PP-2012-15: The Common Structure of Paradoxes in Aggregation Theory

PP-2012-15: Grandi, Umberto (2012) The Common Structure of Paradoxes in Aggregation Theory. [Report]

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Abstract

In this paper we analyse some of the classical paradoxes in Social Choice Theory (namely, the Condorcet paradox, the discursive dilemma, the Ostrogorski paradox and the multiple election paradox) using a general framework for the study of aggregation problems called binary aggregation with integrity constraints. We provide a definition of paradox that is general enough to account for the four cases mentioned, and identify a common structure in the syntactic properties of the rationality assumptions that lie behind such paradoxes. We generalise this observation by providing a full characterisation of the set of rationality assumptions on which the majority rule does not generate a paradox.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2012-15
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2012
Uncontrolled Keywords: Computational Social Choice; Judgment Aggregation; Condorcet Paradox
Depositing User: ugrandi1
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/457

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