ and $x_{2}| | y_{2}$ so $u$ must be comparable with either $x_{2}$ or $y_{2}$. If comparable with $x_{2}$ then either $u \in U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ and $[u]=U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ or not, and then $u \neq x_{2}$ and $x_{2} \mathbb{R} u$ so $u R x_{2}$ and $[u] R_{E} U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ Similarly, if $u$ is comparable with $y_{2}$ then either $[u]=V_{1} \cap V_{2}$ or $[u] R_{E} V_{1} \cap V_{2}$. So, $A_{*} / E=R_{E}^{-1}\left[U_{1} \cap U_{2}, V_{1} \cap V_{2}\right]$. Thus, we have $A_{*} / E$ satisfying case (i).

So now suppose $U_{1} \cap V_{1} \neq \varnothing$. We consider $R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$ and $R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$. If $x_{1} \notin$ $R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$, then $x \in U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[v_{1}\right]$ which is a clopen upset, $y_{1} \notin U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ and $U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \cap V_{1}=\varnothing$. So, replacing $U_{1}$ with $U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ we can proceed as in the previous case. Similarly, if $y_{1} \notin R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$. So, suppose $x_{1} \in R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ and $y_{1} \in R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$. We have either $x_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ or not and either $y_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$ or not. We make a case distinction, either both inclusions hold, exactly one holds or neither holds.

Suppose neither holds, then $x_{2} \in U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right], x_{1}, y_{1} \notin U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ and this set is a clopen upset, and similarly, $y_{2} \in V_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right], x_{1}, y_{1} \notin V_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$ and this set is a clopen upset. Moreover, $\left(U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]\right) \cap\left(V_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]\right)=\varnothing$. So we can proceed as in the previous case with $U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ and $V_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$ replacing $U_{1} \cap U_{2}$
and $V_{1} \cap V_{2}$ respectively.
Suppose exactly one holds, say $x_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ and $y_{2} \notin R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$. Then, by modal separation we can find a clopen upset $V_{2}: x_{2} \in V_{2}$ and $x_{1} \notin V_{2}$. We then define the following sets:

$$
\begin{gathered}
W_{1}:=\left(U_{1} \cap V_{1}\right) \cup U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] ; W_{2}:=U_{1} \cap U_{2} \cap R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \backslash V_{1} ; \\
W_{3}:=V_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right] .
\end{gathered}
$$

We note that $x_{2} \in W_{2}$ and $y_{2} \in W_{3}$. Then, the $W_{i}$ are pairwise disjoint and clopen. We claim moreover that they form an M-partition. For $W_{1}$ and $W_{3}$, these are both upsets so the condition holds trivially. So let $u, v \in W_{2}$ and $u R w$. Either $w \in V_{1}$ or $w \notin V_{1}$. If $w \in V_{1}$ as $u \in U_{1}$ and $u R w$ then $w \in U_{1} \cap V_{1} \subseteq W_{1}$. Then $v \in W_{2}$ so $\exists t \in R[v]: t \in V_{1}$ and again $t \in U_{1} \cap V_{1} \subseteq W_{1}$ so may be taken as witness. Similarly, if $w \notin R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ we also have $w \in U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \subseteq W_{1}$ and so we can take this $t$ as witness again. If $w \notin V_{1}$ and $w \in R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$, as $u R w$ and $u \in U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ which is an upset $w \in U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ so $w \in W_{2}$. Then $v R v \in W_{2}$ so we may take $v$ as witness.

Then, by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence $E$ identifying points within $W_{1}, W_{2}$ and $W_{3}$ and consider $A_{*} / E$. As each $W_{i}$ was clopen in $A_{*}$ they are isolated points in $A_{*} / E$ and $W_{1}$ and $W_{3}$ being upsets in $A_{*}$ make them maximal in $A_{*} / E$. Then, we have $\perp, x_{1}, y_{1} \notin W_{i}$ for $1 \leq i \leq 3$ so $[\perp]=\{\perp\},\left[x_{1}\right]=\left\{x_{1}\right\}$ and $\left[y_{1}\right]=\left\{y_{1}\right\} \in A_{*} / E$ and together with $W_{2}$ and $W_{3}$ witness the substructure.

Finally, as $x_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \exists z \in V_{1}: x_{2} R z$ and $x_{2} \in U_{1}$ which is an upset so $z \in$ $U_{1} \cap V_{1} \subseteq W_{1}$. Then $x_{2} \in W_{2}$ means $W_{2} R_{E} W_{1}$. Similarly, $y_{1} \in V_{1}$ and $y_{1} \in R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$ so $\exists z \in U_{1}: y_{1} R z$ and $V_{1}$ is an upset so $z \in U_{1} \cap V_{1} \subseteq W_{1}$. So $\left[y_{1}\right] R_{E} W_{1}$. Then, letting $u \in A_{*}$ we have $u$ comparable with $x_{2}$ or $y_{2}$. If $u R x_{2}$ or $x_{2}=u$ then $[u] R_{E} W_{2}$ and if $u R y_{2}$ or $y_{2}=u$ then $[u] R_{E} W_{3}$. If $x_{2} R u$ then either $u \in W_{2}$ and $[u] R_{E} W_{2}$ or $u \notin W_{2}$, but then $x_{2} \in U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ which is an upset implies $u \in U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ so in fact $u \notin R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \backslash V_{1}$, i.e. either $u \in V_{1}$ and $u \in U_{1} \cap V_{1} \subseteq W_{1}$ or $u \notin R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ and $u \in U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \subseteq W_{1}$. So $u \in W_{1}$ and $[u]=W_{1}$. If $y_{2} R u$ then $u \in W_{3}$ and $[u] R_{E} W_{3}$. Taken together, $A_{*} / E=\left\{W_{1}\right\} \cup R_{E}^{-1}\left[W_{2}, W_{3}\right]$ and so $A_{*} / E$ satisfies case (iii).

Now suppose both $x_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ and $y_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$, this time we use modal separation to find $U_{2}: x_{2} \in U_{2}, x_{1} \notin U_{2}$ and $V_{2}: y_{2} \in V_{2}$ and $y_{1} \notin V_{2}$ and define the following sets:

$$
\begin{gathered}
W_{1}:=\left(U_{1} \cap V_{1}\right) \cup U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \cup V_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right] ; W_{2}:=U_{1} \cap U_{2} \cap R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \backslash V_{1} ; \\
W_{3}:=V_{1} \cap V_{2} \cap R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right] \backslash U_{1} .
\end{gathered}
$$

We note that $x_{2} \in W_{2}$ and $y_{2} \in W_{3}$. Then, again the $W_{i}$ are pairwise disjoint and clopen. They moreover form an M-partition, $W_{1}$ is an upset so the condition holds trivially and $W_{2}$ and $W_{3}$ follow as the $W_{2}$ argument for the previous case.

Then, by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence identifying points in those sets and consider $A_{*} / E$. As each $W_{i}$ was clopen in $A_{*}$ they are isolated points in $A_{*} / E$. Then, we have $\perp, x_{1}, y_{1} \notin W_{i}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq 3$ so $[\perp]=\{\perp\},\left[x_{1}\right]=$ $\left\{x_{1}\right\},\left[y_{1}\right]=\left\{y_{1}\right\} \in A_{*} / E$ and together with $W_{2}$ and $W_{3}$ witness the substructure.

Finally, as $x_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \exists z \in R[x]: z \in V_{1}$, and $x_{2} \in U_{1}$ which is an upset so $z \in U_{1} \cap V_{1} \subseteq W_{1}$. Then $x_{2} \in W_{2}$ means $W_{2} R_{E} W_{1}$. Similarly, $y_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$ implies $W_{3} R_{E} W_{1}$. Then, letting $u \in A_{*}$ we have $u$ comparable with $x_{2}$ or $y_{2}$. If $u R x_{2}$ or $u=x_{2}$ then $[u] R_{E} W_{2} R_{E} W_{1}$ and if $u R y_{2}$ or $u=y_{2}$ then $[u] R_{E} W_{3} R_{E} W_{1}$. If $x_{2} R u$ then either
$u \in W_{2}$ and $[u] R_{E} W_{2} R_{E} W_{1}$ or $u \notin W_{2}$, but then $x_{2} \in U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ which is an upset implies $u \in U_{1} \cap U_{2}$ so in fact $u \notin R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \backslash V_{1}$, i.e. either $u \in V_{1}$ and $u \in U_{1} \cap V_{1} \subseteq W_{1}$ or $u \notin R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right]$ and $u \in U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[V_{1}\right] \subseteq W_{1}$. So $u \in W_{1}$ and $[u] R_{E} W_{1}$. Symmetrically, if $y_{2} R u$ either $[u] R_{E} W_{3} R_{E} W_{1}$ or $[u] R_{E} W_{1}$. Taken together, $W_{1}$ is a maximum element of $A_{*} / E$ and $A_{*} / E=\left\{W_{1}\right\} \cup R_{E}^{-1}\left[W_{2}, W_{3}\right]$ and so $A_{*} / E$ satisfies case (ii).

This completes the proof of the claim, so we have $B \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $B_{*}$ contains one of the following substructures, where $x_{2}, y_{2}$ and $T$ are isolated:

(iii)

We may still by lemma 2.15 assume that $B_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters. Moreover, by modal separation we can find a clopen upset $U: x_{1} \in U$ and $y_{2} \notin U$ and clopen upset $V: y_{1} \in V$ and $x_{2} \notin V$. Then letting:

$$
U^{\prime}:=U \cap\left(R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \backslash\left\{x_{2}\right\}\right) \backslash\{T\}, V^{\prime}:=V \cap\left(R^{-1}\left[y_{2}\right] \backslash\left\{y_{2}\right\}\right) \backslash\{T\} .
$$

These are both clopen as $x_{2}$ and $y_{2}$ are isolated and have $x_{1} \in U^{\prime}, y_{1}, y_{2} \notin U^{\prime}$ and $y_{1} \in V^{\prime}, x_{1}, x_{2} \notin V^{\prime}$. Moreover, if $u \in U^{\prime} \cap V^{\prime}$ then $u \in U$ and $u R y_{2}$ so $y_{2} \in U$ which is a contradiction, so $U^{\prime} \cap V^{\prime}=\varnothing$. So $U^{\prime}$ and $V^{\prime}$ a pairwise disjoint clopens, and indeed they form an $M$-partition. Letting $u, v \in U^{\prime}$ and $u R w$, we have from claim A that $w R x_{2}, w R y_{2}$ or $w=T$. As $u R w w \in U$ so $w R y_{2}$. If $w R x_{2}$ then either $w \neq x_{2}$ and so $w \in U^{\prime}$, then $v R v \in U^{\prime}$ so we may take $v$ itself as witness, or $w=x_{2}$ and then $v R w$. If $w=\top$ then $v R w$. The case for $V^{\prime}$ is similar, except we note when $w=\top$ that as $u R w$ we are not in case (iii) and have $v R T$ as needed. So, applying lemma 2.17 we may w.l.o.g assume that $U^{\prime}$ and $V^{\prime}$ are singletons, i.e. $x_{1}$ and $y_{1}$ are isolated. Moreover, $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right]$ is clopen and so by corollary 2.24 we can consider
a maximal cluster in it, which as $B_{*}$ consists of only improper cluster is in fact a maximal point in the set. This point sees $x_{1}$ and $y_{1}$, so by considering the $M$ subspace of $B_{*}$ rooted at this point we can assume w.l.o.g that the point is $\perp$ and $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right]=\{\perp\}$. Note, just as we established earlier that the only irreflexive points of $A_{*}$ could be in $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right]$, we can check this also holds for $B_{*}$, i.e. the only irreflexive point in $B_{*}$ is possibly $\perp$.

We now show each case leads to a contradiction. Case (i); We consider the following clopen sets:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
W_{1}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[y_{2}, x_{1}\right] ; & \\
W_{2}:=R^{-1}\left[y_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y_{1}\right] ; \\
W_{3}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[y_{2}\right] ; & W_{4}:=R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] ; \\
W_{5}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[y_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right] ; & W_{6}:=R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] .
\end{array}
$$

By inspection these sets are pairwise disjoint. Moreover, letting $u \in B_{*} \backslash\{\perp\}$ as $x_{1} \| y_{1}, \perp R u, \perp R x_{1}, \perp R y_{1}$ and by lemma $5.6 B_{*}$ has width $\leq 2$ we get that $u$ is comparable with either $x_{1}$ or $y_{1}$. As $u \neq \perp$ either $u \mathbb{R} x_{1}$ or $u \mathbb{R} y_{1}$. If $u \mathbb{k} x_{1}$ then either $x_{1} R u, u R y_{2}, u R x_{2}$ and $u \in W_{1} \cup W_{3} ; y_{1} R u, u \mathbb{R} x_{2}, u R y_{2}$ and $u \in W_{2} \cup W_{4}$ or $u R y_{1}$ and $u \in W_{4} \cup W_{6}$. If $u \mathbb{R} x_{1}$ then either $y_{1} R u, u \mathbb{R} x_{2}, u R y_{2}$ and $u \in W_{2} \cup W_{4} ; x_{1} R u, u \mathbb{R} y_{2}$, $u R x_{2}$ and $u \in W_{1} \cup W_{3}$ or $u R x_{1}$ and $u \in W_{3} \cup W_{6}$. So:

$$
B_{*}=\bigcup_{i=1}^{6} W_{i} \cup\{\perp\} .
$$

We claim that the $W_{i}$ form an $M$-partition. So, let $u, v \in W_{i}$ with $u R w$ with:
$\mathrm{i}=1$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{2}, x_{1}\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{2}, x_{1}\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. Then $w \in W_{j}$ for some $1 \leq j \leq 6$, and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{2}, x_{1}\right]$ we must have $j=1$, then $v R x_{2} \in W_{1}$.
$\mathrm{i}=2$; As the $i=1$ case.
$\mathrm{i}=3$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{2}\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{2}\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. Then $w \in W_{j}$ for some $1 \leq j \leq 6$, and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{2}\right]$ we must have $j=1$ or $j=3$. If $j=1$ then $v R x_{1} R x_{2} \in W_{1}$ and if $j=3$ then $v R x_{1} \in W_{3}$.
$\mathrm{i}=4$; As the $i=3$ case.
$\mathrm{i}=5$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right]$, so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. Then $w \in W_{j}$ for some $1 \leq j \leq 6$, and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right]$ we must have $j=1$ or $j=3$ or $j=5$. If $j=1$ then $v R x_{1} R x_{2} \in W_{1}$, if $j=3$ then $v R x_{1} \in W_{3}$ and if $j=5$ then $v R v \in W_{5}$.
$\mathrm{i}=6$; As the $i=5$ case.
Then, as ever by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence identifying the points within these sets and assume w.l.o.g it is the identity on $B_{*}$. Now, whilst $x_{2} \in W_{1}, y_{2} \in W_{2}, x_{1} \in W_{3}$ and $y_{1} \in W_{4}$ and so this amounts to assuming $W_{1}, W_{2}, W_{3}$ and $W_{4}$ are singeletons, both $W_{5}$ and $W_{6}$ may or may not be empty, i.e. may or may not exist as elements of $B_{*}$. In other words, $B_{*}$ has the following underlying frame
where the elements labelled $a$ and $b$ may or may not be present:


If either $a$ or $b$ are present, the $M$-subspace rooted at $a$ or $b$ respectively is isomorphic to $F_{5}$ so $F_{5}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction. If neither $a$ or $b$ are present we can reduce $B_{*}$ to $F_{6}$, so $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is also a contradiction.

Case (ii); We consider the same clopen sets as in case (i) and proceed as before, however this time we have:

$$
B_{*}=\bigcup_{i=1}^{6} W_{i} \cup\{\perp, \top\} .
$$

Additionally, when checking the $M$-partition criteria we have in each case the possibility that $w=T$, but $v R T$ in all cases as needed. This yields that $B_{*}$ has the following underlying frame where the elements labelled $a$ and $b$ may or may not be present:


Again, if either $a$ or $b$ is present the $M$-subspace rooted at $a$ or $b$ respectively is isomorphic to $F_{6}$ so $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction. if neither are present, we can reduce $B_{*}$ to $F_{6}$ also implying that $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ and a contradiction.

