Modal Logic over Finite Structures*

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September, 1995

In this paper, we discuss the finite model theory of propositional modal logic, PM. Modal logic has been studied extensively in connection with philosophical logic. More recently, connections have emerged between modal logic and computational linguistics and certain areas of computer science. Below we will be interested in the 'classical model theory' of modal logic, an approach taken by van Benthem and others. For example, PM satisfies certain preservation theorems that are analogous to classical theorems for first-order logic, FO. We show that, in contrast to more expressive logics, PM remains well-behaved over the class $\mathcal{F}$ of finite structures, as various classical results remain true over this class.

In order to make this paper self-contained, we briefly describe the syntax and semantics of PM. Most of this material is well-known, and more detailed descriptions can be found in many places (e.g. see [3]). The syntax of PM is obtained from that of simple sentential logic by adding the two modal operators $\Box\varphi$, *necessarily* φ, and $\Diamond\varphi$, *possibly* φ. Over a signature of *proposition symbols*, $\sigma = \{p_1, \ldots, p_k\}$, the class of sentences of PM(σ) is the smallest class containing each atomic sentence p_i and closed under negation, conjunction, disjunction, and the operators $\Box$ and $\Diamond$. We will always assume that the signature is finite and non-empty. A (Kripke) model of PM(σ) is a directed graph A with additional unary

*I would like to thank Prof. Johan van Benthem for introducing me to this subject and to his work, and for many helpful suggestions. I am also extremely grateful to Scott Weinstein for his insight, encouragement, and guidance, and to Marco Hollenberg and Steven Lindell for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This paper constitutes part of my dissertation.

†Supported in part by NSF-STC SBR-8920230.

predicates, $\{P_1, \ldots, P_k\}$, corresponding to each proposition symbol. The edge relation Rxy is often called the 'accessibility relation', and we will say that b is accessible from a just in case Rab.

Definition 1 *Satisfaction for sentences of* PM *at a node (or world) is defined inductively.*

1. $(A, a) \models^{PM} p_i$ *iff* $A \models P_i(a)$.

2. *The Boolean operations are given their standard interpretations.*

3. *For the modal operator necessarily,* $(A, a) \models^{PM} \Box q$ *iff for all* $b \in A$ *such that* $A \models Rab, (A, b) \models^{PM} q$. *Possibly is defined dually,* $(A, a) \models^{PM} \Diamond q$ *iff there is some* $b \in A$ *such that* $A \models Rab$ *and* $(A, b) \models^{PM} q$.

This semantics suggest a natural interpretation of PM into FO. In fact, by reusing variables we can translate PM into the language L^2, the set of FO-formulas that only contain two (reusable) variables, x_0 and x_1. Since sentences of PM are evaluated at a node of the Kripke model, they naturally translate into FO-formulas with one free variable. In order to keep the image of the translation in L^2, we will simultaneously define two functions, $\mu_0(\varphi)$ and $\mu_1(\varphi)$ such that (i) $\mu_d(\varphi)$ contains x_d free; and (ii) for all $\varphi \in$ PM, $\mu_1(\varphi)$ is obtainable from $\mu_0(\varphi)$ by replacing every occurrence of x_0 by x_1, and vice-versa. The functions $\mu_d(\varphi)$ from sentences of PM to formulas of L^2 are defined inductively as follows:

$$\mu_d(p_j) = P_j(x_d)$$

$$\mu_d(q_1 \wedge q_2) = \mu_d(q_1) \wedge \mu_d(q_2)$$

$$\mu_d(\neg q) = \neg \mu_d(q)$$

$$\mu_d(\Box q) = \forall x_{1-d}(Rx_d x_{1-d} \rightarrow \mu_{1-d}(q))$$

$$\mu_d(\Diamond q) = \exists x_{1-d}(Rx_d x_{1-d} \wedge \mu_{1-d}(q))$$

To simplify the exposition, we add a single constant c to our FO-signature, to convert each formula with one free variable into a sentence. Let $\mu(\varphi)$ be the function from PM to L^2 such that for all $\varphi \in$ PM, $\mu(\varphi)$ is obtained from $\mu_0(\varphi)$ by replacing each *free* occurence of x_0 by c. Then each model is viewed as having a distinguished node, at which modal sentences are evaluated. Let FO^M, the *modal fragment of first-order logic*, be the image of PM under the mapping $\mu(\varphi)$.

