Social Choice and Logic via Simple Games
Tijmen R. Daniëls

Abstract:
This thesis is about social choice theory and logic. Social choice
theory is concerned with questions of how a group of agents can decide
as a collective in a way that reflects the individual opinions of
those involved.

This thesis falls into two parts. The first part is concerned with the
consequences of the observation that the logical consistency of
individual opinions can be lost lost when passing to the collective
level. This part investigates the constraints that are placed upon the
process of collective decision making if it is to preserve logical
consistency.  We apply the methods of social choice theorists to the
subject matter that concerns logicians.

One can also adopt a slightly more lenient perspective, recognising
that collective opinions are simply governed by other logical rules
than individual opinions. In the second part of this thesis we enquire
what such rules may look like. This investigation makes the logic of
collective agency an object of study in its own right. In our
investigation, we will draw links between the methodology of social
choice theorists and that of logicians.  Keywords: