Propositional Attitudes in Dynamic Conceptual Semantics, by Renate Bartsch In this paper the shortcomings of the treatment of propositional attitudes in several branches of formal semantics will be discussed, shortly indicated by the names of Stalnaker, Hintikka, Carnap, Cresswell, Von Stechow, Asher, Barwise and Perry. One of the well-known shortcomings is that the structures of propositional contents in these approaches are either too coarse or too fine, and that the semantics contains syntactic-semantic hybrids like structured propositions or abstract situations. Furthermore, they cannot provide a good understanding of the quite flexible notion of identity of propositional attitudes. Another well-known shortcoming is the logical closedness of the set of beliefs in formal semantic theories. In traditional theories of cognition such as Fodor's, on the other hand, the notion of a propositional content as a representation formulated in some formal or natural language is not adequate, taking into account that beliefs are possible without being framed in a language. An alternative approach to propositional attitudes will be formulated in dynamic conceptual semantics, which can avoid the above mentioned shortcomings.