In his dissertation [2], van Benthem gave an algebraic characterization of FO-definable classes that are definable by a modal sentence. He introduced the following important notion.

Definition 2 *Given two models A and B (with distinguished nodes c^A and c^B), a bisimulation between A and B, is a binary relation, $\sim$, contained in $A \times B$, such that*

1. $c^A \sim c^B$
2. *For all a, b such that $a \sim b$, if $A \models Raa'[B \models Rbb']$, then there is a $b' \in B[a' \in A]$ such that $a' \sim b'$*
3. *For all a, b such that $a \sim b$, and all P_j, $A \models P_j(a)$ iff $B \models P_j(b)$.*

We say that A bisimulates with B iff there is a bisimulation between the two models. We also write $(A, a) \sim (B, b)$ if there is a bisimulation $\sim$ between A and B such that $a \sim b$.

Bisimulation is an equivalence relation on structures, which can be seen as a modified, weak kind of partial isomorphism. It is easy to see that if there is a bisimulation between a pair of models, then they satisfy the same modal sentences.

Van Benthem proved the following preservation theorem: a FO-definable class of models is closed under bisimulations iff it can be defined by a sentence in FO^M. Below we prove that this result remains true over $\mathcal{F}$. We then show that an 'existential' preservation theorem, due to van Benthem and Visser (see [1]), also holds over the class of finite structures. Finally, we give an alternative proof, which does not use the compactness theorem, of Andreka, van Benthem, and Nemeti's result [1] establishing the modal analog of the Craig interpolation theorem.

1 Background

In this section, we present background information needed for the proofs of the main results that appear in Section 2. Our development of this material closely parallels analogous results for both FO and for the various finite variable logics. We first define an infinite game to characterize full bisimulation. We then introduce finite versions of the game, and the notion of 'n-bisimulation', and determine their connection to modal definability.

In the *(eternal) modal Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game* the Spoiler and the Duplicator play a modified two pebble Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game, with pebble pairs $(\alpha_0, \beta_0), (\alpha_1, \beta_1)$. At the start of the game, pebbles α_0 and β_0 are on c^A and c^B, respectively. In round 1, the S either places α_1 on some element of A such that $A \models R\alpha_0\alpha_1$ or places β_1 on some element of B such that $B \models R\beta_0\beta_1$. The D then does the same on the other structure. In each subsequent round $n+1$, the Spoiler chooses a pair (α_i, β_i) of pebbles, already in play, and replays either α_i on A such that $A \models R\alpha_{1-i}\alpha_i$ or β_i on B such that $B \models R\beta_{1-i}\beta_i$. The D then plays the other pebble on the other structure in accordance with the same restriction. Each player loses immediately if he or she cannot make a legal move. The Spoiler wins at round n if there is P_m such that $A \models P_m\alpha_i$ iff $B \not\models P_m\beta_i$. (Observe that the Duplicator does not have to play so that the partial mapping from A to B induced by the pebbles is a partial isomorphism—e.g. in some round, she could play β_1 on the same element as β_0 in B, even if S had not just played α_1 on α_0 in A. This is because sentences of FO^M do not contain equality.) The Duplicator wins the game, just in case, in every round the Spoiler does not win. The following proposition is straightforward.

Proposition 1 *For all A and B of signature σ, the following conditions are equivalent:*

1. *There is a bisimulation between A and B.*
2. *The Duplicator has a winning strategy in the modal game on A on B.*

We turn our attention now to modal definability.

