Going for a Walk on a Fine Summer's Day While a Sea-battle is Taking Place, or Concerning Future Contingents and Intentional Action

MSc Thesis (*Afstudeerscriptie*)

written by

Petros D. Stamatis
(born January 22nd, 1979 in Athens, Greece)

under the supervision of **Prof Dr Martin Stokhof**, and submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MSc in Logic

at the *Universiteit van Amsterdam*.

Date of the public defense:
April 23, 2009

Members of the Thesis Committee:
Prof Dr Michiel van Lambalgen
Prof Dr Martin Stokhof
Prof Dr Peter van Emde Boas
Dr Paul Dekker

INSTITUTE FOR LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND COMPUTATION

For my nieces, Katerina and Rea

Contents

Introduction

> How many notes have you made on this book?" The Mouse chanced a tentative light through the hangar.
> "Not a tenth as many as I need. Even though it's doomed as an obsolete museum reliquary, it will be jeweled" – he swung back on the nets – "crafted" – the links roared; his voice rose – "a meticulous work; perfect!"
> "I was born," the Mouse said. "I must die. I am suffering. Help me. There, I just wrote your book for you."
> Katin looked at his big, weak fingers against the mail. After a while he said, "Mouse, sometimes you make me want to cry.
>
> Samuel R. Delany, "Nova"

This thesis, as its title makes clear, is about future contingency and intentional action. It was prompted by a genuine anxiety about what the future holds, and the (overdue) realization that things do not always go as planned.

Some of the things that we take for granted in this investigation are that human beings cannot, due to their nature, have definite knowledge of the future, and that, despite that fact, they continue to make plans and act in relation to desired goals. Interested with the possibility of intentional action within an indeterminate world, we focus on the work of two philosophers that agree on these two presuppositions; Aristotle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. More specifically we center our attention to two of Aristotle's most celebrated and studied texts – On Interpretation (O.I.) and the Nicomachean Ethics (N.E.) – and with Wittgenstein's later take on philosophy – mainly his worries in On Certainty (O.C.) and peripheral texts. In line with our worries, both men seem to preoccupy themselves with the everyday way people interact with each other, opting for a down to earth approach instead of assuming a scientific or a purely theoretical analysis to address the issue of everyday coping with reality. Central to their approach is a conception of human beings as intrinsically social creatures, identified as part of a structured environment that is typical of their nature. It is within that environment that people are considered free to act and express their intentions by doing so.

As part of their everyday interaction, and in relation with the future realm, people have a habit of making promises, of giving their "word" to each other that certain things will come to be, despite the fact that nothing from the part of factual reality supports their doing so. More precisely: If it is not now determined whether we will go for coffee tomorrow, can an assertion that we will go be true? If an assertion that we will go for coffee tomorrow is now true, is the fact of us going for coffee tomorrow determined? These two questions have to do with the notion of truth, and the concept of determination that we work with. Surely saying it doesn't make it true, but still, if we arrange to go for coffee tomorrow, then surely we have determined something, i.e. our shared intention to do so. Whether this shared intention is something that makes the assertion true, or whether it is only the fact of us actually sharing a coffee tomorrow that which makes the assertion turn out to be true, is what will trouble us in the following.

In the first part of this thesis we are concerned with Aristotle. In chapter 9 of O.I. (O.I. 9), Aristotle is addressing the issue of determinism, and it is at first surprising that such a short piece of text can receive such a wide range of controversial interpretations, while still managing to keep commentators perplexed as to its original

motivation and message. For that reason three different accounts of the chapter are presented, that in turn represent three different ways of approaching the Ancient text. The main question we are called upon to answer is whether assuming the truth of an assertion concerning a future event, necessarily implies an absolutely deterministic world. Our first commentator, Hintikka, considers this question unrelated with Aristotle's true worries. Anscombe, our second commentator, urges us to speak nothing of the future since we cannot be absolutely definite to anything we might have to say. Our third commentator, Frede, is the one who takes Aristotle as seriously considering an alternative mode of truth that facilitates promises and oaths as indispensable tools for deliberation and planning. This points us to our second favored Aristotelian text, the N.E., where the concepts of deliberation and planning are thoroughly mapped out. Our investigation of the N.E. focuses on three of Aristotle technical terms – "φρόνησις" (practical wisdom, henceforth phronesis), "προαίρεσις" (commitment, henceforth prohairesis) and "δεινότητα" (comfortable certainty, henceforth deinotita) – with the help of which successful descriptions of situations having to do with intentional human agency are made possible. More to the point, we end up with a definition of an ideal moral agent who is so defined as to be able to procure a value of truth different from the one provided by a direct correspondence between propositions and states of affairs.

Aware of Wittgenstein's "philosophical" turn, in the second part we describe his later views concerning language use, in an attempt to better understand the role that the social setting plays in the way people act. We are most interested in the distinctions between knowledge, certainty and religious belief and in the exact nature of the normative character that a typically human attitude towards reality affects in our everyday life. We consequently provide our reading of the semantic consequences of Wittgenstein's distinctions, acknowledging a form of conditional determinism expressed by our intentional participation in social practices, as part of our civilized form of life.

In the final part, we attempt to forge a connection between some of Aristotle's descriptive terms with the later Wittgenstein's account. The normative force of a religious/ethical belief is related to the force of Aristotle's term of prohairesis, while the expert coping with social life and it's demands is compared with deinotita, a practical executive ability that describes the feeling of security an adult member of a society exhibits in his interactions with other community members. Having acquired a better overall understanding of the Aristotelian position concerning human agency as embellished with Wittgenstein's observations on human everyday attitude, we will then return to our initial discussion of O.I. 9, see if our investigation supports our favored reading of the chapter, and finally examine a proposed solution as able to disarticulate the tension between the occurrence of intentional actions in an indeterminate world.

Part I: Aristotle

Ia. Establishing a common ground

It is fruitful to try to establish a "common ground" between Aristotle's conception of modal terms and contemporary approaches. First of all, the problems facing Aristotle in his thinking about modal notions can best be grasped if we have a rudimentary theory of modality to compare it against. We must keep in mind that there is a question as to what, for Aristotle, was qualified by a modal operator. Textual evidence support both claims that Aristotle held conclusions necessary relative to the truth of their premises[1] and that certain things necessarily took place relative to the fulfillment of particular antecedent conditions[2]. For present purposes, it suffices to know that modal operators will qualify whole sentences and as such, at least part of Aristotle's modal logic can be accounted for on the level of modal propositional logic.

By appeal to various experts from Aristotle's corpus, and in relation with our interest with O.I. 9, we will mention certain terminological problems that we need to keep in mind. In the first part that follows, we will mainly refer to Aristotle's chapters 12 and 13 from O.I., and certain related definitions given in the Categories. In the second, where we will deal with Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes as analyzed in Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2, we will articulate the way in which Aristotle attempts to reach a successful description of a context of use. We will then relate our discussion to the matter at hand, and most notably what is Aristotle's problem in O.I. 9 with the example of "a sea battle taking place".

Initial problems concerning Aristotle's terminology

Understanding Aristotle's writings is in most cases quite difficult. Certain passages and even whole chapters have taxed many scholars and are still closely scrutinized in search for a better understanding. Aristotle's inconsistency in terminology is rooted in his overall willingness to endorse the ordinary, everyday mode of speech of his time. Whenever it is not needed, Aristotle avoids explicit introduction of new technical terms. Also, in the case of words that were apparently interchangeable in the ordinary mode of speech, it seems enough for him to occasionally, but not always, state whether he makes distinctions between different meanings, or if he endorses such use as evident of identity in meaning. Aristotle is thus quite sensitive to the precise sense of his words and seems to have good enough reasons for choosing the way he wishes to express himself. When investigating his logical works, this liberality in terminology usually prompts attempts at establishing "formal" definitions by focusing on Aristotle's use of words in particular contexts rather than on the words themselves. It is for that reason that a close observation of his phraseology and terminology is imperative for understanding his exact point in each and every case.

Whether one takes the material we have now in our hands as sets of lectures, drafts of treatises or as finished works of literature, matters greatly when it comes to problems that arise due to Aristotle's use of his more technical terminology. Hintikka,

[1] Aristotle usually adds the operator expressing necessity to the conclusion of valid syllogisms to indicate its necessity relative to the premises.

[2] See Metaphysics Book VI Chapter 3. Part of the later discussion in O.I. 9 hinges on this very idea.

one of the commentators we will encounter in our exposition of O.I. 9, convincingly argues that, in as far as it goes, treating Aristotle's surviving works as unfinished works of literature[3] is the best way to go. He begins his investigation on Aristotle and his modal theory by referencing technical terminology defined in the Categories, the text that precedes O.I. There, Aristotle has defined the linguistic terms "synonym", "homonym", and "paronym".

In short: two things are considered "synonymous" if they share both name (i.e. linguistic term), and definition, "homonymous" if they share only the name, the definitions being different in the two cases, and "paronymous" when called by different names of which one is nevertheless derived (grammatically) from the other.[4]

Hintikka argues that Aristotle is systematically violating his own definitions throughout the Categories, and attempts to exemplify these violations in Aristotle's chapters 12 and 13 in O.I. that deal with possibility, contingency, and necessity.

At the end of Chapter 12 of O.I. (22a11-13) Aristotle summarizes in the form of a list the following pairs of contradictory expressions:

1. Possible – Not Possible
2. Contingent – Not Contingent
3. Impossible – Not Impossible
4. Necessary – Not Necessary

Hintikka, and rightly so, relates the definitions given in the Categories with the problems one encounters when one attempts to use these expressions in a suitable context. Aristotle himself is quick to admit to certain difficulties when he tries to establish a number of relations among these modal expressions, as his logical intuitions compel him to do. He tries to explain these difficulties away by distinguishing certain features of the word "δυνατόν" (Henceforth dynaton) - usually translated as "possible" - that could be problematic if seen in relation with the word "ἐνδεχόμενον" (Henceforth endehomenon) - translated as "contingent".

Given the definitions of homonymy, synonymy and paronymy, these problems do not seem insoluble, but instead rather interesting in themselves. However, these similarities of phraseology make it extremely difficult for current readers and commentators to draw the correct connections with other parts of the same discussion or to discussions of similar problems elsewhere in the corpus. It might be the case that an overzealous scrutiny of Aristotle's terms could, instead of providing a better understanding of a particular text as a whole, disrupt the argumentation structure and present a fragmented view of Aristotle's points and debated positions. Hintikka's investigation of these problematic terms, along with his tendency to correct Aristotle's mistakes, led him to the construction of a particular model for Aristotelian possibility that will resurface further on.

Either way, to make matters as simple as we currently can, it is considered prudent when trying to provide definitions to these modal terms, to retain as much of Aristotle's terminological distinctions as possible in the attempts seeking to establish a more "formal" modal language. For that reason we will consider the notions of unconditional necessity and unconditional impossibility as direct opposites, and refrain from identifying what is "not contingent" or "not possible" with what is "impossible", by not equating the related Greek terms that can be translated as not contingent, not possible, and impossible.

---

[3] See Hintikka, "Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality", Chapter 1

[4] This is essentially the case of univocal, equivocal, and denominative words in the English language.

In 22b11ff, Aristotle states that what is "necessary" is "possible" in a different sense than that of something "contingent" being "possible". He distinguishes rational from irrational capacities that can in turn be either realized or unrealized. This distinction is a crucial one for Aristotle, mainly when he discusses change and movement in other treatises. For the time being, a helpful analogy can be drawn between the case of dormant and unexpressed traits, and active, and as such expressed, traits of *living* organisms. Aristotle gives an example in order to describe the contingent exercise of a non-actualized potentiality in O.I. 13 23a14ff:

> Both of that which is walking and actual, and of that which is capable of walking but does not now actually walk, it holds good that it is not impossible that it could walk (or could be). Now this latter potentiality we cannot affirm of the necessary in its unconditional sense, but we can in the other sense.[5]

Aristotle's way of using "possible" to express potentiality in the case of someone who *can* walk but currently does or does not, is not a use we can affirm about that which is necessary in an unconditional manner. In its unconditional sense, necessity has as a counterpart the notion of impossibility. However, in the case of potentialities whose manifestation is a contingent matter, "not impossible" does not mean "necessary", but implies possibility with absence of necessity, much like our notion of contingency. In this sense, dynaton is sometimes used to convey potentiality or an ability that can either be or not be actually expressed.

Similar problems are faced when encountering endehomenon as describing possibility. In the everyday mode of speech endehomenon is (still) used in a wider context than the one we would wish for in a rigorous and formal account of modality. Aristotle indicates this in Prior Analytics I 3 25a37-25b2 as follows:

> [T]o "be contingent" is used in several senses; for we say that what is necessary and what is not necessary and what is possible is contingent.

The three cases listed in the secondary clause do not refer to different meanings of the term endehomenon. It seems that they are just three different cases to which the general notion of "possibility" can be applied. Clearly, Aristotle cannot mean that what is necessary is contingent. The word endehomenon in the Greek language carries the literal meaning of "that which is anticipated or expected" and so, *in a sense*, what is necessary the case, what is not necessary the case, and what still has the possibility of turning out to be the case, are all things to be expected in one's portrayal of the encountered situation.

Another instance of this difficulty is encountered in Prior Analytics Book I 13.32a21-9 where Aristotle's awareness of the different logical properties of endehomenon as expressing contingency is distinguished from endehomenon as expressing possibility in connection with what is necessary. The final sentence reads[6]:

---

[5] This particular passage refers to an important distinction between what is conditionally necessary and what is simply necessary, which will be established in Aristotle's discussion in O.I. 9.

[6] Hintikka's rendition of the sentence in pg. 32 of his "Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality" is somewhat different. He translates the passage, adding the bracketed part, as:

> That which is necessary will not be possible, and that which is not necessary [nor

> That which is endehomenon will therefore not be necessary, and that which is not necessary will be endehomenon.

Here we see that Aristotle is trying to establish that when the term ἐνδεχόμενον is used with a technical function in mind, namely that of contingency, something necessary cannot and will not be called endehomenon. This is Aristotle's way of clarifying the meaning of the term when used in a "formal" way. It is up to the reader to keep the "formal" use of endehomenon as opposed to the informal, everyday mode of speech in mind and to make the necessary amendments according to context of use.

Given that we do not have a universal theory to propose, it will be up to us to identify, or not, violations concerning definitions of linguistic terms from case to case. The problems treated in Chapters 12 and 13 of O.I., interesting in themselves as they may be, are not the issue in O.I. 9 that is of primary interest to us. Whilst admittedly recognizing issues of ambiguity in the use of terms, the contextual, and thus conditional, dependence of our terms will better be understood if we additionally establish Aristotle's way of providing a context within which these terms can come under use. This is what Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes is supposed to be an indispensable tool for, i.e., for providing us with a successful portrayal of the (linguistic) world around us.

The Causal Chain

Aristotle's general account of the four causes can be found, in almost the same words, in Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2. In a standard reading, the doctrine applies to everything that requires an explanation, including the processes of nature, artistic production, and, to certain extent, to human action.

Aristotle distinguishes among four kinds of "cause" in virtue of which something can be responsible for something else:

a. *The Material Cause*: That out of which a thing becomes, and which persists through the process of its coming.

b. *The Final Cause*: That for the sake of which a thing becomes. In one sense it is the goal, in another the beneficiary.

c. *The Formal Cause*: What it is for so-and-so to be. In other words, it is the essence or the defining characteristics.

d. *The Efficient Cause*: What tells us "whence comes the origin of a change"[7]. It answers the question "How did/does/will it happen?"

In the case of artistic production, Aristotle thought that efficient, final, and formal causes are in the end one and the same. Consider the case of a tool used for cutting, which we will call a "knife", be it a chisel, a sword or a scythe. The work for cutting demands steel and not wood, and steel of a certain shape (material cause). To the

---

> impossible] will be possible.

Hintikka's refusal to translate ἐνδεχόμενον with "contingent" and not with "possible" even in such passages where the word has a specific formal use, is indicative of his tendencies to alter passages as he sees fit and to retain inconsistencies constantly in the foreground when it comes to Aristotle's terminology, no matter the attempts for clarification. In the following chapters it will be argued that it is this attitude that compels him to wrongfully attribute "simple-mindedness" to Aristotle in O.I. 9.

[7] See Aristotle's Physics II 3, and also Metaphysics V 2.

extent that a tool, in serving the purpose of the craftsman (efficient cause), is fulfilling itself, a knife which will not cut (final cause) is not merely a bad knife, but a mere piece of steel, that is, no knife at all. Steel of a certain shape – what we call a "knife" – is only itself in cutting (formal cause).

From those four, it seems that only the type of cause we call "efficient" has the sort of "responsibility" for its effect that contemporary discussions of causation take into account. Aristotle in his talk of efficient cause has in mind the sort of origins that control change in the world. Although modern accounts of causation take causation to be a relation between events, the Aristotelian efficient cause is not an event but a substance. For example, the purposive craftsman (the efficient cause), in exercising his causal power of his craftsmanship, performs his characteristic activity *in* constructing the knife (an event), thus producing the coming into existence of a knife (another event). Aristotle's view in this respect differs from the contemporary one in identifying as the cause the substance (the agent) whose capacities are exercised in other events. However since in the case of a craftsman, the exercise of the causal powers are exemplified in an event that in turn causes other causal powers of substances to be exemplified in other events (the crafted material acquiring the final form of a steel knife), the two views can be reconciled. The agent is not an efficient cause if his characteristic identifying ability that works as a causal power, is not effectively exercised.

With the help of the four causes Aristotle is able to provide a teleological model for reaching explanations with reference to the end of a process. Although this method is suitable for describing natural processes and artistic production, the lack of psychological factors such as beliefs, desires and intentions can be problematic when we address issues having to do with human action in its most general form. Aristotle is right in refusing to psychologize nature and artistic processes, but in the case of human action a non-psychological teleological account is difficult to procure.[8]

Aristotle further recognizes cases were the description of the substance involved is not specifically or directly connected with the actualization that can be causally effected. Such is the case of a pastry cook that saves one's life through his wholesome food. Such occurrences involve a relation between two separate "items" (being a pastry cook and saving one's life), which have come to be together, when things of this kind do not come together always, or for the most part. Admittedly, there is no self-explanatory association that makes this coming-together readily available for explanation, and if any kind of explanatory power is to be found, it lies in the success of the portrayal of the occasioned context in use.

In general, Aristotle acknowledges the "chance" factor in the world and allows for uncaused causes into his causal account. Accidents involve a particular kind of causation, since according to Aristotle accidents can only have accidental causes themselves[9]. The link of causation in the case of a chance event, runs back as far as a certain origin (the accidental cause), but this origin does not run back to something else. Accidents can be in themselves causes and enter the causal chain, consequently stopping that chain from stretching back any further because they lack (non-accidental) causes of their own. Future "accidental conjectures" are especially problematic, since their causal ancestry does not always reach back to the past or even to the present. As such, particular accidents and coincidences are in most cases

[8] Later, when investigating Aristotle's ethical work, we will expand on certain "technical" notions that will help remedy this particular misgiving.

[9] See Aristotle's Metaphysics VI 2, 1027a7-8 (c.f. XI 8, 1065a6-8): "For the cause of things that are or come to be accidentally is itself accidental."

beyond any rational account of the future realm.

Strictly speaking, accidental causes are no (explanatory) causes at all, for the fact of the simultaneity of, e.g. arriving at an alley at a particular time, meeting villains at exactly the same time and thus coming to an early demise through a knife in the heart is not explained. Even if we assume explanations for each one of the two "items" separately, we will still not have reached a connected form of explanation. Aristotle treats the existence of such "accidental conjectures" as a normal and unexplained occurrence one encounters in everyday life. He rightly feels that there is no need to apply notions of mysticism or fate to impose a law-like regulatory originating source for such encounters. So, in Aristotle's account, a fifth cause is implicitly acknowledged, i.e., the "Accidental Cause". For our purposes, we claim that a future encounter will be a chance encounter relative to the situation one is facing now, if and only if this situation is not yet such that it is now unconditionally necessary that this encounter will come about.

The main reason for our current worry about future contingency is the conceptual need to assign an ontological status to future contingents to which nothing corresponds in current actual terms. It is this worry that we find evident in O.I. 9, and feel it is in need of investigation. In the following, after a short introduction, we will first describe the way Hintikka's fixation on technical problems finds its place in the context of O.I. 9. Having constructed a universal theory of possibility for amending Aristotle's terminological misgivings, Hintikka's approach is of some use, even if only for realizing some important technical distinctions. Next, we will take Anscombe's "theoretical attitude" towards O.I. 9 and relate Hintikka's observations to a practical aspect. As a final comment we will reserve Frede's account, as the one interpretation closer to our own take and the most liable to lead us to a "likelier picture".

Ib. Formulation of the problem in O.I. 9

The exact nature of the main problem discussed in O.I. 9, has been the subject of intense debate from the time it first appeared until now. The brevity of the ancient text combined with Aristotle's lack of adequate technical terminology, especially in delineating the delicate different uses of the term "possible", has muddled our overall understanding of the text. It has troubled both classical scholars, concerned mainly with the question of the Aristotelian point of view, and logicians interested in the logical problems of determinism and in the construction of tense-logics that provide a formal account to the actual workings of the tense-system of, predominantly, English verbs.

O.I. 9 is developed in three parts: In the first (18a28-34) it is postulated that a particular thesis does not hold when it comes to certain contradictory statements about future contingents, in the second (18a34-19a6) it is shown that if this thesis held for singular future propositions, then everything that happened would happen necessarily, and in the third (19a7-19b4) causal determinism is denied and Aristotle presents his own position concerning the treatment of future contingents.

Traditionally, it has received two kinds of interpretations focusing on the problem of *Future Truth.* According to one approach, Aristotle is entertaining two positions: the strong thesis that among two contradictory propositions one is necessary true and the other necessary false, i.e. $\Box p \vee \Box \neg p$, and the weak one stating that among two contradictory statements it is necessary that one is true and one is false, i.e. $\Box(p \vee \neg p)$. As a representative of this view, Anscombe suggests that Aristotle is denying the first one as leading to causal determinism, and openly accepts the second for future states of affairs, while leaving aside the truth and falsity of the individual propositions as purely hypothetical.

According to the second school of "traditional" commentators, Aristotle is in fact discussing the weaker thesis and goes on to reject it along with the stronger one. However, according to the "revamped" version of this view, Aristotle adopts a similar position to the ones rejected, namely that at a given moment of time, and for a given context, it is necessary that from two contradictory future tensed propositions one will be true, and the other false. That is, a future state of events might appear necessary relative to a context, while outside that context contingent. Frede's very thorough interpretation focuses on the distinction between what we will term *Plain Truth* and *Relative Semantic Truth*. Re-introducing the "traditional" point of view, Frede's "likely story" that Aristotle did not so openly accept the dictum that every proposition is true or false, and that the main question behind O.I. 9 is the way that the truth of a statement can affect the existence of facts, is indeed more likely than others.

Hintikka's approach to the chapter, unlike Anscombe's and Frede's, contends that what troubled Aristotle was not in fact Future Truth. The Problem of *Infinite Past Truth* as coined by Hintikka, focused instead in a possible [sic] confusion between omni-temporal truth and necessary truth when it came to Aristotle's technical terminology and modal theory. Two major contributions emerged: The first is now known as A. O. Lovejoy's "Principle of Plenitude",[10] which, on the view that Hintikka ascribes to Aristotle, would lead us to conclude that Aristotle's way of dealing with modalities is thoroughly inconsistent.[11] The second point raised however

[10] It is noteworthy to keep in mind that Lovejoy did not in fact ascribe this dubious principle to Aristotle.

[11] J. van Rijen, "Aristotle's Logic of Necessity", pg. 7, who additionally points out that in J. Hintikka, U. Remes, and S. Knuuttila, "Aristotle on Modality and Determinism", the contributors go so far as to

is one of the most attractive – for some – aspects of Hintikka's otherwise failed hypothesis, one that provides a detailed account of the deterministic position. A corollary to Hintikka's theory is that, even assuming right-branching time every temporally definite sentence and every omni-temporal sentence is necessarily true if true and necessarily false if false. In other words, if what is asserted happens at, e.g. January 22nd 1979, then "p at January 22nd 1979" is true, has always been true and will always be true, and, hence "it is necessary that p at January 22nd 1979" is also true.

In order to establish Aristotle's main concern in the particular chapter, we will first present Hintikka's approach, centered as it is on Aristotle's terminology. Hintikka's exposition will be followed by Anscombe's commentary, leaving the reading advocated by Frede for favored last.

Hintikka's approach: *Infinite Past Truth*

Central to Hintikka's approach is the insistence that Aristotle adhered to a particular notion of possibility, as described by the so-called "Principle of Plenitude". This is the culmination of Hintikka's investigation in Aristotle's modal theory based on his fixation with Aristotle's technical deficiencies in modal terminology and use. The principle holds that all genuine possibilities, or at least all possibilities of some central and important kind, are actualized in time. It gets its name from the implication that God would have to stuff the universe full with specimens of every possible kind of creature. Under suitable interpretations, the Principle amounts to a notion of possibility where nothing is possible other than what is, what has been, and what will be.[12] What is of importance is that if Hintikka's insistence that Aristotle adheres to the Principle of Plenitude is true then it is shown that in O.I. 9, all of Aristotle's moves to remove the deterministic conclusions fail.

Hintikka's model for Aristotelian modal logic is formed by a temporally relative version of the Principle of Plenitude, i.e. that if something is possible at a time t, then it is actual for at least one time t'. If we assume "p" as portraying an "open" proposition like "it is raining", in the sense that no truth value can be assigned to it unless an explicit temporal reference is provided, this principle has as counterparts on the semantic level:

1. If $\Diamond$p at t_0, then p for at least one t, and

2. $\Box$p at t_0, iff p for all t

These, together with their converses amount to Hintikka's interpretation of the Aristotelian modal operators.

Hintikka's model takes for granted that for Aristotle propositions used for stating knowledge or belief claims are temporally indefinite in their most typical form. That is, for Hintikka, all of the propositions Aristotle repeatedly uses concern individual encounters that contain an explicit or implicit reference to "now". Hintikka claims that a typical Aristotelian example such as "Socrates is sitting" is in fact the same as

proclaim Aristotle's theory of modal concepts as an incoherent and open doctrine, in favor of their interpretation.

[12] It is a fact that several scholars throughout the ages have, not unlike Hintikka, used exegetical models to explain their theories of possibility based on the Principle of Plenitude, and indeed most of them promoted the opinion that Aristotle used it himself, if only to make their case and theories more plausible.

"Socrates is sitting now/tomorrow/yesterday" since all contain a reference to the present moment. In Hintikka's view, Aristotle did not deal with examples such as "Socrates is (was, will be) sleeping at such and such a time on such and such a day". Accordingly, truth and falsity are not ascribed to Aristotle's sentences absolutely, but in relation to the time of the utterance. Depending as it does on the idea of temporal truth, this theory is in contrast with the view that the truth-value of a proposition does not change over time[13].

Hintikka has argued at length that to Aristotle temporally indefinite propositions were the only kind of proposition that he could deal with. Hintikka considers it a fact that in the whole Aristotelian corpus there are no instances of sentences whose contents are tied to some objective chronology, thus being independent of the context of utterance. However, in O.I. 9, when Aristotle,

> a systematist who had defined his notions for too narrow a range of cases and was then forced to accommodate new cases in his framework,[14]

comes to entertain sentences about individual encounters tied to an objective time-scale like "p at time t_0", the problem Hintikka coins as the problem of "infinite past truth" becomes evident.

Hintikka considers as a crucial passage that provides grounds for his intuitions 19a23-19b7. His translation reads:

> What is necessarily is, when it is; and what is not necessarily is not, when it is not. But not everything that is necessarily is; and not everything that is not necessarily is not. For to say that everything that is is of necessity, when it is, is not the same as saying unconditionally that it is of necessity. Similarly with what it is not.[15]

The distinction made by Aristotle in the above quotation seems to be one between something being conditionally necessary and something being unconditionally necessary. Aristotle is contrasting things that are necessary in a conditional way with those that are necessary without any such conditions satisfied. This condition is taken by Hintikka to be of a solely temporal nature that essentially comes down to a distinction between *statements* of the form "necessarily p (now)", and *statements* with added temporal qualifications of the form "necessarily p at t".

This reading seems to support Hintikka's claims that the whole O.I. 9 revolves around such a distinction between temporally definite and temporally indefinite statements. Hintikka proposes that Aristotle, as considering only the truth and falsity of a particular kind of statements as really counting for the issue of determinism or indeterminism, opts for a "simple-minded" move.

Hintikka's insistence that for Aristotle something is possible if and only if it is true at at least one point in time, i.e. that the Principle of Plentitude was used, led him to attribute to Aristotle an assumption concerning the relation between necessity and omni-temporal truth. Hintikka maintained that for Aristotle, omni-temporality equals unconditional necessity, since then it follows logically that something is possible if, and only if, it is not omni-temporally false, i.e. is at some point in time true. So in

---

[13] For the differences between Hintikka's, Aristotle's, and current views see Hintikka, "Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality", Chapter 4.

[14] See Hintikka, "Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality", pg. 152

[15] See Hintikka, "Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality", pg. 155

accordance with Hintikka's model, if "p at time t_0" is true once, then "p at time t_0" is true at any time and consequently if true at any time, then necessarily true. The deterministic consequences of this view seem inevitable since Von Wright pointedly argues that taking this misguided step would lead us to claim that, if it is true that there will be a sea battle at a particular day, then it was already true and necessary 10.000 years ago that there was going to be a sea battle that particular day[16].

In that respect, Hintikka argues that the problem Aristotle faces is not one concerned with the problematic application of $p \vee \neg p$ in the case of propositions about future encounters as other interpretations claim. Instead it is suggested that the real problem lies with the fact that propositions about individual future events, in the sense of being tied to a particular time and not to the time of utterance, have always been true, if true at all. According to this interpretation, Aristotle is merely restating the problem rather than trying to solve it, since all true statements about genuinely individual future events like "p at time t_0", remain necessary.

Hintikka's proposal is that Aristotle tries, but fails, to avoid deterministic conclusions by shifting the focus of our attention from statements of the form "p at time t", to statements of the form "p now". According to Hintikka,

> [Aristotle] does not worry…about the implication "if (possibly p at t_0), then (p at t_0)", because he either forgets or disparages the kinds of sentences that occur as its antecedent and consequent.[17]

It does not prove determinism simply because what really counts as showing what is possible at a moment is not what is true of this one moment of time, but whatever is encountered regularly at other moments of time, which Aristotle only discussed in terms of sentences of the form "p (now)". In order for Aristotle to equate possibility with sometime truth – a version of the Principle of Plenitude – he must be concerned not with statements like "*this* coat will wear out"[18], but with statements of the form "*a* coat will wear out". Hintikka suggests that Aristotle treats the statement that there can be a sea battle tomorrow, or that a particular coat can be cut up, as an elliptical statement about sea battles and coats in general, because only then will we have a statement which really says something about all the similar individual encounters at all different times. To put it simply, according to Hintikka, Aristotle's argument is that a sea battle will be fought one day or another and a coat somewhere, someplace, will be cut up before wearing down.[19]

Moreover, Hintikka's discussion of the ways in which Aristotle deals with propositions allows him to draw an analogy to the question whether Aristotle was troubled with $\Box p \vee \Box\neg p$ or $\Box(p \vee \neg p)$. Since for many "open" propositions p, i.e. those that do not portray encounters that never change, neither p nor not-p is always true, it follows that neither of them is consequently true necessarily, and so $\Box p \vee \Box\neg p$ turns out false. Conversely for every proposition p, $p \vee \neg p$ is always true, and

[16] However, it is of course true and in no way misleading to say that, if there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow, then a man who 10.000 years ago had predicted such a future event, would have *spoken* the truth. See von Wright, "Time, Truth and Necessity", pg. 241

[17] See Hintikka, "Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality", pg. 161

[18] See also Hintikka's analysis of Prior Analytics I 3.25a37-b19 in "Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality", pg. 35-38, where his problems with taking this example to be an elliptical statement about coats in general come vividly to the surface.

[19] See Hintikka, "Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality", pg. 172

therefore $\Box(p \vee \neg p)$ is also true. Therefore, in Hintikka's interpretation of Aristotle, what is in fact talked about in O.I. 9 and consequently denied is $\Box p \vee \Box \neg p$.

Hintikka's take on O.I. 9 relies most heavily on the assumption that Aristotle adopted the Princple of Plenitude. However, this is not a concrete a case as Hintikka would like for it to be. Indeed, Sorabji, following Lovejoy's account of possibility, firmly asserts that Aristotle accepted the principle only for a very restricted range of cases, while denying it for others. As he accurately puts it:

> Although the principle of plenitude has appealed to many people, its plausibility, once it is subjected to scrutiny, will tend to vary according to the kind of possibility one has in mind when he evaluates it. Sometimes when we call something possible, we mean merely that it is compatible with the laws of logic (logical possibility), or what we happen to know (epistemological possibility). It is not at all plausible that whatever is possible in these senses will at some time be actual.[20]

More specifically, Aristotle adheres to the principle when it comes strictly to what he considers to be everlasting things. He accepts it in connection with such things as the heavens, their motions and the resulting seasons, but not with regard to a sea-battle or the truth of propositions pertaining to such. In 19a9-18, Aristotle clearly distinguishes between a cloak, which is capable of being cut up, even if it never will be, and things that are forever active:

> Many things are obviously [things that are not always actual]. For example, it is possible for this cloak to be cut up, and yet it will not be cut up but wear out first. But equally, its not being cut up is also possible, for it would not be the case that it wore out first unless its not being cut up were possible. So it is the same with all other events that are spoken of in terms of this kind of possibility.

Sorabji, in analyzing all of Hintikka's textual references finds that, in all non-controversial cases, the idea that what is always true of something is necessarily true of it, is explicitly applied only to everlasting things.[21] When it comes to transient things, the only capacity that Aristotle recognizes as one that will definitely be eventually actualized is that of non-existence; that is, death in the case of living organisms and destruction in the case of inanimate objects.

In Hintikka's account, Aristotle is unable to remove the deterministic conclusions and instead makes a "simple minded" move by silencing out examples like "Socrates is (was, will be) sitting at such and such a time on such and such a day". This predicament does not worry Hintikka, who actually proclaims that such a failure "is no objection to [his] interpretation, although it may be an objection to Aristotle."[22] For Hintikka and his proponents, given Aristotle's habits of thought as *they* have found them to be, it comes as no surprise that Aristotle's account of possibility scarcely serves to clear up any questions as to what can or cannot happen at some particular moment of time.

However, as Van Rijen rightly points out:

[20] See Sorabji, "Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory", pg. 130

[21] See Sorabji, "Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory", Chapter 8

[22] See Hintikka, "Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality", pg. 161

> But if the only evidence for concluding that precisely this is the case with the philosopher under review consists of one's inability to give a coherent interpretation of that philosopher's doctrine, we should be reluctant [to say the least] to accept that conclusion.[23]

Hintikka, in his investigation of O.I. 9, makes an important remark that is of significance to our overall investigation that we will further address:

> Aristotle's solution shows that he is moving back and forth without any compunctions between a future *event* (or a pair of contradictory future *events*) and the *truth* or *falsity* of a statement about such an event…Thus any criticism that turns on the contrast between being and truth…is without a shadow of substance.[24]

Prone as he has been seen to be when it comes to "correcting" Aristotle's mistakes, it is surprising to find Hintikka failing to acknowledge the importance of this crucial observation. The question whether Aristotle was right to make this kind of move so freely, or if he did indeed make it, is something that should be dealt with in more detail. Seeing as how Hintikka's "solution" and various of his assumptions are not so readily accepted, it is quite possible that this should be our central problematic issue with O.I. 9. Provided we do not condone a free "moving back and forth" between the truth or falsity of a proposition portraying a future contingent and the factuality of the future contingent, a contrast between being and truth is quite in order.

In retrospect, Hintikka's "infinite past truth" view draws first of all attention to the fact that, given a "plentiful" environment, a commitment to definite truth values once "future truth" has been admitted for propositions of type "p at time t_0", entails the deterministic argument that there never was, never is, nor ever will be a truly contingent encounter. Furthermore, it is established that we can talk of a "temporal" necessity and that a distinction between *conditional necessity* (depending on the circumstances *and* the time when something is) and *unconditional necessity* can be effectively maintained.

So, Hintikka's fixation with the Principle of Plenitude coupled with an anxiety concerning possible violations of definitions, elucidates the deterministic position that Aristotle is describing and fervently tries to abolish, giving us a better understanding of the kind of argumentation we must seek to nullify.

Anscombe's approach: *Future Truth*

Contrary to Hintikka, Anscombe[25] does not belong to those commentators whose primary concern is to discover Aristotle's point by a "detailed" account of his technical terms and the difficulties that arise from his use of them. Anscombe's reading – as is evident from the way she expresses herself in her monograph – is an attempt to take matters further than a mere logical analysis would. It stands to reason that her approach, awkward as it may be, serves as an excellent point to further our investigation. Simply put, Anscombe decides to read O.I. 9 with an intention in mind.

Anscombe's monograph is comprised of three parts. In the first part Anscombe is

---

[23] See van Rijen, "Aristotle's Logic of Necessity", pg.11

[24] See Hintikka, "Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality", pg. 169

[25] See Anscombe, "Aristotle and the Sea-Battle"

thoroughly going through the whole of O.I. 9, and provides us with her own translation, making comments were she sees fit. The second part is presented in the form of an informal dialogue, a part she chooses to name "elucidation". This part of her presentation gives us to understand that Anscombe is mainly interested in utterances, things we can *meaningfully say* about future "facts". Her paper ends by an extremely short account of her position and by making a comparison between Aristotle and Wittgenstein on account of their similar views pertaining to a strong correspondence theory of truth.

In order to prepare the ground for this comparison, we are encouraged by Anscombe to view our theoretical attitude towards the whole set of circumstances – a prophecy together with its fulfillment – as *exactly the same* as our theoretical attitude to the supposition that we knew of someone's rising from the dead and so on. This suggestion is one made with a particular point in mind, namely to direct us into thinking in terms of utterances akin to articulations of religious beliefs, for which, as being pseudo-factual, Wittgenstein held that no truth-values attach to them.[26]

Moreover, Anscombe seems to have indulged in silencing one of Aristotle's crucial terms in giving her own twist to the chapter under consideration. More to the point, her "belief" is that the word "ἤδη" (already) has no temporal connotations in the crucial passage where it appears, and thus disparages the temporal nature of Aristotle's argument, in favor of a more ontological one.

According to Anscombe, when Aristotle in 18a28-29 turns our attention to what is singular and future, he is quick to state that these cases do not conform to the modal rule that governs the past and present facts.

> For what is and for what has come about, then, it is necessary that the affirmation, or negation, should be true or false.

An initial problem arises because, according to Anscombe, the modal operator "necessary" may be taken as qualifying each of the two disjuncts that have "true" or "false" as their respective terms, or as qualifying the whole subsequent phrase. That is, depending on the reading one adopts, the sentence means that the rule that governs past and present but not singular and future propositions is either:

1. $\Box p \vee \Box \neg p$,

or

2. $\Box(p \vee \neg p)$,

For Anscombe and the other commentators belonging to this school of thought, it is $\Box p \vee \Box \neg p$ that Aristotle ascribes to propositions portraying past and present facts, while he denies, or at least tries to modify, this principle for singular portrayals of future "facts", since these express propositions still indeterminate as to truth and falsity.[27] According to Anscombe's line of thought, Aristotle is taken as introducing a deliberate ambiguity, which, meticulously sustained throughout the whole of the remaining part of O.I. 9, is only unveiled in the very end. The previously quoted

[26] More will be said concerning this interesting suggestion in part IIc of this paper, which focuses precisely on Wittgenstein's account of religious beliefs.

[27] In contrast to Anscombe, Frede's position is that the necessity of future contingents is not derived from the false distribution of the necessity functor over the disjunction, but from the assumption of absolute truth-values.

passage should therefore be read as:

> For what is and for what has come about, then, the affirmation, or negation, should necessarily be true or necessarily false.

Anscombe claims that Aristotle is here modalizing the truth of the propositions that portray facts that now exist, or have existed in the past. This modal version of truth is denied for propositions portraying future contingents and so, Anscombe's reading hints towards a kind of factual necessity that Aristotle maintains for present and past facts, in direct opposition to what lies contingently in the future. The propositions pertaining to past and present facts are *necessarily* true, in a way that propositions about individual future "facts" are not. It thus comes out that whether we assign truth values to propositions or not, and if so how we do so, supposedly mirrors a difference in the ontological status of the "facts" portrayed by such propositions.

However, no matter how strongly one is willing to perceive an ambiguity at the beginning of the text, once a disjunction is no longer to be encountered, as is the case in the continuing paragraphs of O.I. 9, there can surely be no further question of an erroneous distribution of the necessity operator. Leaving aside further textual evidence pointing directly to the opposite reading[28], it suffices to note that *no* such "true/necessary true" distinction is found elsewhere in O.I. 9,[29] and that Aristotle in our second of his favored texts, the N.E., states that "one does not deliberate about what has happened but what lies in the future and is contingent; what has happened cannot be undone" implying not the necessity of the truth of past facts, but their irrevocability. One might say that, epistemically, the past is as "contingent", or "open to alternatives" as the future. And, ontologically, what has happened is necessary only in the sense that nothing that happens subsequently can make a difference to it. Something that has been done and so is a factual encounter at a particular time t, cannot later cease to be a factual encounter at the same time t. The specific quote from the N.E. does not emphasize the "necessity" of a proposition's past truth. Instead it is used to elucidate the fact that the truth of the occurrence of a contingent fact in the past is just that; an occurrence of a contingent fact. The difficulty here is about causation and that it appears to only run in one direction, from past to future. In that case, there is nothing that we can do to change the past, irrespective of determinism. The choices that we make may end up determining the future, but they can never have an influence on the past. The past is closed because causation only works *forwards*, and it is for that reason that the future is considered open.

Further following Aristotle's argumentation, Anscombe stresses that the point where Aristotle later bases his solution is 18b13-17 where it is alleged that:

> [I]f something is unable not to come about, then it is *impossible* for it *not* to come about. But if it is *impossible* for something *not* to come about it is *necessary* for it to come about. Therefore it is necessary that everything that is going to be should come about. So nothing will be "whichever happens" or by chance. For if by chance then not by necessity.

---

[28] The interested reader is directed to Frede, "The Sea Battle Reconsidered", pg. 47-49, and of course to the original Aristotelian textual fragments mentioned therein.

[29] It is interesting to note that Frede mentions a lecture given by her at the University of Pennsylvania in the spring of 1977, where Anscombe, as a member of the audience, agreed that the textual evidence were against the "true/necessary true" distinction. See Frede, "The Sea Battle Reconsidered", pg. 47

In this passage it is maintained that if something lacks the ability not to exist, then it is impossible for it not to exist. Thus the fact that it is impossible for something not to exist is precisely what makes that existence a necessity.

Reminding ourselves of our initial discussion[30] were we saw that the Greek term dynaton describing possibility in reference to necessity, is sometimes also used to describe contingency in reference to conditional necessity, we can give two different readings to the passage. If Aristotle is using the specific term to imply "potentiality", in the sense of a two-way possibility (contingency), then he is in fact presupposing a possibility of being that entails the possibility of not being. Therefore, according to the reading we choose to employ, we get two distinct claims:

1. If it never was the case, never is the case, and never will be the case for something not to exist, then obviously the deterministic conclusion of its unconditional necessary existence follows.

2. If what lies "hidden" in the quotation involves such cases as when something contingent does not now exercise it's ability not to be, it follows that either its existence is now (conditionally) necessary, or that its non existence is now (conditionally) impossible.[31]

This is the only "problematic" place in the ancient text where the reader encounters the multiplicity of terms mentioned earlier and so meticulously described by Hintikka. As it is plain to see, Aristotle is here using the multiple uses of dynaton as part of his argumentative strategy, something that might derail the thoughts of a superficial reader, but surely not those of a trained and unbiased commentator who is used to Aristotle's way of making a point. Once the misunderstanding is resolved and the term dynaton is understood as referring to an ability instead of a "necessary" possibility, we overcome the otherwise deterministic conclusions and come to anticipate Aristotle's solution centered around the difference between conditional necessity and unconditional necessity evidenced in his "solution" a few lines further (19a23-27).

We mentioned earlier a crucial flaw in Anscombe's overall treatment that needs attention. At the end of O.I. 9, where Aristotle provides his solution, Anscombe's translation of the relevant passage (19a35-40) omits from the Greek word "ἤδη" (already) any temporal connotations[32], concealing it in the phrase "*that does not mean*". Her translation of the related passage reads:

> This is how it is for what is not always existent or not always not-existent. For such things it is necessary that a side of the antiphasis should be true or false, but not this one or that one, but whichever happens; and that one should be true rather than the other; but *that does not mean* that it is true or false.

[30] See pg. 7

[31] As Sorabji points out, Hintikka's profoundly accurate account provides us with Aristotle's argument in De Caelo I 12, 281b3-25, that if something were at all times sitting, it would be incapable of standing, and that what always exists is incapable of perishing. This is presumably what Aristotle has in mind in O.I. 19a9, when he says that the dual possibility of being and of not being does not apply to what is forever active.

[32] Anscombe, thanking Miss M. Hartley of Somerville College, ascribes only logical and no temporal aspects in the use of the term and likens it's present use with the German "schon", or "noch nicht".

If her overall interpretation of O.I. 9, based as it is on the "true/necessary true" distinction was to work, we would still need instead of "but that does not mean that it is true or false" something like "but that does not mean that it is *necessarily* true or *necessarily* false" in the above quotation, which is something that Aristotle simply does not say. As is the case, the most obvious translation would replace Anscombe's rendering with something like "but not *already* true or false". Either way, Anscombe's rendering of O.I. 9 is based on this "true/necessary true" distinction for propositions, and with this in mind she translates 19a23 as:

> The existence of what is when it is, and the non-existence of what isn't when it isn't, is necessary.

and proceeds to comment:

> i.e. it cannot be otherwise. A modern gloss, which Aristotle could not object to, and without which it is not possible for a modern person to understand his argument, is: and cannot be shown to be otherwise. It will by now have become very clear to a reader that the implications of "necessary" in this passage are not what he is used to. But see the "elucidation".[33]

As mentioned earlier, the "elucidation" is that part of her paper that is given to us in a form of an informal dialogue. This mode of presentation enforces our conviction that Anscombe is concerned with the things that one can *meaningfully say* about the future. Anscombe is right in drawing out certain epistemic implications from this formulation. We cannot *show* the past and present facts to be otherwise than they are, and so their respective propositions have their truth definitely settled, i.e. they are necessarily true or necessarily false. Not only our utterances, but neither our behavior can affect the factual nature of the states of affairs portrayed by past and present tensed propositions. For Anscombe, the past and present facts cannot be otherwise than they are, and so we are able to talk about them meaningfully by making knowledge claims. Her point is that when we use future tensed propositions, what we refer to has a pseudo-factual nature. Since for that reason no definite truth-value can be ascribed to those propositions, it follows that we cannot make claims concerning knowledge of the future. We may claim knowledge of past or present facts due to their status as true (or false) facts portrayed by necessarily true (or necessarily false) propositions, but we cannot claim knowledge of future "facts" precisely because of their status as pseudo-facts. In that respect, propositions referring to them have no definite truth-values, which means that they are essentially propositions with no truth-values, and as such nonsensical.

Anscombe contends that the most that we can say about a future encounter comes down to uttering a tautology. That is, Anscombe accepts that an utterance of the form "p or not p" is necessarily true (trivially) even for future tensed propositions. However a claim of "knowing that p or not p" would still be senseless to make, and so the utterance of "p or not p" is, in Anscombe's account, better left unsaid.

Provided Anscombe's claims are understood correctly, in her interpretation of O.I. 9, she holds that contingency and future truth, are compatible. For Anscombe the truth is absolute, i.e., there is no conditional and unconditional distinction in *necessary*

[33] See Anscombe, "Aristotle and the Sea Battle", pg. 49

truth. That is, propositions about future contingents do not yet have definite truth-values, but once the pseudo-facts come to obtain as facts or not, as the case may be, they will. But then, the facts being established, their truth or falsity becomes at the same time a necessary truth or falsity. (In Anscombe's sense that then they could not be shown to be otherwise.) So, the lapse of time between prediction, i.e. a knowledge claim, and coming-to-be plays no role in the definition of that absolute truth.

For Anscombe, indeterminacy in truth and falsity is *no* truth or falsity. Propositions concerning knowledge of future situations do not have any definite truth-values, and as such they have none. By claiming that Aristotle accepted $\Box p \vee \Box \neg p$ for past and present facts, irrespective of our conscious knowledge, Anscombe wants to point out that those facts actually did (not) happen. The truth-value of those facts is absolute/necessary in that sense. However, by denying $\Box p \vee \Box \neg p$ for propositions that refer to future contingents, Anscombe wants to point out that nothing can be objectively said about how these encounters will actually go. It seems that her chosen "theoretical attitude" is not entertaining a form of determinate world, but a determined, as in absolute and necessary, form of truth.

This is not such an extreme proposal, if one realizes that an overzealous indeterminist that adheres to an absolute kind of truth might find himself only hypothesizing about the truth and falsity of propositions in the future while leaving the prospective encounter untouched. Anscombe's approach focuses solely on the ontological issue of future contingents. This possible reading is incomplete seeing as how temporal and existential issues are both present in Aristotle's account. Certain future contingent situations *do* admit to temporal, besides existential, conditions. It is in this respect after all that Hintikka's investigation on O.I. 9 shows some merits. Anscombe's account, focusing on the issue of knowledge of the future, disparages the issue of deliberate involvement in shaping the way the future might turn out. Aristotle's main worry with determinism is only marginally related with the issue of knowledge of the future. More to the point, his worry lies with the fact that a conception of a pre-determined world might lead us to conclude that intentional action and deliberation towards affecting the future is pointless. If our focus of attention is placed on the fact that we cannot in a definite way know how the future might turn out, then it could be the case that that would discourage any attempts at controlling our destiny as human beings through our actions and decisions.