Case (iii); We consider the following clopen sets:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
W_{1}:=R^{-1}\left[\top, y_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y_{1}\right] ; & W_{2}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[y_{2}, x_{1}\right] ; \\
W_{3}:=R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] ; & W_{4}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right] ; \\
W_{5}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] . &
\end{array}
$$

By inspection these are pairwise disjoint. Moreover, letting $u \in B_{*} \backslash\{\perp, \top\}$, as $x_{1} \| y_{1}, \perp R u, \perp R x_{1}, \perp R y_{1}$ and by lemma $5.6 B_{*}$ has width $\leq 2$ we get that $u$ is
comparable with either $x_{1}$ or $y_{1}$. As $u \neq \perp$, either $u \mathbb{R} x_{1}$ or $u \mathbb{R} y_{1}$. If $u \mathbb{R} x_{1}$, then either $x_{1} R u, u R y_{2}, u R x_{2}$ and $u \in W_{2} ; y_{1} R u, u \mathbb{R} x_{2}, u R y_{2}$ and $u \in W_{1} \cup W_{3}$ or $u R y_{1}$ and $u \in W_{3} \cup W_{5}$. If $u R y_{1}$, then either $y_{1} R u, u \mathbb{R} x_{2}, u R y_{2}$ and $u \in W_{1} \cup W_{3} ; x_{1} R u, u R y_{2}$, $u R x_{2}$ and $u \in W_{2} \cup W_{4}$ or $u R x_{1}$ and $u \in W_{4}$. So:

$$
B_{*}=\bigcup_{i=1}^{5} W_{i} \cup\{\perp, \top\} .
$$

We claim that they form an $M$-partition. So, let $u, v \in W_{i}$ and $u R w$ with:
$\mathrm{i}=1$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y_{1}\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y_{1}\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. If $w=\top$ then $w \in W_{1}$ and $v R v \in W_{1}$. If $w \neq \mathrm{T}$, then $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 5$ and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y_{1}\right]$ we must have $j=1$ and again $v R v \in W_{1}$.
$\mathrm{i}=2$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{2}, x_{1}\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{2}, x_{1}\right]$ and $w \notin\{\perp\}$. If $w=\top$ then $v R x_{2} R \top$ so $v R w$. If $w \neq \top$, then $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 5$ and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{2}, x_{1}\right]$ we must have $j=1$ or $j=2$. If $j=1$ then again $v R x_{2} R T \in W_{1}$ and if $j=2$ then $v R x_{2} \in W_{2}$.
$\mathrm{i}=3$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right]$ and $w \neq \mathrm{T}$. If $w=\top$ then $v R y_{1} R y_{2} \in W_{1}$. If $w \neq \top$ then $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 6$ and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right]$ we must have $j=1$ or $j=3$. If $j=1$ then $v R y_{1} R y_{2} \in W_{1}$ and if $j=3$ then $v R y_{1} \in W_{3}$.
$\mathrm{i}=4$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. If $w=\top$ then $v R x_{1} R x_{2} R \top$ so $v R w$. If $w \neq T$, then $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 5$ and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[y_{1}\right]$ we must have $j=1$ or $j=2$ or $j=4$. If $j=1$ then $v R x_{1} R x_{2} R x \top \in W_{1}$, if $j=2$ then $v R x_{1} R x_{2} \in W_{2}$ and if $j=4$ then $v R x_{1} \in W_{4}$.
$\mathrm{i}=5$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. If $w=\top$ then $v R x_{2} R \top$ so $v R w$. If $w \neq \top$ then $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 5$ and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right]$ we must have $j=1, j=2, j=3$ or $j=5$. If $j=1$ then $v R x_{2} R T \in W_{1}$, if $j=2$ then $v R x_{2} \in W_{2}$, if $j=3$ then $v R y_{1} \in W_{3}$ and if $j=5$ then $v R v \in W_{5}$.

Then, as ever by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence identifying the points within these sets and consider $B_{*} / E$. Now, whilst $T \in W_{1}, x_{2} \in W_{2}$, $y_{1} \in W_{3}$ and $x_{1} \in W_{4}, W_{5}$ may or may not be empty, i.e. may or may not exist as an element of $B_{*} / E$. In other words, $B_{*} / E$ has the following underlying frame where the element $W_{5}$ may or may not be present:


If $W_{5}$ is not present then $B_{*} / E \cong F_{6}$ so $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ and we have a contradiction. If $W_{5}$ is present we can reduce $B_{*} / E$ to $F_{6}$, again giving $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ and a contradiction.

Lemma 5.8. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Then $\forall A \in \mathcal{A}, A_{*}$ does not contain the following substructure:


Proof. Suppose not, let $A \in \mathcal{A}$ have the substructure described above which we label as follows:


We make the following claim:
Claim: $\exists B \in \mathcal{A}: B_{*}$ is rooted and contains the substructure witnessed by four elements elements $x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}, y$ such that either
(i) $x_{3}$ and $y$ are maximal and isolated with $B_{*}=R^{-1}\left[x_{3}, y\right]$.
(ii) $B_{*}$ has a maximum element $T$ that is isolated, $x_{3} R T$ and is isolated, $y R T$ and is isolated and $B_{*}=\{T\} \cup R^{-1}\left[x_{3}, y\right]$.
(iii) $B_{*}$ has a maximal element $T$ that is isolated, $x_{3}$ is maximal and isolated, $x_{2} R T$, $y R T$ and is isolated and $B_{*}=\{T\} \cup R^{-1}\left[x_{3}, y\right]$.
(iv) $B_{*}$ has a maximal element $T$ that is isolated, $x_{3}$ is maximal and isolated, $x_{1} R T$, $y R T$ and is isolated, $x_{2} R T$ and $B_{*}=\{T\} \cup R^{-1}\left[x_{3}, y\right]$.

As ever, by lemma 2.15 and taking an $M$-subspace we may assume that $A_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters and is rooted by $\perp$. Once again, we also note if $u \in A_{*}: u R u$ then either $\perp=u$ or $\perp R u$. Now $\perp R x_{1}$ and $\perp R y$ and $x_{1} \| y$, so by lemma 5.4, $u$ is comparable with $x_{1}$ and $y_{1}$. In particular, $u \notin\left\{x_{1}, y\right\}$ and so $x_{1} R x_{1}$ and $y R y$. Then by lemma $5.3, x_{1} R u$ and $y R u$ so in fact $u R x_{1}$ and $u R y$. That is, the only irreflexive points in $A_{*}$ belong to $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}[y]$.

By modal separation we can find clopen upsets $U$ and $V$ such that $x_{1} \in U$ and $y \notin U$ and $y \in V$ and $x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3} \notin U$. We make our first case distinction, either $U \cap V=\varnothing$ or not.

If $U \cap V=\varnothing$; then moreover $R^{-1}[V] \cap U=\varnothing$ and $R^{-1}[U] \cap V=\varnothing$. By modal separation we also find a clopen upset $U^{\prime}: x_{3} \in U^{\prime}$ and $x_{2} \notin U^{\prime}$ and let $W=U^{\prime} \cap U$. We note that $W \cap V=\varnothing, x_{3} \in W, y \notin W, y \in V$ and $x_{3} \notin W$. Now $W$ and $V$ are
disjoint clopen upsets, so easily form an $M$-partition. By lemma 2.17 we consider the modal equivalence $E$ identifying points within $W$ and $V$ and $A_{*} / E \in \mathcal{A}$. As they were clopen in $A_{*}$ they are isolated points in $A_{*} / E$, and as they were upsets in $A_{*}$ they are maximal in $A_{*} / E$. Then we have $\perp, x_{1}, x_{2} \notin W$, or $V$ so $[\perp]=\{\perp\},\left[x_{1}\right]=$ $\left\{x_{1}\right\},\left[x_{2}\right]=\left\{x_{2}\right\} \in A_{*} / E$. As $R^{-1}[V] \cap U=\varnothing$ and $x_{1}, x_{2} \in U$ we have $x_{1}, x_{2} \notin$ $R^{-1}[V]=R_{E}^{-1}[V]$, and similarly, $W \cap V=\varnothing$ implies $R^{-1}[W] \cap V=\varnothing$ and $y \in V$ so $y \notin R_{E}^{-1}[W]$. Therefore, $\left[x_{1}\right],\left[x_{2}\right], W$ and $V$ witness the substructure.

Finally, letting $u \in A_{*}$, by lemma $5.6 A_{*}$ has width $\leq 2$ and $x_{3} \| y$ so $u$ must be comparable with either $x_{3}$ or $y$, that is $x_{3} R u, u R x_{3}, y R u$ or $u R y$. If $x_{3} R u$ then $u \in W$ and $[u]=W$, if $u R x_{3}$ then $[u] R_{E} W$. Similarly, if $y R u$ then $[u]=V$ and if $u R y$ then $[u] R_{E} V$. So $A_{*} / E=R_{E}^{-1}[W, V]$ and we have $A_{*} / E$ satisfying case (i).

Now we suppose $U \cap V \neq \varnothing$; if $x_{1} \notin R^{-1}[V]$ then $U \backslash R^{-1}[V]$ is a clopen upset such that $x_{1} \in U \backslash R^{-1}[V], y \notin U \backslash R^{-1}[V], y \in V, x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3} \notin V$ and $U \backslash R^{-1}[V] \cap V=\varnothing$. So we can work as in the previous case with $U \backslash R^{-1}[V]$ in place of $U$. Similarly, if $y \notin R^{-1}[U]$ we can work as in the previous case with $V \backslash R^{-1}[U]$ in place of $V$. So suppose $x_{1} \in R^{-1}[V]$ and $y \in R^{-1}[U]$. We make our second case distinction, either $x_{3} \in R^{-1}[V]$ or not.

Suppose not; we again use modal separation to find a clopen upset $U^{\prime}: x_{3} \in U^{\prime}$ and $x_{2} \notin U^{\prime}$. Then, we define the following clopen sets:

$$
\begin{gathered}
W_{1}:=U \cap V \cup V \backslash R^{-1}[U] ; W_{2}:=U^{\prime} \cap U \backslash R^{-1}[V] ; \\
W_{3}:=V \cap R^{-1}[U] \backslash U .
\end{gathered}
$$

We note that $x_{3} \in W_{2}, y \in W_{3}$, and by inspection the $W_{i}$ are pairwise disjoint. We claim moreover that they form an $M$-partition. For $W_{1}$ and $W_{2}$, these are both upsets so the condition holds trivially. So let $u, v \in W_{3}$ and $u R w$. We have $u \in V$ so $w \in V$. If $w \in U$ then $w \in W_{1}$, if $w \notin U$ and $w \in R^{-1}[U]$ then $w \in W_{3}$ and if $w \notin U$ and $w \notin R^{-1}[U]$ then $w \in W_{1}$, so $w \in W_{1}$ or $w \in W_{3}$. If $w \in W_{1}$, as $v \in W_{3}$ we can find $t \in U: v R t$ then $t \in W_{1}$ so may be taken as witness. If $w \in W_{3}$ then $v R v \in W_{3}$.

So, by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence $E$ identifying points within these sets and consider $A_{*} / E \in \mathcal{A}$. As each was clopen in $A_{*}$ they are isolated points in $A_{*} / E$ and as $W_{1}$ and $W_{2}$ were upsets they are maximal in $A_{*}$. We have $\perp, x_{1}, x_{2} \notin W_{i}: 1 \leq i \leq 3$ so $[\perp]=\{\perp\},\left[x_{1}\right]=\left\{x_{1}\right\},\left[x_{2}\right]=\left\{x_{2}\right\} \in A_{*} / E$. If $W_{2} R_{E} W_{3}$ then $\exists u \in W_{2}$ and $v \in W_{3}: u R v$, but then $u \in U$ so $v \in U$ but $v \in W_{3}$ gives $v \notin U$ so we have a contradiction. Therefore $W_{2} R_{E} W_{3}$. If $W_{3} R_{E} W_{2}$ then $\exists u \in W_{3}$ and $v \in W_{2}: u R v$, but then $u \in V$ and so $v \in V$, but $v \in W_{2}$ gives $v \notin R^{-1}[V] \supseteq V$ so we have a contradiction. Therefore $W_{3} R_{E} W_{2}$. If $\left[x_{2}\right] R_{E} W_{3}$ then $x_{2} R u$ for some $u \in W_{3}$ but $x_{2} \in U$ so $u \in U$ and $u \in W_{3}$ implies $u \notin U$, a contradiction. Therefore, $\left[x_{2}\right] R_{E} W_{3}$ and similarly $\left[x_{1}\right] R_{E} W_{3}$. If $W_{3} R_{E}\left[x_{2}\right]$ then $\exists u \in W_{3}: u R x_{2}$, but then $u \in V$ and $x_{2} \notin V$ so we have a contradiction. Therefore, $W_{3} \mathbb{R}_{E}\left[x_{2}\right]$ and similarly, $W_{3} \mathbb{R}_{E}\left[x_{1}\right]$. Putting this all together, $\left[x_{1}\right],\left[x_{2}\right], W_{2}$ and $W_{3}$ witness the substructure. We moreover have that $W_{3} R_{E} W_{1}$, as $y \in W_{3}$ and $y \in R^{-1}[U]$ so $\exists u \in U: y R u$ and then $u \in U \cap V \subseteq W_{1}$.

Letting $u \in A_{*}$, by lemma $5.6 A_{*}$ has width $\leq 2$ and $x_{3} \| y$ so $u$ must be comparable with $x_{3}$ or $y$, that is $x_{3} R u, u R x_{3}, y R u$ or $u R y$. If $x_{3} R u$, then $u \in W_{2}$ and $[u]=W_{2}$, if $u R x_{3}$ then $[u] R_{E} W_{2}$. If $y R u$, then $u \in V$ and as noted earlier this implies either $u \in W_{1}$ and so $[u]=W_{1}$ or $u \in W_{3}$ and $[u]=W_{3}$, if $u R y$ then $[u] R_{E} W_{3}$. So $A_{*} / E=\left\{W_{1}\right\} \cup R^{-1}\left[W_{2}, W_{3}\right]$.

Finally, either $x_{2} \in R^{-1}[V]$ or $x_{2} \notin R^{-1}[V]$. If the former, then $\left[x_{2}\right] R_{E} W_{1}$ and we are in case (iii), and if the latter $\left[x_{2}\right] \mathbb{R}_{E} W_{1}$ and we are in case (iv).

Suppose $x_{3} \in R^{-1}[V]$; once more we use modal separation to find a clopen upset $U^{\prime}$ such that $x_{3} \in U^{\prime}$ and $x_{2} \notin U^{\prime}$. This time, we define the following clopen sets:

$$
\begin{gathered}
W_{1}:=U \cap V \cup U \backslash R^{-1}[V] \cup V \backslash R^{-1}[U] ; W_{2}:=U \cap U^{\prime} \cap R^{-1}[V] \backslash V ; \\
W_{3}:=V \cap R^{-1}[U] \backslash U .
\end{gathered}
$$

We note that $x_{3} \in W_{2}, y \in W_{3}$, and by inspection the $W_{i}$ are pairwise disjoint We claim moreover that they form an $M$-partition. For $W_{1}$ this is an upset so the condition holds trivally. Letting $u, v \in W_{2}$ and $u R w$, then $w \in U \cap U^{\prime}$ and this is an upset. Then either $w \in V$ and so $w \in W_{1}, w \notin R^{-1}[V]$ and $w \in W_{1}$ or $W \notin V$ and $W \in R^{-1}[V]$ and so $w \in W_{2}$. So $w \in W_{1}$ or $W_{2}$, if the former then as $v \in W_{2}$ $\exists t \in V: v R t$ and then $t \in W_{1}$ so we may take it as witness, and if $w \in W_{2}$ then $v R v \in W_{2}$. Letting $u, v \in W_{3}$ and $u R w$ we have $w \in V$ as it is an upset. Then either $w \in U$ and so $w \in W_{1}, w \notin R^{-1}[U]$ and so $w \in W_{1}$ or $w \notin U$ and $w \in R^{-1}[U]$ and so $w \in W_{3}$. So $w \in W_{1}$ or $W_{2}$, if the former then as $v \in W_{2} \exists t \in U: v R t$ and then $t \in W_{1}$ so we may take it as witness, and if $w \in W_{2}$ then $v R v \in W_{2}$.