Definition 3 *The quantifier rank of a formula, $qr(\varphi)$, is defined inductively.*

1. $qr(P_i) = 0$
2. $qr(\neg\varphi) = qr(\varphi)$
3. $qr(\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2) = qr(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2) = max(qr(\varphi_1), qr(\varphi_2))$
4. $qr(\Diamond\varphi) = qr(\Box\varphi) = qr(\varphi) + 1$

Of course, there are no genuine quantifiers in PM; the choice of terminology emphasizes the connection between PM and FO. In particular, for all $\varphi \in$ PM, $qr(\varphi)$ equals the quantifier rank of the FO-sentence, $\mu(\varphi)$. Let PM^n be the set of sentences of quantifier

rank $\leq n$. Given a model A, the PM^n-theory of A is then the set of sentences, of quantifier rank $\leq n$, satisfied by A.

Lemma 1 *Let σ be a fixed signature.*

1. *For all n, up to logical equivalence, there are finitely many sentences of PM^n.*
2. *There is a recursive function $f(n)$ that generates a (finite) list of all sentences, up to logical equivalence, of quantifier rank $\leq n$.*
3. *For all A, the PM^n-theory of A is finitely axiomatizable.*

Proof. We prove Part 1 by induction on n. The case $n = 0$ is obvious. For $n + 1$, observe that every sentence of quantifier rank $\leq n + 1$ is a Boolean combination of sentences of the form $\Diamond\theta$, with $qr(\theta) \leq n$. Parts 2 and 3 follow easily from Part 1. ■

Definition 4 *We say that there is an n-bisimulation between A and B, written $A \sim_n B$, iff there is a sequence of relations $\sim_0, \ldots, \sim_n$, each on $A \times B$, such that:*

1. $c^A \sim_0 c^B$
2. *For all $m < n$, if $a \sim_m b$, and $A \models Raa'$ then there is a $b' \in B$ such that $B \models Rbb'$ and $a' \sim_{m+1} b'$[and vice-versa].*
3. *For all $m \leq n$, if $a \sim_m b$, then for all P_j, $A \models P_j(a)$ iff $B \models P_j(b)$.*

Intuitively, $A \sim_n B$ means that A and B bisimulate 'up to depth n'. Observe that $A \sim B$ implies $A \sim_n B$, for all n, and that $\sim_n$ also defines an equivalence relation on classes of structures. By fixing a bound on the number of rounds in a game, we get the n-round modal Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game. Then the following proposition can be proved by straightforward modification of standard results connecting Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games to logical expressibility.

Proposition 2 *For all n, and A and B over some σ, the following conditions are equivalent:*

1. *There is an n-bisimulation between A and B.*

2. *The Duplicator has a winning strategy in the n-round modal game on A on B.*

3. *For all modal formulas θ of quantifier rank $\leq n$, $A \models \theta$ iff $B \models \theta$.*

The next proposition follows easily from Proposition 2 and Lemma 1.

Proposition 3 *Let $\mathcal{C}$ be any class of models, closed under isomorphism. Let $\mathcal{C}'$ be any subclass of $\mathcal{C}$, also closed under isomorphism. Then, for all n, the following conditions are equivalent:*

1. *For all $A \in \mathcal{C}', B \in \mathcal{C} - \mathcal{C}', A \not\sim_n B$.*

2. *For all $A \in \mathcal{C}', B \in \mathcal{C} - \mathcal{C}'$, the S wins the n-round modal game on A and B.*

3. *There is a modal sentence of quantifier rank $\leq n$ that defines the class $\mathcal{C}'$ over $\mathcal{C}$.*

Bisimulation and n-bisimulation are rather weak equivalence relations, in the sense that they determine relatively large equivalence classes. In other words, for every model A there are many other models with the same modal theory. Our proofs will exploit this feature repeatedly.

We fix the following terminology.

Definition 5 *The children of a in A are those b such that $A \models Rab$. We say that b is a descendent of a iff there is a directed path from a to b. For all n, b is an n-descendent of a if there is a path of length $\leq n$ from a to b. The family of a, written F^a is the submodel of A with universe $\{a\} \cup \{b \mid b$ is a descendent of $a\}$. For all a and b, we say that a and b are disjoint iff $F_a \cap F_b = \emptyset$.*

The r-neighborhood of a point a, denoted $N_r(a)$, is defined inductively. $N_0(a)$ is the submodel of A with universe $\{a\}$. For all $r+1$, $b \in N_{r+1}(a)$ iff $b \in N_r(a)$ or there is an $a' \in N_r(a)$ such that $A \models Ra'b \vee Rba'$. An r-tree is a directed tree rooted at c of height $\leq r$. An r-pseudotree is a model such that $N_r(c)$ is a tree such that all distinct pairs of its leaves are disjoint, as defined above.