Frede's approach: *Plain vs. Relative Semantic Truth*

Generally speaking, propositions can be viewed as "open" declarative sentences such as "it is raining", or "there is a sea battle", which do not express truth or falsity, without being coupled with an "absolute" location in time. The temporal reference required for the assignment of a truth-value for these "open" propositions is usually provided by the context of utterance, and it is this kind of propositions that Hintikka ascribes to Aristotle. Frede's investigation on the other hand, considers future tensed propositions that are ambiguous between an indefinite reading (one in which the tense acts as an existential quantifier) and a definite reading, where the definite reference is again usually provided by the context. Frede, in contemplating Hintikka's position, stresses the point that although it is tempting to regard future contingent propositions as indefinites of some kind, it must be kept in mind that the examples Aristotle uses by reference to "*this* coat" and "*the* Sea-battle" stand for rigid designators[34] and are to

[34] More specifically Frede shares our intuitions that Aristotle has, in this treatise, a particular Sea-Battle in mind, namely that of Salamis (480 BC).

be treated quite differently from indefinite statements which do not necessarily refer to the same subject or even to the same time.

According to Frede, in the opening lines of O.I. 9(18a28-33), what is asserted for all propositions p, barring the singular contingent propositions concerning the future, is that T(p) or F(p) holds for such propositions, i.e. the Principle of Bivalence. Frede continues to define the law that of two contradictory states one or the other must hold, as the Law of Excluded Middle. Using the capital letter P for a state of affairs that is portrayed by a proposition p, we then get two readings:

1. The Weak one: $T(p) \vee F(p) \rightarrow \Box(P \vee \neg P)$, and
2. The Strong one: $T(p) \vee F(p) \rightarrow \Box P \vee \Box\neg P$

Whether one takes the strong version or the weaker one, a relationship between the truth or falsity of propositions and the corresponding facts has been established from the first sentences of the chapter, and is indeed repeated in the closing lines. Since, according to Frede's approach, the Law of Excluded Middle applies only to those states of affairs for whose respective propositions the Principle of Bivalence holds, it follows that for future contingent states of affairs, neither the weak, nor the strong version seem to apply. It is in that respect that Frede proposes that Aristotle's solution is centered around a suspension of truth-values when it comes to assertions about the occurrence or not of events as yet undetermined.

Concerning past and present states of affairs, the existence of settled facts is established independent of our establishing of the truth and falsity of the propositions and so there is no complication encountered in our everyday mode of communication. Concerning future contingents however, the future "fact" in question is necessitated not in any absolute or causal sense, but relative to the assumption that the corresponding proposition is true. That is, relative to the assumption of a logical "law" between truth of a proposition and the related state of affairs such as $\Box(T(p) \rightarrow P)$, or $T(p) \rightarrow \Box P$. Frede adopts the term "*relative semantic necessity*" for the relationship between propositions and corresponding facts, this relation being that the definite truth values require definite facts and vice versa, while leaving the case of an indefinite kind of truth as something to be entertained.

In short, this relation is nothing more than a restriction on the assumption that *every* proposition is either true or false in a *definite* way. Although not explicitly stated in O.I., Aristotle's willingness to accept this form of restriction is found by Frede to be contained in its most straightforward terms in On Generation and Corruption Bk. II Chp.11. 337b4 – 338a10:

> We need only appeal to the distinction between the statements "something will be" and "something is about to be"... For if it be true to say of something that it '"will be" (ἔσται), it must at some time be true to say of it that "it is"(ἐστίν): whereas, though it be true to say now of something that "it is about to occur"(μέλλει), there is nothing to prevent it's not happening[35]; thus

[35] It must be noted that in Joachim's translation this sentence reads "*whereas, though it be true to say now of something that "it is going to occur", it is quite possible for it not to come-to-be"*, which of course is a completely altered version compared with the text, but nevertheless makes more sense. If we are to keep a strict translation, we must take here Aristotle to mean that there is nothing besides the agent to prevent something described as mellon from happening. That is, the context is such that every possibility is open, requiring the human agency for an outcome.

> a man might not walk, though he is now 'about to' do so. In general, since it is possible for some of the things which "are" also "not to be", it is clear that the same ambiguous character will attach to them no less when they are coming-to-be: in other words, their coming-to-be will not necessarily take place.

Here Aristotle refers to the absolutely necessary future event as "what will be" (τὸ ἔσται, henceforth heste)and distinguishes it from what is "about to happen" (τὸ μέλλον, henceforth mellon). What we have here is the acknowledgment of specific linguistic conventions that would enable us to distinguish among things that "*will* happen", and things that are "*going to* happen"[36].

Yet another passage where the same line of thought is exhibited, is Rhetorics 1392b33-1393a8, in which one of the advices given to any prospective orator is to treat future possibilities as if they were definite facts, so that a stead-fast and strong character is presented to the audience and an amplification of the focus of attention to the matter at hand that is of immediate relevance with the imminence of that future state of affairs is maintained:

> How questions of Future Fact should be argued is clear from the same considerations: That a thing is going to be done if there is both the ability and the wish to do it; or if along with the power to do it there is a craving for the result, or anger, or calculation, prompting it. For this reason also, if a man has an eager desire, or intention, of doing a thing, it probably is going to be done; since, as a rule, things that are going to happen are more likely to happen than those that are not. That a thing is going to happen if it's natural antecedent has already happened. For instance, if it is clouding over, it is [probably] going to rain. That if the means to an end have occurred, then the end is likely to occur; thus, if there is a foundation, there is going to be a house.

Given Aristotle's distinction between that which will lie in the future and that which is "going to happen", Frede asserts that the main concern we need to have while reading O.I. 9 is the relation between the status of an event and the way in which we choose to describe it. In other words, Frede claims that by assuming a fixed truth value for a proposition in the future indicative necessitates the assumption that the event is certain too.

To further her argument that what is at stake in the whole of the chapter is something more than a mistaken distribution of the necessity functor as Anscombe has previously claimed, Frede points out that the main reason for the worry about future contingency is the conceptual need to assign an ontological status to future events to which nothing corresponds in current actual terms. Since we do occasionally make use of the fact of a "semantic commitment" such as an oath, there is a "bind" between the "truth" of such a proposition and the existence of a future state of affairs. That is, in the case of present and past events we do not pay attention in our everyday life to the dependence of facts on truths, but presuppose the reverse dependence. However, in the case of a promise or an oath, the contingency is eliminated only when one treats them as if exemplifying concrete facts and adheres to specific linguistic and

[36] Not wanting to argue that Aristotle has here specifically defined linguistic rules in mind, where one term implies something and the other something else, we are able to see a resemblance between heste as "will be" and mellei as "is going to be". As is the case, the sentence "He is going to walk" can be at the moment of utterance (now) true, even though the agent might not actually do so. This is not the case with locutions using "will be".

behavioral rules. The ritualistic procedure one undergoes when taking an oath to "tell the truth and nothing but the truth, so help me God" is meant to represent a forceful implementation of a form of truth-value for future conduct unlike the typical one. The point made is that active involvement and participation in human affairs presupposes a fundamentally settled attitude towards things as yet contingent by their nature. In order for a promise, an oath, or a resolution to have a functional role in a community of people, it needs to be realized that their truth or falsity does not depend in the concrete realization of any actual state, or fact. It is rather the social circle's *attitude* of relying in the communal sense of individual responsibility that all members admit to that makes a social actor taken to be an agent able to keep a promise, or uphold an oath. Human agency within a civilized framework is dependent upon such a semantic commitment that licenses certain assertions and facilitates certain behavioral patterns.[37]

The full text where Aristotle provides his solution is 19a23-19a39, where three clearly recognizably different steps are taken:

Step 1. 19a23-27: What is, necessarily is when it is; and what is not necessarily is not, when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is, and not everything that is not, necessarily is not. For to say that everything that is, is of necessity, when it is, is not the same as saying unconditionally that it is of necessity. Similarly with what it is not.

According to Frede's view, the refutation of the determinist has ended in 19a18-22 where Aristotle stated that "…it is clear that not everything is or comes about of necessity...". The first part of the "solution" serves the purpose of clarifying what has to be modified and what has to remain intact. For it seems that a "kind" of necessity has been refuted, while at the same time, even contingent events are necessary, namely once they come to be.

The kind of temporal necessity encountered here simply is that at a point of time, given the context provided by the external circumstances of the world and the internal conditions of the agent, something is inevitable. That inevitability however might have nothing to do with the "thing in itself." That is, a thing of a contingent nature will retain its contingency throughout its existence, despite the fact that other factors have now made said existence a necessary affair.

Step 2. 19a27-32: And the same account holds for contradictories; everything necessarily is or is not, or will be or will not be; but one cannot divide and say that one or the other is necessary. I mean for example: it is necessary for there to be a sea battle tomorrow or not; but it is not necessary for a sea battle to take pace tomorrow, nor for one not to take place – though it is necessary for one to take place or not to take place.

The insistence that the same account holds for contradictories, shows us that we must not, Frede cautions, regard one of the members as absolutely necessary (and thus its opposite as an impossibility) when it is only conditionally necessary. Keeping in line with the same account in applying the differentiation indicated in the first part Frede does not deny that Aristotle warns us not to commit the mistake of distribution, but claims that though the antithesis is necessary, the distribution of the necessity is

[37] This particular point will be spelled out in more detail in the final part of this thesis.

wrong for future "beings" or "ὄντα" (our states of affairs), i.e. $\Box(P \vee \neg P)$, but not $\Box P \vee \Box\neg P$. However, the Law of Excluded Middle remains intact as a rational principle for future states. In each case one or the other has to become the case eventually, since *objectively* there is no such state of affairs as "a Sea-battle is taking place or a Sea-battle is not taking place", that can be described by a true or false affirmation. The Law of Excluded Middle is applicable in *principle* but not in *fact* as long as the outcome is open. Its formal validity for states of affairs is restricted to the time of the event in question.

Step 3. 19a32-39: So, since statements are true according to how the actual things are, it is clear that wherever these are such as to allow of contraries as chance has it, the same necessarily holds for the contradictories also. This happens with things that are not always so or not always not so. With these it is necessary for one or the other of the contradictories to be true or false – not, however, this one or that one but as chance has it; for one to be true rather than the other, yet not already true or false.

Frede's position is that Aristotle from as early as 18a34-b8 has used $T(p) \vee T(\neg p)$ for propositions and $\Box(P \vee \neg P)$ for the corresponding states of affairs or events. Consequently, she reads Aristotle as merely stating that the propositional validity of the former *implies* that one of the corresponding facts must obtain.

Obviously, such a case is harmless when we refer to the present and past since the facts are settled, but problematic when applied unrestrictedly to the future. Truth and fact are not simply to be regarded as equivalent and they cannot be substituted for each other, but they seem to somehow "necessitate" each other. This kind of necessity however is not causal or anything of that sort, that would make the events depicted by the proposition actual.

In 19a33 ("…statements are true according to how the actual things are"), Frede's understanding differs from Anscombe's, who claims that Aristotle has a strong correspondence in mind, namely that the truth itself is modified according to the factual nature of the state of affairs. According to Anscombe's view, lack of concrete factuality implies lack of *absolute* truth-value, which in turn implies lack of *any* truth-value. It seems that it is indeed more plausible to hold that a weaker correspondence is in effect, in the sense that if the facts are definite then the truth-values are also, and that if the "facts" are not definite then the truth-values are also. Frede's position in effect allows for an "indefinite" kind of truth-value for future contingents that is certainly not in accord with a conception of an absolute truth that is associated with concrete facts. That is, given the context and by assuming the correct linguistic locutions that allow us to make credible promises and plans, certain events that are contingent in nature, can be seen as having their "potential" existence settled from now. So, in Frede's account, propositions about future, and as such not currently factual, matters can come to have a particular "kind" of truth-value that allows human agents to act and relate with one another in a meaningful manner.

Commenting on the commentators

Turning to Hintikka's approach, we note that his evidence consists for the main part of short and scattered passages. His extensive and thorough investigation draws attention to interesting interconnections between a variety of term-instances, although admittedly the overall result does not satisfy with its explanatory insights. Hintikka's reading, if true, portrays Aristotle as in effect saying nothing new, and as leaving the

real problem concerning determinism untouched. Aristotle simply can't say anything, because his own formal theory subverts his attempts to do so. This is of course a possible reading that one is free to entertain. However, viewed from a different perspective, it could be that a piece-meal approach such as Hintikka's may systematically obscure some of the data needed to shed light onto the larger picture in which these same parts can be neatly fitted.

His interpretation takes three things for granted. Firstly, Aristotle is taken to adhere to a specific definition of possibility, in the form of the Principle of Plenitude, which inadvertently restricts his moves in combating determinism. Secondly, Aristotle is portrayed as systematically using, and indeed as being solely interested in, temporally indefinite sentences of the form "p now", a tendency Hintikka considers as dominating all philosophical enquiries in Greek antiquity. Thirdly, Aristotle's texts are considered by their nature to be flawed and incomplete, since they are not treated as finished works but as drafts and notes in need of refinement.

Hintikka seeks to rectify Aristotle's misgivings through a careful investigation into Aristotle's ways of using technical terms and phraseology as they are evident in a multiplicity of seemingly related texts of the corpus. Through this examination, a variety of real and significant problems become apparent, having to do mainly with Aristotle's insistence on using in his writings the ordinary and everyday expressions having to do with potentiality, ability, necessity, possibility and contingency. Whether one can locate these misgivings into each and every one of the Aristotelian texts, or if they are indeed misgivings when they do present themselves in particular contexts, is an altogether different matter. Hintikka chooses to take it for granted that ambiguities in the meaning of technical terms are indicative of mistakes in their use on Aristotle's part. Moreover, acknowledging Aristotle's liberties with his terms and their respective definitions, Hintikka allows for himself the same kind of liberties he finds so discomforting in Aristotle's ways, when these liberties in definitions suit his purposes.

When it comes to the reading of O.I. 9, Hintikka's portrayal of Aristotle's problems is then seemingly straightforward and simple. When sentences other than solely the one's Aristotle is used to work with are entertained, a clash between a "deterministic" definition of possibility with Aristotle's conception of an indeterminate future is inevitable. In other words, assuming that Aristotle adheres to the specific Principle of Plenitude, the deterministic conclusions are for Aristotle inevitable when examining temporally qualified sentences, which his theory is unable (or unwilling) to acknowledge. Confronted with the undesired fact that such sentences, if seen under the perspective of a modal theory equating necessity with omnitemporality, are already true if true at all, Aristotle is forced to make a "simple-minded" move. Unable to resolve the tension between his intuitions concerning an indeterminate future and the deterministic outcomes of his "plentiful" modal theory when it comes to sentences of the form "p at time t", Aristotle is quick to abolish such sentences from his field of interest.

However, these bold assumptions could indeed be true, provided all of Hintikka's presuppositions were also in turn undoubtedly true. Starting from the Principle of Plenitude we see that Hintikka's technical approach in trying to establish rigid definitions of possibility and contingency of a particular nature, simply are not in accordance with Aristotle's examples and uses. Instead of viewing Aristotle's unmistakable liberties with his terms as a method of Aristotle's argumentation, Hintikka sees problems that restrict the tenability of Aristotle's philosophical worries. It is a fact that Aristotle does not adhere to an all-pervading formal system that requires a uniform application of technical terms in all of his philosophical treatises.

Undoubtedly this causes significant problems for those who choose to view the particular piece of text that is O.I. 9 as only a piece of unfinished text, part of a purely logical treatise. By not taking into account Aristotle's true worries with determinism, and by focusing solely on problems that arise from his technical use of terminology, Hintikka misses the point. For Hintikka, technical problems overshadow the real efforts Aristotle makes towards saying something meaningful concerning the troublesome status that exists between an indeterminate world and deliberate human agency. Instead of using rigid definitions and restrictive models to force a specific interpretation on Aristotle's philosophy, a better suggestion is rather that we should opt to view Aristotle's philosophical positions as indicative of expressing concerns that his logical approach has led him to entertain. Rather than locating mistakes in his philosophical worries with reference to his technical tools, i.e. to the words he uses to voice certain concerns, we should focus our attention, at least primarily, on these concerns.

The use of technical terms in Aristotle's writings is as problematic as Hintikka finds them to be. His overall work on Aristotle has many merits and can shed light on many difficult passages. A reconstruction of Aristotle's doctrines, if that is the goal one has, does require such a rigorous and demanding investigation. However, it is not enough. Rather, the particular chapter should not be seen as indicative of mistakes concerning these doctrines, but instead as an important cornerstone to understanding said doctrines. We have more to gain by taking the problem discussed in the chapter as a real one, instead of insisting to use the whole of the chapter as a mere example that either satisfies or not our preconceived models. As it stands, it is even more unproductive to denounce the author and his intentions upon realizing that this "example" does not fit our preconceptions and modeling.

In this respect both Anscombe and Frede seem to share our point of view. By both, Aristotle is seen as vigorously trying to make a philosophical point using logical means to do so. Ambiguities in expressions have a particular role to play in the argumentative structure and are there for a reason; to lull the reader into certain "dead ends" from which he will escape when keeping in mind the multiplicity of use of certain terms. Aristotle's choice of words is not inherently problematic, but his choice of their function in his overall strategy is tricky and demanding. Central to both their interpretations is Aristotle's attitude towards a strong correspondence theory of truth, with Anscombe advocating Aristotle's strict conformity to the theory and Frede suggesting Aristotle's willingness towards a partial revision of the theory.

Anscombe, and very rightly so, focuses her attention on the kind of "theoretical attitude" that is exhibited by the author. In this respect we are in full agreement with her tendencies to "read" something more than what is explicitly mentioned in the text, and dutifully share her readiness to look for connections where there are seemingly none to be found. Furthermore, Anscombe's paper is unique in a profound way that makes her approach quite important. She does not mention any of Aristotle's other writings and instead bases her reading on her own intuitions and ideas. Admittedly such a "brave" attempt is found lacking textual support, but Anscombe's peculiar way has made her position one of the most influential one's when it comes to the particular chapter.

Anscombe's reading in effect promotes a contrast between the early Wittgenstein's theory of truth and an Aristotelian strong correspondence theory. The end of her paper finds her proclaiming their compatibility. To put matters into perspective, we mention briefly that the correspondence theory of truth is nothing more than a common sense theory which holds that a statement is true if what it

asserts corresponds to the way things actually are, and false if that is not how things are. More precisely a sentence is true if and only if it depicts a state of affairs that obtains. The relation of correspondence is between a meaningful sentence and its sense, i.e. a possible state of affairs, but the truth of the sentence is does not reside in that relation, but in the actual obtaining of the state. The relation is what gives meaning to the sentence, while the obtaining of the state of affairs is what makes it true. According to Wittgenstein, this is the theory that applies in the case of the kind of statement whose truth or falsity is established by observation, and it is such a correspondence theory of truth that you inevitably adopt if you subscribe, as Wittgenstein did, to a picture theory of the meaning of sentences.

When the matter comes to future contingents, Anscombe suggests that we take the utterance concerning something as yet not actually obtaining as exemplifying the same "theoretical attitude" someone has when proclaiming he knows of somebody's rising from the dead, i.e., when we have an articulation of a religious belief.[38] By claiming this, Anscombe has a very particular point in mind, namely the fact that according to Wittgenstein's account such an utterance lacks a truth-value. Anscombe is proposing to treat sentences concerning future events as devoid of truth and falsity, since the respective states of affairs are as yet nonexistent.[39] It seems that Anscombe is in a way advising us to keep silent when it comes to things that we cannot – in any *definite* way – talk about, such as single future contingencies.

Her insistence to disregard the temporal aspects in the passage we have previously quoted is intentional. Anscombe's rendition of the passage is such as to portray an Aristotle wishing to support a strong correspondence theory of truth. "*... one should be true rather than the other; but that does not mean that it is true or false"*. In her version we get the impression that Aristotle is denying truth and falsity both for states of affairs and predictions about them in a declaration of adherence with the strong correspondence theory of truth. However, when we contrast Anscombe's translation with the more prevalent one, we get a different feeling about what Aristotle is in fact saying. "*...one should be true rather than the other; but not already true or false"*. In this version we see a reluctance to attribute truth or falsity to an utterance, despite the fact that it seems that between two contradictory statements one is in a way "truer" than the other. This is what we would expect of someone who tries to remain true to a strong correspondence theory of truth, while entertaining alternatives. Aristotle's problem in that passage is that despite the fact that a state of affairs does not now obtain, i.e., the fact of it's obtaining is not a true fact, nevertheless an utterance depicting its upcoming existence is *in a way* true, although not true in the way that a strong correspondence theory requires. The question therefore is in what way this utterance could be true, without implying the necessity of the future state of affairs that would in turn imply a deterministic world. In other words, an utterance describing a future event should be true beforehand in a way that would somehow influence the world and the agents therein, *as if* the occurrence of the state of affairs was a pre-established fact. One might say that Aristotle could be entertaining a sort of truth for an utterance about a future state of affairs that would express a necessitation in the attitude of the agents and manifest itself in their

[38] Wittgenstein's views on religious beliefs are presented in part IIb. On a different note, one is further advised while examining Anscombe's writings to view "necessary truth", when encountered in her paper, as akin to Wittgenstein's "certainty" and to substitute "plain contingent truth" with "true knowledge/belief".

[39] Although such attitude is indeed read by some in the Tractatus, it seems that – after all is said and done – the later Wittgenstein might have something further to add.

subsequent actions, although admittedly not as yet expressed in an actually obtaining state of affairs.

This is in effect Frede's reading of Aristotle's text. She acknowledges that Aristotle refers to a particular Sea-battle as an example that serves to direct his discussion and the focus of his audience to a particular event as a reference to virtuous conduct and effective agency in a dire situation. Of significance is her reference to the Rhetoric where it is explicated how the description one chooses to give to a future event affects one's audience and resulting actions. Seen not as a purely logical treatise, but as an ethical statement born out of logical remarks, O.I. 9 is what underlies Frede's interpretation of the Aristotelian standpoint. Supported by the necessary textual evidence, her version manages to bring forth arguments that discredit opposing views, or at least put them into serious question, and to portray an Aristotle fervently trying to make a valid, although not strictly logical, point.

It is a fact that the question as to which principle is under consideration in O.I. 9 is not clear. That Aristotle rejected $\Box P \vee \Box \neg P$ for states of affairs is agreed upon by all three commentators that we have looked at. Whether this was also Aristotle's only problem is not in any definite way answered by our limited investigation. What counts as strong evidence for one line of interpretation contradicts the evidence for the others, and what supports the latter speaks against the former.

It is for that reason that we need to take a closer look at the consequences that worry Aristotle, if the world was taken to be of an absolutely deterministic nature. If Frede's way of looking at Aristotle in the particular chapter has more explanatory power than the other two, it is because her interpretation complies with Aristotle's own presuppositions concerning possible human agency and action.

Taking care of the consequences

If it would have been *always* true in the past to affirm that something that now is the case would have come to be the case, then all future events would come about of necessity and chance events would never occur. This is something Aristotle repeats after every refutation of the deterministic arguments in O.I. 9, since it is within the sphere of "what is capable of being otherwise" that chance appears, and not within a world where everything is preordained.

In 18b32-37 we are told that, if determinism were true, the very natural tendencies of man to deliberate, plan and make assertions about future states of affairs, would make no difference to the world:

> [If everything is or comes about of necessity] there would be no need to deliberate and take trouble, e.g. "if we do this, this will happen, if not, not"… [a]nd indeed it would make no difference if people said the opposite things or not; for clearly this is how things are, even if there isn't one man saying something and another denying it.

In other words, if everything that happened, happened necessarily, deliberation would be pointless. This is extremely problematic for Aristotle, since, as acknowledged in the lines preceding his "solution" in 19a7-23, certain future events have their origin in deliberation and in action, thus forming a "causal" chain having as the final link the chosen future event:

> Now, [saying that it was always true of what comes about that it would come

> to be] is impossible. For we know by experience[40] that some of the things that are going to happen take their start from a particular decision and from a particular praxis, and that in general in things that are not always actual there exists the possibility of being or not being. In them, both are open, both being and not being, and also becoming and not becoming…So it is obvious that not everything is or comes about out of necessity, but that some things are chance events – and for them the affirmation or the negation are not in the least one truer than the other – while for other things one is closer to being true, or is true in most similar cases, but still it is open for either of them to happen, and the other not.