So, by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence $E$ identifying points within these sets and consider $A_{*} / E \in \mathcal{A}$. As each was clopen in $A_{*}$ they are isolated points in $A_{*} / E$, and as $W_{1}$ was an upset it is maximal in $A_{*} / E$. We have $\perp, x_{1}, x_{2} \notin$ $W_{i}: 1 \leq i \leq 3$ so $[\perp]=\{\perp\},\left[x_{1}\right]=\left\{x_{1}\right\},\left[x_{2}\right]=\left\{x_{2}\right\} \in A_{*} / E$. If $W_{2} R_{E} W_{3}$ then we have $u \in W_{2}$ and $v \in W_{3}$ such that $u R v$, but then $u \in U$ implies $v \in U$ and $v \in W_{3}$ implies $v \notin U$ which is a contradiction. So $W_{2} \mathbb{R} W_{3}$, and similarly $W_{3} \mathbb{R}_{E} W_{2}$. Then, just as in the previous case $\left[x_{2}\right] \mathbb{R}_{E} W_{3}$ and $\left[x_{1}\right] \mathbb{R}_{E} W_{3}$. So $\left[x_{1}\right],\left[x_{2}\right], W_{2}$ and $W_{3}$ witness the substructure. We moreover have that $W_{E} R_{E} W_{1}$ and $W_{2} R_{E} W_{1}$.

Finally, letting $u \in A_{*}$ we have just as in previous cases that $x_{3} R u, u R x_{3}, y R u$ or $u R y$. If $x_{3} R u$ then as $x_{3} \in W_{2}$ as argued earlier this implies either $u \in W_{1}$ and $[u]=W_{1}$ or $u \in W_{2}$ and $[u]=W_{2}$. If $u R x_{3}$ then $[u] R_{E} W_{2}$. Similarly, if $y R u$ then $[u]=W_{1}$ or $[u]=W_{3}$ and if $u R y$ then $[u] R_{E} W_{3}$. So $A_{*} / E=\left\{W_{1}\right\} \cup R^{-1}\left[W_{2}, W_{3}\right]$ and satisfies case (ii).

This completes the proof of the claim, so we have $B \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $B_{*}$ contains one of the following substructures with $x_{3}, y$ and $T$ isolated:



We may still be lemma 2.15 assume that $B_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters. We further claim that we may w.l.o.g assume $x_{2}$ is isolated.

For cases (i) and (ii) we use modal separation to find a clopen upset $U$ such that $x_{2} \in U$ and $x_{1}, y \notin U$. We then consider:

$$
W:=U \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] \backslash\left\{x_{3}\right\} .
$$

Then, $x_{1}, x_{3}, \top, y \notin W$ and $x_{2} \in W$ and $W$ is clopen. Letting $u, v \in W$ and $u R w$, $w \in U$ and from our case distinction we know either $w R x_{3}, w R y$ or $w=T$. As $y \notin U$ we have $w R y$. If $w R x_{3}$ then either $w=x_{3}$ and so $v R w$ or $w \neq x_{3}$ and $w \in W$ and $v R v \in W$. If $w=\mathrm{T}$, then we are in case (ii) and $v R w$. In other words $\{W\}$ forms an $M$-partition, and we by lemma 2.17 may consider the modal equivalence identifying points within $W$ and $B_{*} / E \in \mathcal{A}$. Noting that for $u \in B_{*}$ if $y R u$ then $u \in\{y, T\}$ and so $[y] \mathbb{R}_{E} W$, it is easy to see that if case (i) held for $B_{*}$ then it does for $B_{*} / E$ with $\left[x_{1}\right], W,\left[x_{3}\right]$ and $[y]$, and similarly for case (ii). Therefore, we may assume w.l.o.g that $E$ is the identity on $B_{*}$, i.e. $W=\left\{x_{2}\right\}$ and it is isolated.

In case (iii) we consider:

$$
W_{1}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] \backslash R^{-1}[T] ; W_{2}:=U \cap R^{-1}[T] \backslash\{T\} .
$$

$W_{1}$ and $W_{2}$ are clopen and disjoint and we claim moreover an $M$-partition. For $W_{1}$, as $x_{3}$ is maximal this is an upset so the condition holds trivially. Letting $u, v \in W_{2}$ and $u R w$, then $w \in U$ and so $w R y$. Now, if $w=\top$ then $v R w$, and if $w \neq \top$ by case (iii) $w R x_{3}$. So then, either $w R T, w \in W_{2}$ and $v R v \in W_{2}$ or $w R \top$ and so $w \in W_{1}$ and $v R x_{3} \in W_{1}$. So, by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence $E$ identifying points within those two sets and $B_{*} / E \in \mathcal{A}$. Moting that for $u \in B_{*}$ if $y R u$ then $u \in\{y, T\}$ and so $[y] \mathbb{R}_{E} W_{1}$ and $[y] \mathbb{R}_{E} W_{2}$, it is easy to see that $B_{*}$ still satisfies case (iii) with $\left[x_{1}\right], W_{2}, W_{1},[y]$. So we may assume w.l.o.g that $E$ is the identity on $B_{*}$, i.e. $W_{2}=\left\{x_{2}\right\}$ and it is isolated.

Now for case (iv) we use modal separation to find a clopen upset $U$ such that $x_{2} \in U$ and $x_{1}, y, \top \notin U$ and consider:

$$
W:=U \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] \backslash\left\{x_{3}\right\} .
$$

This is clopen. Letting $u, v \in W$ and $u R w$ then $w \in U$ and so $w \neq T$ and $w R y$. So by case (iv) we have $w R x_{3}$, so either $w=x_{3}$ and $v R w$ or $w \neq x_{3}, w \in W$ and $v R v \in W$. By lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence identifying points in $W$ and $B_{*} / E \in \mathcal{A}$. Noting that for $u \in B_{*}$ if $y R u$ then $u \in\{y, \top\}$ and so $[y] \mathbb{R}_{E} W$ it is easy to see that $B_{*}$ still satisfied case (iv) with $\left[x_{1}\right], W,\left[x_{3}\right]$ and $[y]$. So we may assume w.l.o.g that $E$ is the identity on $B_{*}$, i.e. $W=\left\{x_{2}\right\}$ and it is isolated.

A similar process lets us assume w.l.o.g that $x_{1}$ is isolated in $B_{*}$. Then, $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap$ $R^{-1}[y]$ is clopen and so by corollary 2.24 we can consider a maximal cluster in it, which as $B_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters is in fact a maximal point $p$ in the set. This point sees $x_{1}$ and $y$, so by considering the $M$-subspace of $B_{*}$ rooted at $p$ we can assume w.l.o.g that the point is $\perp$ and $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}[y]=\{\perp\}$. Finally, just as we established earlier that the only irreflexive points in $A_{*}$ could be in $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}[y]$, we can check this also holds for $B_{*}$.

We now show each case leads to a contradiction. However, we first note the following. Suppose $\exists u \in B_{*}$ such that $R[u] \cap\left\{x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}, y\right\}=\left\{x_{3}, y\right\}$. Then, as $u R x_{3}$ $u \neq y$ and as $u \mathbb{R} x_{1} \perp \neq u$. As $u R y, x_{2} \mathbb{R} u$ and $x_{1} \mathbb{R} u$, in other words $A_{*}$ contains the following substrcture:


This contradictions lemma 5.7.
Case (i); We consider the following clopen sets:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
W_{1}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y\right] ; & \\
W_{2}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{1}, y\right] ; \\
W_{3}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \backslash R^{-1}[y] ; & \\
W_{5}:=R^{-1}[y] \cap R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] . &
\end{array}
$$

By inspection these sets are pairwise disjoint. Moreover, letting $u \in B_{*} \backslash\{\perp\}$, we have from case (i) and $R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}[y]=\{\perp\}$ that either $u R x_{3}$ or $u R y$ and $u \mathbb{R} x_{1}$. If the latter then then $u \in W_{4} \cup W_{5}$. If the former, either $u R y$ or $u R^{k} y$, if $u R y$ then as noted above $R[u] \cap\left\{x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}, y\right\} \neq\left\{x_{3}, y\right\}$ so either $u R x_{1}$ and $u \in W_{4}$ or $u \mathbb{R} x_{1}$ so $u R x_{2}$ and $u \in W_{5}$. If $u R y$ then $u \in W_{1} \cup W_{2} \cup W_{3}$. So:

$$
B_{*}=\bigcup_{i=1}^{5} W_{i} \cup\{\perp\}
$$

We claim that the sets form an $M$-partition, so let $u, v \in W_{i}$ and $u R w$ with:
$\mathrm{i}=1$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. Then $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 5$ and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y\right]$ we must have $j=1$ and $v R v \in W_{1}$.
$\mathrm{i}=2$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{1}, y\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{1}, y\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. Then $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 5$ and ass $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{1}, y\right]$ we must have $j=1$ or $j=2$. If $j=1$ then $v R x_{2} R x_{3} \in W_{1}$ and if $j=2$ then $v R v \in W_{2}$.
$\mathrm{i}=3$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}[y]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}[y]$ and $w \neq \perp$. Then $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 5$ and as $w \notin R^{-1}[y]$ we must have $j=1, j=2$ or $j=3$. If $j=1$ then $v R x_{1} R x_{3} \in W_{1}$, if $j=2$ then $v R x_{1} R x_{2} \in W_{2}$ and if $j=3$ then $v R v \in W_{3}$.
$\mathrm{i}=4$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. Then $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 5$ and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right]$ we must have $j=1$ or $j=4$. However, if $j=1$ then $u R w R x_{3}$ but we noted earlier that $u \mathbb{R} x_{3}$. So $j=4$ and $v R v \in W_{4}$.
$\mathrm{i}=5$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. Then $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 5$ and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{1}\right]$ we must have $j=1, j=2, j=4$ or $j=5$. If $j=1$ then $v R x_{2} R x_{3} \in W_{1} \mathrm{~m}$ if $j=2$ then $v R x_{2} \in W_{2}$, if $j=4$ then $v R y \in W_{4}$ and if $j=5$ then $v R v \in W_{5}$.

Then, as ever by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence identifying the points within these sets and assume w.l.o.g it is the identity on $B_{*}$. Now, whilst $x_{3} \in W_{1}, x_{2} \in W_{2}, x_{1} \in W_{3}$ and $y \in W_{4}$ and so this amounts to assuming these sets are singletons, $W_{5}$ may or may not be empty, i.e. may or may not exists as an element of $B_{*}$. In other words, $B_{*}$ has the following underlying frame where the element labelled $a$ may or may not be present:


If $a$ is present then the $M$-subspace of $B_{*}$ rooted at $a$ is isomorphic to $F_{5}$ and $F_{5}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction. If it is not present then we can reduce $B_{*}$ to $F_{5}$, again giving $F_{5}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ and a contradiction.

Case (ii); We consider the same clopen sets as in case (i) and proceed as before, except now we have:

$$
B_{*}=\bigcup_{i=1}^{5} W_{i} \cup\{\perp, \top\} .
$$

Additionally, when checking the $M$-partition for each $W_{i}$ we have the possibility of $w=\mathrm{T}$, but then $v R w$. Applying lemma 2.17 gives that $B_{*}$ has the following
underlying frame where the element labelled $a$ may or may not be present:


If $a$ is present then the $M$-subspace of $B_{*}$ rooted at $a$ is isomorphic to $F_{5}$ and $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction. If it is not present then we can reduce $B_{*}$ to $F_{5}$, again giving $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ and a contradiction.

Case (iii); We proceed almost as case (i). We define our clopen sets as before except we take

$$
W_{1}:=\{\top\} \cup R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[x_{2}, y\right] .
$$

Then, we check that:

$$
B_{*}=\bigcup_{i=1}^{5} W_{i} \cup\{\perp\} .
$$

This proceeds as case (i) except we begin by noting either $w=\top$ and then $w \in W_{1}$ or $w \neq \top$ and then either $w R x_{3}$ or $w R y$.

When checking for the $M$-partition, when $i \neq 4$, this is as case (i) except we may have $w=\top$ and $w \in W_{1}$. For $i=1$ we have $v R v \in W_{1}$, and for $i \neq 1$ then $v R w$.

For $i=4$; as $u \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right]$ we have $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right]$ and $w \neq \perp$. So $w \in W_{j}: 1 \leq j \leq 5$ and as $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right]$ we must have $j=1$ or $j=4$. If $j=1$ then as we noted earlier $u R y$ and $u \mathbb{R} x_{2}$ implies $u \mathbb{R} x_{3}$ so $w \mathbb{R} x_{3}$, therefore, $w=T$, and $v R y R w$. If $j=4$ then $v R v \in W_{4}$.

As ever, by lemma 2.17 we consider the modal equivalence identifying points within these sets and $B_{*} / E$. Now, whilst $T \in W_{1}, x_{2} \in W_{2}, x_{1} \in W_{3}$ and $y \in W_{4}, W_{5}$ may or may not be empty, i.e. may or may not exist as an element of $B_{*} / E$. In other words, $B_{*} / E$ has the following underlying frame where the element $W_{5}$ may or may not be present:


If $W_{5}$ is not present then $B_{*} / E \cong F_{6}$ so $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ and we have a contradiction. If $W_{5}$ is
present we can reduce $B_{*} / E$ to $F_{6}$, again giving $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ and a contradiction.
Case (iv); For this case we proceed slightly differently. We consider the $M$ subspace $\mathcal{X}$ of $B_{*}$ rooted at $x_{1}$, note that by case (iv) we have $X=\{\top\} \cup R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right]$. We define the following clopen sets:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
W_{1}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{3}\right] \backslash\left(R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \cup\{T\}\right) ; & \\
W_{2}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \backslash R^{-1}[\top] ; \\
W_{3}:=\{\top\} ; & W_{4}:=R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right] \cap R^{-1}[\top] .
\end{array}
$$

By inspection these sets are pairwise disjoint. Moreover letting $u \in X$ either $u=\top$ and $u \in W_{3}$ or $u \neq \top$, so $u R x_{3}$ and $u \in W_{1} \cup W_{2} \cup W_{4}$. So:

$$
X=\bigcup_{i=1}^{4} W_{i}
$$

We claim that the sets form an $M$-partition, so let $u, v \in W_{i}$ and $u R w$ with:
$\mathrm{i}=1$; We have $u \notin R^{-} 1 x_{2}$ so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[x_{2}\right]$ and as $u R x_{3}$ by case (iv) we have $w \neq \top$ and $w R x_{3}$. So $w \in W_{1}$ and $v R v \in W_{1}$.
$\mathrm{i}=2$; We have $u \notin R^{-1}[\top]$ so $w \notin R^{-1}[\top]$ and in particular $w \neq T$. So, either $w \in W_{1}$ and then $v R x_{2} R x_{3} \in W_{1}$ or $w \in W_{2}$ and $v R v \in W_{2}$.
$\mathrm{i}=3 ; u=\mathrm{T}=v$ so $w=\mathrm{T}$ and $v R w$.
$\mathrm{i}=4 ; w \in W_{j}$ for $1 \leq j \leq 4$, if $j=1$ then $v R x_{2} R x_{3} \in W_{1}$, if $j=2$ then $v R x_{2} \in W_{2}$, if $j=3$ then $v R T \in W_{3}$ and if $j=4$ then $v R v \in W_{4}$.

So, by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence identifying the points within these sets, and assume w.l.o.g it is the identity on $\mathcal{X}$, i.e. $X \cong F_{5}$, so $F_{5}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.

These three lemmas 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 are sufficient to establish the core of our main theorem for this chapter. Before we do so, there are two additional structures we'll want to control for.