We now describe certain operations on models that produce either bisimilar or n-bisimilar models. For A and a, we say that A' is obtained from A by adding a copy of the family of a iff A' is the extension of A with universe the disjoint union of A and of

F^a such that for all $a \in A$ and $a'_1 \in F'^a$, the 'copy' of F^a in A', $A' \models Raa'_1[Ra'_1a]$ iff $A \models Raa_1[Ra_1a]$, where a'_1 is the copy of $a_1 \in F^a$. The binary relation $\{(a, a') \mid a \in A, a' \in A'$ and $a = a'$ or a' is a copy of $a\}$ witnesses that $A \sim A'$.

Another concept from modal logic is that of *unraveling* a structure to produce another structure with which it bisimulates. Before defining this notion, we give a simple illustration. Let A be the graph on one vertex with a loop, and let A' be the directed chain on $c = 0, 1, \ldots, n$ such that for all $m < n, A' \models Rm, m+1$ and $A' \models Rnn$. We can view A' as having been obtained from A by unraveling, or unwinding, the loop n times. The set $A \times A'$ is itself a bisimulation between A and A'. In general, any model A can be n-unraveled, so that the n-descendents of c form an n-tree. By ω-unraveling F^c in A we obtain a (possibly infinite) tree. Every unraveling of A bisimulates with A.

To simplify the definition, we assume that every element of A is a descendent of c, i.e $A = F^c$. The n-unraveling of A will be an n-pseudotree, which we call A'. We first describe the tree portion of A', that is, $N_n(c^{A'})$. The root of the tree will be c itself. For each path in A of length $s \leq n$ starting at c, there is a node of height s in the tree. Thus, each such node is indexed by a path $\overline{a} = (c = a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_s)$ [that is, a sequence of length $s+1$] such that for all $q < s, A \models Ra_qa_{q+1}$. For each such $\overline{a}, A' \models P_j(\overline{a})$ iff $A \models P_j(a_s)$. Given a path $\overline{a}$ and an element $a' \in A$, let $\overline{a} * a'$ denote their concatenation, that is, the sequence $(a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_s, a')$. In A', there is an edge from $\overline{a}$ to $\overline{a}_1$ iff $\overline{a}_1 = \overline{a} * a'$, for some $a' \in A$. This completes the description of the n-tree which is the n-neighborhood of c in A'. We now attach copies of families to the leaves of this tree of height n, to obtain the n-pseudotree A'. That is, at each node $\overline{a} = (c = a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_n)$, we attach a copy of F^{a_n}, identifying the elements $\overline{a}$ and a_n. There may be many copies of any family, but each pair of families is disjoint. It is now easy to construct a bisimulation between A and A'. The ω-unraveling is defined similarly, except that no families are attached to any nodes.

We collect together some easy to verify facts for later use.

Proposition 4 *For all A, 1. $A \sim F^c_A$. 2. A bisimulates with a tree rooted at c, its ω-unraveling. 3. A bisimulates with an n-pseudotree, its n-unraveling. 4. A n-bisimulates with an n-tree, a submodel of its n-unraveling. 5. Over a fixed signature σ, there is a recursive function $f(x)$ such that for all modal sentences φ of quantifier rank $\leq n$, if φ is satisfiable, by a finite or infinite model, then it is satisfiable by an n-tree of cardinality*

$\leq f(n)$. *6. For all finite A, the modal theory of A is finitely axiomatizable iff F^c is acyclic.*