According to Aristotle, the human world is enmeshed with general rules and regularities and as such, besides involving things that abide to necessary law, it also involves exceptions and breaches of uniformity. Such things are chance events that most of the times are beyond rational thought and contemplation. If a future realm with states of affairs undetermined as to their actual being or not is to be endorsed, we need to first recognize the possible occurrence of future events that are as yet matters of chance, making it impossible for us to give definite predictions about their occurrence[41]. Besides those completely accidental occurrences we, as experience teaches us, need to additionally allow that although observation of particular contexts resulting in particular future states makes some occurrences more probable, still chance may interfere in the causal process and alter the anticipated outcome.

These are precisely the aspects of the world that human action takes advantage or care of in order to impose a certain (intended) outcome on things, namely one that is most preferable to man. In the N.E. Aristotle goes to great lengths to describe how a correct account of deliberation can help steer the course of events through well thought-out actions. By our deliberate wanting and acting we are able to "force" one of two opposite state of affairs to come to be, making that particular chosen state of affairs not a matter of chance any more, but a necessary accomplishment relative to the total situation including the action that is willingly undertaken. Deliberation starts from an assumed end – in this case a future state of affairs – and terminates with something that we can do here and now. That means that the last step of our deliberation is, or becomes, the first step in realizing our end. Moreover, the steps presupposed in the attainment of the end are also conditions that are constituent parts of the end. The "chosen" state of affairs that one has endorsed is partly fulfilled in the fulfillment of each of the steps, i.e. the means.

It is easily seen that Aristotle's reluctance to attribute an absolute truth value to an assertion about the occurrence of a future event that an agent "eagerly desires", is rooted in the fact that an accident, a matter of chance, might occur in the realization of one of the intermediate steps, leaving the occurrence of the intended future event unrealized. That is, even if after deliberation and meticulous planning one willingly undertakes the task of bringing about a particular future state of affairs, chance events might still occur that may prevent that realization. Whether the non-occurrence of the professed future event due to unforeseen circumstances affects the "kind" of truth we have ascribed to the earlier proclamation, is a matter that relates to the kind of responsibility we ascribe to the agent.

If any necessity is to be found in the obtaining of a specific type of a future event,

[40] Literally translated as "we see".

[41] For example it is impossible to speak today of "tomorrow's traffic accident", having a particular traffic accident in mind. In these cases we talk about accidents of "this or that kind" that might be prevented.

it is relative to the actions performed intended to bring it about, including the characteristics of the agent performing them. The particular decision and the particular praxis that Aristotle mentions in the N.E. express the freedom of choice and the unhindered freedom to act that is characteristic of such an agent. These are not to be considered as being caused by any external necessity found in a deterministic world, but as themselves being non-accidental causes of future events. It is important for Aristotle that the agency required to bring about this or that state of affairs to be something of a non-accidental nature, rooted in something ingrained in the particular actor. Hence Aristotle has to inquire under what conditions we treat man as a responsible agent, and as such being liable to praise or blame for his actions and decisions. The answer is straightforward, although admittedly not illuminating. We are treated as responsible agents so far as, in acting, we deliberately and without hindrance carry out what we wish, in our attempts to impose our will to the world.

Key to a proper understanding of Aristotle's theory of future contingency is "action" and the freedom and sense of responsibility that that requires. For that reason, in the following chapter we will investigate Aristotle's account of the way in which human beings are able to perform such actions in the social sphere. Aristotle, taking for granted that all such actions are directed towards the fulfillment of the general goal of living well within the confines of a structured society, provides us with those human treats that will enable us to give an explanation as to the way we come to act as members of a community. His account thus centers in an attempt to describe the causes that lead human beings to act, rather than focusing on providing a description of human actions in general. By assuming a goal towards which human action is directed, Aristotle is restricting the chance factor to those aspects of human affairs that deal with a person's place in a human society. His ethical views, based as they are on a conception of human life as a social life within a civil picture, will help us define those determining characteristics of a community member that allow social interaction and willful involvement in communal affairs.

By doing so, we will establish Aristotle's way of describing human agency through the use of certain technical terms that will provide us with a better understanding of those things that Aristotle wishes to safeguard by denouncing determinism. In that way, we will come to see in what way Aristotle's concerns about those purely chance events that are indicative of the indeterminate nature of the natural world can be harnessed by reference to specific aspects of the realm of human agency. More specifically, to further our investigation, we must now attempt to locate those elements that serve to enhance Aristotle's account of the four causes in such a way as to satisfy our need of "psychological" factors such as beliefs, desires, and intentions that are required for a successful description of human intentional agency.

Ic. Moral agency in the N.E.

As we observed in the previous, Aristotle's theory of the four causes cannot be so readily applied when describing cases that have to do with human intentional agency. We need a description of a given situation that presupposes a general account of the character of an individual in order to talk about the motives for an agent's actions and to be able to evaluate them under the given conditions of the particular situation. The needs, wishes, desires and beliefs of an individual have an intrinsic part to play in that agent's deliberation and plan making. They are essentially the causes that lead the agent to take effective action to determine an as yet undetermined outcome of a given situation, and as such are things that we need to somehow implement in our investigation concerning Aristotle's account of the Sea-battle in O.I. 9. More specifically we need to address these issues from a moral perspective, since Aristotle's conception of the human world is mostly concerned with the moral/ethical dimension of deliberate human action.

According to Aristotle, human beings, as all living animals, strive for pleasure in life. However, man truly reaches his excellence, the purpose of all his actions, only through a virtuous everyday practice. Seeing as man is not a solitary animal but part of a community, an organic part of a social unit, his true "fulfillment" can only be reached only within and through the community he is part of. Beyond being merely a theoretical concept, this social attitude is instantiated in a physical communal dwelling place, the polis, where civilized human beings appear and recognize each other as achieving or failing to achieve excellence. That is, the dwelling place in which a community truly lives together, extending beyond a shared physical location, forms a particular environment where human beings find their expression and function as such. Acting within that civilized framework requires the actors to be involved in the common affairs and to accept the responsibility that such involved action demands.

Any course of action, in the performance of which these conditions are satisfied, is a process initiated in the social actor and so is in effect the efficient cause of any action done deliberately as a means to the commonly desired goal. Aristotle notes in N.E. 1110a18 that

> if the origin [of the praxis] lies within the agent, it is in his responsibility to either perform it or not.

As long as in deliberation and action we execute a purpose, we are treated as responsible agents praised and blamed for what we say, rewarded and punished for the things we do. We are held responsible for the things we claim and for the drives that we endorse. Since such actions, and only those, are "good" or "bad", where "goodness" or "badness" denote "manifestations of moral character", it follows that we are efficient causes of good and bad actions. As is evident in everyday life,

> [i]t is sometimes difficult to choose among two things the one we should prefer and to which of two bad outcomes to conform with. But it is even harder to remain firm to that which we recognize as duty. (N.E. 1110b32-35)

The duty of the individual is none other than to live his life as best he can, and it is a duty towards both his fellow community members and his own self. Aristotle's term for this typically human duty of "being well" is "εὐδαιμονία" (Henceforth

eudaimonia), and it is this duty conceived as an attitude that permeates all of the agents choices and decisions. Consequently, eudaimonia is not a describable state of affairs that one can direct his efforts towards, but an attitude towards life, its demands, and rewards[42].

A life in accordance with eudaimonia is related with our desires, wishes and beliefs that, in Aristotle's conception, work as the driving forces that cause us to react to the stimulus of his social environment. His suggestion in N.E. is to commit ourselves to the harnessing of those forces, both irrational and rational in kind, so that particular self-determined dispositions to become established in our character. In that respect, Aristotle claims that human beings have a particular rational faculty in their disposal, whose sole purpose of function is precisely the taking care of contingent situations. It is his firm belief that through habituation and practice that this part attains its excellence. Aristotle defines this excellence as Φρόνεσις (Henceforth: Phronesis) translated somewhat liberally as "practical wisdom", and it is this excellence that all human beings can manifest in their actions.

Phronesis (Practical Wisdom)

At the end of Book 1 of the N.E. Aristotle distinguishes the good states of the soul as:

(i) Virtues of the impulsive, orectic, or irrational faculty (generosity, temperance) which is the seat of the emotions – anger, fear, hate – or in more general terms desire, and

(ii) Virtues of the rational faculty (theoretical wisdom, intelligence, practical wisdom), further subdivided according to a difference in the objects of examination. Thus we identify:

(iia) the part of the rational faculty wherein dwell facts dependent on first, unchanging and necessary principles, i.e. the scientific part, and

(iib) the part wherein dwell facts of contingency (1139a9), i.e. the calculative part

Rational virtues are formed through schooling that requires time and experience from the individual. The moral virtues typical of the irrational part of the soul are formed through habit, and to that effect, Aristotle draws attention to the fact that the Greek word meaning morality, "ἦθος", is not all that different from the Greek word meaning habit, "ἔθος".[43] There is a distinction between the actions that produce a disposition, and the actions that the disposition produces. In order to develop, for example, the moral state of bravery, we must practice the doing of brave things; but the brave acts which we thus do are not brave in the same full sense as those which we do when our habit is formed in virtue of the bravery which has been by now instilled in us as part of our established character.

[42] In that respect, Aristotle recognizes certain parameters that lie "outside" the agent that affect eudaimonia and are related with the chance factor. The parameters that make one have the attitude that makes certain actions easier to execute include having friends, money and political power. (N.E. 1099a34-1099b2)

[43] Kirkland, in his paper "The temporality of phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics", reminds us that its first meaning is a "familiar location, a haunt, or a dwelling place where one has become accustomed to living". He also mentions that the same connection is found in Latin with "habitus" and "habitare", from which English derives its "habit" and "habitat", and that the same holds for the German "Gewohnheit" and "wohnen".

Concerning connections that hold for a time, or for the most part and not indifferently for all time or without exception and that correspond to a variable and indeterminate nature, human science fails to provide absolute truth or demonstrative certainty. For contingent matters, the truth attained from the rational part of the "thinking soul", is a truth attained only through moral and ethical excellence, that is, only with the subservience of an excellent irrational faculty. Aristotle elucidates this point by proclaiming that: "the produce of every acting practical intelligence is that "kind" of truth that corresponds with correct appetite." (1139a34) According to this statement, the appetite that is located in the irrational part of the soul, ideally working in accord with intelligence, an intellectual capacity located in the rational part of the soul, provides a "kind" of truth concerning matters of a contingent nature. Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia,[44] forces upon him a bold assumption: mainly that the irrational appetitive element in man's soul can be controlled and its potentially useful drives harnessed. The good man must avoid excessive and defective feeling and reaction to feeling. His conduct must embody both the right feeling and the right amount of that feeling. Fear, hate and anger are, as we stated earlier, part of his emotions, and as such are part of his repertoire. Fear, for example, in excess leads to cowardice, in defect to recklessness. Aristotle is thus seeking to find the correct "formula" which expresses that right control. For that purpose, he promotes phronesis, usually translated as "practical wisdom", as the excellent rational faculty of the calculative part of the rational soul that works in controlled cooperation with the irrational soul. Thus he assumes an ideal agent – his Phronimos – whose distinct character traits exemplify the concord between reason and desire in his actions.

Phronesis is bound to ethical virtue and cannot exist without it (1144b20-21, 1144b30-32. In 1097a24 Aristotle specifically says that phronesis is the intellectual capacity that is responsible for making judgments concerning what he calls the "good deed", juxtaposing his ideal agent with the truly villainous. Good deliberation, seen purely as a rational excellence, might lead to effectively deciding upon the means by which to achieve a despicable aim (1142b18-22) and so *the true villain* and *the practically wise*, in that respect, share the *same rational capacities*, with the discerning mark being the aim of their respective irrational faculties.

Phronesis, as the excellence of the calculative part, derives its enabling power in ethical action by non-epistemic resources and not by a scientific grasp of necessary and a-temporal ethical truths. Ethical judgment insofar as it employs phronesis, cannot be expected to ground itself a priori or absolutely by way of reason, for its particular power is derived in part from a pre-reflectively acquired, habituated disposition, which, moreover, concerns the non-rational part of the soul.

Here is where Aristotle is in need of a normative notion that would come into play for inducing an equilibrium between the rational and the irrational part of the soul, thus making this peculiar "kind" of truth accessible. It is after all a fundamental position of Aristotelian ethics that each part of the soul needs the assistance of the other in order to achieve its own maximum potential. On the one hand desire cannot be properly disciplined unless there is a goal provided by the rational part of the soul at which to aim, and on the other hand, as the irrational soul becomes gradually more disciplined, it enables the other part to arrive at a more correct account of the mean.

[44] Etymologically, it consists of the word "εὖ" meaning "good" and "δαῖμον" which means "spirit" or "minor deity", used by extension to mean one's fortune.

Prohairesis (Commitment)

In virtually every area of Aristotle's ethical thought the concept of προαίρεσις (Henceforth prohairesis) features prominently. Each of his ethical treatises contains one chapter devoted specifically to the subject of prohairesis, making it a vital part of Aristotelian ethics. It is for that reason unfortunate that a fundamental lack of clarity about the concept that is signified by the word continues to exist.

Most commentators are satisfied to translate prohairesis in certain cases as "choice", in others as "will", "intention", "purpose" or even "decision", all the while refraining from addressing the issue as to how these diverse concepts are related in Aristotle's mind under one heading. Kenny[45] has devised "purposive choice" in keeping with his position that no natural English concept corresponds to Aristotle's. Charles[46] has adopted a variety of descriptions ranging from "preferential choice" to "desire", while Anscombe[47] declares prohairesis as "a very peculiar" and "spurious" concept, one that she describes as a kind of "rational wanting".

Seeing as how Aristotle extensively uses in his writings prohairesis, thus undoubtedly marking it as one of his most proffered terms, it is dubious to claim that Aristotle was lacking in other technical terms and so was using the same word with no particular role for it in mind. Either way, it is suggested that this "wanting" can be better explained in terms of what is wanted qua conducive to or part of "doing well", or "blessedness". Prohairesis is better understood if addressed as conducive of eudaimonia.

It is not surprising to note that children and animals cannot be said to hold a prohairesis (N.E. 1111b8-9). That is, although a child can be said to act voluntarily and choose a course of action, it cannot be said that, for example, by choosing to eat vegetables instead of meat the child is expressing a commitment or a purposive decision to become a vegetarian. Aristotle gives a reason for his claiming so in Politics 7.15.1334b17-28, where he identifies the lack of training in the exercise of the child's intellect as the cause that prevents the forming of a prohairesis. Time, experience and effort are required from the child for its actions to be identified as the result of a prohairesis while on its way of becoming an active participant in a structured society. Animals on the other hand, being irrational creatures by definition, lack rationality altogether, a quality vital in Aristotle's description of prohairesis.

This concept is attributed only to full-fledged members of a community and demands social immersion from the individual exemplifying it. In the light of the common good toward which our communal space is ordered, man can be called a "political animal" inasmuch as man can be called a "rational animal". For there is no doubt that, ideally, social norms exist to facilitate the transition to excellence for the constituent parts of the whole, i.e. the individuals making up the polis, since the goals of the community that is the polis, envelop and reflect the goals of the individual. In that respect, members in a community need to have sufficient experience in social life to desire, and be able, to control their conduct by rule. The man of the polis has to distinguish the various types of action and the various types of moral property, establish the right connections between them, and proceed to exemplify those through his conduct. As an individual of equal standing within a community of social actors, the man of the polis, having established a stable and firm character, is able to control his reactions in such a way as to afford the respect and attention of his fellow

[45] See Kenny, "Aristotle's Theory of the Will"

[46] See Charles, "Aristotle's Philosophy of Action"

[47] See Anscombe, "Thought and action in Aristotle: What is "Practical Truth?"

community members. Thus, his actions are not erratic reactions to passing feelings and base desires. Quite the contrary, the habitual performance of certain characteristic acts of civility has come to mold and shape a personality in accord with the sense of commitment that any willful participation and involvement in common practices demands.

In a "grand" prohairesis, both parts of the soul, i.e. the part containing logos and the part containing the passions, are in full accord. As Aristotle puts it in 1139a22:

> Since ethical virtue is a state involving prohairesis, and since prohairesis is desire involving deliberation, it is therefore necessary that the reasoning be true and the desire correct, if in fact the prohairesis is to be grand. That is, the logos affirms and desire pursues, the same things.

In 1139a31-33 Aristotle states that prohairesis is the principle of praxis – the efficient but not the final cause[48] – while the cause of prohairesis is desire and reasoning about an end." The "source" of prohairesis is of dual nature; it is desire located in the irrational part, and reasoning about an end located in the rational part of the soul. As it is, both parts work as the grounds upon which the principle of praxis/action is formed. "Hence prohairesis exists neither apart from nous and intelligence nor apart from an ethical state. Therefore prohairesis is either nous combined with desire, or desire combined with intelligence."(1139a33-1139b5)

It is thus maintained that nous and intelligence from the rational part, and an ethical state from the irrational part, when in equilibrium, result in a grand prohairesis, a characteristic of the ideal acting agent. For that reason, in order for Aristotle to consider a man as acting correctly in accordance with reason and morality, three conditions need to be fulfilled (1105a33-37):

- **a.** The agent needs to have overall knowledge of the situation
- **b.** The agent needs to act under a prohairesis, and his actions need to exemplify that prohairesis
- **c.** The agent needs to perform his actions based on firm character exemplifying strong will.

Ideally then, our agent has the highest form of (proper) knowledge while acting - that of an eyewitness - he holds fast to a prohairesis with that prohairesis exemplified in his choice of actions, and he is of a stable and consistent character[49]. We cannot infer from the quality of the act the character of the agent, as we infer the quality of a shoemaker from the goodness of his shoes. An agent is not considered just unless his actions, besides being such as a just man would do, are actually done by him in the way in which the just man would do them. A settled purpose, whose formation has presupposed a long training in acting correctly, is a characteristic of the kind of knowledge a man has, when he knows what the right ideals are, and how to secure them. As far as man is a creature whose nature is not simple but compound, according to his developed and later on established character, he is free as long as he is self-determined.

The character of man consists of potentialities of alternative and contrary realizations. Such potentialities for the contrary must issue at *this* or *that* contrary

[48] In 1101a25 Aristotle defines eudaimonia as internal perfection being the final cause of praxis.

[49] On Aristotle's view, a character exists only when there is a habitual performance of the typical acts of that character.

action, but whether in *this* or in *that* is not causally determined beforehand. A further factor must supervene to transform a potentiality into actuality, that further factor being a prohairesis. Even when the potentiality has been formed into an actuality, there is a sense in which the other alternative is present and developed. When the προαίρεσις is weak, these contrary potentialities might become realized in different but similar situations. Hence a doctor might use his acquired skill with medicine to poison if the lesser goal of making money overrides his commitment to heal.

In the ideal agent, the ideal citizen of a polis, the prohairesis is amendable to social laws. We do not have to wait until the action of such a man is through in order to learn what his prohairesis was for. If we abstract in our thought from the agent's prohairesis, there remains only a part of the conditions from which an event will ultimately issue, whereas if we take a full view of the nature of the agent as an agent including his prohairesis, the event appears necessary, certain and determinate. Within the social environment of the polis we can reason about, and hence to some extent predict, the actions that prohairesis gives rise to, as these individual actions will inevitably reflect the concept of well-being according to an established, and socially immersed character.

Prohairesis is determined by deliberation focused on how to obtain an object of one's will rather than merely of one's desire. It is a deliberation with a view to one's ends, that is, things like being honored, the life of virtue, material prosperity, or even sensual pleasure. The fact that we deliberate[50] and plan implies that how things will generally develop cannot be predicted with absolute certainty in the sphere of the contingent since there is freedom from control by necessary law. The event of a sea-battle taking place tomorrow, is not merely uncertain for limited knowledge, but uncertain even for infinite knowledge. The event depends upon what certain human agents – the generals – decide as prohaireton (choice-worthy), but these "choices" emerge in entire dependence of the socially constitutive law expressed in their grand prohairesis[51]. Thus practical deliberation is made with a view to execute the dictations of a prohairesis by choosing what can be termed as prohaireton at each particular case under examination. When the agent works under a prohairesis (prohairoumenos) these "preferential choices" are expressions of desired things to be done, since they are "judged" as being the best acts available of encapsulating the grand prohairesis and its goals. This sort of executable choice is the final "deliberate desire", which immediately precedes action, and accepts the conclusion of practical reasoning. Since what has been judged as preferable as filling the requirements of prohairesis, is an action that can be performed now, some choices must behave as executive means to be done to achieve a given goal that exemplifies the agent's prohairesis. Thus, our prohairesis is exemplified in the attitude we reserve towards the actions we take and the choices we consider appropriate and in accordance with the kind of life we live.

---

[50] "Deliberation" is the usual translation of the Greek term "βούλησις", but does not quite fit the bill. It is the case that once again a multitude of translations are better suited, depending on the context. Sometimes "will", in other cases "wish" is to be employed for a better understanding. Aristotle himself sometimes assigns βούλησις to the irrational, sometimes to the rational soul. See Topics 4.5.126a13 and De Anima 3.9.431b5 where "βούλησις" is located in the calculative, and hence rational part of the soul in juxtaposition with Politics 7.15.1334b22-25 and De Anima 2.3.414b2 where "βούλησις", as a species of appetite is located in the irrational part of the soul. Deliberation implies both a rational faculty and a need of the lapse of time, making the word incompatible with many of the points Aristotle repeatedly tries to make.

[51] Aristotle does not grant the status of a prohairesis to the insistence of a fan that a specific athlete will win, precisely because the fan has no direct and "hands on" way of affecting the result. What he acknowledges however is that that insistence exemplifies the will of the fan (1111b27-30).

This kind of "rational deliberator" does not bring to bear all the attitudes, motives and beliefs which relate to the options before him, nor does he seek to assess which course has the greater value in light of *all* these reasons; he will compare them only in the light of their contribution to his ultimate goal. The goal in question is not a merely theoretical matter; it is a matter of successfully giving a certain sort of shape to one's self, this achieved in part by giving a certain sort of shape to one's life. Provided that lesser "choices" are compatible with the grand prohairesis and so come to be desired, they are not simply steps to take for something besides themselves. The means, that is, the stages of virtuous activity by which the ideal agent attains his end, are constituent portions of the end, or have intrinsic value as being themselves lesser ends. In a good, i.e., moral, praxis the successive steps are not valueless and instead exemplify the agent's conception of eudaimonia.

As it is we agree with those commentators who claim that:[52]

- **a.** There exists a prohairesis antecedent to the final executive decision,
- **b.** The final executive decision is morally admissible only if it is based on, and expresses an antecedent grand prohairesis and
- **c.** The grand prohairesis is based on "moral" reasoning derived from one's conception of the good life, i.e. eudaimonia.

Deinotita (Comfortable Certainty)

Following Aristotle we read (1144a20-24) that

> Virtue makes one's prohairesis correct, but as for what has to be done for the sake of it, that doesn't belong to virtue but to another power…which they call δεινότητα: this is what makes one able to do those things which lead to the goal one has set oneself and so reach it. If the goal is noble, it is praised; if ignoble, it is a form of villainy. This is why we call both the practically wise and villainous δεινούς.

Both Charles and Anscombe have (somewhat misleadingly[53]) translated δεινότητα (Henceforth deinotita) as "cleverness" with Charles identifying it as an "excellence of reasoning". In reality it is a practical executive ability which enables one to put into

[52] See mainly Anscombe, "Thought and action in Aristotle: What is "practical truth"". For a similar position see Kenny, "Aristotle's theory of the will", pg. 96-99, and also Meyer, "Aristotle on moral responsibility", Chapter 1. For a different reading see Charles pg. 137-141. If, following Charles, we take the grand προαίρεσις as a policy decision and the lesser προαίρεσις as an executive decision, then quoting Aristotle in 1111b30, we are reminded that προαίρεσις is not for what is impossible, but rather for actions that the agent thinks are within his power to do. If προαίρεσις could be exclusively for a policy decision that the agent had not as yet discovered means to implement, it might be for something that the agent had no reasons for thinking he could effect. However focusing on the ideal agent of the φρόνιμος, Charles seems inclined to allow that for the φρόνιμος, a., b. and c. hold true, even if only for such an ideal agent and not in general. After all, it is this particular agent that is of main interest, and although examples of deliberation that have other and more specific goals than well being do abound (man qua doctor, politician, soldier), only the φρόνιμος agent is treated as deliberating having as his primary goal εὐδαιμονία (one might say he is the ideal man qua man).

[53] The translation of δεινότητα as cleverness by both Anscombe and Charles is imprecise as we can attribute this practical executive facility to agents whose acts do not always admit to the description of "clever". A closer translation might be "formidability" for then a swimmer's swimming being characterized as "formidable" would make more sense than his swimming being described as "clever". Formidability as a word also transmits the comfortable certainty an expert swimmer exhibits in any kind of troubled water.

effect one's plan and getting to the goal. Aristotle has mentioned virtue, and it seems as though the rational element we have so far considered as part of the soul's equilibrium to be missing from the above quotation. However, Aristotle is not talking here just about moral virtue, but by saying "virtue" he implies the excellences of both parts of the soul which working in unison produce the correct prohairesis. That is, the virtues of the rational and the irrational part have established equilibrium in the forming of a correct prohairesis, and now it is the turn of an alternate power, that of deinotita, to play its part as a non-rational habituation.