Lemma 5.9. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Then $\forall A \in \mathcal{A}, A_{*}$ does not contain the following substructure, where $R^{-1}\left[z_{i}\right] \cap R[x]=$ $\left\{u \in A_{*}: z_{i} R u \& u R z_{i}\right\}$, i.e. each $z_{i}$ is an immediate successor to $x$ :


Proof. Suppose not, let $A \in \mathcal{A}$ have the substructure described and labelled as above. Now, by lemma 5.3 we may consider a maximal cluster in $R^{-1}[x]$ which is an irreflexive point, and may assume w.l.o.g that this point is $\perp$, and also that $\perp$ is the root of $A_{*}$ by taking the $M$-subspace with $\perp$ as the root. Then $R^{-1}[x]=\{\perp\}$. Moreover, by lemma 5.4 we have $A_{*}=\{\perp\} \cup R[\perp]=\{\perp\} \cup\{x\} \cup R[x]$. We can also by lemma 2.15 assume $A_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters, note this implies that
$R^{-1}\left[z_{i}\right] \cap R[x]=\left\{z_{i}\right\}$. Additionally, by lemma 5.6 $A_{*}$ has width $\leq 2$, so letting $u \in$ $A_{*} \backslash\{\perp, x\}, u \in R[x]$ and as $z_{1}| | z_{2}, x R z_{1}$ and $x R z_{2} u$ must be comparable with either $z_{1}$ or $z_{2}$. Then as $R^{-1}\left[z_{i}\right] \cap R[x]=\left\{z_{i}\right\}$ we in fact have $u \in R\left[z_{1}\right] \cup R\left[z_{2}\right]$. In summary, $A_{*}=\{\perp, x\} \cup R\left[z_{1}\right] \cup R\left[z_{2}\right]$, and then from lemma 5.3 we have $\forall u \in R\left[z_{1}\right] \cup R\left[z_{2}\right]$ that $u R u$, i.e. $\perp$ and $x$ are the only irreflexive points in $A_{*}$.

Now, by modal separation we can find clopen upsets $U_{1}$ and $U_{2}$ such that $z_{i} \in U_{j}$ iff $i=j$. As $z_{i} \in U_{i}$ we have $R\left[z_{i}\right] \subseteq U_{i}$ which further implies $A_{*}=\{\perp, x\} \cup U_{1} \cup U_{j}$. Now, if $U_{1} \cap U_{2}=\varnothing$, they are pairwise disjoint clopen upsets so easily form an $M$ partition. As usual, we may assume w.l.o.g that they are singletons, i.e. $A_{*}$ is exactly the labelled frame and so $A_{*} \cong F_{16}$ so $F_{16}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.

So now suppose $U_{1} \cap U_{2} \neq \varnothing$. We consider $R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$ and $R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$. If $z_{1} \notin$ $R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$, then $z_{2} \in U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ which is a clopen upset, $z_{2} \notin U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ and $U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right] \cap U_{2}=\varnothing$. So, replacing $U_{1}$ with $U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ we can proceed as in the previous case. Similarly, if $z_{2} \notin R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$ we can replace $U_{2}$ with $U_{2} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$. So suppose $z_{1} \in R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ and $z_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$. We define the following clopen sets:

$$
\begin{gathered}
W_{1}:=U_{1} \cap U_{2} \cap U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right] \cap U_{2} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right] ; W_{2}:=U_{1} \cap R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right] \backslash U_{2} ; \\
W_{3}:=U_{2} \cap R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right] \backslash U_{1} .
\end{gathered}
$$

By inspection these sets are pairwise disjoint. Moreover, letting $u \in A_{*} \backslash\{\perp, x\}$ then $u \in R\left[z_{1}\right] \cup R\left[z_{2}\right]$. If $u \in R\left[z_{1}\right]$ then $u \in U_{1}$, so then if $u \in U_{2}$ or $u \notin R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ then $u \in W_{1}$ and if $u \notin U_{2}$ and $u \in R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ then $u \in W_{2}$. Similarly, if $u \in U_{2}$ then either $u \in W_{1}$ or $u \in W_{3}$. So:

$$
A_{*}=\{\perp, \top\} \cup \bigcup_{i=1}^{3} W_{i} .
$$

We claim moreover that the sets form an $M$-partition, so let $u, v \in W_{i}$ and $u R w$ with:
$\mathrm{i}=1 ; W_{1}$ is an upset so $w \in W_{1}$ and $v R v \in W_{1}$.
$\mathrm{i}=2 ; u \notin U_{2}$ so $w \notin U_{2}$, and $w \neq \perp$ and $w \neq x$. So $w \in W_{1} \cup W_{2}$, if $w \in W_{2}$ then $v R v \in W_{2}$ and if $w \in W_{1}$, we have $v \in R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ so $\exists t \in U_{2}: v R t$ then $t \in U_{1} \cap U_{2} \subseteq W_{1}$.
$\mathrm{i}=3$; As the $i=2$ case.
So, by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence identifying points within these sets and assume w.l.o.g that it is the identity on $A_{*}$. Now, $z_{1} \in W_{2}$, $z_{2} \in W_{3}$ and $U_{1} \cap U_{2} \neq \varnothing$ so $W_{1} \neq \varnothing$, so this amounts to assuming that these sets are singletons, i.e. $A_{*} \cong F_{17}$ and $F_{17}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.

Lemma 5.10. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Then $\forall A \in \mathcal{A}, A_{*}$ does not contain the following substructure, where $R^{-1}\left[z_{i}\right] \cap$ $R[x]=\left\{u \in A_{*}: z_{i} R u \& u R z_{i}\right\}$, i.e. each $z_{i}$ is an immediate successor to $x$ :


Proof. Suppose not, let $A \in \mathcal{A}$ have the substructure described and labelled as above. We may by lemma 2.15 assume w.l.o.g that $A_{*}$ consists of only improper clusters which in particular implies $R^{-1}\left[z_{i}\right] \cap R[x]=\left\{z_{i}\right\}$, and by considering the $M$-subspace of $A_{*} R^{+}[x] \cup R^{+}[y]$ we may assume $A_{*}=R^{+}[x] \cup R^{+}[y]$. Additionally, by lemma $5.6 A_{*}$ has width $\leq 2$, so letting $u \in R[x]$, as $z_{1}| | z_{2}, x R z_{1}$ and $x R z_{2} u$ must be comparable with either $z_{1}$ or $z_{2}$. Then as $R^{-1}\left[z_{i}\right] \cap R[x]=\left\{z_{i}\right\}$ we in fact have $u \in R\left[z_{1}\right] \cup R\left[z_{2}\right]$. So $R[x]=R\left[z_{1}\right] \cup R\left[z_{2}\right]$. Finally, as $y R y$ if $y R u$ then by lemma 5.3 $u R u$ and if $x R u$ then $u \in R\left[z_{1}\right] \cup R\left[z_{2}\right]$ so again by lemma $5.3 u R u$. That is, the only irreflexive point in $A_{*}$ is $x$.

Now, by modal separation we can find clopen upsets $U_{1}$ and $U_{2}$ such that $z_{i} \in U_{j}$ iff $i=j$. Note that $x, y \notin U_{1} \cup U_{2}$. Once more, either $U_{1} \cap U_{2}=\varnothing$ or not. Suppose $U_{1} \cap U_{2}=\varnothing$; They are pariwise disjoint clopen upsets, so easily form an $M$-partition. As usual, we may assume w.l.o.g that they are singletons, that is $U_{1}=\left\{z_{1}\right\}, U_{2}=$ $\left\{z_{2}\right\}$, and $z_{1}$ and $z_{2}$ are isolated and maximal in $A_{*}$. Then $\left\{z_{1}\right\} \cup A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[z_{1}, z_{2}\right]$ is a clopen upset, so again assuming w.l.o.g it is a singleton we have $A_{*}=R^{-1}\left[z_{1}, z_{2}\right]$. Finally, we consider the clopen set $V=R^{-1}\left[z_{1}\right] \cap R^{-1}\left[z_{2}\right]$. Now, $x \in V \backslash R^{-1}[V]$ which is clopen, and if $u \in V \backslash R^{-1}[V]$ then $u \in V$ but $u \notin R^{-1}[V]$ means $u k u$, which as we noted earlier means $u=x$. So $V \backslash R^{-1}[V]=\{x\}$ and $x$ is isolated in $A_{*}$. We then define the following clopen sets:

$$
\begin{gathered}
W_{1}:=V \backslash\{x\} ; W_{2}:=R^{-1}\left[z_{1}\right] \backslash V ; \\
W_{3}:=R^{-1}\left[z_{2}\right] \backslash V .
\end{gathered}
$$

By inspection these are pairwise disjoint. We claim moreover that they form an $M$-partition. Letting $u, v \in W_{i}$ and $u R w$ with:
$\mathrm{i}=1$; we have that $w \in R^{-1}\left[z_{1}, z_{2}\right]$, and as $u R w w \neq x$. So either $w \in V$ and $w \in W_{1}$, or $w \notin V$ in which case either $w \in R^{-1}\left[z_{1}\right]$ and $w \in W_{2}$ or $w \in R^{-1}\left[z_{2}\right]$ and $w \in W_{3}$. If $w \in W_{1}$ then as $v \neq x v R v \in W_{1}$, if $w \in W_{2}$ then $v R z_{1} \in W_{2}$ and if $w \in W_{3}$ then $v R z_{2} \in W_{3}$.
$\mathrm{i}=2 ; u \in R^{-1}\left[z_{1}\right]$ and $u \notin V$ means $u \notin R^{-1}\left[z_{2}\right]$, so $w \notin R^{-1}\left[z_{2}\right]$. As $A_{*}=$ $R^{-1}\left[z_{1}, z_{2}\right]$, we get $w \in R^{-1}\left[z_{1}\right]$ and $w \notin V$ so $w \in W_{2}$. Then $v R v \in W_{2}$.
$\mathrm{i}=3$; As the $i=2$ case.
So we may by lemma 2.17 consider the modal equivalence identifying points within these sets and assume w.l.o.g that it is the identity on $A_{*}$. Then $y \in W_{1}$, $z_{1} \in W_{2}$ and $z_{2} \in W_{3}$ means that $A_{*} \cong F_{12}$, so $F_{12}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.

Now suppose $U_{1} \cap U_{2} \neq \varnothing$; We consider $R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$ and $R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$. If $z_{1} \notin R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ then $z_{1} \in U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ which is a clopen upset, $z_{2} \notin U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ and $U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right] \cap$ $U_{2}=\varnothing$. So, replacing $U_{1}$ with $U_{1} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ we can proceed as in the previous case. Similarly, if $z_{2} \notin R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$, we can replace $U_{2}$ with $U_{2} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$. So suppose $z_{1} \in R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ and $z_{2} \in R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$. We define the following clopen sets:

$$
\begin{gathered}
W_{1}:=U_{1} \cap U_{2} \cap A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right] \cap A_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right] ; W_{2}:=U_{1} \cap R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right] \backslash U_{2} ; \\
W_{3}:=U_{2} \cap R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right] \backslash U_{1} .
\end{gathered}
$$

By inspection these sets are pairwise disjoint. We claim moreover that the sets form an M-partition, so let $u, v \in W_{i}$ and $u R w$ with:
$\mathrm{i}=1 ; W_{1}$ is an upset so $w \in W_{1}, x \notin W_{1}$ so $v \neq x$ and $v R v \in W_{1}$.
$\mathrm{i}=2: u \in U_{1}$ which is an upset so $w \in U_{1}$. If $w \in U_{2}$ then $w \in W_{1}$, if $w \notin R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ then $w \in W_{1}$ and if $w \notin U_{2}$ and $w \in R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ then $w \in W_{2}$, so $w \in W_{1} \cup W_{2}$. If $w \in W_{1}$, then $v \in R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ so $\exists t \in U_{2}: v R t$, then $t \in U_{1}$ so $t \in W_{1}$ and may be taken as witness. If $w \in W_{2}$, then $x \notin W_{2}$ so $v \neq x$ and $v R v \in W_{2}$.
$\mathrm{i}=3$; As the $i=2$ case.
So, by lemma 2.17 we may consider the modal equivalence identifying points within these sets and assume w.l.o.g that it is the identity on $A_{*}$. Now, as $U_{1} \cap U_{2} \neq$ $\varnothing, W_{1} \neq \varnothing$, and $z_{1} \in W_{2}$ and $z_{2} \in W_{3}$, so this amounts to assuming that these sets are singletons.

Moreover, let $u \in A_{*}$. If $u \in R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$, then $u R w \in U_{1}$ and as we argued in the $i=1$ case, $w \in U_{1}$ implies $w \in W_{1} \cup W_{2}$, so $u \in R^{-1}\left[W_{1}, W_{2}\right]$. Then, letting $v \in W_{2}$ we have $v \in R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ and $v \in U_{1}$ so $\exists t \in W_{1}: v R t$ and $R^{-1}\left[W_{2}\right] \subseteq R^{-1}\left[W_{1}\right]$. So $u \in R^{-1}\left[W_{1}\right]$. Similarly, if $u \in R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ then $u \in R^{-1}\left[W_{1}\right]$. Then, if $u \notin R^{-1}\left[U_{1}\right]$ and $u \notin R^{-1}\left[U_{2}\right]$ we have $u \in W_{1}$ and $u \in R^{-1}\left[W_{1}\right]$. On our assumption that $W_{1}=\{T\}$, this means $\forall u \in A_{*}$ we have $u \in R^{-1}[T]$, i.e. $A_{*}=R-1[T]$.

Then, let $u \in A_{*}: z_{1} R u$, as $z_{1} \in U_{1}$ we have $u \in U_{1}$ so $u \in W_{1} \cup W_{2}$ i.e. $u=z_{1}$ or $u=\top$ and $R\left[z_{1}\right]=\left\{\top, z_{1}\right\}$. Similarly, $R\left[z_{2}\right]=\left\{\top, z_{1}\right\}$. Finally, letting $u \in A_{*}$ we have either $y R u$ or $x R u$ and $z_{1}| | z_{2}, y R z_{1}, y R z_{2}, x R z_{1}, x R z_{2}$ and by lemma $5.6 A_{*}$ has width $\leq 2$. So $u$ is comparable with $z_{1}$ or $z_{2}$.

Putting this all together, $A_{*}$ contains the following substructure, where $z_{1}, z_{2}$ and $T$ are all isolated and $A_{*}=\{T\} \cup R^{-1}\left[z_{1}, z_{2}\right]$ :


Now, we can proceed exactly as we did for the $U_{1} \cap U_{2}=\varnothing$ case except when checking the given clopen sets form an $M$-partition we always have the possibility that $w=T$, but then $v R w$ as needed. This lets us assume w.l.o.g that $A_{*} \cong F_{13}$, so $F_{13}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.

### 5.3 The Main Theorem

We are now finally in position to prove our main structural result.
Given two disjoint transitive frames $\left(X, R_{X}\right)$ and $\left(Y, R_{Y}\right)$ we define their sequential composition, denoted $X \oplus Y$ as the frame $X \cup Y$ under the relation $R=R_{X} \cup R_{Y} \cup$ $\left\{(y, x) \in(X \cup Y)^{2}: x \in X, y \in Y\right\}$. That is, we paste $Y$ below $X$ and insists that every element of $Y$ sees every element of $X$. This naturally extends to collections of frames with $\oplus X_{i}$ for a linear order $I$.

Theorem 5.11. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Let $A \in V$ be finitely generated, non-trivial and SI. Then the frame underlying $A_{*}$ is
a sequential composition of frames $\underset{\alpha \leq \beta}{\oplus} Q_{\alpha}$ for some $\beta \in O r d$ and such that:
$Q_{\alpha}$ is $\begin{cases}\text { a single cluster } & \text { if } \alpha=\beta \text { or } \alpha \text { is a limit ordinal } \\ \text { a single cluster, a two cluster anti-chain or } H & \text { if } \alpha=0 \\ \text { a single cluster or a two cluster anti-chain } & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}$
Note that when we say $Q_{\alpha}$ is a two cluster anti-chain we mean that $Q_{\alpha}$ consists of two arbitrary disjoint clusters that do not see each other.

Moreover, any maximal clusters are single reflexive points, if $Q_{\alpha}$ is a two cluster anti-chain then clusters in $Q_{\alpha+1}$ are improper.

If $A_{*}$ contains an irreflexive point we will say it is $i$-type, otherwise it is $r$-type, and if $A_{*}$ is $i$-type then $\beta=\lambda+n$ for some limit ordinal $\lambda, n \neq 0$ and $\exists 0<m \leq$ $n: \forall \alpha<\lambda+m Q_{\alpha}$ contains no irreflexive points, $\forall k \geq m Q_{\lambda+k}$ is a single irreflexive point and if $m<n$ then $Q_{\lambda+m-1}$ is a single cluster.