Proof. We provide proofs of Facts 5 and 6. From Fact 4 and Proposition 2, it is clear that for all $\varphi \in \mathrm{PM}^n$, φ is satisfiable iff it is satisfied by an n-tree. Given a fixed finite signature σ, we now define an effective procedure that maps each natural number n into a finite set of n-trees $\mathcal{T}^n$ such that for all $\varphi \in \mathrm{PM}(\sigma)$ of quantifier rank $\leq n$, if φ is satisfiable, then it is satisfied in some $A \in \mathcal{T}^n$. This will suffice to establish the claim. The sets $\mathcal{T}^n$ are defined inductively. $\mathcal{T}^0$ contains every model, up to isomorphism, with exactly one element, and has cardinality $= 2^{|\sigma|}$. For $n+1, A \in \mathcal{T}^{n+1}$ iff $A \in \mathcal{T}^n$ or A is an n-tree rooted at c with children $a_1, \ldots, a_k$ satisfying the following properties: (i) for all $i \leq k$, the family F^{a_i} is isomorphic to some tree $B \in \mathcal{T}^n$; and (ii) for all $i \neq j \leq k, F^{a_i} \ncong F^{a_j}$. It is easy to verify both that there is a recursive bound on the size of models in each $\mathcal{T}^n$ and that every n-tree bisimulates with an n-tree in $\mathcal{T}^n$. This establishes Fact 5.

We now prove Fact 6. Suppose that F^c is acylic. We show, by induction on the height n of F^c, that A is axiomatized by a sentence of quantifier rank $= n+1$. For $n = 0$, let $\theta = (\bigwedge_{P \in \tau} P \wedge \bigwedge_{Q \in \sigma - \tau} \neg Q) \wedge (\neg \Diamond P' \wedge \Box P')$, where τ is the set of proposition symbols satisfied at c, and P' is any proposition symbol in σ. For $n \geq 1$, and each child a_i of c, let θ_i be a sentence that axiomatizes the family F^{a_i}. Then let $\theta = (\bigwedge_{P \in \tau} P \wedge \bigwedge_{Q \in \sigma - \tau} \neg Q) \wedge (\bigwedge_i \Diamond \theta_i) \wedge (\Box \bigvee_i \theta_i)$. It is clear that θ axiomatizes the modal theory of A. In the other direction, let A be such that F^c contains a cycle, and let θ be a modal sentence of quantifier rank n. Let B be an n-tree that verifies θ. It is easy to show that there is a modal sentence, ψ, of quantifier rank $= n+1$ true in A but not in B. For example, for any $P \in \sigma$, let $\psi = \Diamond(\ldots \Diamond(P \vee \neg P) \ldots)$ contain a string of $n+1$ $\Diamond$'s. Therefore the modal theory of A is not axiomatized by any sentence of quantifier rank n, and hence is not finitely axiomatizable. ■

Observe that Fact 5 implies some well-known results. One, a modal formula is satisfiable iff it is satisfiable by a finite Kripke model. Two, it is decidable whether a formula is satisfiable, both over the class of all structures and over $\mathcal{F}$.

2 Preservation theorems

In this section, we show that two modal preservation theorems remain valid over the class $\mathcal{F}$. The arguments do not use finiteness in any essential way; therefore they also give

alternative proofs of the theorems in the general case that do not rely on the Compactness theorem. Finally, we show how these methods can be used to reprove the modal version of the Craig interpolation theorem without employing compactness.

Definition 6 *Let $A \equiv^n B$ mean that for all $\varphi \in$ FO, with $qr(\varphi) \leq n$, $A \models \varphi$ iff $B \models \varphi$.*

Proposition 5 *The bisimulation preservation theorem for modal sentences remains true in the finite case. That is, a class $\mathcal{C}$ is FO-definable and closed under bisimulations iff it is definable by a modal sentence.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{C}$ be a FO-definable class that is closed under bisimulations. Suppose that $\mathcal{C}$ is not definable by a modal formula. By Proposition 3, this implies that for all n, there are $A \in \mathcal{C}$ and $B \notin \mathcal{C}$ such that $A \sim_n B$. (Of course, since $\mathcal{C}$ is closed under bisimulations, we have that $A \not\sim B$.) We will show that this condition implies that for all n, there are actually $A \in \mathcal{C}$ and $B \notin \mathcal{C}$ such that $A \equiv^n B$. This immediately implies that $\mathcal{C}$ is not FO-definable, a contradiction.

