PP-2019-18: Terzopoulou, Zoi and Endriss, Ulle (2019) Strategyproof Judgment Aggregation under Partial Information. [Pre-print] (In Press)
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Abstract
We introduce a model of judgment aggregation in which individuals do not necessarily have full information regarding the judgments held by their peers. This intuitively limits an individual’s ability to strategically manipulate the aggregation process. Our results confirm this basic intuition. Specifically, we show that known impossibility results concerning the existence of reasonable strategyproof judgment aggregation rules break down once we abandon the classical assumption of full information. For instance, the simple plurality rule is strategyproof in case individuals do not have any information about their peers, while the well-known premise-based rule can be rendered strategyproof by withholding only a negligible amount of information.
| Item Type: | Pre-print |
|---|---|
| Report Nr: | PP-2019-18 |
| Series Name: | Prepublication (PP) Series |
| Year: | 2019 |
| Subjects: | Computation Logic Mathematics Philosophy |
| Depositing User: | Ulle Endriss |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Aug 2019 13:53 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Aug 2019 13:53 |
| URI: | https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1696 |
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