Proof. By lemma $5.6 A$ has finite width, and $A$ is finitely generated, therefore by theorem 2.22 $A_{*}$ contains no infinite ascending chains. In particular, $A_{*}$ is conversely well founded amongst clusters, that is letting $X \subseteq A_{*}$ be non-empty, $X$ contains maximal clusters. As $A$ is non-trivial and $\mathrm{SI}, A_{*}$ is non-empty and the interior of its set of topo-roots is non-empty. In particular, it is rooted. We start by proving the main structure through ordinal recursion.

For $Q_{0}$ and $Q_{1}: A_{*}$ conversely well founded and non-empty gives $S l_{0}\left(A_{*}\right) \neq \varnothing$. Moreover, $A_{*}$ is rooted and by lemma 5.6 has width $\leq 2$, so $S l_{1}\left(A_{*}\right)$ contains at most two clusters. If there is just a single cluster we take $Q_{0}$ as that cluster. Now, either $A_{*}=Q_{0}$ and we are done, or $A_{*} \neq Q_{0}$. Then, as $A_{*}$ is conversely well founded we may consider a the maximal clusters in $A_{*} \backslash Q_{0}$. These must be of depth 1 , and again $A_{*}$ rooted and of width $\leq 2$ means there are at most two. Letting $Q_{1}$ be those clusters we have $Q_{0} \otimes Q_{1}$ and as we took maximal clusters in $A_{*} \backslash Q_{0}$ we also have $A_{*} \backslash\left(Q_{0} \cup Q_{1}\right) \subseteq R^{-1}\left[Q_{1}\right]$ as required.

Now suppose there are two clusters of depth 1 ; we proceed as above except now we have a number of possible substructures of $A_{*}$ :



In case (ii), the cluster of depth 2 may or may not be the root, in the other cases the root of $A_{*}$ cannot be of depth 2 by construction, and we include it in the substructure as the labelled cluster $\perp$.

In cases (ii) and (v), we let $Q_{1}$ be the single cluster/two cluster anti-chain at depth 2 and $Q_{0}$ be the clusters of depth 1 and have $Q_{0} \oplus Q_{1}$. Again, as we took maximal clusters in $A_{*} \backslash Q_{0}$ we also have $A_{*} \backslash\left(Q_{0} \cup Q_{1}\right) \subseteq R^{-1}\left[Q_{1}\right]$ as required. We can rule out case (iii) as it contradicts lemma 5.7.

For case (i), let $X$ denote top right cluster, that is the cluster at depth 0 not seen by the cluster of depth 1 . Now, $\perp \in R^{-1}\left[S l_{2}\left(A_{*}\right)\right]$ so it is non-empty and we may consider a maximal cluster in this set, which will be of depth 3 and we call $Y$. Now, either $Y$ sees $X$ or not. If it does, then we take $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$ rooted at $Y$. Note that by lemma $5.3 Y$ is the only cluster in the subspace that can be a single irreflexive point and all four clusters in the subspace are finite, so the subspace itself finite and each cluster can be reduce to a single point via $\gamma$-reductions. The resulting frame is $F_{5}$, so $F_{5}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction. If it does not, $Y \neq \perp$, and then $\{\perp, Y\} \cup S_{2}\left(A_{*}\right)$ gives a substructure of $A_{*}$ contradicting lemma 5.8. So we can also rule out case (i).

This just leaves case (iv), which we handle a little differently. Namely, the two clusters of depth 1 cannot be irreflexive points by lemma 5.1 and also must be improper as otherwise $F_{1}$ is an $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$ and $F_{1}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction. Similarly, the cluster of depth 2 which sees both clusters of depth 1 cannot be an irreflexive point by lemma 5.9, and must be proper otherwise we obtain $F_{4}$ as an $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$ which is also a contradiction. Thus, the four clusters at depth 1 and 2 form a frame of type $H$ which we take for $Q_{0}$. We then repeat our process, $A_{*} \neq Q_{0}$ so we consider maximal clusters in $A_{*} \backslash Q_{0}$ which will be clusters of depth 3 and there can be at most two of them. Thus, we have the following as possible substructures of $A_{*}$ :



Note that in case (c), the cluster of depth 3 may or may not be the root. In cases (c) and $(\mathrm{g})$ we may take $Q_{1}$ to be the single cluster or two cluster anti-chain at depth 3 and have $Q_{0} \oplus Q_{1}$ as required, and once more we have $A_{*} \backslash\left(Q_{0} \cup Q_{1}\right) \subseteq R^{-1}\left[Q_{1}\right]$ as we took maximal clusters. Cases (a), (b), (d) and (e) contradict lemma 5.8 so we can rule them out. For case (f), letting $X$ and $Y$ denote the two clusters of depth 3, we have $R^{-1}[X] \cap R^{-1}[Y] \neq \varnothing$, and so we may consider a maximal cluster in that set. Then, taking the $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$ rooted at this cluster, it has the following as its underlying frame:


Now, using modal separation and taking differences we can recover the cluster $X$ which implies it is a clopen subset of $A_{*}$. This holds similarly for $Y$. Then $R^{-1}[X] \backslash$ $R^{-1}[Y]$ and $R^{-1}[Y] \backslash R^{-1}[X]$ are easily seen to be an $M$-partition. Taking the resulting quotient space from lemma 2.17, we find $\mathcal{X}$ such that $\mathcal{X}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ where the frame
underlying $\mathcal{A}$ is:


Finally, we can reduce this to $F_{6}$, so $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction, ruling out case (f). This completes the construction of $Q_{0} \oplus Q_{1}$.

Now, let $\alpha \geq 1$ and suppose we have completed the construction for all $\gamma \leq \alpha$, that is we have $\forall \gamma \leq \alpha$ a substructure $Q_{\gamma}$ such that:

$$
\bigcup_{\gamma \leq \alpha} Q_{\gamma}=\bigoplus_{\gamma \leq \alpha} Q_{\gamma} \text { and } A_{*} \backslash \bigcup_{\gamma \leq \alpha} Q_{\gamma} \subseteq R^{-1}\left[Q_{\alpha}\right] .
$$

If $A_{*}=\underset{\gamma \in \alpha+1}{\bigoplus} Q_{\gamma}$ then we are done, and if not we may can consider the maximal clusters in $A_{*} \backslash \bigcup_{\gamma \leq \alpha} Q_{\gamma}$. As $A_{*}$ has width $\leq 2$ there are at most two such clusters and we take $Q_{\alpha+1}$ as these clusters. Now, from the construction and $\alpha \neq 0$ we have $Q_{\alpha}$ is either a single cluster or two cluster anti-chian. If $Q_{\alpha}$ was a single cluster then as $A_{*} \backslash \underset{\gamma \leq \alpha}{ } Q_{\gamma} \subseteq R^{-1}\left[Q_{\alpha}\right]$ all clusters in $Q_{\alpha+1}$ see it. As we took maximal clusters we have our $\underset{\gamma \leq \alpha+1}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma}$ with $A_{*} \backslash \underset{\gamma \leq \alpha+1}{\bigcup} Q_{\gamma} \subseteq R^{-1}\left[Q_{\alpha+1}\right]$ as required.

If $Q_{\alpha}$ is a two cluster anti-chain, we have the following possible subframes of $A_{*}$ :


In case (ii), the single cluster in $Q_{\alpha+1}$ may or may not be the root, in the other cases
the root of $A_{*}$ cannot be in $Q_{\alpha+1}$ by construction, and we include it in the substructure as the labelled cluster $\perp$.

In cases (ii) and (v), we have $\underset{\gamma \leq \alpha+1}{\bigoplus} Q_{\gamma}$ and as we took maximal clusters we also have $A \backslash \underset{\gamma \leq \alpha+1}{\bigcup} Q_{\gamma} \subseteq R^{-1}\left[Q_{\alpha+1}\right]$ as required. Case (iii) contradicts lemma 5.7 so we can rule it out.

For case (i); First, we note that as $Q_{\alpha}$ is a two cluster anti-chain it cannot be a limit ordinal. Then, by using modal separation on clusters in $Q_{\alpha-1}$ with the clusters of $Q_{\alpha}$ we have that $\underset{\gamma<\alpha-1}{\bigoplus} Q_{\gamma}$ is a clopen subset of $A_{*}$, it is also by the construction an upset. Applying lemma 2.16 we find a modal equivalence $E$ which identifies all points in it and consider $A_{*} / E$, which contains the following substructure with the $X_{i}$ the two clusters in $Q_{\alpha}$ and $Z$ the single cluster in $Q_{\alpha+1}$ :


Note that, by the construction $A_{*} / E=\{T\} \cup X_{1} \cup R^{-1}\left[Z, X_{2}\right]$. Now, $\perp \in R^{-1}[Z]$ so it is non-empty and we may consider a maximal cluster in this set, which we call $Y$. Now, either $Y$ sees $X_{2}$ or not. If it does, then we take the $M$-subspace of $A_{*} / E$ rooted at $Y$, which has as underlying set $\{T\} \cup X_{1} \cup X_{2} \cup Z \cup Y$. Note that by lemma 5.5 the clusters $X_{1}, X_{2}$ and $Z$ cannot be single irreflexive points and all the clusters are finite, so the subspace is finite and each cluster can be reduced to a single point via $\gamma$-reductions. The resulting frame is $F_{6}$, so $F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction. If it does not, $Y \neq \perp$, and then taking an element from $\perp, Y, Z, X_{1}$ and $X_{2}$ respectively we find a substructure of $A_{*} / E$ contradicting lemma 5.8 . So we can also rule out case (i).

For case (iv), we have that $R^{-1}\left[Q_{\alpha+1}\right] \neq \varnothing$, so we take a maximal cluster in it and consider the $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$ rooted there. Then, once again we can collapse
$\oplus Q_{\gamma}$ into a single point which gives $\mathcal{X}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ where $\mathcal{X}$ has the following under$\gamma \leq \alpha-1$
lying frame:


As $A$ was finitely generated, by lemma 2.20 all its clusters are finite, so the clusters in $\mathcal{X}$ are finite making the whole frame finite. Then we reduce $\mathcal{X}$ to $F_{6}$, giving that
$F_{6}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction.
Now, let $\alpha \geq 1$ be a limit ordinal and suppose we have completed the construction for all $\gamma<\alpha$, that is we have $\forall \gamma<\alpha$ a substructure $Q_{\gamma}$ such that:

$$
\bigcup_{\gamma<\alpha} Q_{\gamma}=\bigoplus_{\gamma<\alpha} Q_{\gamma} \text { and } A_{*} \backslash \bigcup_{\eta \leq \gamma} Q_{\eta} \subseteq R^{-1}\left[Q_{\gamma}\right] .
$$

Now, $A_{*}$ is rooted so $A_{*} \neq \underset{\gamma<\alpha}{\bigoplus} Q_{\gamma}$, and we may consider the maximal clusters in $A_{*} \backslash \underset{\gamma<\alpha}{\bigcup} Q_{\gamma}$. As $A_{*}$ has width $\leq 2$ there are at most two such clusters, and we take $Q_{\alpha}$ as these clusters. Now, letting $x \in Q_{\alpha}$ we have $\forall \gamma<\alpha$ that $\gamma+1<\alpha$ and so $x \notin Q_{\gamma+1}, x \in A_{*} \backslash \bigcup_{\eta \leq \gamma} Q_{\eta}$ and $x \in R^{-1}\left[Q_{\gamma+1}\right]$. Then, letting $y \in Q_{\gamma}$ and $z \in Q_{\gamma+1}: x R z$ by construction $z R y$ and so $x R y$. Therefore, we have $\underset{\gamma<\alpha}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma} \oplus Q_{\alpha}$, and as we took maximal clusters we also have $A_{*} \backslash \bigcup_{\gamma \leq \alpha} Q_{\gamma} \subseteq R^{-1}\left[Q_{\alpha}\right]$ as required.

To finish the limit case we need to argue that in fact $Q_{\alpha}$ can only be a single cluster and not a two-cluster anti-chain. Suppose for contradiction it is a two cluster anti-chain, we label these clusters $X_{1}$ and $X_{2}$. Then root of $A_{*}$ is in $A_{*} \backslash \underset{\gamma \leq \alpha}{ } Q_{\gamma}$, so it is non-empty and we can find maximal clusters in it. Applying modal separation to $X_{1}$ with $X_{2}$ and these clusters respectively, we find a clopen upset $U_{1}$ such that $X_{1} \subseteq U_{1}$ and $U_{1} \cap\left(X_{2} \cup A_{*} \backslash \bigcup_{\gamma \leq \alpha} Q_{\gamma}\right)=\varnothing$. Then, as $X_{1}$ sees every point in $\underset{\gamma<\alpha}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma}$ we have $\underset{\gamma<\alpha}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma} \cup X_{1} \subseteq U_{1}$. So, in fact $U_{1}=\underset{\gamma<\alpha}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma} \cup X_{1}$. Similarly, we can find a clopen upset $U_{2}$ such that $U_{2}=\underset{\gamma<\alpha}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma} \cup X_{2}$. Then, taking their intersection implies $\underset{\gamma<\alpha}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma}$ is a clopen subset of $A_{*}$. However, letting $\gamma<\alpha$, we similarly apply modal separation on clusters in $Q_{\gamma}$ against clusters in $Q_{\gamma+1}$ to check that $\underset{\eta \leq \gamma}{\oplus} Q_{\eta}$ is clopen. Then, the collection $\left\{\underset{\eta \leq \gamma}{\oplus} Q_{\eta}\right\}_{\gamma<\alpha}$ form an infinite open cover of $\underset{\gamma<\alpha}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma}$ with no finite sub-cover, contradicting that $A_{*}$ is compact.

This completes the construction of $A_{*}=\underset{\alpha \leq \beta}{\bigoplus} Q_{\alpha}$, which must terminate as $A_{*}$ is rooted. We now check our additional claims. If $A_{*}$ has a maximal cluster that is not a single reflexive point then it is either a single reflexive point contradicting lemma 5.1 or a proper cluster, and taking the $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$ that is just this cluster we obtain $F_{1}$ so $F_{1}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction. Letting $Q_{\alpha}$ be a two cluster anti-chain and consider any cluster $X$ in $Q_{\alpha+1}$. This cluster sees both clusters in $Q_{\alpha}$ and we consider the $M$-subspace of $A_{*}$ rooted at $X$. If $\alpha=0$ then this space can be reduced to $F_{4}$ giving $F_{4}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is a contradiction. If $\alpha \neq 0$, we also have that $\alpha$ is not a limit ordinal, and so we can consider the clopen upset $\underset{\gamma \leq \alpha-1}{\bigoplus} Q_{\gamma}$. Collapsing this via lemma 2.16, we can reduce the resulting space to $F_{10}$ and so $F_{10}^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ which is again a contradiction.

Finally, let $A_{*}$ be $i$-type and let $\delta$ be the least ordinal such that $Q_{\delta}$ contains an irreflexive point. Now, by cor 5.5 there can only be finitely many ordinals $\gamma: \delta \leq$ $\gamma \leq \beta$, so then $\beta=\lambda+n$ for some $n \in \omega$, and $\lambda \leq \delta \leq \beta$. If $n=0$ then $\lambda=\delta=\beta$, so then $Q_{\lambda}$ is a single cluster, which in fact is a single irreflexive point we label $x$.

Moreover $R[x]=\underset{\gamma<\lambda}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma}$ is closed, but then as we argued earlier for each $\gamma<\lambda$ $\oplus Q_{\eta}$ is clopen, and so together form an open cover of $R[x]$ with no finite sub$\eta \leq \gamma$ cover, which is a contradiction with $A_{*}$ being compact. So $n \neq 0$ and $\exists 0<m \leq n$ : $\delta=\lambda+m$. Then, by the definition of $\delta$ we have $\forall \alpha<\lambda+m$ that $Q_{\alpha}$ contains no irreflexive points and again by corollary $5.5 \forall k \geq m Q_{\lambda+k}$ is a single irreflexive point. Then, if $m<n$ then $Q_{\lambda+m-1}$ is defined and it cannot be a two cluster anti-chain by lemma 5.9 so is a single cluster.

We will also consider finite, non-trivial and FSI members of our varieties, for which we can instantiate the previous theorem.