More specifically, we show that there is a function $l(x)$ such that, for all n, if $A \sim_{l(n)} B$, then there are A' and B' such that $A \sim A', B \sim B'$ and $A' \equiv^n B'$. By choosing $A \in \mathcal{C}$ and $B \notin \mathcal{C}$, we get $A' \in \mathcal{C}$ and $B' \notin \mathcal{C}$. Given A and B, we find A' and B' by modifying A and B in a sequence of steps, as described in the following lemmas.

Lemma 2 *Let A and B be such that $A \sim_t B$. Then there are t-pseudotrees A' and B' such that $A \sim A', B \sim B'$, and $A' \sim_t B'$.*

Let A' and B' be the t-unravelings of A and B. Then A' and B' are t-pseudotrees such that $A \sim A'$ and $B \sim B'$. By the transitivity of $\sim_t$, this implies that $A' \sim_t B'$.

Lemma 3 *Let A and B be t-pseudotrees such that $A \sim_t B$. Then there are t-pseudotrees A' and B' such that $A \sim A'$, $B \sim B'$, and $N_t(c^{A'}) \cong N_t(c^{B'})$.*

The proof describes an algorithm for modifying the two models in a sequence of steps that yields models with isomorphic t-neighborhoods of c. After each step $s, s \leq t$, we have models A_s and B_s such that $A \sim A_s$ and $B \sim B_s$, and c^{A_s} and c^{B_s} have isomorphic s-neighborhoods. At each step $s+1$, A_{s+1} [resp. B_{s+1}] is obtained from A_s by adding copies of families of nodes of distance $s+1$ from c.

Let $\{a_1, \ldots a_l, b_1, \ldots, b_m\}$ be the set of the children of c in A and B. The relation $\sim_{t-1}$ induces an equivalence relation on this set such that each equivalence class has at least one member in each of A and B. To obtain A_1 and B_1 with isomorphic 1-neighborhoods of c that bisimulate with A and B, it suffices to add enough copies of families of the c-children a_i and b_j such that each equivalence class has an equal number of members in A_1 and B_1. For example, renumbering the indices of c-children if necessary, suppose that $\{a_1, \ldots, a_i; b_1, \ldots b_j\}$ is one such equivalence class. Also, without loss of generality, assume that $i \leq j$. Then A_1 will contain $j - i$ additional copies of the family F^{a_i}. Let $g_1(x)$ be a bijection between the c-children in A_1 and B_1 such that for all a_i, $(A_1, a_i) \sim_{t-1} (B_1, g_1(a_i))$. By iterating this procedure, at each step $s+1$, we obtain A_{s+1} and B_{s+1}, and a bijection g_{s+1} between nodes of distance $s+1$ from c^A and c^B with the following properties. For all nodes a_i in A_s of distance s from c, the bijection g_{s+1} maps the children of a_i to those of $g_s(a_i)$, and for all $a \in dom(g_{s+1}), (A_{s+1}, a) \sim_{t-(s+1)} (B_{s+1}, g_{s+1}(a))$. Finally, we choose A' and B' to be the models A_t and B_t.

Together, these lemmas establish that there are models $A \in \mathcal{C}$ and $B \notin \mathcal{C}$ that look rather similar. In particular, for all t, there are t-pseudotrees $A \in \mathcal{C}$ and $B \notin \mathcal{C}$ such that $N_t(c^A) \cong N_t(c^B)$. Although these models have isomorphic t-neighborhoods of c, we still know nothing about the other part of each model, which might make A and B 'look very different' in FO. The final step of the proof takes care of this by using a version of Hanf's lemma.