Aristotle, far from treating deinotita as a rational faculty, something suggested by translating it as "cleverness", refers to the particular term by using purely non-rational means. This is the point were we encounter Aristotle in his most "mystical" and "vague" fashion. He attributes the forming of this ability to the "eye of the soul" (1144a26) as if the grand prohairesis, being a state in which rationality and irrationality work in accord, allows the soul to somehow "see" what needs to be done here and now. It is something besides a rational capacity and an irrational desire, but it is also an integral part of the phronimos character, although not identical with φρονησις itself. It is, one might say, the delineating difference between someone who is competent and someone who is an expert in a particular activity. The important factor is that for a phronimos, or for a true villain for that matter, this power is exemplified not just in one or a few of their activities, but is instead observed in all facets of their character and resulting actions.

In order to better understand the connection between phronesis and this elusive power, Aristotle also urges us to consider some animals, those that show a precognitive power in their behavior, as themselves exemplifying a "sort" of phronesis when it comes to securing their well being and survival (1141a33-36). It would be helpful to leave aside the "rational" part from the definition of man as a "rational animal" and focus more strongly on the "animal" part. It might seem dubious that animals, as has been said irrational creatures by definition, exemplify even a "sort" of non-rational capacity akin to phronesis, i.e. practical wisdom. Aristotle thinks that the behavior of higher animals, including human beings is determined by a set of dispositions that collectively determine how the animal's capacities for feeling and doing will be exercised on any given occasion.

Ethical judgment for Aristotle is 'what is to be done" in any particular situation, and he insists that one must always "look" toward what is situated to the "kairos":

> These matters do not fall under any art or rule, but the agents themselves must always target their attention to the kairos (N.E. 1104a7-8)

Kairos can be translated as "the right or opportune moment" when we can act to bring about a favorable result, and it is that element that separates the expert from the merely competent. Since praxis is always fuelled by a desire to bring about a particular state of affairs in the future, the opportune moment for action cannot be judged with absolute precision. Since however the possibly advantageous opportunity will be missed if one deliberates for too long, a decision needs to be made and an action needs to be taken, despite the indeterminacy of the outcome.

Deinotita is the special ability of the expert to take a direct hold of the situation and the time parameters defining it. Phronesis issues moral certainties for the particular situation and deinotita allows the agent to act upon them. The dictations of phronesis are actualized by a skillful and "comfortably certain" character having no solid grounds for justifying that decision, since it is based on a thoughtless grasp of

the situation and of the demands the time parameters make.

We have seen that deliberation and planning, the things Aristotle considers as things that would be meaningless in a pre-determined setting, are the areas of human nature that Aristotle's phronimos agent excels in. This particular agent is so defined as to answer to specific requirements, providing us with specific parameters that need to be fulfilled in order to consider this type of agent as our starting point. The notion of prohairesis as inducing equilibrium between the rational and irrational faculties and deinotita as the practical executive ability of an expert, both deeply rooted in the agent's social immersion, are two such parameters. We centered our investigation to these two notions, since we found them to be necessary prerequisites for the attainment of phronesis, a moral excellence able to manifest the kind of truth-in-action that can be labeled as "practical". This particular kind of truth, due to the nature of our chosen agent, is subject to the demands of morality as defined by his communal environment and field of action. As such, our phronimos agent is held morally responsible for the results of his actions, a necessary predicament for any sensible member of a society.

Our investigation of the phronimos agent, and of the functional role prohairesis and deinotita have in his assessment of well-being, is related to Aristotle's discussion of necessity and contingency. These typically human characteristics are necessary in establishing a particular human agent who, through his actions and decisions, is able to eliminate as much of life's contingency as possible. In the following we will attempt to draw this connection more vividly, by re-establishing certain aspects of our so far account.

Id. General outlook of Aristotle's account

As we previously saw, one way to approach O.I. 9 is to narrow down the richness of the concepts being dealt with, specifically that of the terms "possible" and "contingent". More to the point, in Hintikka's account, there was an increase in the degree of abstraction from the text by specifying more and more rigorously the particular meaning intended by the use of the terms. This tactic resulted in decreasing the interest in their application, while at the same time increasing the confidence in their supposed accuracy. But, as was argued, this method of investigation served little to increase the scope of our understanding of the whole interconnected web in which the ideas in question are blended.

In our effort to widen our appreciation of the connections dimly apprehended between certain patterns of interest that were brought forth in O.I. and wider contexts, and in order to deepen our apprehension of the complexities of meaning inherent in the concepts of potentiality and contingency as portrayed in the use of the terms "possible" and "contingent" we opted for a different strategy.

Through reference to one of his most studied ethical treatises, the N.E., we have pictured Aristotle as a person who desires to safeguard the efficacy of the self in determining an individual's course of action. In his terms, the deliberative part of the thinking soul is not considered as a metaphysical anomaly, alien to its spatio-temporal environment, but, on the contrary, one's environment and social embodiment are portrayed as playing a defining role in the constitution of one's character and effective agency. This course of action was aimed at improving our understanding of those things that Aristotle was trying to safeguard in his account in O.I. 9. A wider view of his views on action and deliberation might enable us to deal more explicitly with some of the factors in the theory underlying O.I. 9.

Such a speculative exploration has certain practical misgivings. It is undoubtedly the case that if our investigation is unable to provide something more than a plausible theoretical interconnection between O.I. 9 and the N.E., we might end up with no variables to study in order to better direct our efforts. A purely theoretical account would go against the practical aspect that this thesis aims to promote for the issues discussed in O.I. 9. For that reason we centered our attention to those aspects of Aristotle's account in the N.E. that are in close relation with the wider areas of interest portrayed in O.I.

More specifically, we re-stated Aristotle's problem as that, while a number of possibilities for tomorrow's action may present themselves to a moral agent capable of taking effective action, those possibilities nevertheless do not present themselves as affecting actually embodied entities that conform to the existent conditions of today. A proposition pertaining to a future action that is not actual, i.e. performed in the present, lacks a definite truth-value for reasons beyond the future action's being a possibility as such. As both Anscombe and Frede seem to imply, the verb "to be" does not refer to those future entities in the sense with which it refers to past and present facts. So we tried to make the point that since our – that is Aristotle's – notion of truth as divulged by a strong correspondence theory between propositions and state of affairs, cannot work for these cases, an alternative notion of truth was required to retain a typically human conception of experienced reality.

Denying determinism as carelessly inviting us to consider the future as actually existing, Aristotle draws attention to an alternative source of truth-attainment located in the agent himself. Although reluctant to call an utterance pertaining to a future state

of affairs as *definitely* true, Aristotle was portrayed by Frede, as at least willing to entertain a different notion of truth for such utterances, a notion closely related to deliberation and planning. We suggested that phronesis, or "practical wisdom" in our less than concise terms,[54] is this particular truth-inducing quality Aristotle alleges towards in O.I. 9, a virtue of a rational "soul" working in tandem with its irrational faculties.

Of paramount importance to the attainment of this particular excellence is the social aspect. The deliberating agent is viewed as such only within the confines of a structured community. Certain aspects of an agent's character and personality are so defined by Aristotle as to demand the total immersion of an individual in a communal disclosure place, only within which we will be able to talk of planning and deliberation as conducive to well-being.

The normative notion of prohairesis, which is the result of such a social immersion, plays the role of the discerning mark between a full-fledged member of a human society and children, non-human animals and Gods alike. A necessary precondition for effectively acting and morally responsible agents, a grand prohairesis, facilitates the exercise of phronesis and issues specific judgments concerning lesser executive decisions that need to be implemented in accordance with the occasional contextual parameters. An indispensable component of the Aristotelian definition of a moral character, be it vicious or virtuous, the grand prohairesis is the efficient cause for those particular actions for whom the term praxis is ostensibly reserved.

Of further importance is the term of deinotita that is used to describe the practical executive ability that enables the moral agent to manipulate his environment in order to manifest his decisions into actions that one can do here and now. Besides the will to implement decisions and judgments, an ideal acting agent relies on this instinctive "second nature" to manipulate the available means in an unconscious way, allowing for an instinctive and immediate response aiming towards the implementation of a particular course of action. A collectively determined capacity for effective and expert manipulation of alternating parameters, deinotita is defined by a set of pre-established dispositions engrained in the ideal actor.

In short, our so far account has made evident that Aristotle has a particular way to describe human agency in view of deliberate action. Through reference to those technical terms, and with the use of the theory of the four causes, we are now in a better position to describe human intentional agency, as conceived by Aristotle. More specifically, prohairesis was described as the efficient cause of praxis, and deinothta as the executive ability that takes care of the material parameters of a praxis. Those terms equip the moral agent with phronesis, an alternative way of establishing an "informal" truth, that results in the "internal perfection" that is the final cause expressed by the concept of eudaimonia. These terms are supposedly enough to provide us with those "psychological parameters" lacking from the theory of the four causes, and though vague and particular to a specific account of moral actor, direct us towards a successful description of human action

[54] It is unfortunate that by translating phronesis as "practical wisdom" we are unable to convey the fact that in the Greek language we can derive from phronesis the verb Φρονῶ. That is, in full accordance with linguistic and grammatical rules one can use Φρονῶ in the place of "I know", or "I believe" to utter something akin to, but not quite like, "*I know* that there will be a Sea-battle tomorrow", or "*I believe* that there will be a Sea-battle tomorrow" respectively. In other words φρόνησις can be seen as producing a distinct epistemic operator from those we have come to expect from the notions of both knowledge and belief.

As we previously observed, in the context of O.I. 9 several ontological issues were raised that cannot be dealt with by the use of an outdated ontology of "things". Aristotle by stating in O.I. 16a3 that "Thoughts are "likenesses" of things" brings us as close as we can expect to a fact-based correspondence between proposition and reality. However, he is not as explicit as our investigation would require in order for us to specify exactly what on the part of reality is responsible for the truth of a saying when it comes to future contingents.

It is in order to delve further into such a correspondence theory of meaning, and against the background of Aristotle's metaphysics, that Wittgenstein's characterization of the world as a collection of facts seems to invite us to look at some of his work on the subject in search of suitable connections. Moreover, some of Aristotle's presuppositions concerning the causes that lead people to act in certain ways and his insistence on the social aspect of any such action are issues that the later Wittgenstein dealt with extensively and in a most illuminating and straightforward way. So, to further our investigation we propose to entertain a likeness in "theoretical attitude" between Aristotle and Wittgenstein, first noted for different, yet closely related reasons, by Anscombe's account of the Sea-battle, where both Wittgenstein and Aristotle were portrayed as essentially arguing against the possibility of any knowledge claims when it comes for the future.

Not unlike Aristotle's conception of truth, the Tractarian view holds that a statement is true if what it asserts corresponds to the way things actually are, and false if that is not how things are. This view forced on Wittgenstein's early account the silencing out of phenomena that are not part of the world of empirical reality. In other words, according to the requirements of his earlier theory of meaning, all those things that are not expressible in meaningful and well-articulated propositions were considered by Wittgenstein as nonsensical, and as such should remain unspoken. However, his later shift to a more pragmatic approach to language, with its focus on the social aspect, is an extremely interesting place to try to locate further similarities between Wittgenstein and Aristotle's account of the Sea-battle.

Prospecting on their initially established agreement on a strong correspondence theory of truth, a continued examination of the later Wittgenstein's account of language use presents itself as a significant background upon which to position and view Aristotle's ethical terms. It will turn out that Anscombe's willingness to acknowledge an initial correspondence between Wittgenstein and Aristotle, if further pursued and remedied, will yield interesting interconnections that can work to bring Aristotle's account to a closer proximity. It is for that reason that we find it advisable to take an anachronistic step and look at Wittgenstein's account of the differences between knowledge, certainty, and religious belief, as well as the "curious" ontological status of "pseudo-factuality" that holds for the future realm, that we can then relate with our discussion of future contingency.

Part II: Wittgenstein

IIa. Concerning O.C.

Shunted onto unused sidings

It is widely held that O.C., despite the fact that its writer did not publish it during his lifetime, comprises an autonomous part of his later writings. This is mainly because of the fact that in his private notebooks Wittgenstein seems to have consciously separated the fragments that were posthumously presented as O.C. from his other notes pertaining to his reflections on color and the philosophy of psychology. Of course the ideas and themes that Wittgenstein deals with in O.C. already occur in some of his earlier manuscripts. O. C. is indicative of certain issues that troubled Wittgenstein throughout his later phase and just one of the places where part of Wittgenstein's later worries are addressed.[55]

Inspired by G.E. Moore's "A defense of Common Sense" and "Proof of an external World", Wittgenstein decided to present his own interpretation of Moore's claims that he *knew* things like that "The earth has existed for more than 50 years". In Wittgenstein's view, examples such as those used by Moore express certainties that are usually not expressed linguistically at all, but displayed in our "acting". Such propositions, which from now we will call M-propositions, when thought of in linguistic terms, are propositions of the form of empirical ones, insofar as they seem to make claims about the obtaining of some states of affairs. Despite the fact that most of them seem to state contingent facts, the possibility of their being doubted under usual circumstances is prohibited by the fact that, not only our web of beliefs and knowledge claims, but our everyday normal discourses depend upon them. Although numerous propositions of this kind can be constructed, the only common characteristic Wittgenstein is willing to recognize among them is that they are all propositions about which one cannot be simply mistaken, even though they are not all necessary. They are propositions of a certain kind such that no doubt can exist about them, if making judgments is to be possible at all.

If seen under the concept of a language game, these M-propositions play the role of the constitutive norms that define a language game but they are definitely not "moves" within that game.[56] They are necessary conditions for the possibility of the game, and a play that does not abide by these rules entails that one does not in any way play the game. Within a game, its constitutive rules are compelling and cannot be justified, refuted or reinterpreted. This can be carried out in another game, in another context, or in another practice. In other words, certain propositions that appear to be empirical knowledge claims in fact create and define our language-games. As such they offer modes of verification and resemble a system of "measurement" by which all other knowledge claims are judged and are consequently granted the status of being true or false. This background, or "scaffolding" (O.C. §211), as expressed by M-propositions, forms our world-picture (Weltbild), and constitutes a "system of reference" (Bezugssystem). The sentence "This is a hand" can be understood as a constitutive rule of an epistemic language game L, and hence as an epistemic certainty of L. It cannot be doubted or justified in L itself, but it may serve as part of the unjustified foundations of justification procedures within the particular language

[55] See for example the translation of Wittgenstein's notes by Peter Winch under the title of "Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness".

[56] For certainties in relation to games see Kober, "On Epistemic and Moral Certainty".

game L.

There is no further evidence one can call upon to justify this system of reference, and in the same sense we cannot call the M-propositions that convey our world-picture as reasonable or unreasonable, justified or not justified. These propositions, although arrived at in a non-rational way, are also not irrational, for they define what counts as rational and irrational. There are no reasons, nor evidence that can be provided for M-propositions because it is the M-propositions taken as a whole that determine what counts as evidence and reasons in the first place. If we attempt doubting this "system of reference", we will soon reach a dead end, since

> The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life. (O.C. §105)

If we disregard that particular "life-giving" element, we deny our thoughts the very thing that makes them possible in the first place. Whatever the justification procedure, certainties remain untouched. They cannot be explained by other sentences within L (since they constitute the game) and so they cannot be justified within L. Realizing that there is no secure ground beyond this groundless background, is one of the most difficult things to fathom, for it seems that the end of our doubts is not an ungrounded presupposition, but a whole set of "things that stand fast" that come together to generate an ungrounded way of acting.[57] In that respect it is meaningless to search for knowledge of concretely defined foundations for our way of acting that constitute the solid basis for all of our language games besides "acting" itself.[58] It is not the presupposition of the truth of M-propositions that somehow legitimizes other assertions as if they rested upon that truth. In this sense, it is not singled out statements that strike one as obvious when trying to understand what "*knowing* that the earth existed for more than 50 years" means, but it is the system of reference that one has and is taking for granted. It is also obvious that mistakes cannot be made in this case, since the background we have come to attribute to all sane individuals is such as to deem the contrary belief as a sign of irrationality. We would be unable to understand a person whose beliefs make it evidently the case that he does not accept our system of verification. Hence the acceptance of the constitutive rule "This is a hand" also functions as a criterion for rationality, since the constitutive norm of a language game L also defines or determines what counts for a meaningful, permitted, significant, or rationally acceptable way of acting within L.

Insofar as certainties are displayed in our "acting", talk about doubt or mistake in their case is meaningless. However, since our ways of acting change over time and according to circumstance, certainties do not have the form of eternal, and as such unconditionally necessary, truths. So, it must also be the case that the possibility of "coming" to doubt or deny M-propositions is always present. This of course does not imply that, of those propositions supporting our world-view, all can be doubted at the same time, but only that singled out certainties might fall under doubt while others will not.

The reasons that could facilitate this possibility vary. A sentence like "This is a hand" might be denied if there are unfavorable circumstances of recognition present,

---

[57] In everyday practice I do not use the *knowledge* that "I have two hands". I simply, and quite literally, use my two hands.

[58] Both Malcolm in "Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behavior", and Rhees in chapter 15 of his "Wittgenstein's On Certainty", agree that this ungrounded "foundation" is an agreement in reactions, and additionally an agreement in "going on in the same way".

if there is lack of language ability, if we are dealing with eccentricity or even mental disturbance, but in all these cases, this denial will have no effect on the communal everyday language-game. However, that is not to say that part of the M-propositions that form the axis around which our knowledge revolves, cannot, in due time and under different circumstances, be called into question. There are situations where this might happen, but this would happen in language games resting on other epistemic norms.

> This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility. (O.C. §152)

Wittgenstein affirms that the line between M-propositions and ordinary empirical propositions is not one that is fixed once and for all. In fact an empirical proposition might in time "harden" and either replace one of the existing M-propositions, or come to be added to our system of reference as a new norm accompanying the other M-propositions in its own right. We might come to learn something as a new fact, but it is not as a fact or as a proposition that this newfound certainty enters our system of reference, but as a constitutive rule.

World-pictures are acquired or changed through upbringing, conversion or persuasion. It is granted, that the change in someone's world-view is an act that would enable him "to look at the world in a different way". The relation with the help of which a certainty is acquired, or changes its status, is best described in terms of that between a teacher and a pupil. A teacher, a competent member of the linguistic community as regards language games, imparts the current socially acceptable world picture to a willing subject, the child, which must take upon itself to realize the relevant world-picture in its everyday social life and practice.

Disputes can emerge about particular propositions that are part of our reference system during this exchange, but not between different systems. These disputes are not dependent on reasoning, but instead, if the "conversion" is to reach its full effect, one must grasp satisfactorily the whole of the "inherited background" we are attempting to impart, as if we were dealing with a child that needs to comprehend a way of life. It is not a case of simply changing or revising one's beliefs, but of coming to experience life in a wholly new way, of giving up certain practices and activities, and of submitting oneself to others. Gradually, the child will leave the confines of the teaching ground and begin to test his competence in language games through practice, in an ever-growing social circle.

> When this happens the child is said to "understand the meaning of those words. It is only in comparison with the practices of the community of speakers in which the child is reared that the child's utterances are correct or incorrect.[59]

We must understand that one adheres to these constitutive rules, the M-propositions, unconsciously, for otherwise it would be impossible for someone to actually partake in a communal life. As Wittgenstein puts it

> Now might not "I know, I am not just surmising, that here is a hand" be conceived as a proposition of grammar? Hence not temporally. (O.C. §57)

[59] See Malcolm, "Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behavior", pg. 11. Malcolm, in this particular part of his paper is contrasting Wittgenstein's "communal language" with Chomsky's "primary linguistic data" and Fodor's conception of an "internal language".

Here Wittgenstein denies a temporal parameter to these M-propositions, in the sense that in our everyday lives they are being used with unconscious satisfaction that they hold fast. Indeed an individual which in every waking step consciously surmised that "My heart is going to beat", "My eyelids are going to open and close", "Blood will continue to run through my veins", and so on, would be an unstable man liable to exclusion from a variety of language games.

The conception of "This is a hand" in such a non-temporal way is something that every human being exhibits in his everyday dealings. It means that there can be no such thing as doubt in this case. The reference structure is never questioned – barring revision of particular M-propositions – while we partake in socially constituted language games. It would not make sense, and it would be outside the scope of human existence, to constantly try to place ourselves in a position to doubt that a whole system of facts is just there and simply works.

Granted, as one gets older living in an evolving community, some of these facts do come into question. For example one's heart might become weak, but surely then we are encountering circumstances that can be described as "beyond" normal ones, in need of a variety of "experts" to help us look at life in another way, be they doctors or priests. In these cases, ones that we hope are exceptional for most of us, doubt of one certainty forces a barrage of others to come into question, in an effort to re-satisfy ourselves with their assured status. The constitutive norms are not "rigid" in the sense that they do not change over time, but are "rigid" in a sense that allows us to experience life and the lapse of time due to their "holding fast". Wittgenstein likens Moore's insistence that he *knows* this is a hand as more or less the same as what statements like "I have a pain in this hand", or "I once broke this hand" presuppose, where a doubt as to the existence of said hand does not come in. (O.C. § 371, 372)

It is important to note that with an ordinary empirical belief it is the evidence of experience that justifies the belief, whereas for an M-proposition this is not the case, since it is not tested by experience but is a rule that although it has the form of an empirical proposition, is not supported by evidence. Since in order to see whether we know something we must be able to consider the evidence procured as more secure than the claim under examination, there can be no form of justification or refutation of the axis of the system from within that system. The most one can say is that some things like "This is a hand", "My heart is beating", "I have a working brain", are just some of those things that, when taken together, stand now fast for one, or that they are as certain as such things are (O.C. §184).

IIb. Epistemic and moral certainties

In the above we have sketched Wittgenstein's account of the conceptual structure that supports the fundamental epistemic practices within a community. In the account that follows we will attempt a break from O.C. in order to express certain ideas that are loosely based on some of Wittgenstein's other, but related, writings.[60]Our subjective reading is mainly a critique of Michael Kober's paper "On Epistemic and Moral Certainty: A Wittgensteinian Approach", and is an attempt to relate the earlier discussion we had concerning certainties with the kind of moral and ethical behavior that is typical of the acting, adult human being.

The nature of human beings and their societal relations go beyond the exchange of factual knowledge and information between the members that comprise the community. The shared language of the community contains expressions that have a function in some contexts in life and not in others.[61] Different expressions are employed for different activities and different circumstances. The whole of the developed, complex employment of language by the adult member embodies something that resembles an instinct for what is socially admissible and what is not. Feelings and rational desires are inherent in the speaker's considerations, and it is expressions of these attitudes that one comes to expect from others and is willing to indorse as legitimate reactions to the shared reality. By participating in ever-expanding social practices the adult human being starts to accommodate in the range of his reactions feelings and attitudes that belong to the active involvement in inter-personal human relationships that extend beyond matters that require a view of the world strictly as fact. The connecting ties between the individuals produce an impersonal, collective standard of value imperative for the willful participation in language games, and that requires one to take proper account of the good of others in his actions and claims. New rules start to emerge having little to do with questions and doubts about objective facts and epistemic truths. Due to the very process of socialization, these expanded language games come to constitute a domain that forms and demands ways of acting, that are not just the outcome of perceptual reactions to features in the environment, but interpersonal reactions oriented towards actions involving others. When acting within social surroundings, certain expectations of interpersonal regard need to be fulfilled and certain reactions to the fulfillment (or not) of these expectations are naturally deemed appropriate by social standards. In order for the actor to be entitled to the experience of such attitudes as gratitude, anger, friendship or love, the actor needs to subject himself to the demands of morality for, if nothing else, these demands are central to our conception of what is most important and valuable in our communal lives. The certainties that functioned as standards of rationality are "augmented" by a different kind of certainties that seem to work as standards for admissible social interaction. The mastery of the communal language involves more than sharing the same sensory apparatus; it involves sharing the same ways of proceeding, and admitting to the same normative standards that go with them.

The transition from participation in fundamental language games to more elaborate practices relies heavily on the social instruction and development of the

[60] See for example "Zettel", "Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief", and those parts of Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" that have to do with rule following.