Corollary 5.12. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Let $A \in \mathcal{A}$ be finite, non-trivial and FSI. Then the frame underlying $A_{*}$ is a sequential composistion of frames $Q_{0} \oplus \ldots \oplus Q_{n}$ such that:

$$
Q_{k} \text { is } \begin{cases}\text { a single cluster } & \text { if } k=n \\ \text { a single cluster, a two cluster anti-chain or } H & \text { if } k=0 \\ \text { a single cluster or a two cluster anti-chain } & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Moreover, any maximal clusters are single reflexive points, if $Q_{k}$ is a two cluster anti-chain then clusters in $Q_{k+1}$ are improper.

If $A_{*}$ contains an irreflexive point we will say it is $i$-type, otherwise it is $r$-type, and if $A_{*}$ is $i$-type then $n \neq 0$ and $\exists 0<m \leq n: \forall k<m Q_{k}$ contains no irreflexive points, $\forall k \geq m Q_{k}$ is a single irreflexive point and if $m<n$ then $Q_{m-1}$ is a single cluster.

Proof. $A$ is finite so obviously finitely generated. Then we apply theorem 5.11 noting that we must have $\beta=n \in \omega$ as $A_{*}$ is finite.

With theorem 5.11 in place we now have our detailed description of the dual spaces to finitely generated, non-trivial SI members in the varieties we are interested in. This represents the bulk of the work needed to establish the sufficient direction of our main result, which we will conclude in the next chapter. Along the way, we have provided a detailed description of how irreflexive points behave in these spaces (corollary 5.5 and lemmas $5.9 \& 5.10$ ) which we will continue to make use of.

## Chapter 6

## Primitive Varieties of K4-algebras

With a detailed description of the finitely generated SI members of the varieties in question, we can complete the characterisation of primitive K4-algebras. We effectively do this in two stages, the first is to establish the FMP for our varieties.

Theorem 6.1. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for some $n>0$. Then $\mathcal{A}$ has the FMP.

Proof. We follow the same proof strategy as Rybakov [29, Lemma 3.9], which itself is a variation on the drop-point technique of $K$. Fine [14, Theorem 4].

Let $\varphi \in F m$ and $A \in \mathcal{A}$ be such that $\not \vDash_{A} \varphi$. As $\mathcal{A}$ is generated by its SI members [10, ex 7.24], we may assume it is SI, and w.l.o.g that it is generated by $h\left(p_{i}\right) \in A$ where the $\left\{p_{i}\right\}_{i \leq n}$ are the propositional variables occurring in $\varphi$. Therefore, $A$ is finitely generated and SI. $A$ is also non-trivial as the trivial algebra validates all formulas. Thus we may apply theorem 5.11 giving $A_{*}=\underset{\alpha \leq \beta}{\oplus} Q_{\alpha}$.

For now let us assume $A_{*}$ is $r$-type. Recall from the proof of theorem 3.25 that $h$ induces a valuation $V$ on $A_{*}$ such that $V \not \vDash_{A_{*}} \varphi$. We extend this valuation in the natural way to define a clopen subset $V(\psi)$ for any $\psi \in F m$. Also recall from lemma 2.20 that as $A_{*}$ is $n$-generated each cluster of $A_{*}$ has at most $2^{n}$ elements.

For each sub-formula $\psi$ of $\varphi$ consider:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\alpha_{\psi}:=\min \left\{\alpha \in \operatorname{Ord}: \alpha \leq \beta \text { and } V(\neg \psi) \cap Q_{\alpha} \neq \varnothing\right\} . \\
B:=\left\{\alpha_{\psi} \in \text { Ord }: \psi \text { is a subformula of } \varphi\right\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

Note that as there are finitely many sub-formulas of $\varphi$, the set $B$ is finite. Moreover, we claim that each $\alpha_{\psi}$ is a successor ordinal. Suppose not, then $V(\neg \psi)$ is by definition clopen, and we have $\forall \alpha<\alpha_{\psi} V(\neg \psi) \cap Q_{\alpha}=\varnothing$. Then, $\alpha_{\psi}$ is a limit ordinal so $Q_{\alpha_{\psi}}$ is a single cluster giving that $\underset{\alpha_{\psi} \leq \alpha \leq \beta}{\oplus} Q_{\alpha}=R^{-1}[V(\neg \psi)]$ which is clopen. Thus, its complement which is $\underset{\alpha<\alpha_{\psi}}{\bigoplus} Q_{\alpha}$ is also clopen. Now, by modal separation we can easily show that for any $\alpha \leq \beta \underset{\gamma \leq \alpha}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma}$ is clopen, and so the collection $\left\{\underset{\gamma \leq \alpha}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma}\right\}_{\alpha<\alpha_{\psi}}$ together cover $\underset{\alpha<\alpha_{\psi}}{\bigoplus} Q_{\alpha}$. This then is an open cover of $\underset{\alpha<\alpha_{\psi}}{\bigoplus} Q_{\alpha}$ with no finite subcover, contradicting compactness.

Now, we define $M \subseteq A_{*}$ as follows: For each subformula $\psi$ of $\varphi$, either $Q_{\alpha_{\psi}}$ is of type $H$, a two cluster anti-chain or a single cluster. If it is either of type $H$ or a two cluster anti-chain, we choose one of the possible two single element clusters in $Q_{\alpha_{\psi}+1}$ and label its element $x_{\psi}$. If $Q_{\alpha_{\psi}}$ is a single cluster, we simply choose one of the
elements in the cluster for $x_{\psi}$. We then define:

$$
M:=\bigcup_{\alpha_{\psi} \in B} Q_{\alpha_{\psi}} \cup\left\{x_{\psi} \in A_{*}: \alpha_{\psi} \in B\right\} \cup Q_{0} .
$$

Note that as $B$ is finite and each $Q_{\alpha}$ has at most four finite clusters $M$ itself is finite. We claim moreover that $M$ is clopen. As each $\alpha_{\psi}$ is not a limit ordinal, each $x \in M$ belongs to $Q_{\alpha}$ where $\alpha$ is not a limit ordinal. Then, as noted earlier both $\oplus Q_{\gamma}$ $\gamma \leq \alpha-1$ and $\underset{\gamma \leq \alpha}{\oplus} Q_{\gamma}$ are clopen, and so $Q_{\alpha}$ which is their intersection is clopen. Then, as $Q_{\alpha}$ is finite by Stone separating $x$ from each other member of $Q_{\alpha}$ and taking intersections we get $\{x\}$ clopen. Thus, $M$ is a finite collection of isolated points and is clopen. This means $M$ is a finite sub-frame of $A_{*}$. Our aim now is two-fold. We want to find a surjective continuous $p$-morphism $f: A_{*} \rightarrow M$ and a valuation $W: P \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(M)$ such that $W \not \vDash_{M} \varphi$. Then, by the duality $M^{*} \in \mathcal{A}$ and $\vDash_{M^{*}} \varphi$, which gives $\mathcal{A}$ has FMP as required.

For the map $f$; For each $y \in A_{*} \backslash M$ we consider:

$$
\alpha_{\psi_{y}}:=\min \left\{\alpha_{\psi} \in B: y \in Q_{\alpha} \text { and } \alpha_{\psi} \leq \alpha\right\} .
$$

Then, let $f: A_{*} \rightarrow M$ be the map defined by

$$
f(y):= \begin{cases}y & \text { if } y \in M \\ x_{\psi_{y}} & \text { if } y \notin M\end{cases}
$$

This is clearly surjective, therefore we only need to check it is a continuous $p$-morphism.
For continuity; as $M$ is finite its topology is discrete, and so it is sufficient to check that $\forall y \in M f^{-1}(y)$ is clopen. If $y \in M$ then $y$ is isolated in $A_{*}$, and if $y \neq x_{\psi}$ for any $\psi \in \varphi$ then $f^{-1}(y)=\{y\} \subseteq M$ so this is clopen. So now consider $x_{\psi}: \psi \in \varphi$. Let $\lambda \in \varphi$ be the subformula of $\varphi: \alpha_{\lambda}=\min \left\{\alpha_{\eta} \in B: \alpha_{\psi}<\alpha_{\eta}\right\}$, i.e. $Q_{\alpha_{\lambda}}$ is the greatest layer of $A_{*}$ intersecting $M$ after $Q_{\alpha_{\psi}}$ Then, by the definition of $f$ we get:

$$
f^{-1}\left(x_{\psi}\right)=\bigcup_{\alpha_{\psi}<\alpha<\alpha_{\lambda}} Q_{\alpha} \cup\left\{x_{\psi}\right\} .
$$

As $\alpha_{\lambda} \in B, \alpha_{\lambda}$ is not a limit ordinal, and so:

$$
\bigcup_{\alpha_{\psi}<\alpha<\alpha_{\lambda}} Q_{\alpha}=\bigcup_{\alpha \leq \alpha_{\lambda}-1} Q_{\alpha} \backslash \bigcup_{\alpha \leq \alpha_{\psi}} Q_{\alpha}
$$

This is therefore clopen in $A_{*}$. Then, $x_{\psi}$ is isolated in $A_{*}$ and $f^{-1}\left(x_{\psi}\right)$ is clopen.
For $R[f(y)]=f[R[y]]$; let $y \in A_{*}$. We make two observations. First, suppose that $y \mathbb{R} f(y)$, then from structure of $A_{*}$ we have $y \in Q_{\alpha}$ and $f(y) \in Q_{\gamma}$ with $\alpha \leq \gamma$. Then, from the defintion of $f$ we also have $\gamma \leq \alpha$, so in fact $\gamma=\alpha$ and $y$ and $f(y)$ are in different clusters. This means $Q_{\alpha}$ is a two cluster anti-chain. Moreover, $y \neq f(y)$ so $y \notin M$ and therefore $f(y)=x_{\psi}$ for some $\psi \in \varphi$. Then, as $y \notin M M \cap Q_{\alpha} \neq Q_{\alpha}$, and so $x_{\psi} \notin Q_{\alpha_{\psi}}$, that is $\alpha=\alpha_{\psi}+1$ and $Q_{\alpha_{\psi}}$ is also a two cluster anti-chain. So, both clusters in $Q_{\alpha}$ are improper. In summary, either $y R f(y)$ or $y, f(y) \in Q_{\alpha}$ where $Q_{\alpha}$ is an anti-chain of two points.

Second, let $u, v \in A_{*}$ such that $u R v$. If $u \in M$, then either $v R f(v)$ so $f(u)=$ $u \operatorname{RvRf}(v)$ or $v, f(v) \in Q_{\alpha}$ where $Q_{\alpha}$ is an anti-chain of two points. Then $u \neq v$ and
$u R v$ means $u \in Q_{\gamma}$ such that $\gamma>\alpha$ and so $u R f(v)$ and $f(u)=u R f(v)$. If $u \notin M$ and $v \in M$ then by definition $\alpha_{\psi_{u}} \geq \gamma$ where $v=f(v) \in Q_{\gamma}$. If $\alpha_{\psi_{u}}>\gamma$ then $f(u) R f(v)$, if $\alpha_{\psi_{u}}=\gamma$ we have either $Q_{\gamma}$ is of type $H$ or a two cluster anti-chain, $f(u)=x_{\psi_{u}} \in Q_{\gamma+1}$ and $f(u) R f(v)$ or $Q_{\gamma}$ is a single cluster and so $f(u)=x_{\psi_{u}} R f(v)$. If $u \notin M$ and $v \notin M$ then as $u R v \alpha_{\psi_{u}} \geq \alpha_{\psi_{v}}$, if $\alpha_{\psi_{u}}>\alpha_{\psi_{v}}$ then $f(u) R f(v)$ and if $\alpha_{\psi_{u}}=\alpha_{\psi_{v}}$ then $f(u) x_{\psi_{u}}=x_{\psi_{v}}=f(v)$ and $f(u) R f(v)$. In all cases, $f(u) R f(v)$, i.e. $f$ is $R$-preserving.

Then, letting $z \in M$ such that $f(y) R z$, we have $y \in Q_{\alpha}$ and $z \in Q_{\gamma}$ and $z=f(z)$. If $y R f(y)$ then $y R f(y) R z$ and $z=f(z)$ so $f(z) \in f[R(y)]$. If $y, f(y) \in Q_{\alpha}$ and $Q_{\alpha}$ is an anti-chain of two points, then as $f(y) R z$ either $f(y)=z$ and then $y R y$ so $f(z) \in f[R(y)]$ or $\gamma<\alpha$ and so $y R z$ and again $f(z) \in f[R(y)]$. So $R[f(y)] \subseteq f[R[y]]$.

Finally, letting $z \in M$ such that $z=f(u)$ where $y R u$, then $f(y) R f(u)=z$ and $z \in R[f(y)]$. So $f[R[y]] \subseteq R[f(y)]$.

For the valuation; for each $p_{i} \in \varphi$ we define $W\left(p_{i}\right)=V\left(p_{i}\right) \cap M$. We claim that $\forall x \in M \forall \psi \in \varphi x, V \models \psi$ iff $x, W \models \psi$. Then, in particular as $V \not \vDash_{A_{*}} \varphi$ we can consider $\alpha_{\varphi} \in B$ and have $V(\neg \varphi) \cap Q_{\alpha_{\varphi}} \neq \varnothing$. So, letting $x \in V(\neg \varphi) \cap Q_{\alpha_{\varphi}}, x \in M$ and $x, V \not \vDash \varphi$, so $x, W \not \vDash \varphi$ and $W \not \vDash_{M} \varphi$ as required. We proceed by induction:

For $\psi=p_{i} \in \varphi$; letting $x \in M x, V \models p_{i}$ iff $x \in V\left(p_{i}\right)$ iff $x \in W\left(p_{i}\right)$ iff $x, W \mid=p_{i}$.
For $\psi=\lambda \wedge \eta$; letting $x \in M x, V \models \psi$ iff $x, V \models \lambda$ and $x, V \models \eta$ iff $x, W \models \lambda$ and $x, W \models \eta$ iff $x, W \models \psi$

For $\psi=\neg \lambda$; letting $x \in M x, V \models \psi$ iff $x, V \not \vDash \lambda$ iff $x, W \not \vDash \lambda$ iff $x, W \models \psi$.
For $\psi=\square \lambda$; letting $x \in M$ if $x, V \models \psi$ then letting $y \in M: x R y y, V \models \lambda$ so $y, W \vDash \lambda$ and then $x, W \models \lambda$. If $x, V \not \vDash \psi$ then $\exists y \in A_{*}: y, V \not \vDash \lambda$, so letting $y \in Q_{\alpha}$ we have $V(\neg \lambda) \cap Q_{\alpha} \neq \varnothing$. Therefore $\alpha_{\lambda} \leq \alpha$. If $\alpha_{\lambda}<\alpha$ then we have $z \in Q_{\alpha_{\lambda}} \subseteq M$ such that $z, V \not \vDash \lambda$ and $y R z$, so then $z, W \not \vDash \lambda$ and $x R z$, therefore $x, W \not \vDash \psi$. If $\alpha_{\lambda}=\alpha$ then $y \in M$ and $y, W \not \vDash \lambda$ so $x, W \not \vDash \psi$.

We still need to check the case when $A_{*}$ is $i$-type. Recall that this means $A_{*}$ has at its base some finite number of irreflexive points in a chain. As such, when constructing $M$ we also include each layer of $A_{*}$ that is a single irreflexive point. The proof then follows as in the $r$-type case. Continuity is maintained as the irreflexive points still only appear in successor ordinal layers and so they are isolated in $A_{*}$ which covers the additional continuity requirements. Then, $R[f(y)]=f[R[y]]$ when $y$ is an irreflexive point is immediate from them forming a chain. Finally, constructing the valuation proceeds exactly as above.

The second stage and final major result of our investigations relates to weak projectivity.

Lemma 6.2. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety omitting $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$ for $n>0$. Then every finite, non-trivial FSI member of $\mathcal{A}$ is weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$.

Proof. Let $A \in \mathcal{A}$ be finite, non-trivial and FSI. Then we may apply corollary 5.12 giving $A_{*}=\bigoplus_{m=0}^{n} Q_{m}$. Let $k$ be the least $i$ such that $S l_{i}\left(A_{*}\right)$ is a single irreflexive point or the root of $A_{*}$.

