Question-Answer Games Thomas Ågotnes, Johan van Benthem, Hans van Ditmarsch, Ştefan Minică Abstract: We propose strategic games wherein the strategies consist of players asking each other questions and answering those questions. We formally define simplifications of such games wherein two players simultaneously ask each other a question that the opponent is then obliged to answer. The motivation for our research is to model conversation including the dynamics of questions and answers, to provide new links between game theory and dynamic logics of information, and to exploit the dynamic/strategic structure that, we think, lies implicitly inside epistemic models for epistemic languages, and to make that structure an explicit subject of logical study. Our results are: the notion of a two-person question-answer game with information goals, the existence and computation of Bayesian equilibria for these games, and a connection between logic and game theory namely the existence of equilibria for positive goal formulae. Keywords: modal logic, game theory, two-person strategic form games, de re / de dicto