[61] See Malcolm, "Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behavior", pg. 11

individual. By living in a society, a young member comes, and is in fact invited, to obtain information from "expert" players of social language games so as, in a first step, to discover and develop his own competence level in reference to such competence levels as are exhibited by mentors, heroes, and idols. Although the young member observes the "expert's" competence performance, it is in a second stage that he comes to test his own performance against the hypothesized "ideal" competence model. He imitates the actions of his idols "as if" possessing the same competence level as the "experts" of his favor. Nonetheless, performance errors occur inadvertently, since no such overall "expert" exists and since no two people are alike, leaving the now (crestfallen) young member to his own devices. It is at this stage that a variety of competence models have now come into the possession of the young member. The plethora of experiential data that now have been filtered through schooling and initial experimentation, allow him to discover his "niche" in the social sphere. Further social experimentation occurs, with results being anticipated in the assumption of various "expected" competence models to come into effect and, plainly stated "do the job". But yet again, since to obtain certainty one would require a God's eye view of at least all competence models, performance errors inadvertently occur. The young, ideally "expertly" schooled member encounters a category of situations that cannot be dealt with by the currently entertained competence models. It is in these situations that the young member seeks an explanation, a description of a never before encountered situation that makes sense. As a result, the picture adopted by a fully mature, productive member of a community is a moral world picture. Of course a moral world picture is closely related to an epistemic one, in the sense that first one needs to be acquainted with what there is or could be, i.e. become aware of a uniform and collective agreement towards a shared factual reality. It is only after doubts and questions that have to do with epistemic truths are successfully resolved that one is able to acknowledge and work out the interconnection of those facts to more elaborate attitudes that one experiences within a social framework. By partaking in moral-epistemic discourses that go beyond fundamental epistemic discourses, which are simply about how the world is, the young "initiate" becomes a fully accredited member of a society and is expected to act and perform on the basis of his competence concerning the moral language under use.

Uniformity in moral language does not imply identity of moral character between the members of a community. On the contrary, variation of individual moral character is not only to be expected, but in a sense promoted as the very thing that brings people together to form a diverse and evolving community. However, if a constitution of individual moral character is to be of any use to that community, this variation needs to be accompanied by uniformity in behavioral performance that is deemed appropriate according to the social parameters. Despite the variety of moral characters that can be present within a civil framework, the very civility of that framework must regulate behavior in such a way as to promote collective standards for individual and particular judgments pertaining to right and wrong actions. The fact that different people see and deal with moral issues differently, while at the same time being willing, responsible, and involved members of a society, makes it the case that differentiated moral views are but extensions of a common moral world picture that facilitates the existence of moral differences between the members.

Kober's paper "On Epistemic and Moral Certainty" is a spirited attempt to trace similarities and differences between the epistemic and moral language games that we have been describing. His account relies heavily on a specific conception of human

interaction as a game constituted by rules in a rulebook. Kober's view of human action brings out several points in need of clarification that will prove useful in our understanding of moral certainties.

Kober rightly maintains that epistemic and moral language games cannot be strictly distinguished, since descriptions of factual content form the basis upon which a moral discourse secures its starting point. On the other hand, one can have a basic epistemic discourse without any mention of moral aspects, a fact that by itself makes evident that moral language games are more inclusive than epistemic ones and as such more elaborate. The fact of the matter is that moral language games cannot but get their starting point from epistemic discourses, and that an epistemic discourse which does not sooner or later enter the more "philosophical" domain of morality cannot but remain a mere exchange of facts.

As Kober's description goes, when encountering knowledge claims in basic epistemic language games, we rely on other knowledge claims that somehow justify the ones made as means to providing an answer to questions such as "How do you know?" According to Kober, this process can reach all the way back to epistemic certainties like "This is a hand" for which no other justification is possible, since as stated earlier, propositions like this are part of the system of reference on which we base all such justifications.[62] When confronted with doubt in our use of an epistemic certainty such as "This is a hand", we are prone to evade such an inappropriate move by saying "I have learnt English", or the like. Such a response does not simply refer to knowledge of a particular word in English, but is used to describe the fact that the use of the word "hand" is something that we are accustomed to recognize and work with as it occurs from context to context. "I have learnt English", means that I have learned the use of English words such as "hand", and it is from that use that the certainty that "This is a hand" is derived. Of course this makes sense to say when we look at certainties that are somehow linguistically expressed. As noted earlier, the large majority of certainties is never articulated in linguistic terms, but instead is displayed in our "acting".

Either way, Kober goes on to argue correctly that *if* one were to question a linguistically expressed certainty, a communication breakdown would occur at once. "For how [are we] to communicate with someone concerning things around us if he is seriously denying that this is a hand?"[63] So, keeping in line with the metaphor of viewing discourse as playing a game, he contends that epistemic certainties are certainties because of the constitutive role we attribute to them in describing the game. When, for example, in the game of chess we place a rook in a certain position, we can justify this move by reference to the norm "Rooks move in "such and such" a way, unless obstructed", and as a response to the question "How do you know that?" we can claim: "I have learned chess", in an obvious reference to the whole system of constitutive rules that define the game of chess. Consequently, Kober maintains that all knowledge claims that can be called true can be reduced to epistemic certainties, while all knowledge claims that can be called false are irreducible to these same epistemic certainties.[64]

Kober looks upon moves that are in accordance with the constitutive rules of a

---

[62] See Kober, "On Epistemic and Moral Certainty", pg. 367

[63] See Kober, "On Epistemic and Moral Certainty", pg. 368.

[64] This position promotes the view that reducibility or conformity to epistemic certainties is somehow justification enough for all subsequent claims. However it must be noted that epistemic certainties offer the system of measurement and not the measurement itself. As it is, in Kober's account, the moves are justified because they can be verified, which is not quite true to Wittgenstein's account.

language game only as admissible or permitted. This notion of admissibility that Kober describes is about permission and not about correctness of reaction. Kober recognizes this point for he openly acknowledges that moves are usually said to "make sense" only if they prove significant in winning the game. That is, moving a rook in a specific place on the board is *allowed* in relation to the constitutive rules, but deemed *correct*, or the *right* one, only with relevance to the particular game of chess that is currently under play. In chess, unlike language games, the task of reaching the prescribed goal is something that can be traced back to a rulebook that provides guidelines as to what precisely is the goal to be achieved and as to the various ways that this can be achieved. So, in the game of chess, the constitutive rules define both the admissibility of a move, and it's correctness as relative to a prescribed goal.

Kober maintains that acting in a language game differs from acting in chess in that to act in a language game "quite often cannot be seen as winning a game".[65] So, Kober's argument is that we should view moves in moral language games as "making sense" only if they are permissible (or not), and not as (additionally) making sense as being correct (or not) in relation to a goal.

Following such a restricted view of moves in a language game as, Kober, when discussing the case of moral language games, likens expressions such as "Killing is evil" or "All men and women have equal rights" as moral certainties of such nature as constitutive of the very possibility of acting morally or talking about moral issues. That is, the moral certainty of "Killing is evil" is thought of as only permitting a move within a moral language game. As such, he considers moral certainties as akin to constitutive rules of the more elaborate kind of language games he aims to describe. Since epistemic certainties function as standards for rationality or mental competence, then, according to Kober's analogy, moral certainties must function as standards of moral competence. As we treat a person doubting an epistemic certainty like "This is a hand" as irrational, it seems that we should treat a person who doubts that "Killing is evil" as incompetent for participation in moral discourse. But what does "moral competence" mean?

Contrary to what was said about "rationality" in the case of fundamental epistemic language games and epistemic practices, by moving on to the more elaborate realm of moral language games that have more to do with agreement in the lives of people in a community, we see that such an agreement would be in effect if we could call someone's action or comment as unreasonable, no less than if we were to call it reasonable. That is, although in the case of epistemic certainties where, for example, we do not or cannot know what it would be like to doubt that the Earth has existed for many years, in the case of moral certainties we are in a position to know what it would be like to doubt that killing is evil. One may distinguish killing in self-defense, tyrannicide, euthanasia or abortion from murder and declare only murder to be morally evil. But this means that moral certainties are fundamentally unlike epistemic certainties. So if we would want to hold on to an analogy between them, as Kober does, we need an alternative explanation. Kober wishes to claim that this sort of distinction can only be done within a moral discourse M* different from the moral discourse M in which "Killing is evil" is a moral certainty. In that case then, one could then treat the case of murder as one of the circumstances that make a moral norm such as "Killing is evil" a questionable moral claim within the M* language game which is distinctly different from M. In short, Kober's proposal is to view moral disagreement, i.e. different moral views, as a matter of "playing" different language

[65] Here we do not consider "quite often" to equate "in most cases", hence our disagreement with Kober. See Kober, "On Epistemic and Moral Certainty", pg. 366

games. However, Wittgenstein's idea in O.C. is that a world picture contains the concepts through which we understand the world, i.e. it is a way of seeing the world. Other ways of seeing the world are imaginable, but are not alternatives in the real sense since they are but extensions of our individual moral view. We *can* understand the different imaginable moral views from within our moral view.[66]

In an empirical sense, a small group can be said to have something like a particular moral world picture. However, in the non-empirical sense that Wittgenstein wishes us to think in terms of, our moral view is but an extension of the moral world picture of the human society we live in. Differences in moral views are but functions of our common world picture. If we accept Kober's proposal that moral disagreement is a case of "playing" different moral language games, we indorse a relativistic account of morality that makes meaningful communication and interaction somewhat impossible. If on the other hand we accept and understand moral disagreement as a legitimate action within one and the same language game, we are able to see moral disagreement as viewing a different aspect of a shared, communal world picture.

It is certainly the case that before we embark upon playing a game we are instructed as to its basic rules. However, the things that make a language game the language game that it is, are not the things we regard as basic, but those things that never turn up. In the analogy to the chess game, the fact is that we are able to play the game because there are things that are beyond doubt because they never arise in the first place. Wittgenstein, as if to clarify this particular point, makes a distinction between what he calls objective and subjective certainty. Subjective certainty is described as expressing complete conviction, an actual total absence of doubt that nevertheless does not exclude the possibility thereof, usually accompanied by a tendency to convince other people, e.g., that men and women have equal rights, whereas something is said to be objectively certain when a mistake about it cannot be possible, e.g., believing that I am sitting in my room when I am not. (O.C. §194, 195) Certainties like "There are pawns", "The pawns do not move by themselves" and the like, are not part of the rulebook Kober relies upon to justify moves within that game, and are the kind of objective certainties that allow the experience of a game in the first place independently of specific rules that might identify it as the particular game called chess.

Similarly, the epistemic certainty that "People can kill and be killed" is assumed as part of the unquestioned, unmentioned basis for any language game that has to do with killing. This matter is one that simply does not arise in such language games and it is for that reason that the issue of its truth or falsity never arises. Again, what makes a language game about killing what it is, are the issues that do not arise, not issues that we do not doubt because we consider them to be basic. But such *is* the case with the moral "certainty" of "Killing is evil." In order to partake in a language game about killing, we must have previously learned the use of "killing" words such as murder, matricide, and the like. A query as to what "killing" in a particular language game is has to do with its intended use in the current language game and little to do with the particular status it has in our lives. It is not in another language game that this can be

[66] We take it for granted that here we are talking about human beings that live together with other human beings in the same social surrounding. We are not presently concerned with examples such like meeting a man who has been brought up alone on an island, detached from other human contact, a king who believes that the world started with his birth, a primitive native that confronts a missionary, or a child that is learning a language. These examples do fall under Wittgenstein's interest, but serve to elucidate the way that a world picture is acquired or changed, not with how people of a shared reality communicate.

done, but within the same one. That is, one upon hearing "Killing is evil" might ask "What exactly do you mean, in this discussion that we are now having, by that?", or in other words "What are you trying to *accomplish* by saying that, now?" It seems that "Killing is evil" is better described as an articulation of a subjective certainty as expressing an actual absence of doubt on the part of the subject, and of said subjects tendency to convince other people that might still be in doubt. Evoking the help of the river-bed metaphor we might say that objective certainties such as "People can kill and be killed" are the hard bedrock, whereas subjective certainties such as "Killing is evil" are much closer to the water, were alteration is more easily encountered.[67]

Yet another reason we disagree with Kober's strict identification of moral and epistemic certainties is the following. Viewing human action and discourse as playing a game does not seem to work for the more elaborate moral language games. First of all, a communal goal, however vague and unarticulated, is existent in every communal practice. That is why, given our current discussion, we must expand on the notion of "winning" in a language game to get a better feel for what it is we are seeking to compare. Convincing, giving hope, converting, discomforting, entertaining are all things that can fit the description of what it is to "win" in the more elaborate kind of language game that we are interested in, and describe matters which fall under the scope of a subjective kind of certainty. An account of language games centered on a conception of moves that admit only to constitutive rules for admissibility and not for correctness in relation to a goal, can only describe idle talk. The very nature of the moral language games that we are trying to describe forces us to consider admissible moves as "making sense" if they are both admissible, and correct in their relation to the occasional, desired goal.

Admittedly, if we choose to characterize moral certainties as constitutive norms of moral language games, we have the benefit of making the particular normative force that moral convictions have in our everyday dealings more vividly apparent. But this account of moral language games presupposes a chain of reasoning analogous to the one advocated for epistemic certainties in Kober's account, namely that there exist moral certainties that serve as some kind of rock-bottom justification.

Moral certainties *do* function as standards of moral character and they also seem to work as standards for admissibility in moral language games. However, we must keep in mind that a person of an obnoxious or even vicious character is still a moral character. That particular fact certainly affects the treatment reserved by other community members for his claims and comments, but it is not the case that we preclude a person of a flawed character from certain discussions because of any incompetence in moral discourse, but rather because of his unproductive and superficial moves in the current moral language game. This attitude by no means precludes a person whose moral beliefs "aggravate" the majority of community members from other, even more complex, moral discussions as an equally competent participant.

Generally speaking moral certainties such as "Killing is evil" are ideal norms, which all reasonable members of civilized society share, in the sense that they are considered to be basic. In effect however, the repeated assertion of these ideal norms when considering particular situations is in direct contrast with the unconscious satisfaction enjoyed by the epistemic certainties. The very fact that our societies have

[67] This feature of subjective certainty is not restricted to moral certainties, but it also occurs with epistemic ones. Thus there are those who believe that the earth is flat, or that we have never been on the moon. However, under closer inspection, their attempts to convince other people rely on a moral subjective certainty; namely that there is a conspiracy that withholds the truth from the general public.

laws that deal with such matters, is evidence enough that these differences are so often encountered between community members, that an independent and thorough account of every such possible difference needs to be established prior to the event of a disagreement, in order to regulate the smooth function of the community and police deviant behavior. Presumably it is this sort of "rulebook" that Kober has in mind when he entertains the case of a person who doubts that "Killing is evil" or that "Men and women have equal rights". It seems that as an answer to the question "How do you know that men and women have equal rights?" we could respond by proclaiming that "I know the law", in order to keep the analogy with "I have learned English", or "I have learnt chess" alive. However, this description does not do justice to the actual moral language games being played, and though Kober's account aims at providing an "ideal" picture, it seems that by following his account certain issues remain untouched. It cannot explain away admittedly problematic, but nevertheless frequently encountered, everyday cases. Consider the case of "Men and women do *not* have equal rights" as a moral certainty constituting a particular character that does not regulate his behavior in response to that moral certainty, but thanks to the normative intervention of laws and judicial regulations. This is a simple case where behavior is regulated by something external/communal, despite the particular constitution of an obnoxious character. Is that person not a member of society able to partake in moral language games? On the other hand, consider the case of a character so constituted as to live out his life while never questioning the moral certainty of "Killing is evil" as being one of those things that "stand fast" for him. Is it the case that, in the event of his killing a man in self-defense, that this man feels no remorse or guilt simply because the court of law finds his actions justified? No, at least not necessarily.

In our setting, moral certainties do of course have a normative role to play but rather than considering this role of a singular, constitutive nature, we take it to be of a dual nature. It is a feature of a moral discourse that it is not necessarily concerned with moral facts, but mainly with how to act in particular situations or with how to look at and understand human behavior under those situations. That is, moral discourse is not only about what can exist as a moral fact, but about the way that these facts affect the world-picture we endorse and how, by doing that, certain actions seem to be allowed, while others not. Plainly stated, moral certainties *constitute character* and *regulate behavior*.[68] If we were able, as Kober wishes, to justify moral claims by making other moral claims, reaching back to "moral" constitutive norms such as "Killing is evil" or "Men and Women have equal rights" found registered in a rulebook, we would eliminate individual moral responsibility, substituting it with subservience to something external to achieve morally admissible behavior[69]. Instead, our claim that moral certainties, as constitutive of our character can regulate our behavior in particular circumstances, seems to work better at describing the subjective

[68] The whole set of written laws and unarticulated moral certainties are what prescribe a particular character to a community, be it democratic or racist, and at the same time regulate the communal responses in such a way as to provide, for example, opportunities that are equal, or not.

[69] Kober's account of moral language games constituted by rules and laws to be found in a rulebook can be read in a rather distressing manner. A man who does not kill simply because it is not allowed by the book of law, is not exactly the ideal citizen. Our account needs to offer something more and besides the "rulebook" analogy, if we are to provide a description that satisfies. After all, ideally, laws are made and revised because of alterations in the social behavioral patterns. It would be a totalitarian society one which defined societal interaction by strict reference to written law. If nothing else, the law is only a partial codification of moral principles. Our actions should justify the laws and not the other way round.

kind of certainty "Killing is evil" portrays, while retaining its strong normative character. As such, our account differs from Kober's in that, by reference to a moral certainty we point to a whole system of measurement constitutive of and particular to our individual moral character, which works to form a moral view associated with a world picture that regulates behavior. It does not point to a system of reference common to all moral language games, but to a system of reference subject to our personal character, as it is our particular conception of life. In this way we can still salvage the peculiar normative force that moral certainties have in our lives. As it is, moral language games and practices are not separate from epistemic language games because of the fact that *we* take part in them. An "ideal" account of such practices cannot be given without an "ideal" account of who "we" are supposed to be.

IIc. Concerning religious belief

In the above section we presented our take on Wittgenstein's ideas about the status of moral certainties. We claimed that certainties in a moral context have a dual role to play, namely to constitute a moral character and to regulate moral behavior. In order for us to establish whether this assertion is a legitimate one to make, we think it best to follow up our discussion about moral certainties with an example. After all, moral certainties, as subjective certainties that signal an actual absence of doubt on the part of the subject, who is aware that others might doubt what he is subjectively certain of, form a kind of "theoretical attitude" towards the world that we need to better understand.

By looking at Wittgenstein's later phase, we see that the place occupied by the notions of sin, redemption, and judgment in the way a human community lives, as well as their irreducibility to theoretical explanations and scientific predictions, becomes the main theme. In search for a particular example to view expressions of certainties from within a moral context, and prompted by Anscombe's earlier suggestion to view the prediction of a future event as evident of the same "theoretical attitude" one has when one proclaims knowledge of someone's rising from the dead,[70] we now focus our attention on Wittgenstein's ideas concerning the contents of religious beliefs.

Wittgenstein's own notes were used to compile various works under his name that contain many of his ideas on the subject, such as "Culture and Value", and also the "Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief", for which student notes were gathered and used. Questions that have to do with exactly how accurate these lecture notes can be for us to fall back on when trying to determine Wittgenstein's positions concerning the topics discussed are besides the point. With careful and conservative reading, one can find several elements that help define, in as much precise a way as currently possible, Wittgenstein's "theoretical attitude" towards religious beliefs.

First of all, religious discourse is like moral discourse in that it is not cognitive in character, and hence the criterion of "rational" meaningfulness does not apply. Religious belief and the language used to express it give expression to one's religious form of life and are at the same time a component therein. Thus to verbalize a religious belief is to express, often in pictorial language, some aspect of one's religious form of life while at the same time engaging in that form of life, just like verbalizing a moral certainty is at the same time an expression *and* an act of moral significance.

According to Wittgenstein, any interpretation of religion which understands religious beliefs as explanations, and thus as competing with science, is to be dismissed. If this were the case, religious beliefs could be true or false, and could be epistemologically justified. Instead, religious beliefs are taken to be immune against any rational criticism, with their peculiar "rationality" residing in the fact that they permeate all of the believer's actions and decisions. Religion as such does not need to be founded on or against theoretic evidence, since it constitutes a practice. Religious beliefs should not be considered "mythical" simply because they are not scientifically founded, nor should they be considered non-rational or irrational.[71] It would be

[70] See pg. 18

[71] We take it that a non-rational belief is a belief that is upheld without the existence of evidence, and that an irrational belief is a belief that is upheld despite the existence of evidence to the contrary.

meaningless to ask a believer if he thinks his beliefs are true; it would be better to ask (or better yet to try to witness) what role they play in his life.

Let us consider an example Wittgenstein uses, that of the belief in the occurrence of a Last Judgment, and imagine a believer and a non-believer taking opposing stands to such an assertion.

According to Wittgenstein a religious belief of this sort seems to make a claim about what will be the case, and in this respect a religious belief is akin to an empirical one. Religious belief seems to retain a "factual" nature, since one can seemingly make factual claims about what has been, what is or what will be, by using them in everyday discourse. Wittgenstein however, claims that the believer and the non-believer do not in *fact* contradict each other, but in *deed*. That is, a believer by asserting that there will be a Last Judgment contradicts the non-believer in character and in action-guiding force, and not regarding a factual prediction. A true believer, would take evidence contrary to his view as irrelevant to his belief, a belief that can in fact "fly in the face of" the best evidence science has to offer. A proof or disproof ought not to work for making a believer out of a non- believer or vice versa, for Wittgenstein to deem their beliefs as truly "religious" ones.

It is a belief that controls one's life in a way that no empirically based belief does. What is at issue is not simply the belief or disbelief in some particular state of affairs, but about how one should lead a life. A true believer cannot simply doubt the beliefs that guide his life, without affecting his life as a whole. The commitment and submission of the believer to his "religious" beliefs, through "thick and thin", makes no sense with respect to ordinary empirical belief and is something that one can have only as a result of a specific kind of life and of a passionate commitment to a particular, some might say even peculiar, system of reference.

The nature of the commitment, in the same sense encountered with our M-propositions, is a non-rational one. Not irrational and yet again not rational, since this commitment is not arrived at on the basis of the most plausible evidence, but is rather a belief that is held passionately, that satisfies one of it's reality and makes one comfortable in his living. Wittgenstein, in one of his most profound moments, remarks:

> [What] inclines even me to believe in Christ's resurrection? I play as it were with the thought. - If he did not rise from the dead, then he decomposed in the grave like every human being. *He is dead and decomposed*. In that case he is a teacher, like any other and can no longer help; and we are once more orphaned and alone. And have to make do with wisdom and speculation. It is as though we are in a hell, where we can only dream and are shut out from heaven, roofed in as it were. But if I am to be really redeemed, I need certainty - not wisdom, dreams, speculation - and this certainty is faith. And faith is faith in what my heart, my soul, needs, not my speculative intellect. For my soul, with its passions, as it were with its flesh and blood, must be redeemed, not my abstract mind. (C.V. pg. 33)

Christ's resurrection is not a hypothesis that scientific investigation could make more or less credible, and it is not the subject of historical enquiry. To believe in the resurrection is to do certain things in a way that is different from those who do not believe in it, and it is to have an attitude comprehensible only if one can entertain this belief. The resurrection seen in this sense is not a factual possibility, but a requirement of a religious/moral person's soul.

It is obvious that in these cases, "I know" cannot be used in its everyday sense to express the meaning of a religious belief. Wittgenstein remarks:

> "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre").[72] And "I knew he was in the room, but he wasn't in the room" is like "I saw him in the room, but he wasn't there". "I know" is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition (like "I believe"), but between me and a fact. (O.C. §90)

The idea of genuine knowledge as an eyewitness account cannot be applied to describe religious beliefs. The perceptual situation in these cases is such that there is no room for doubt or hesitation, and therefore no use for reflection, inference, derivation or verification. Moral certainty as evidenced in the articulation of a religious belief is not simply a "coming to see", but a "thoughtless grasp", a "direct taking hold":

> It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts. (O.C. §510)

The point of holding commitment to a certain narrative, to a particular explanation of the facts of life, is to seek out the best way to live, which expresses a particular "theoretical attitude" that is of practical significance and simple enough for the individual to assimilate in his actions. Vasiliou[73] correctly observes that when Wittgenstein talks about religious belief in the terms of a passionate commitment to a "system of reference" and a "way of living", someone could realize a direct affinity with a very particular kind of "Platonic" knowledge prominent in Greek moral philosophy (eudaimonia), which, when in effect, would enable the possessor to attain true "happiness".[74]

---

[72] It must be noted that the aforementioned "primitive" meaning of "I know" is also shown by the facts of the Greek language. One of the common Greek ways to claim knowledge was to use the verb οἶδα which, literally taken, amounts to saying that I have seen the thing in question. Hintikka, quoting Bruno Snell, confirms that this was not a mere piece of etymology but a fact the speakers of the language were aware of. See Hintikka, "Time, truth and knowledge in Aristotle", pg. 72-74

[73] See Vasiliou, "Wittgenstein, Religious Belief, and On Certainty", pg. 36

[74] However accurate this observation might be, our current intention is not to associate expressions of religious belief with eudaimonia taken to be a form of "Platonic" knowledge, but with eudaimonia taken to be a form of "Aristotelian" attitude.