Let also $C \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $A \in \mathbb{H}(C)$. Since $A$ is finite, $\exists B \leq C: B$ is finitely generated and $A \in \mathbb{H}(B)$. Moreover, if $A \in \mathbb{I S}(B)$ then $A \in \mathbb{I S}(C)$, so it is sufficient to check the former. By the duality (lemma 2.10), this amounts to assuming $A_{*}$ is a closed upset of $B_{*}$ and we must show there is a surjective continuous $p$ morphism $f: B_{*} \rightarrow A_{*}$. The plan is to do this recursively by collapsing points in
$R^{-1}\left[S l_{i}\left(A_{*}\right)\right] \backslash R^{-1}\left[S l_{i-1}\left(A_{*}\right)\right]$ into $A_{*}$. More formally, we are going to define a series of modal equivlaences where we can identify the underlying set of the resulting quotient space with $A_{*} \cup R^{-1}\left[S l_{1}\left(A_{*}\right)\right], A_{*} \cup R^{-1}\left[S l_{2}\left(A_{*}\right)\right], \ldots, A_{*} \cup R^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{*}\right)\right]$ and finally $A_{*}$ respectively.

For $E_{0}$; By the structure of $A_{*}, S l_{1}\left(A_{*}\right)$ is either a single reflexive point or an antichain of two reflexive points. We label these $a_{0}$ and $b_{0}$ respectively. Now, consider:

$$
B_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[A_{*}\right] \cup\left\{a_{0}\right\} .
$$

This is an upset and moreover we claim it is clopen. $B_{*}$ is finitely generated so by theorem $2.27 \forall i \in \omega S l_{i}\left(B_{*}\right)$ is finite and clopen. Then, considering $x \in A_{*}$ $x \in S l_{i}\left(B_{*}\right)$ for some $i \leq n+1$, and by first stone separating from each other element in $S l_{i}\left(B_{*}\right)$ and then taking intersections we get that $\{x\}$ is clopen, i.e. $A_{*}$ is a finite collection of isolated points and so it and any subset of $A_{*}$ is clopen. This in turn implies $B_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[A_{*}\right] \cup\left\{a_{0}\right\}$ is clopen.

Now, by lemma 2.16 we take the modal equivalence identifying points in the set as $E_{0}$. We define $B_{0}:=B_{*} / E_{0}$ and use $R_{0}$ to denote its relation. Of course $B_{*} \rightarrow B_{0}$ and $B_{0}$ is finitely generated. Moreover, consider the set:

$$
A_{0}:=\left\{[x] \in B_{0}:[x] \cap A_{*} \neq \varnothing\right\} .
$$

Notably, letting $[x] \in A_{0}$, and $x^{\prime} \in[x] \cap A_{*}$, either $x^{\prime}=a_{0},[x]=\left[a_{0}\right]$ and $\left[a_{0}\right] \cap A_{*}=$ $\left\{a_{0}\right\}$ or $x^{\prime} \neq a_{0},[x] \neq\left[a_{0}\right]$ so $[x]=\left\{x^{\prime}\right\}$ and $[x] \cap A_{*}=\left\{x^{\prime}\right\}$. That is, if $x \in A_{*}$ then $[x] \in A_{0}$ and $[x] \cap A_{*}=\{x\}$.

Letting $[y] \in B_{0}$, either $y \in R^{-1}\left[A_{*}\right]$ or not. If $y \in R^{-1}\left[A_{*}\right]$ then $[y] \in R_{0}\left[A_{0}\right]$, and if $y \notin R^{-1}\left[A_{*}\right]$ then $[y]=\left[a_{0}\right] \in R_{0}^{-1}\left[A_{0}\right]$. So $B_{0}=R_{0}^{-1}\left[A_{0}\right]=A_{0} \cup R_{0}^{-1}\left[A_{0}\right]$. The pre-image of $A_{0}$ in $B_{*}$ is $A_{*} \cup B_{*} \backslash R^{-1}\left[A_{*}\right]$ which is clopen and so $A_{0}$ is clopen in $B_{0}$.

Then, letting $x, y \in A_{*}$ if $x R y$ then $[x] R_{0}[y]$. If $[x] R_{0}[y]$ so $\exists x^{\prime} E_{0} x$ and $y^{\prime} E_{0} y$ : $x^{\prime} R y^{\prime}$. If $x=a_{0}$ then $[x]=\left[a_{0}\right]$ so $[y]=\left[a_{0}\right], y=a_{0}$ and $x R y$. If $y=a_{0}$ then as $\left[b_{0}\right]=\left\{b_{0}\right\}$ and $R\left[b_{0}\right]=\left\{b_{0}\right\}$ we have $\left[b_{0}\right] \mathbb{R}_{0}\left[a_{0}\right]$ so $[x] \neq\left[b_{0}\right]$ and $x \neq b_{0}$ and so $x R y$. If $x \neq a_{0}$ and $y \neq a_{0}$ then $[x]=\{x\},[y]=\{y\}$ and $x R y$. Therefore, $\forall x, y \in A_{*} x R y$ iff $[x] R_{0}[y]$. Now, we consider $A_{0}$ as a transitive space under the restricted relation and discrete topology (as it is finite). Considering the quotient map $x \mapsto[x]$ restricted to $A_{*}$, as both $A_{*}$ and $A_{0}$ are finite it is trivially continuous and open, and as $x R y$ iff $[x] R_{0}[y]$ it moreover a $p$-morphism. It is clearly surjective, and letting $x, y \in A_{*}:[x]=[y]$ we have $\{x\}=[x] \cap A_{*}=[y] \cap A_{*}=\{y\}$ so $x=y$. So the map is an isomorphism and $A_{0} \cong A_{*}$.

In summary, we have constructed $B_{0}$ and $A_{0} \subseteq B_{0}$ such that $B_{*} \rightarrow B_{0}, B_{0}$ is finitely generated, $B_{0}=A_{0} \cup R_{0}^{-1}\left[A_{0}\right]=A_{0} \cup R_{0}^{-1}\left[S l_{1}\left(A_{0}\right)\right], A_{0}$ is clopen in $B_{0}$ and $A_{0} \cong A_{*}$.

For $E_{i}: 1 \leq i<k$; Suppose we have constructed $B_{i-1} \& A_{i-1} \subseteq B_{i-1}$ such that $B_{i-2} \rightarrow B_{i-1}, B_{i-1}$ is finitely generated, $B_{i-1}=A_{i-1} \cup R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right], A_{i-1}$ is clopen in $B_{i-1} \& A_{i-1} \cong A_{i-2}$. Note that $A_{i-1} \cong A_{i-2} \cong \ldots . A_{0} \cong A_{*}$ so has the same structure as $A_{*}$, so $S l_{i}\left(A_{i-1}\right)$ is either a single cluster or two cluster anti-chain. We choose a point in each cluster as $a_{i}$ and $b_{i}$ respectively. Moreover, $S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)$ is also either a single cluster or two cluster anti-chain. If $i=1$ and $Q_{0}$ is of type $H$ then we set up our labels as follows, otherwise we simply choose elements in the clusters as
$c_{i}$ and $d_{i}$.


Notably, in both cases $c_{i} R_{i-1} a_{i}$ and $c_{i} R_{i-1} b_{i}$, and as $i<k a_{i} R_{i-1} a_{i}$ and $a_{i} R_{i-1} b_{i}$. The case for $i=2$ and $Q_{0}$ is of type $H$ is slightly different and we will cover it separately, for now assume either $i \neq 2$ or $Q_{0}$ is not of type $H$, i.e. applying corollary 5.12 , we have that $S l_{i}\left(A_{i-1}\right)$ and $S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)$ is one of the following:


We will detail the first case, all others are recoverable by deleting references to $b_{i}$ and $d_{i}$ as required.

Letting $x \in B_{i-1} \backslash\left(A_{i-1} \cup R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]\right)$, as $B_{i-1}=A_{i-1} \cup R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]$ we have $x R_{i-1} a_{i}$ or $x R_{i-1} b_{i}$. We define $m(x)=R_{i-1}[x] \cap\left\{a_{i}, b_{i}\right\}$. We then define three sets:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& U_{1}:=\left\{x \in B_{i-1} \backslash\left(A_{i-1} \cup R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]\right): m(x)=\left\{a_{i}\right\}\right\} \cup\left\{a_{i}\right\} ; \\
& U_{2}:=\left\{x \in B_{i-1} \backslash\left(A_{i-1} \cup R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]\right): m(X)=\left\{b_{i}\right\}\right\} \cup\left\{b_{i}\right\} ; \\
& U_{3}=\left\{x \in B_{i-1} \backslash\left(A_{i-1} \cup R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]\right): m(x)=\left\{a_{i}, b_{i}\right\}\right\} \cup\left\{c_{i}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

By inspection these are pairwise disjoint. We claim they form an $M$-partition. Now, as $A_{i-1}$ is clopen and finite we can stone separate each $x \in A_{i-1}$ from the other elements and take intersections to find $\{x\}$ is clopen and $A_{i-1}$ is a finite collection of isolate points. In particular, all subsets of $A_{i-1}$ are clopen. Then, letting $x \in B_{i-1} \backslash$ $\left(A_{i-1} \cup R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]\right), m(x)=\left\{a_{i}\right\}$ iff $x R_{i-1} a_{i}$ and $x \mathbb{R}_{i-1} b_{i}$ iff $x \in R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[a_{i}\right] \backslash$ $R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[b_{i}\right]$. Therefore we can express $U_{1}$ as:

$$
U_{1}=\left(B_{i-1} \backslash\left(A_{i-1} \cup R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]\right) \cap\left(R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[a_{i}\right] \backslash R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[b_{i}\right]\right)\right) \cup\left\{a_{i}\right\} .
$$

Therefore, $U_{1}$ is clopen. Similarly, we can express $U_{2}$ and $U_{3}$ as:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& U_{2}=\left(B_{i-1} \backslash\left(A_{i-1} \cup R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]\right) \cap\left(R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[b_{i}\right] \backslash R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[a_{i}\right]\right)\right) \cup\left\{b_{i}\right\} . \\
& U_{3}=\left(B_{i-1} \backslash\left(A_{i-1} \cup R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]\right) \cap\left(R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[a_{i}\right] \cap R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[b_{i}\right]\right)\right) \cup\left\{c_{i}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Therefore, both are clopen as well.
Then, letting $u, v \in U_{1}$ and $u R_{i-1} w$, as $u R_{i-1} w$ we have $u \notin R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]$. If $w \in A_{i-1}$ then again $u \mathbb{R}_{i-1} w$ and $u \mathbb{R}_{i-1} b_{i}$ implies $w \mathbb{R}_{i-1} b_{i}$ so $w$ is in the same cluster as $a_{i}$ or $w \in S_{i-1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)$, either way $a_{i} R_{i-1} w$, and $v R_{i-1} a_{i}$ so $v R w$. If $w \notin A_{i-1}$ then $m(w)$ is defined and as $w R_{i-1} b_{i}, m(w)=\left\{a_{i}\right\}$, so $w \in U_{1}$ and $v R_{i-1} a_{i} \in U_{1}$. The case for $u, v \in U_{2}$ is symmetric.

So now let $u, v \in U_{3}$ and $u R_{i-1} w$. Now, either $u=c_{i}$ or $u \notin R^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]$. In the latter, $w \notin R^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]$. Again, if $w \in A_{i-1}$ then $w \in S_{i}\left(A_{i-1}\right)$ so either $a_{i} R_{i-1} w$ and then $v R_{i-1} a_{i}$ or $b_{i} R_{i-1} w$ and then $v R_{i-1} b_{i}$. If $w \notin A_{i-1}$ then $m(w)$ is defined and $w \in U_{1} \cup U_{2} \cup U_{3}$. If $w \in U_{1}$ then $v R_{i-1} a_{i} \in U_{1}$, and if $w \in U_{2}$ then $v R_{i-1} b_{i} \in U_{2}$.

So suppose $w \in U_{3}$, we want to find $t \in U_{3}$ such that $v R_{i-1} t$. Now, suppose that there is no $w^{\prime} \in R_{i-1}[u]$ such that $w^{\prime} R_{i-1} a_{i}, w^{\prime} R_{i-1} b_{i}$ and $w^{\prime} R_{i-1} w^{\prime}$. Then, firstly, in particular $u R_{i-1} u$ and considering $w \in R_{i-1}[u] \cap R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[a_{i}\right] \cap R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[b_{i}\right]$, as $B_{*}$ is finitely generated by lemma 2.22 we can consider an $R_{i-1}$-maximal cluster in this set which again is a single irreflexive point which we denote as $z$. Then $a_{i}, b_{i}, z$ and $u$ witness the following substructure in $B_{*}$ contradicting lemma 5.9:


So, in fact $\exists w^{\prime} \in R_{i-1}[u]$ such that $w^{\prime} R_{i-1} a_{i}, w^{\prime} R_{i-1} b_{i}$ and $w^{\prime} R_{i-1} w^{\prime}$. Then, if there was no $t \in U_{3}$ such that $v R_{i-1} t$ in particular have $v R_{i-1} v, R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[a_{i}\right] \cap R_{i-1}[v]=\left\{a_{i}\right\}$ and $R_{i-1}^{-1} \cap R_{i-1}[v]=\left\{b_{i}\right\}$ and so $v, w^{\prime}, a_{i}$ and $b_{i}$ witness the following substructure in $B_{*}$ contradicting lemma 5.10:


So, in fact $\exists t \in U_{3}: v R t$ as required.
Finally, if $u=c_{i}$ then $w \in A_{i-1} \cap R_{i-1}[c]$. Noting that as $c_{i} R_{i-1} a_{i}, c_{i} R_{i-1} b_{i}$ and $a_{i}| | b_{i}$ from corollary 5.12 we have the cluster containing $c_{i}$ is improper, i.e. is exctly $\left\{c_{i}\right\}$. So either $w R_{i-1} u$ and $w=c_{i} \in U_{3}$ and we proceed as we did in this case before, or $w \mathbb{R}_{i-1} u$ so $w \in S_{i}\left(A_{i-1}\right)$ and we again proceed as we did in this case before.

So, applying lemma 2.17 we take $E_{i}$ as the modal equivalence identifying points within $U_{1}, U_{2}$ and $U_{3}$ and define $B_{i}:=B_{i-1} / E_{i}$ and

$$
A_{i}:=\left\{[x] \in B_{i}:[x] \cap A_{i-1} \neq \varnothing\right\} .
$$

Once more, we have $B_{i-1} \rightarrow B_{i}$ and $B_{i}$ is finitely generated. Letting $[x] \in A_{i}$ and $x^{\prime} \in[x] \cap A_{i-1}$, either $x^{\prime}=a_{i},[x]=U_{1}$ and $[x] \cap A_{i-1}=\left\{a_{i}\right\}, x^{\prime}=b_{i},[x]=U_{2}$ and $[x] \cap A_{i-1}=\left\{b_{i}\right\}, x^{\prime}=c_{i},[x]=U_{3}$ and $[x] \cap A_{i-1}=\left\{c_{i}\right\}$ or $x^{\prime} \notin\left\{a_{i}, b_{i}, c_{i}\right\}$ so $[x]=$ $\left\{x^{\prime}\right\}$ and $[x] \cap A_{i-1}=\left\{x^{\prime}\right\}$. That is, if $x \in A_{i-1}$ then $[x] \in A_{i}$ and $[x] \cap A_{*}=\{x\}$.

Letting $[y] \in B_{i}$, either $y \in R_{i-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i-1}\right)\right]$ or not. If it is, then $[y] \in R_{i}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i}\right)\right]$ and if it isn't then either $y \in A_{i-1}$ and $[y] \in A_{i}$ or $y \notin A_{i-1}$ so $y \in U_{1} \cup U_{2} \cup U_{3}$ and then $[y] \in\left\{U_{1}, U_{2}, U_{3}\right\}$ and $[y] \in A_{i}$. So $B_{i}=A_{i} \cup R_{i}^{-1}\left[S l_{i+1}\left(A_{i}\right)\right]$. The pull back of $A_{i}$ to $B_{i-1}$ is $A_{i-1} \cup U_{1} \cup U_{2} \cup U_{3}$ which is clopen in $B_{i-1}$, so $A_{i}$ is clopen in $B_{i}$.

Then, letting $x, y \in A_{i-1}$, if $x R_{i-1} y$ then $[x] R_{i}[y]$. If $[x] R_{i}[y]$ then $\exists x^{\prime} E_{i} x$ and $y^{\prime} E_{i} y: x^{\prime} R_{i-1} y^{\prime}$. Then either $x, y \notin\left\{a_{i}, b_{i}, c_{i}\right\}$ and so $[x]=\{x\}[y]=\{y\}$ and $x R_{i-1} y$ or $x, y \in\left\{a_{i}, b_{i}, c_{i}\right\}$ in which case we have one of the following cases:
$x=a_{i}=y$ then $a_{i} R_{i-1} a_{i}$ so $x R_{i-1} y$.
$x=a_{i}, y=b_{i}$ then $x^{\prime} \in U_{1}$ and $y^{\prime} \in U_{2}$ so $x^{\prime} R_{i-1} y^{\prime} R_{i-1} b_{i}$ but $x^{\prime} \mathbb{R}_{i-1} b_{i}$ so this is impossible. In a similar manner, the cases for $x=a_{i}, y=c_{i}$ or $x=b_{i}, y=a_{i}$ or $x=b_{i}, y=c_{i}$ are impossible.
$x=b_{i}=y_{i}$ then $b_{i} R_{i-1} b_{i}$ so $x R_{i-1} y$.
$x=c_{i}$ and $y=a_{i}$ or $y=b_{i}$, then $c_{i} R_{i-1} y$ so $x R_{i-1} y$.
Once again then, $\forall x, y \in A_{i-1} x R_{i-1} y$ iff $[x] R_{i}[y]$. Now we consider $A_{i}$ as a transitive space under the restricted relation and discrete topology. Considering the quotient map $x \mapsto[x]$ restricted to $A_{i-1}$, as both $A_{i-1}$ and $A_{i}$ are finite it is trivially continuous and open, and as $x R_{i-1} y$ iff $[x] R_{i}[y]$ it is moreover a $p$-morphism. It is clearly surjective, and letting $x, y \in A_{i-1}:[x]=[y]$ we have $\{x\}=[x] \cap A_{i-1}=$ $[y] \cap A_{i-1}=\{y\}$ so $x=y$. So the map is an isomorphism and $A_{i-1} \cong A_{i}$.

In the specific case that $i=2$ and $Q_{0}$ is of type $H$ then $Q_{0}$ and $S l_{3}\left(A_{2}\right)$ form one of the following labelled sub-frames:


This case proceeds as before, except for a specific part of checking the $M$-partition requirement. Namely, where $u, v \in U_{2}$ and $u R_{1} w$ and $w \in A_{i}$. Then as $u R_{1} a_{2}$ we have $w R_{1} a_{2}$ so either $w$ is in the same cluster as $b_{2}, w=b_{1}$ or $w=a_{1}$. If $w$ is in the same cluster as $b_{2}$ then $b_{2} R_{1} w$ and $v R_{1} w$. If $w=b_{1}$ then $v R_{1} b_{2} R_{1} w$. If $w=a_{1}$, then $u R_{1} w$ so $R_{1}[u] \cap Q_{0}=\left\{a_{1}, b_{1}, b_{2}\right\}$. Considering $R_{1}^{\omega}[u] \subseteq B_{1}$ as a closed upset, we have $R_{1}^{\omega}[u]^{*} \in \mathbb{H}\left(B_{1}^{*}\right), B_{1}^{*}$ is finitely generated, and so $R_{1}^{\omega}[u]$ is also finitely generated and so $R_{1}^{\omega}[u]$ has the structure $\oplus_{\alpha \leq \beta} P_{\alpha}$ as described by theorem 5.11. Moreover, $a_{1}, b_{1}, b_{2} \in R_{1}^{\omega}[u]$ and have the same depth, so we have $b_{2} \in S l_{2}\left(R_{1}^{\omega}[u]\right)$ and $a_{1} \in S l_{1}\left(R_{1}^{\omega}[u]\right)$ with $b_{2} R_{1} a_{1}$. This forces $P_{0}$ to also be of type $H$, thus $\exists t \in R_{1}^{\omega}[u]$ such that $t \in S l_{2}\left(R_{1}^{\omega}[u]\right)$ and $t R_{1} a_{1}, t R_{1} b_{1}$. But then, $t \in S l_{2}\left(B_{1}\right)$ and $t_{1} R a_{1}$ and $t R_{1} b_{1}$, i.e. $t=a_{2}$ and $u R_{1} a_{2}$ which is a contradiction.

Repeatedly applying our process, we obtain $B_{k-1}$ and $A_{k-1}$ such that $B_{*} \rightarrow B_{k-1}$, $B_{k-1}=A_{k-1} \cup R_{k-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{k-1}\right), A_{k-1}\right.$ is clopen in $B_{k-1}$ and $A_{k-1} \cong A_{k-2} \cong \ldots \cong A_{*}$. Then $S l_{k}\left(A_{k-1}\right)$ is either the first irreflexive point in $A_{k-1}$ or not an irreflexive point and so the cluster containing all of the roots of $A_{k-1}$.

Suppose it the root cluster of $A_{k-1}$, we again choose an element from it and label it $a_{k}$. Then, we define $E_{k}$ on $A_{k-1}$ by:
$E_{k}:=\left\{\left(x, a_{k}\right),\left(a_{k}, y\right),(x, y) \in B_{k-1}^{2}: x, y \in B_{k-1} \backslash A_{k-1}\right\} \cup\left\{(u, u) \in B_{k-1}^{2}: u \in B_{k-1}\right\}$.
That is, $E$ is the smallest equivalence relation identifying all points outside $A_{k-1}$ with $a_{k}$. We claim this is a modal equivalence. Letting $u E_{k} v$ and $u R_{k-1} w$, either $u, v \in A_{k-1} \backslash\left\{a_{k}\right\}$ and so $u=v$ and $v R_{k-1} w$ or $u, v \in\left(B_{k-1} \backslash A_{k-1}\right) \cup\left\{a_{k}\right\}$. Then, as $B_{k-1}=A_{k-1} \cup R_{k-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{k-1}\right)\right], u, v \in R^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{k-1}\right)\right]$ and so both $u$ and $v$ see $a_{k}$ and by extension all of $A_{k-1}$. So either $w \in A_{k-1}$ and $v R w$ or $w \notin A_{k-1}$ so $v R a_{k}$ and $w E_{k} a_{k}$.

Then, letting $u \mathbb{E}_{k} v$ either $u \in\left(B_{k-1} \backslash A_{k-1}\right) \cup\left\{a_{k}\right\}$ or $u \in A_{k-1}$. In the former, $v \notin\left(B_{k-1} \backslash A_{k-1}\right) \cup\left\{a_{k}\right\}$ and this set is a clopen $E_{k}$-class, therefore it separates $u$ and $v$ as required. In the latter $u \in A_{k-1} \backslash\left\{a_{k}\right\}$ and $v \neq u$ then $u \in A_{k-1}$ implies it is isolated so $\{u\}$ separates $u$ and $v$ as required.

So, we finally let $B_{k}:=B_{k-1} / E_{k}$ and once more:

$$
A_{k}:=\left\{[x] \in B_{k}:[x] \cap A_{k-1} \neq \varnothing\right\} .
$$

Now, letting $[y] \in B_{k}$, either $y \in A_{k-1}$ and $[y] \in A_{k}$ or $y \notin A_{k-1}$ and $[y]=\left[a_{k}\right] \in A_{k}$ So $B_{k}=A_{k}$ making it finite and its topology discrete.

Letting $x, y \in A_{k-1}$ if $x R_{k-1} y$ then $[x] R_{k}[y]$. If $[x] R_{k}[y]$ either $x, y \neq a_{k}, x=a_{k}$ or $y=a_{k}$. If $x, y \neq a_{k}$ then so $[x]=\{x\},[y]=\{y\}$ and $x R_{k-1} y$. If $y=a_{k}$ then $\exists x^{\prime} E_{k} x$ and $y^{\prime} E_{k} y$ such that $x^{\prime} R_{k-1} y^{\prime}$ then $y=a_{k}$ implies $y^{\prime} \in B_{k-1} \backslash A_{k-1} \cup\left\{a_{k}\right\}$ which again means $y^{\prime} R_{k-1} a_{k}$ so $x^{\prime} R_{k-1} a_{k}$ and $[x]=\left[x^{\prime}\right]=\left[a_{k}\right]$ so $x=a_{k}$, so this reduces to the $x=a_{k}$ case, and then $x R_{k-1} y$ as its a root for $A_{k-1}$. So, once more $\forall x, y \in A_{k-1}$ we have $x R_{k-1} y$ iff $x R_{k} y$ and the quotient map restricted to $A_{k-1}$ is an isomorphism and $A_{k-1} \cong A_{k}$. Finally then, $B_{*} \rightarrow B_{k-1} \rightarrow B_{k} \cong A_{k} \cong A_{k-1} \cong A_{*}$. So $B_{*} \rightarrow A_{*}$ as required.

Now suppose $A_{k-1}$ is $i$-type and $S l_{k}\left(A_{k-1}\right)$ is the first layer of $A_{k-1}$ that is a single irreflexive point which we label $a_{k}$. Now, either $Q_{n-1}$ is a two cluster anti-chain or not. If it is, then firstly by lemma 5.4 the points in it are reflexive so $k>n-1$ and in fact $k=n$, i.e. the base of $A_{k-1}$ is the following:


Notably:

$$
R_{k-1}^{-1}\left[a_{k-1}\right] \cap R_{k-1}\left[a_{k}\right]=\left\{u \in B_{k-1}: a_{k-1} R_{k-1} u \& u R_{k-1} a_{k-1}\right\} .
$$

So, by lemma 5.9 $R_{k-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{k-1}\right)\right]=R_{k-1}^{-1}\left[a_{k}\right]=\varnothing$. So $B_{k-1}=A_{k-1}$ and $B_{*} \rightarrow$ $B_{k-1} \cong A_{k-1} \cong A *$. So $B_{*} \rightarrow A_{*}$ as required.

Finally, suppose $Q_{n-1}$ is a single cluster, then recalling corollary 5.12 the base $A_{k-1}$ is the following:


Moreover, as $B_{k-1} \in \mathcal{A}$ and $S l_{k}\left(A_{k-1}\right)$ is a single irreflexive point, from corollary 5.5 we have that $R_{k-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{k-1}\right)\right]$ is a tree of irreflexive points of depth $l \in \omega$ such that $l+k \geq n$. Then, $B_{k-1}=A_{k-1} \cup R_{k-1}^{-1}\left[S l_{k}\left(A_{k-1}\right)\right]$ and $A_{k-1}$ is finite, so $B_{k-1}$ is finite and of depth $k+l$.

Consider the collection of sets $\left\{\operatorname{Sl}_{r}\left(B_{k-1}\right)\right\}_{k \leq r \leq k+l}$. As $B_{k-1}$ is finite each of these is trivially clopen. Given any $u \in S l_{r}\left(B_{k-1}\right), u$ is irreflexive, sees a point of depth $r^{\prime}$ : $r^{\prime}<r$ and only such points, so the collection forms an $M$-partition. Taking $E$ as the modal equivalence induced by lemma 2.17 and considering $B^{\prime}:=B_{k-1} / E$ we have $B^{\prime} \cong \bigoplus_{m=0}^{k-1} Q_{m} \oplus\left\{a_{k}\right\} \oplus\left\{a_{k+1}\right\} \oplus \ldots \oplus\left\{a_{k+l}\right\}$. Then, applying $l+k-n \alpha$-reductions to $B^{\prime}$ we obtain $A_{k-1}$ and so $B_{k-1} \rightarrow B^{\prime} \rightarrow A_{k-1}$. Finally, $B_{*} \rightarrow B_{k-1} \rightarrow A_{k-1} \cong A_{*}$, so $B_{*} \rightarrow A_{*}$ as required.

With the hard work done the final proof of our characterisation of primitive K4algebras is straightforward.

Theorem 6.3 (Primitive Varieties of K4-algebras).
Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a variety of K4-algebras. Then $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive iff $\mathcal{A}$ omits $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $\exists n>0: \mathcal{A}$ omits $G_{n}^{*}$.

Proof. The only if direction is exactly lemma 4.2. For the if direction, suppose $\mathcal{A}$ omits $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}: n>0$. By lemma $3.19 \mathcal{A}$ has EDPC. Letting $M$ be a sub-varietiy of $\mathcal{A}, M$ also omits $F_{i}^{*}: 1 \leq i \leq 17$ and $G_{n}^{*}$, so by theorem $6.1 M$ has FMP. By lemma 6.2 each non-trivial, finite FSI member of $\mathcal{A}$ is weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$. So from theorem 3.22 we conclude that $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive.

Finally, we obtain as a corollary the characterisation of HSC transitive modal logics.

Corollary 6.4 (Hereditarily Structurally Complete Logics over K4).
Let $\lambda$ be a normal modal logic with equivalent algebraic semantics $\mathcal{A}$. The following are equivlaent:
(i) $\lambda$ is HSC;
(ii) $\mathcal{A}$ is primitive;
(iii) For all $1 \leq i \leq 17 F_{i}$ is not a $\lambda$-space and $\exists n>0$ such that $G_{n}$ is not a $\lambda$-space.

Proof. Combination of theorems 6.3, 3.14 and 3.25.
With theorem 6.3 and corollary 6.4 we have completed our main task, establishing our new characterisation of primitive varieties of K4-algebras and by extension of hereditarily structurally complete transitive modal logics. With the structural results of the preceding chapter in place, we were able to firstly establish that our varieties have the FMP (theorem 6.1) and secondly that that their finite, non-trivial FSI members were weakly projective (theorem 6.2) in the variety. This completed the necessary steps to employ our sufficient condition and complete the proof of the characterisation.

## Chapter 7

## Conclusions

By utilising the relationships between logic, algebra and topology we have both corrected Rybakov's characterisation of the hereditarily structurally complete transitive modal logics and given a new, detailed proof strategy of the new characterisation. Whilst our strategy added a substantive theoretical load to the proof in the form of Jónnson-Tarski duality and algebraic logic, that additional theory helped illuminate a group of HSC transitive modal logics missed by Rybakov's characterisation and clarified exactly how component parts to the main proof progressed.

To close let us consider a few areas of further study. The central theory that enabled our investigation was the joining together of transitive modal logic being algebraizable and a duality theory for its associated class of algebras. A natural expansion to our investigation is to look for other logics which share this set up. When introducing the equivalent algebraic semantics and the Jónsson-Tarski duality we worked with modal logic generally before specialising to the transitive case, so the picture is readily present here. However, there are significant problems with attempting our proof strategy in the general modal case. In order to utilise the sufficiency condition we gave the variety of algebras we work with needed to have EDPC, but there are varieties of modal algebras that lack the EDPC [8, Theorem 5.4, pg 597]. This means a more general version of theorem 3.22 would be required which drops the EDPC requirement. A potential candidate is that for any variety $\mathcal{A}$ if the finitely generated, non-trivial SI members of $\mathcal{A}$ are weakly projective in $\mathcal{A}$ then the variety is primitive [24, p. 4.7]. One would then have to attempt a proof of theorem 6.2 without transitivity and working with a finitely generated space in place of a finite one, which would in contrast to our work (theorem 2.27) necessitate understanding the behaviour of finitely generated modal spaces beyond their elements of finite depth.

A more modest generalisation one could attempt would be to consider weakly transitive modal logic (wK4), which is algebrized by the variety of weakly transitive modal algebras (wK4-algebras), modal algebras $A$ such that forall $a \in A$ $a \wedge \square a \leq \square \square a$. wK4-algebras do have EDPC [8, Pg597], so one could study HSC wK4 logics through a similar proof strategy. There would be some significant subtleties to work out, beyond determining the potential characterisation the assumption of transitivity is woven throughout the development of our proof. One would want to make sense of reductions in the weakly transitive setting, and develop new techniques for defining modal equivalences on weakly transitive spaces to make the eventual proof manageable. Finally, as mentioned any algebraizable logic whose equivalent algebraic semantics has a duality theory is potential ground for an investigation in our style. As examples, intuitionistic modal logics $[32,30]$ has a corresponding class of algebras [2] which moreover have a duality available [22], as do
multi-modal algebras [21].

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