IId. General outlook of Wittgenstein's account

In O.C., Wittgenstein, talks about certain propositions and the "peculiar" normative role they play in our language and practice. In the last two sections, we concerned ourselves with this "peculiar" role, first by considering certainties as constitutive rules in epistemic language games, and secondly by attempting to extend our discussion to include more elaborate, moral contexts. In the case of basic epistemic certainties, we retained an analogy between certainty and the constitutive rule of a game in order to understand these certainties as "criteria" for a rational constitution of character. This analogy was shown to be misleading, since identifying a social practice with a game, could lead to a kind of foundationalist account for certainties that does not do justice to Wittgenstein's account. Following Wittgenstein, we observed that certainties, be they epistemic or moral, do not dictate *how* our activities are conducted, or *how* our language games are played. What they do is to allow us to conduct activities, and to play language games, and so they do not act as ultimate explanatory or justificatory grounds but as a "life giving" element. Thus, an appeal to ultimate facts as unexplained explainers, as justificatory, rock-bottom stopping points needs to be dismissed.

To that effect, we claimed that an analogy between certainties and constitutive rules of games should no longer be maintained, most evidently when our discussion turns to moral contexts. To put it simply, we claimed that, in a moral context, just as the constitution of an individual moral character is crucial to understanding normative activities that have to do with agreement in the lives of people, so is the regulation of behavior according to communal standards.

Still, it is our current task to decipher what it is that certainties actually do in relation to meaningful, intentional, human action, and it is for that reason that we need to see how our previous sections relate to Wittgenstein's later view of meaning as use.

As mentioned earlier, the early Wittgenstein held the view that language, with its capacity to represent the way that things are or could be in the world, can accommodate truth by way of showing the conditions under which particular meaningful sentences truly represent the way things are. The later Wittgenstein however no longer considers truth as the central notion in the explanation of meaning, proposing instead the view of language as a set of social practices and rule following activities. To put it simply, according to the later Wittgenstein:

1. Rules are social institutions, social customs or social conventions
2. To follow a rule is therefore to participate in an institution and to adopt or conform to a custom or convention

As Wittgenstein himself proclaims,

> [to] obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are institutions (customs)" (P.I. §199)

In O.C., Wittgenstein sketches an account of the norms of our linguistic practices. According to this account, it is the way that we talk and act that explains the special normative role that certain propositions (certainties) play. These "norms" are held in place by everything that we say and do. So, if we are to consider certainties as rules of some sort, we need to understand that these rules are not normative standards of

communication and inquiry unrelated to what we actually say and do, setting pre-established limits on our practices and language games. For Wittgenstein, a normative practice is a social practice that contains common ways of proceeding, which we can understand as shared techniques that are culturally transmitted. A behavior that admits to normative evaluation is a behavior coordinated according to shared procedures, which have been learned and can be taught to others.

From this, it follows that explanatory categories dealing exclusively with our individual cognitive abilities will not be sufficient to explain the phenomenon of what a rule is and how it "works". As is the case, something more than individual psychology is needed to accommodate Wittgenstein's new approach to meaning. We also need theories drawn from sociology and its readings on social processes in which we ourselves as socially constituted forms of life participate. So, in order to see how certainties work, we have to see how they function in specific social situations. Accordingly, intentions and intentional activity can only be understood when properly situated:

> An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions. (P.I. §337)

According to the view we proposed earlier,[75] we go on from our (social) training in the way we do because we seem to have internalized a set of dispositions or tendencies that happen to be activated in a particular way by the examples we encounter in training from as early on as childhood. The real constraining sources that prevent us from arbitrarily choosing our actions and utterances as we encounter case after case are not given by any fixed interpretive formulation providing an explanation, but by the circumstances we are confronted with locally. These circumstances include our instincts, our biological nature, the kind of interactions we have with other members of our established community, our training, and so forth. Through repeated practice, the novice internalizes the normative standards of the linguistic community he is becoming a part of, and by the end of the learning process the novice regards the way he has been taught to go on as the only way to proceed. When the training is completed successfully, the learned procedures and techniques do not simply determine causally our actions, but they are rather the reasons why we do what we do in the way we do it.

On Wittgenstein's view, what is most characteristic of our rule-following activities is that they exhibit the existence of a peculiar agreement among practitioners that is created and maintained by processes of socialization. Observing social conventions results in a "formal politeness" that is a natural aspect of human beings and their activities and in a peculiar form of solidarity and reliability that members of a culture reserve for each other. Thus, the "form of life" that we share as members of the same culture, affects our individual moral character in that it eventually becomes part of our nature as members of a society to subject our behavior to shared norms, or standards. This involves not only the establishment of a regularity in the learner's behavior, but also the constitution of a character that functions as a normative attitude towards how to proceed.

[75] See pg. 50

III. Aristotle's terms under Wittgenstein's Later View on Meaning

IIIa. Relation with Ancient thought:

Prohairesis seen as religious/ethical belief prompting action

We have repeatedly argued that prohairesis is a moral pre-condition akin to a normative force, based on the dispositions engrained through schooling and habituation in the moral agent from a young age. The moral aspect of this particular notion is a highly desired defining characteristic, for it answers to the demands made by an agent's interactions with his fellow community members. When acting within social surroundings, certain expectations of interpersonal regard need to be fulfilled and certain reactions to the fulfillment (or not) of these expectations are naturally deemed appropriate by social standards. In order for the actor to be entitled to the experience of such attitudes as gratitude, anger, friendship or love, the actor needs to subject himself to the demands of morality for, if nothing else, these demands are central to our conception of what is most important and valuable in our communal lives.

We observed earlier that there exists a grand prohairesis antecedent to the final executive decision reached through deliberation and "moral" reasoning. The grand prohairesis serves the purpose of describing a conception of the "good life" which is expressed in a series of choice-worthy decisions for action, which being themselves desired on their own accord as conducive to "blessedness", are instances of eudaimonia .

In Aristotle's account, what the expert moral agent has learned through years of social practice appears in the way the world shows up in the formation of his particular grand prohairesis. The holder of a particular grand prohairesis is described as exhibiting the kind of commitment to a world-picture through "thick and thin" that only a socially amendable way of looking at life can provide. If we look at Aristotle's insistence that prohairesis is the efficient cause leading to praxis, juxtaposing it with his inclination to view the agent himself as the efficient cause of all of his activities[76], we get the impression that grand prohairesis and agent are, in this respect, treated on a par. More specifically, the agent's moral character as defined by his prohairesis is the causal power with which Aristotle identifies the agent, and the consequent praxis consists of those voluntary actions, which his character naturally produces.

Being an indispensable part of a moral agent's character, such a prohairesis exhibits the kind of world-picture that defines an agent as a social actor. As such, a grand prohairesis once formed and established cannot be simply doubted. It regulates the agent's behavior in such a way as to make it impossible for the agent to place its authority under question in ordinary and everyday circumstances. It plays the role of establishing and regulating the agent's responses in a way best suited to express his conception of wellbeing.

A firm and established character is an indispensable trait of the moral agent who acts under the guidelines of his grand prohairesis, making the agent simply unable to casually revise this aspect of his personality, unless exceptional circumstances present themselves in a way as to demand a total re-evaluation of the experienced social reality. It is not the case that one can be simply persuaded into accepting or rejecting a grand prohairesis as would be the case with any other kind of judgment or claim.

[76] The end goal of theoretical knowledge is truth, of poietical knowledge production and of practical knowledge praxis.

There are no objective facts that one can procure as evidence to point to a way of assessing life as the only "true" one. In Aristotle's account, to act under such a prohairesis is not something one learns, but something one comes to assimilate through experience. The knowledge of a list of individuated actions as necessary accomplishments of things "to be done" by everyone is not something that could lead to the formation of a prohairesis. As Aristotle claims, an act cannot be called just unless it is performed by a man of a just attitude, an attitude that can only be established through time and experience, and by the painstaking procedure of trial and error. This, however, does not mean that a young member of a community is alone in his task of securing a way of assessing life, left to fend for himself in an unknown territory. What the young members of a community can be taught and directed towards is the tendency to cultivate those dispositions that, through experience and practice, will eventually manifest within the young member a prohairesis that will afford him the status of a moral actor in a social environment, with al the demands and benefits that this implies .

A grand prohairesis does not assess reality in epistemic terms but expresses the particular commitment to a way of "assessing life" that identifies a form of life in relation to a particular way of social living. The shared world-picture divulged by the expression of those forms of ethical ties that regulate the function of a community is included into the individual prohairesis of its constituent parts, identifying an individual as an integral part of his community in virtue of his characteristic, social constitution. An expression of an individual prohairesis is a definition of the individual agent, and at the same time a depiction of the socially constituted framework shared by the members of the disclosure space of the polis.

A grand prohairesis is an already settled way for the agent to respond to the solicitations of things as they present themselves through his everyday experience. The agent has come to see things from some socially compatible perspective and sees them as affording certain actions within a moral setting. His past experience with *that* sort of thing in *that* sort of situation enables the actor to see a variety of situations from the same ethical perspective but as unique opportunities requiring different tactical decisions.

The rational defining element of a prohairesis, expresses the aspect of this formed disposition of deliberately deciding upon a means to a desired end. Aristotle attributes to the rational element inherent in a prohairesis the task of providing the correctness of reasoning and the rightness of deliberation in finding the means to obtain the object of one's will. In Aristotle's account, the virtuous and the vicious character both share the same rational capacities that produce the kind of "good" deliberation that effectively decides upon the means to either bring about a praiseworthy or a despicable aim. However, since Aristotle wishes his notion of prohairesis to encompass both a rational and an irrational component, both coming together to affect the workings of his moral agent, judgments pertaining to one's ends are the work of the moral virtue attained by his ideal agent. This is the part of his character that is responsible for the goodness of aim, or the rightness of purpose. The correct end of the activity prompted by a prohairesis is what is "good" for the individual in relation to his place in his community. In that respect, a vicious character lacks the correct aim because he lacks the ethical virtue that corresponds to the communal notion of the "good" for which an agent of virtuous character receives the benefits of security and comfort in his everyday living.

As the mark that characterizes the phronimos, whose particular virtue is concerned with those things in life that are of contingent nature, his prohairesis

prompts reactions that fall under the particular "kind" of truth attained by practical wisdom. As such they fail to be assigned the sort of absolute truth or demonstrative certainty established by a purely demonstrative science. Much like an ethical belief, a grand prohairesis lacks the definite truth-value associated with a strong correspondence between proposition and state of affairs. What the grand prohairesis does is to prompt action, issuing judgments from a moral standpoint about what is facticaly feasible and morally right.

The examples of religious beliefs that we have been given by Wittgenstein differ from what Aristotle perceives as a prohairesis in that they need not be for something one can bring about by one's own actions, and so the two accounts seem to somewhat diverge. Aristotle explicitly refuses to use prohairesis as a term to describe a wish pertaining to something that is impossible for the agent to directly affect by his own actions. For example, we cannot have a prohairesis for an athlete to win if there is no way that we can somehow exert our influence in deciding the winner of the race. However, by going to the stadium and by cheering our favored athlete on, we do feel *as if* we do in fact play a part in the athlete's performance. The holding fast to a prohairesis is the holding fast to a conception of a world that the agent can affect and is for actions that the agent thinks are under his power and he can do. Thus, although the "religious" aspect is totally lacking in Aristotle's account of what a prohairesis is, both Wittgensteinian religious beliefs and the Aristotelian prohairesis are concerned with individual, concrete actions that one performs here and now, and in this respect they coincide. A moral person is not necessarily a religious person in "our" usual sense of the word, but a religious person is a moral person according to Wittgenstein's sense. Wittgenstein's account of religious beliefs is in a way an ethical account upon which we can project the notion of an Aristotelian prohairesis.

In the form of an example, a general and a soldier might both share the same kind of an all-encompassing prohairesis that puts them in the precarious position to fight for the same goal, in our case for victory over that which threatens their shared conception of well-being. However, the general's utterance pertaining to the occurrence of a Sea-battle tomorrow is distinctly different when uttered by the simple soldier. Since the soldier cannot directly affect the decision of a battle taking place tomorrow or on any other day, his utterance will not express a prohairesis, but an aspect of his desire or wish. However, since the soldier's utterance can express his willingness or intention to participate (or not) in tomorrows endeavor, we can say that despite the fact that he cannot have a prohairesis, in voicing his wish he nevertheless acts under the compulsion of his prohairesis. The soldier and the general share the kind of prohairesis qua members of a society, but each one has a distinct executive prohairesis qua soldier and qua general respectively.

Aristotle's notion carries the same action-prompting force for a moral agent that a religious belief carries for a religious agent. As Wittgenstein describes a person who is religious as fundamentally a person who lives a certain form of life, so in turn Aristotle describes a person who is moral as fundamentally a person who lives a certain form of life. In that respect, a religious belief and a prohairesis identify a particular way of viewing and living life in the social sphere. As Anscombe has previously suggested, an Aristotelian prohairesis and a Wittgensteinian religious belief depict individual agents exhibiting the same kind of "theoretical attitude" in the choice and performance of their actions. Insofar as we are entitled to see an analogy between ethical and religious beliefs in Wittgenstein's account, a prohairesis is best described as an ethical belief that compares to a moral certainty in regulating one's life and actions. The status of a grand prohairesis in a moral agent's conception of

well-being can be compared to the status of a religious belief in a religious agent's conception of life.

Deinotita seen as comfortable certainty in action

In Wittgenstein's account, the source of the intelligibility of the world and of human beings resides in everyday, public practices. This public, everyday understanding is by and large shared by all competent members of a community. However, once a young member has had sufficient experience in his social environment, this level background becomes the source from which expertise in social coping can be attained. Turning to Aristotle's account, we see that the young moral agent, in participating in this active understanding of the world through ever-expanding societal relations, eventually comes to acquire a picture of the world expressed in the forming of a grand prohairesis that orients his actions towards the common good.

Since no one can prepare a list of precisely defined situations that one will encounter and since no one can have plans or interpretations ready at hand for all such encounters, competent social agents begin to replace reasoned responses with intuitive behavior. Gradually, through habitual and instinctive performance, the involved social actor is able to overcome his training and so far encountered examples, and see new possibilities for action even in the most ambiguous and conflicted situations. What started out as a general responsive attitude towards the world gradually becomes an acquired ability to make more subtle and refined situational discriminations. The longer the experience of acting within a shared cultural practice, the easier it becomes to react through self-activation so as to intervene in the world. These self-activating responses are not born out from any new and novel source, but through the everyday appearance of the world already established in the actor. The very process of teaching and education in acting and speaking through observation and participation is what begins to gradually expand a person's repertoire in all facets of his life prompting intuitive moral performance. Undoubtedly, the transition from competence to expertise is something that happens only to a small part of the members of a society, making those individuals capable of extending the bounds of the intelligible in novel ways, but we must keep in mind that our aim is to describe precisely those agents as examples of virtue attained. In the Wittgensteinian sense however, certainty in action is a necessary presupposition of every kind of action, including that of the young infant. So, in that sense, certainty in behavior is not confined to expert behavior, but occurs always, at least to some extent. So, the analogy with the Aristotelian deinotita is only partial.

For these "ideal" agents, the ability to follow publicly arranged and verifiable "agreements" based upon commonly held communal judgments, is refined in a comfortable, intuitive and spontaneous unreflective interaction with the social environment and the (unspoken) network of social conventions. They start to simply "see" what needs to be achieved rather than deciding which of several possible alternatives should be selected. The goals and the means to ends start to become obvious and the level of involvement becomes such as to exclude doubts, which come only with detached evaluation.

Aristotle describes the practical executive ability that makes one able to take the intermediate steps leading to the fulfillment of the set goal with increasing ease and confidence as deinotita. It is the kind of apprehension the "eye of the soul" provides

that can be attained only after the individual has established a grand prohairesis signifying a total social immersion.

> [This] "mental state", the "knowing", gives [one] no guarantee of what will happen. But it consists in this, that [one] should not understand where a doubt could get a foothold nor where a further test was possible. (O.C. §356)

Not falling back on established standards and rules requires readiness to accept risks and deinotita is the expert social actor's innate tendency securing the confidence needed to do just that. The comprehension of the uniqueness of his concrete situation sets the agent's understanding apart from the one's average understanding in terms of rules and standards.

> One might say: "I know" expresses *comfortable* certainty, not the certainty that is still struggling. (O.C. §357)

Aristotle's definition of the ideal acting moral agent – the phronimos – includes both notions of prohairesis and deinotita. Because there are no rules that dictate that what the phronimos does is the correct thing to do in that type of situation, the phronimos cannot explain why he did what he did. The resolute individual in acting does what might be only retroactively recognized as appropriate but what one does is not the taken-for-granted, average right thing, but what his or her past experience leads him or her to do, given his spontaneous understanding of that particular situation.

> Now I would like to regard this certainty not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well)." (O.C. §358)

Moreover, because each situation is specific and the past experience of the phronimos unique, what he does cannot be *the* appropriate thing; it can only be *an* appropriate thing. Sensitive to the opportune moment for action, deinotita enables the expert moral agent to provide an answer and to offer a reaction in response to the particular situation he is facing, securing the correctness of the answer and the success of the reaction. In keeping his attention targeted to the kairos, the agent is able to seize the occasion and thus go beyond previously encountered examples.

> But that means [we need] to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were as something animal. (O.C. §359)

The "mental state" one has when his "eye of the soul" is at work gives no guarantees. The presented course of action is rooted in the sense of security only a certainty in one's executive abilities and environment can provide. Manipulating the available means with his intuitive performance, the agent feels comfortable in the surrounding social environment to do so, for his prohairesis has instilled inside him both the correctness of reasoning and goodness of aim. Although at first such novel acting might be perceived as unwarranted, hasty or superficial, it will turn out to be a correct response, as an expression of a morally excellent form of life. (Of course this being very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.) In this respect, the "comfortably certain" agent is absolutely attuned to his social surroundings and acts with little effort within the disclosure space of a polis that, as Aristotle and Wittgenstein both invite us to entertain, reminds us of a higher animal's instinctive

reactions and survival traits within the comfort zone of his natural habitat.

IIIb. Moral Responsibility and Justification

Throughout this thesis we have opted to view O.I. 9 and the questions pertaining to the future occurrence of a Sea-battle, as characteristic examples of Aristotle's ethical worries and considerations. If we are to favor this "pragmatic" reading over a more "technical" one, we need to go back to our initial discussion and see in what way the results of our investigation enable us to locate the deeper problematic underlying the ancient text, and if they present us with a better understanding of Aristotle's suggestions concerning human intentional agency and future contingents. More specifically we need to return to our favored interpretation of the particular chapter, that promoted by Frede, and see if and in what way the notions of prohairesis and deinotita as expounded by our account of Wittgenstein's remarks, can both strengthen our conviction for the rightness of that particular interpretation and provide part of an "Aristotelian" envisaged solution.

Concerning conviction of favored interpretation

Given Frede's position that questions having to do with determinism arise not in any absolute or causal sense, but relative to the assumption that propositions corresponding to future contingent affairs are in a definite way true, we will focus our attention on the relation between a future event and the way we choose to describe it. In the foregoing we tried to establish that O.I.9 makes primarily an ethical point centered on a conception of performative praxis within a particular context of Life. As a first step towards that goal, we have related Wittgenstein's take on Ethics with Aristotle's discussion in the N.E.

In doing so, we assume that a language game exists such that human life forms in performance can directly influence and question their own performing. Evidently, our most general and inclusive of purported contexts will be essentially provided by what we usually signify with the use of the term "life". Human life forms and their various claims are regarded as basing their associations in an *agreement* concerning a shared, even if undefined, form of reality. This agreement reflects a particular notion of truth that works to facilitate smooth interaction/inter-relation, which, consequently, articulates a performance within that reality. Any justification or refutation of any particular claim will be primarily evidenced in the way we proceed to make a conscious check whether our claims reflect a uniform and coherent whole of civil procedures. By agreeing on a reality, our various human beings also agree on a particular civilized framework that envelops them, with their respective performance regulated by the kind of "formal politeness" that results from casually observing social conventions. This "formal politeness" exhibits the normative force of such concepts as moral and ethical certainties, religious beliefs, and the like, that from case to case are in play. The level of "formality" depends on the explicit understanding of the particular social conventions or practices to be addressed within each given time-frame and spatial parameters that provide a local focus on our agreement with reality.

In general, contingent propositions represent the logic inherent in our reasoning and civilized practices. After all, it is this kind of propositions that according to Wittgenstein, when linguistically expressed, elucidate the certainties displayed in our "acting". Inadvertently, since our case in point is with O.I. 9, we constrict ourselves to those contingent propositions that are oriented towards a future time frame and are located by the according spatial parameters. Our way of understanding meaningful future contingent propositions as responding to intentional actions and practices is to

invoke the notion of a goal-in-Life as an attitude that any expression of such a future oriented contingent proposition relates us to.

Such experiences will be examples that fall under a familiar mode of linguistic descriptions. Our current list of proposed experiences that are exemplary of a goal-in-Life attitude, all to be found in our chosen texts, are:

a. Taking a walk on a fine summer's day
b. Killing your own Mother
c. Throwing cargo overboard
d. Your cloak being cut up
e. Taking part in a Sea-battle

Wittgenstein, in his "Lecture on Ethics", within which he argues against a universal science of Ethics, proclaims that:

> [T]he absolute good, if it is a desirable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge.

Any attempt to "fix our minds" on what one means when talking of an absolute ethical value, at most can be evidenced in stock and controllable examples such as "taking a walk on a fine summer's day." Wittgenstein describes the accompanying sensations that follow this example as "wonder at the existence of the world", or better yet as an "experience of absolute safety."

The proponents of a universal account of Ethics common to all human beings irrespective of their civilization might find it prudent at this point to argue that Aristotle's conception of eudaimonia is in fact that kind of absolute state of affairs Wittgenstein denies, thus bringing our investigation to a halt.[77] Their argument seems to be that since eudaimonia was defined as internal perfection being the final cause of praxis (N.E. 1101a25), an action will be good if it is proven to contribute to the "internal perfection" of those associated with that act, and bad if it does not. In that way, the proponents of this attitude believe they have found an objective criterion for justifying ethical action, leaving little room for speculation and doubt. Without the existence of eudaimonia conceived as a particular and absolute state of affairs, one could not evaluate human actions, or form social institutions and endorse communal activities. If health, justice, cooperation, the keeping of promises were not "means" to the attainment of "internal perfection" taken as a state, then one could be justified in denouncing all effort and struggle of upholding them.

But then surely this reading of eudaimonia disparages cases of people who, under the influence of events and the pressure of life conditions, exemplify their ethical behavior in ways that countermand their personal happiness and wellbeing. These cases are not as isolated, or as extreme, as the proponents of absolute Ethics would wish, and so cannot become the exceptions that justify the rule saying that ethical actions are directly tied with the personal happiness of man. If nothing else, we are entitled to enquire as to which kind of eudaimonia one such universal ethicist is

[77] In the previous, we have described eudaimonia as an *attitude* towards states of affairs, and not as a state of affairs. Thus we consider "internal perfection" to describe an attitude towards the world. See pg. 34.

referring us to. As Wittgenstein might put it, people give meaning to eudaimonia according to the Form of Life they belong to, and even then they themselves might not agree on what eudaimonia actually is. Within a shared Form of Life, there is literally a plethora of "goals" one is liable to pursue with the attainment of which a form of happiness could ensue. Eudaimonia, in this sense, is nothing but a humanly chosen route in life, a potentiality depending on the moment (kairos) that we make an ethical choice, according to the conditions we find ourselves in, or the knowledge we have amassed, all of which weighed against a "from case to case" conceived notion of ethical value. This is after all the reason why our ethical behavior must not, and is not, defined by a goal common to all, but exclusively by our own free will. As Wittgenstein acknowledges, there are a multitude of examples one might "fix his mind to" as portraying a characteristic experience that carries any ethical value. It is quite possible that no two people agree on using the same examples to express their goal-in-Life of living well. (*"As I have said before, this is an entirely personal matter and others would find other examples more striking.")*

Those who wish to engineer a universal account of Ethics by assuming a teleological account of ethical action seem to argue that ethical behavior must be judged and defined, not by those things that differentiate us as human beings, but only by the final – common – goal-in-Life attitude that brings us together under the same perspective. Simply put, such a position would logically oblige us to know our destination in Life and the goals we need to pursue and strive for beforehand, in order to truly appreciate our lives.

Granted, Aristotle's theory of cause is a teleological structure but, as was previously[78] argued, his account of the human good and goal-in-Life in the N.E. should not be understood in terms of any temporal process and end to be causally effected by some "means" or other, but rather, as an account of a characteristically human state of completion, and a concept of self-activation that includes the notions of introspection and self-awareness. When Aristotle appears to describe a hierarchy of means to ends in the N.E., what he enumerates are not just "means to", but "constituents of", or "ingredients of" eudaimonia. These are after all the "choiceworthy" choices that exemplify the established formation of a grand prohairesis. Accordingly, eudaimonia should not be understood as a condition of "happiness" consequent upon all the attainable goals of practical reasoning, but as virtually the very condition of the "flourishing" human being in reasoning and acting, evident in our everyday dealings.

In effect, we claim that Aristotle would endorse the example of "taking a walk on a fine summer's day" as an obvious candidate for voicing his goal-in-Life attitude. This claim can be additionally reinforced by reference to an example used by Aristotle in the N.E. that works as a counterexample of a goal-in-Life attitude and eudaimonia. As it is, it is an example that works to "fix our minds" on what one means when talking of the "absolute evil":

> There are actions, that one should never allow himself to be forced to execute but rather die suffering through the worst of tortures. Whatever made Alcmaeon of Euripides kill his own mother is ridiculous.[79]

[78] See pg. 10

[79] Aristotle refers to a lost tragedy of Euripides. Alcmaeon was the son of Amphiaraus and Eriphyle. Because his mother betrayed his father to his enemies, Alcmaeon was ordered by Amphiaraus to kill Eriphyle. Having complied with his father's wishes, Alcmaeon was driven mad from guilt.

For the vast majority, "Killing your mother" is certainly not a characteristic experience of ethical value in the sense that "taking a walk on a fine summer's day" can be. Aristotle is referring to a particular tragedy of Euripides that has to do with matricide, taking for granted the fact that the majority of his audience have knowledge of the particular drama, and have formed an opinion about the "ridiculous" reasons that led Alcmeon to kill his mother. In an attempt to relate Aristotle's example with Wittgenstein's, we can claim that if we take the use of the term "mother" as a term evoking in one's mind those sensations of "absolute safety and comfort" Wittgenstein attaches to any approach towards the "absolute good", then a crude, but helpful, analogy between the two examples can be drawn. If the picture associated with "taking a walk on a fine summer's day" is seen as an attainable picture of Paradise, then "killing your mother", as an example of "absolute evil", can be seen as an attainable picture of Hell. What is of importance to us, to further our attempts at promoting a practical aspect, is to examine what we mean by "attainable" in each case.

It is for that reason that we need to turn our attention to the matter of boulisis (deliberation), by reminding ourselves of desires, plan making, and reasoning processes, that make any kind of "attainment" possible in the first place.

If we wish to portray ourselves as objective critics of ethical behavior concerned with ethical responsibility, we need to realize and accept that certain actions taken by themselves, are not such as to allow an effortless detection of ethical value, thus allowing easy reach to an ethical verdict. In N.E. 1110a10-21 Aristotle uses the example of "throwing cargo overboard during a storm" to make this point apparent:

> In the abstract no one throws away intentionally [the ship's cargo overboard during a storm], but to save the life of himself and his crew any sensible man will do so. Such praxis, then, are mixed, but resemble intentional ones; for at the moment of being performed they are objects of choice. The end of a praxis depends on the occasion: so the moment (kairos) of praxis is when the terms "intentional" and "unintentional" are to be applied. So, in a sense, the man performs the praxis intentionally since the movement of his organic parts that are the instruments of praxis has its origin in the agent himself. But, if the origin resides within the one who acts, it is up to him to execute or refrain from executing. As such, the execution can be called "intentional", but also, in another sense, "unintentional", since no one desires to execute those acts for their own sake.

Obviously by claiming that the end or "final cause" of praxis depends on the occasion (kairos), Aristotle is in effect supporting our previous claim that eudaimonia, i.e. the final cause of praxis, is indeed, at least in the N.E. account, something to be defined from case to case and from time to time.

This quotation further serves to make a vital distinction between cause and reason, for it seems that there is a difference between giving a "reason for acting" and providing a "cause of action".

Consider a question, and two different answers:

Q: What made you throw the cargo overboard?

1. I heaved with my two hands, and I threw the cargo overboard
2. I wanted to save the lives of myself and my crew, and I threw the cargo overboard

Answer 1. identifies a cause, whereas answer 2. identifies a reason. Reasons may be causes, but not all causes are reasons. It is a mistake to try to explain intentional behavior in terms of causal mechanisms alone. However, it is also a mistake to consider what is done due to certain normative standards of correctness as completely independent of what is triggered by causal mechanisms. In any case, there seems to be a difference between "mere" causal explanation and "reasons" explanation.[80] Of course, as Aristotle's account allows, we could construct a "book of causal Law" that only concentrates on "brutal facts" to reach a verdict. By doing so, we could characterize the "throwing away of cargo" as intentional, since the "brutal fact" is that a particular man consciously used his limbs to throw the cargo overboard. However, this method of attributing intentionality in a man's action through such a restrictive cause-effect account would only come out as a serious misinterpretation of Aristotle's argumentation. Either way, as acknowledged earlier,[81] such a strict causal analysis although useful in describing the processes of nature and artistic production, is doomed to fail in the case of intentional human agency.

On a different note, we could choose to follow a more "technical" approach and stipulate various conditions whose fulfillment (or not) of which might seem to make the decision easier. Such conditions could be:

Belief Condition 1: If A believes he can effect ϕ, then A ϕ's intentionally
Knowledge Condition: A ϕ-s intentionally only if A ϕ's knowingly
Voluntariness Condition: A ϕ-s intentionally only if A ϕ's voluntarily

,e.t.c.

These conditions however, inherently flawed and vague as they are, serve little to promote our own take on the matter. Such universal conditions cannot do justice to the particular situations we need to deal with in trying to establish an ethical value for a given praxis. For example the captain surely knows that by throwing away the cargo his employer will suffer financially, but (under normal circumstances) we cannot claim that that is part of his intentions.

What our so-far account of phronesis has insisted upon is in promoting a sense of a performative praxis as being "intentional-within-a-description", and it is this line of thought that we will continue to follow throughout.

As stated earlier, rocks, floods, viruses, non-human animals, children, and adult human beings can be causally responsible (in the strict sense) for certain actions that result in certain effects, but only human adults can be said to hold ethical responsibility for the results of their praxis. Children and animals, for example, can be said to act in a way that makes them the cause of certain effects (N.E. 1111b8-9), but their behavior is denied description in moral or ethical terms (N.E. 1145a25-27). It is obvious that ethical agency, at least in the N.E. account, involves the exercise of a type of "causality" particular to the adult human self; one, stretching terms too far, might call it "reasoning".

Aristotle's typical position concerning non-accidental efficient causation allows both a substance and a causal power to be cited as efficient causes. The sculptor and his acquired skill of sculpting, the house-builder and his exercised activity of house building, can both be said to be the efficient causes that, unless externally impeded,

[80] There is an abundance of literature on this particular topic. However, for present purposes it suffices to simply note the existence of a distinction and relate it with the issue at hand.

[81] See pg. 10

result in the "natural" production of a statue and a house respectively. One of the main points of this theory is that the particular ability that identifies an agent is considered a standing condition that exercises a continuous efficacy, both when its particular capacities are active, and when they are not.

By additionally reminding ourselves of the fact that Aristotle recognizes cases were the description of the agent involved is not specifically or directly connected with the actualization that is attainable, we might be able to view the "throwing away of the cargo" example in a clearer light. For, surely, the captain of a cargo ship is not hired for his abilities in life-saving, but for his abilities in sea-faring.

As is the case with our example, "being a captain" and "saving one's life", taken as factual descriptions of possible situations, have come to be together to form the nucleus of the example. This is obviously a case of an "accidental conjecture", since these "items" do not come together always, or at least they do not do so for the most part. Obviously, there is no self-explanatory association of a "cause and effect" mode that would make this coming-together at a particular moment in time readily available for sufficient explanation. It is precisely at this point that prohairesis, the efficient cause of praxis, serves its purpose in our account.

We have claimed that, in general, an ethical agent is identified with his prohairesis, which, as an ethical certainty prompting action, points to a particular commitment to a way of assessing life at any given moment, at any given circumstance. As for what has to be done for the sake of prohairesis, i.e. for the sake of assessing life the way we do, we are provided with the power of an executive nature that is exemplified in our comfortable attitude in addressing our life assessments. It is only when these considerations are all taken into account that the "accidental conjecture" will seem to fit a "non-accidental" description. That is, only when we refer to those terms that cause the formation of a moral world picture particular to the adult member of a community will we be able to successfully describe the situation at hand. "Any sensible man", Aristotle proclaims, would throw away the cargo to save his life and the life of his fellow crew-members, not just the captain who, accidentally, is the man justified by his position to give the final order.

But what of that man who, fully aware of his responsibilities and place in life both as captain and human being, while realizing the negative aspects of his action is still able to provide a reasonable description of his actions, maintaining and accepting his deeds as "intentional-within-the-description"? Aristotle's account is once more elucidating and precise. No praise, no blame, but a communal assurance by a "jury of his peers" is reserved for these cases, one that, given the circumstances, given the choices available, and irrespective of the consequences, assures that anyone would do the same thing. In an important even if hard to articulate sense, the individual prohairesis of a captain as being an integral part of a civilized society, is what the agent is, consequently identifying the identity of the shared Form of Life, within an "intentional-within-a-description" description.

Keeping all of this in mind, we can address the examples encountered in O. I. 9 in the same way. For that reason, we remind the passage in O.I. 19a10-18 where Aristotle is providing us with the example of a cloak being cut up:

> [I]t is possible for this cloak to be cut up, and yet it will not be cut up but wear out first. But equally, its not being cut up is also possible, for it would not be the case that it wore out first unless its not being cut up were possible. So it is the same with all other events that are spoken of in terms of this kind of possibility.

Speaking in terms of the aforementioned kind of possibility, Frede's line of interpretation offers us a useful reading to keep in mind:

> The result is that the Aristotelian can admit that e.g. it is true that your prediction that my coat will be cut up does not bring it's destruction about; the scissors do that. Yet my spiteful hanging on to it "makes" your prediction wrong; just as your prediction "made" me hold on to it.[82]

Frede's "likely story" of the cloak example can work equally well for the infamous Sea-battle example. By reasonably (intentionally) choosing a description for the future event of a Sea-battle taking place, we can see in what way Aristotle's interests in deliberation and plan-making fall into place. In effect, we are now in the position to better understand Aristotle's civilized indeterminism, as relative to the level of involvement of the respective agents whose future holds the occurrence or not of a Sea-battle. Provided our so far argumentation has made it plausible, by treating the "taking place" of a Sea-battle in a similar way with the "taking place" of a walk on a fine summer's day, we are able to describe tomorrow's Sea-battle as a characteristic experience of ethical value, typical in every case of human, and thus moral, action.

Concerning grounds for conviction of proposed solution

Having secured for ourselves a particular way to understand the worries unearthed in O.I. 9, by acknowledging Frede's "likely story" and interpretation as more than worth our while, the time is ripe for us to examine her proposed reading of the chapter.

Frede urges us to take into account Aristotle's distinctions concerning what is mellon (what is going to happen) and what is heste (what will happen), as these are explicated in On Generation and Corruption and Rhetoric.[83]

In an attempt to pre-empt our reservations, Frede is quick to acknowledge that:

> [T]he passage in the On Generation and Corruption seems to presuppose the discussion in On Interpretation 9 and it is very possible that once the semantic distinction was canonized no further discussion was deemed necessary. In On Interpretation however, the problem was unavoidable since all contradictory assertions and negations and their truth and falsity were under discussion.

She then follows this remark with a footnote:

> This accounts for the fact, it seems, that Aristotle can touch the problem of future contingents with a lighter hand in On Generation and Corruption. Circumlocutions with "μέλλει" on the other hand, are much more difficult to handle in a context like that of On Interpretation because of the vagueness of the meaning of the colloquial phrase.

For a variety of reasons we are reluctant to freely adopt such a solution to the chapter. First and foremost it is because of our current inability to comment and thus assume a definite position concerning what, if anything, is presupposed in the discussion being

[82] See Frede, "The Sea-battle Reconsidered", pg.61

[83] See pg. 23

waged in On Generation and Corruption. Our investigation has centered on particular parts of the Aristotelian corpus that do not include extensive reading of Frede's proposed texts. It would be inappropriate to assume such things at face value. This lack of knowledge, coupled with the fact that locutions with mellon are admittedly not handled in our context of O.I. 9, makes it seem unwise to burden our current discussion with even more locutions of "vague meaning".

Even so, entertaining the idea that "Aristotle also somewhat hides behind a diplomatic terminology",[84] we feel prompted, in great part due to our affiliation with Wittgenstein, to aim for full disclosure.

Let us, in that respect, identify "There is going to be a Sea-battle tomorrow" with "A Sea-battle is mellon tomorrow", and "There will be a Sea-battle tomorrow" with "A Sea-battle is heste tomorrow". Now, according to Aristotle in Rhetoric and as supported by more recent accounts,[85] we have that:

1. For "There will be a Sea-battle tomorrow" to be true now, necessarily, the state of affairs being described must eventually some time tomorrow come to be. That is, tomorrow, the utterance "There is a Sea-battle" must at some moment in time depict the state of the actual (local) world.

2. For "There is going to be a Sea-battle tomorrow" to be true now, there is no need for the described state of affairs to actually come to be at some time tomorrow.

With the use of "will", no actions of the self interfere with the occurrence of the Sea-battle, irrespective of external parameters that could still influence the outcome. With the use of "going to be", the possibility of a personally induced obstacle arising, one non-related with external parameters, is still left open. That is, in the case of "going to be" one could still "change his mind" and act in such a way as to alter the proposed outcome. Thus, "There will be a Sea-battle tomorrow" is false if in the end a Sea-battle does not take place tomorrow, which is not the case with "There is going to be a Sea-battle tomorrow". Seen in this way, a cop-out solution to our problems seems evident. We can adopt the appropriate linguistic conventions and use in our discourses and practices only locutions with "going to be."[86] But is that truly something our overall investigation prompts us to propose? Yes and no. After all, in Rhetoric, we are advised to use such "going to be" locutions to evoke feelings of imminence to our audience, thus promoting involvement in the affairs described.

If we are to make practical sense of a performed praxis, or encountered example, active involvement is a prerequisite to all facets of our account. It is only with this condition satisfied that any explanation can be seen to fit a reasonable and civil picture. If we, as involved assertors, recognize the gain of assuming such "linguistic conventions" to our discourse, we need to assume that our respective and involved audience does to. As Aristotle's account in the N.E. has made evident, the phronimos agent is an ethical agent enjoying a particular "assertoric" status in his community and it is only natural to assume that his fellow civilians, with which the phronimos forms an organic whole, recognize that status, and in so doing license and encourage the

[84] See Frede, "The Sea-battle Reconsidered", pg. 43

[85] The distinction between locutions with "will be" and "going to be" are also mentioned in M. van Lambalgen and F. Hamm, "The Proper Treatment of Events", pg. 114-127.

[86] Incidentaly this is also Van Rijen's proposed solution to the chapter.

phronimos to take the sort of action, or even make the sort of utterance where objective justification is not possible.[87]

Granted, the agent of the phronimos is a special and ideal case of a social actor. But it is precisely this special case that Aristotle wants his audience to keep in mind as an example to aspire to and imitate. It is as if the moral agent takes the responsibility upon himself and guarantees the truth of his assertion simply by referring to his way of assessing life, which is of course anything but an objective way of providing justification. Quoting Wittgenstein:

> It makes a difference: whether one is learning in school what is right and wrong in mathematics, or whether I myself say that I cannot be making a mistake in a proposition. In the latter case I am adding something special to what is generally laid down." (O.C. §664, 665)

The phronimos's only way to respond to challenges pertaining to his claim is only to "cling" to his prohairesis, his commitment to a particular narrative, and to the world that it depicts. By making a promise, taking an oath, giving one's word, we invoke the strength of our societal relations with our fellow society members to provide credibility to our claims.

The need to assign an ontological status to future events to which nothing corresponds in current actual terms is satisfied by the assurance the figure of the phronimos provides that can make it the case that even though the judgment itself might retroactively prove to be wrong, the wanting of what was judged best as a means to doing well can still be right.

> In particular circumstances one says "you can rely on this"; and this assurance may be justified or unjustified in everyday language, and it may also count as justified even when what was foretold does not occur. A language-game exists in which this assurance is employed. (O.C. §620)

There can be no "normal" kind of justification that can answer to the question of how one *knows* that there is going to be a Sea-battle tomorrow, for in the strict sense one cannot *know* beforehand. It is not a case where we can procure concrete and secure evidence to support our claim. As Wittgenstein says:

> [I]f what [one] believes is of such a kind that the grounds which he can give are no surer than his assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes.(O.C. §243)

---

[87] Brandom calls this kind of assertion a "bare assertion" and considers it a special case of a more fundamental case of assertion. He identifies a particular kind of "force" these "bare assertions" have in the mouths of tribal Deities or religious enthousiasts. In his words, and in relation with our previous account of religious beliefs, when such people claim something,

> others may take their word for the truth of what is asserted – others have the speakers warrant to rely on what has been asserted as a premise for inference. And this dimension of authority makes sense only if such an authority can be appealed to justify otherwise impermissible utterances. Thus even bare assertion presupposes a context in which the *audience* consists of assertors and inferers who *do* undertake justificatory responsibility for their remarks.

See Brandom R., "Asserting", pp.643

As Aristotle also recognized, the fact that the premises of a proof entail the conclusion and are true is only sufficient for the formal validity of the proof. However, their epistemological usefulness depends on that they must also be "better known" than the conclusion. In the case of assertions about future contingents the latter conditions cannot be met, hence the most that one can reply to the challenge of "How do you know?" is with "In *thi*s case, at *this* time, *I* am led to see it *this* way."

> It would be wrong to say that I can only say "I know that there is a chair there" when there is a chair there. Of course it isn't true unless there is, but I have a right to say this if I am sure there is a chair there, even if I am wrong. (O.C. § 549)

Suppose that a phronimos agent has judged truly that a Sea-battle taking place tomorrow is necessary for doing well, but falsely that a Sea-battle is going to take place tomorrow. If he asserts today that a Sea-battle is going to take place tomorrow, and this turns out not to be the case due to unforeseen circumstances, the phronimos will not lose any credibility as an assertor since he is held morally responsible not for the occurrence or not of the Sea-battle, but for what the wanting of the Sea-battle was for. If on the other hand he has judged truly that a Sea-battle taking place tomorrow is necessary for doing well but, aware that things could go either way, opts to announce that "There will be a sea-battle tomorrow, and this is true in the ordinary sense but it is in fact quite open and there may not be a sea battle after all", he will have in fact denounced any kind of responsibility and commitment. Instead of attempting to "speak truly" and make a meaningful though perhaps wrong assertion, he would have engaged in idle talk.

When it comes to a question of what the future holds, there is no objective truth that we can start from, no ultimate justification that we can reach. All we can do is point to the ties of interpersonal regards of trust and goodwill to our fellow men, and to the level of moral responsibility we are willing to undertake as active members of a society, committed as we are to a specific way of assessing life and its demands.

Taking into account Aristotle's worries, we need to enquire as to what is that "added special" when I myself say that I cannot be making a mistake in a proposition that points to the existence of a language game concerning "reliance" that makes the phronimos and his fellow human beings so "sure" of. In our opinion, with respect to both Aristotle and Wittgenstein, it is the way we act that makes all the difference in the world. Ancombe's rendition of O.I. 9 seems to suggest silence as the appropriate thing for the phronimos agent to uphold, a suggestion that could in some cases prove useful. After all, no one knows what the future holds and so upon questioned about such things, a phronimos agent could indeed refuse to respond, or avoid providing a straight answer to a question pertaining to a future Sea-battle, in "silencing out" questions impossible to answer definitely. Given the practical aspect of our account, a suggestion that the person asking the question to "go get some sleep" seems more to the point.

In closing we feel confident enough to confirm that both Aristotle and Wittgenstein, besides being indeterminists, and civilized at that, are (unfortunately?) not duty-free. They both seem to naturally assume ethical responsibility as essential to Life and its various Forms. After all is said and done, it is indeed all about Ethics.

Bibliography

[1] Ackrill, J.L.: 1984. *Aristotle the Philosopher*, Oxford University Press

[2] Ackrill, J.L.: 1978. Aristotle on action, *Mind New Series* 87 (348), pp. 595-601

[3] Anscombe, G.E.M.: 1965. Thought and action in Aristotle: What is practical truth?, in R. Bambrough (ed.), *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, New York, pp. 143-158

[4] Anscombe, G.E. M.: 1956. Aristotle and the sea-battle, *Mind LXV*, pp. 1-15

[5] Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*, Kaktos Publishing House

[6] Aristotle: *Organon Volume I: Categories, On Interpretation*, Kaktos Publishing House

[7] Brandom, R.: 1983. Asserting, *Nous* 17 (4), pp. 637-650

[8] Brandom, R.: 1976. Truth and assertibility, *The Journal of Philosophy* 73 (6), pp. 137-149

[9] Carr, D.: 1979. The logic of knowing how and ability, *Mind New Series* 88 (351), pp 394-409

[10] Chamberlain, C.: 1984. The meaning of prohairesis in Aristotle's ethics, *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 114, pp. 147-157

[11] Charles, D.: 1984. *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action*, Duckworth Publishing

[12] Dreyfus, H.L.: 2002. Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation, *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1, pp. 367-385

[13] Dreyfus, H.L.: 2004. What could be more intelligible than everyday intelligibility? Reinterpreting division I of Being and Time in the light of division II, *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society* 24 (3), pp. 265-274

[14] Dromm, K.: 2003. Imaginary naturalism: The *natural* and *primitive* in Wittgenstein's later thought, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 11 (4), pp. 673-690

[15] Frede, D.: 1985. The sea-battle reconsidered: A defense of the traditional interpretation, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 3, pp. 31-87

[16] Hintikka, J.: 1977. Aristotle on modality and determinism, *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, XXIX

[17] Hintikka, J.: 1973. *Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality*, Oxford Clarendon Press

[18] Jeffrey, R.C. and **Von Wright, G.H.:** 1979. Intention and intentionality, in C. Diamond and J. Teichman (eds.), *Essays in Honor of G.E.M. Anscombe*, , Sussex

[19] Joachim, H.H. and **Rees, D.A. (ed.):** 1966. *Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics – A Commentary*, Oxford Clarendon Press

[20] Katz, B.D.: 1996. On a sophisma of Richard Kilvington and a problem of analysis, *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5, pp. 31-38

[21] Kenny, J.P.: 1979. *Aristotle's Theory of the Will*, New Haven

[22] Kober, M.: 1997. On epistemic and moral certainty: A Wittgensteinian approach, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 51, pp. 365-381

[23] Korner, S. (ed.): 1974, *Practical Reason*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell

[24] Kirkland, S.D.: 2007. The temporality of phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics, *Ancient Philosophy* 27, pp. 127-140

[25] Kretzmann, N.: 1977. Socrates is whiter than Plato begins to be white, *Nous* 11 (1), pp. 3-15

[26] Kretzmann, N.: and **Sorabji R.** 1976. Aristotle on the instant of change, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 50, pp. 69-89 and 91-114

[27] Kretzmann, N.: 1983. Goodness, knowledge, and indeterminacy in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas", *The Journal of Philosophy* 80 (10) Part 2, pp. 631-649

[28] Lambalgen, M. and **Hamm, F.:** 2005. *The Proper Treatment of Events*, Blackwell Publishing

[29] MacClure, G.: 1978. Contingent a priori truths, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 38 (3), pp. 399-409

[30] MacFarlane, J.: 2007. Future contingents and relative truth, *The Philosophical Quarterly* 53 (212), pp. 321-336

[31] Malcolm, N.: 1982. Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behavior, *Philosophical Investigations* 5 (1), pp. 3-22

[32] Meyer, S.S.: 1993. *Aristotle on Moral Responsibility*, Blackwell Publishing

[33] Montada, J.P.: 1996. Aristotle and Averroes on "coming-to-be" and "passing-away", *Oriens* 35, pp. 1-34

[34] Rees, R. and **Phillips, D.Z. (ed.):** 2003. *Wittgenstein's On Certainty*, Blackwell Publishing

[35] Rijen, J.: 1986. *Aristotle's Logic of Necessity*, Offsetdrukkerij Kanters B.V. Alblasserdam

[36] Schapiro, T.: 2001. Three conceptions of action in moral theory", *Nous*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 93-117

[37] Schatzki, T.R.: 1996. *Social Practices*, Cambridge University Press

[38] Sorabji, R.: 1980. *Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory*, Duckworth Publishing

[39] Stokhof, M.: 2002. *World and Life as One: Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought*, Stanford University Press

[40] Stump, E.: 1992. God's obligations, *Philosophical Perspectives* 6, pp. 475-491

[41] Taylor, R.: 1957. The problem of future contingencies, *The Philosophical Review* 66 (1), pp. 1-28

[42] Taylor, R.: 1960. I can, *The Philosophical Review* 69 (1), pp. 78-89

[43] White, M. J.: 1981. Fatalism and causal determinism: An Aristotelian essay, *The Philosophical Quarterly* 31 (124), pp. 231-241

[44] Williams, G.: 1951. Freedom of choice in the pre-determined future, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 12 (1), pp. 130-134

[45] Wittgenstein, L.: 1969. *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, Basil Blackwell Oxford

[46] Wittgenstein, L.: 1969. *On Certainty*, Basil Blackwell Oxford

[47] Wittgenstein, L.: 1969. *Philosophical Investigations*, Basil Blackwell Oxford