Proposition 6 (Hanf [4]) *For each signature σ, there is a function $f(x)$ with the following property. For all n, A and B, if there is a bijection $h : A \mapsto B$ such that for all $a \in A$, $N_{f(n)}(a) \cong N_{f(n)}(h(a))$, (with a and $h(a)$ distinguished), then $A \equiv^n B$.*

Lemma 4 *Let A and B be $(3f(n))$-pseudotrees with $N_{3f(n)}(c^A) \cong N_{3f(n)}(c^B)$, where $f(x)$ is the Hanf function. Then there are A' and B' such that $A \sim A'$, $B \sim B'$, and $A' \equiv^n B'$.*

Each of A' and B' will be obtained from A and B, respectively, by extending the original model by adding disjoint components in such a way that it will be obvious that A' and B' possess the same $f(n)$-nbhds. It is clear that extending models in such a way does not affect bisimulations. Let A_0 [B_0] be the submodel of A [B] with universe $A - N_{f(n)}(c^A)$ [$B - N_{f(n)}(c^B)$]. We define A' [B'] to be the disjoint union of A and B_0 [B and A_0]. We've

added to A the part of B that may look very different from it, and vice-versa, so that A' will look the same 'locally' as B'. In particular, for example, it is easy to see that $card(A') = card(B')$. We now define a bijection between these models in 3 parts. Let $g(x)$ be an isomorphism between $N_{3f(n)}(c^A)$ in A and $N_{3f(n)}(c^B)$ in B. Define $h_1(x)$ to be the bijection between $N_{2f(n)}(c^A)$ and $N_{2f(n)}(c^B)$ that is a restriction of the isomorphism $g(x)$. Let A_1 be the submodel of A' whose universe is those elements of B_0 that are in $N_{2f(n)}(c^B)$ (viewing B_0 here as a submodel of B.) We define B_1 similarily. Let h_2 be the bijection between A_1 and B_1 that is also a restriction of the isomorphism $g(x)$. Let h_3 be the bijection between the remaining pieces of A' and B' that takes the 'A-part' of A' to the 'A-part' of B', and the B-part of A' to the B-part of B'. It is then easy to verify that $h = h_1 \cup h_2 \cup h_3$ is a bijection from A' to B' that 'preserves $f(n)$-nbhds'. (This is perhaps easier to see if one draws a picture.) Thus $A' \equiv^n B'$ as desired.

To complete the proof, all that remains is to combine the above results. Suppose that $\mathcal{C}$ is FO-definable and closed under bisimulations, but not definable by a modal formula. Then by Lemmas 2, 3, and 4, for all n, there are $A \in \mathcal{C}$ and $B \notin \mathcal{C}$ such that $A \equiv^n B$. But this implies that $\mathcal{C}$ is not FO-definable, a contradiction. This proves the proposition. ■

The next preservation theorem that we consider characterizes those sentences whose classes of models are closed under extensions. Before stating the main result, we define some terminology and prove a few preliminary lemmas.

Definition 7 *1. A $\Diamond$-sentence is a modal sentence built up from atomic propositions and negated atomic propositions using $\wedge$, $\vee$, and $\Diamond$.*

2. For all A and B, we write $A \rightsquigarrow_\Diamond B$ iff for all $\Diamond$-sentences φ, if $A \models \varphi$, then $B \models \varphi$.

3. Given a model A, the $\Diamond$-theory of A is the set of $\Diamond$-sentences satisfied by A.

Observe that the $\Diamond$-sentences are precisely those $\varphi \in \mathrm{PM}$ such that $\mu(\varphi)$ is an existential FO sentence. In particular, the class of models of any $\Diamond$-sentence is closed under extensions.

Lemma 5 *Let A be an n-tree, rooted at c.*

1. For all $\Diamond$-sentences, φ, of quantifier rank $\geq n+1$, $A \not\models \varphi$.

2. The $\Diamond$-theory of A is axiomatized by a sentence of quantifier rank $= n$.

Proof. Part 1 is obvious, since A does not contain any paths of length $n+1$. By Lemma 1, let $\theta_1, \ldots \theta_k$ be the set of all $\Diamond$-sentences of quantifier rank $\leq n$, up to equivalence, satisfied in A. By Part 1, it is clear that $\theta = \bigwedge \theta_i$ axiomatizes the $\Diamond$-theory of A. ■

Lemma 6 *Given a fixed signature, there is a finite set of n-trees, $\mathcal{T}^n = \{B_1, \ldots, B_v\}$ such that for all A, there is a $u \leq v$ such that $A \sim_n B_u$. Furthermore, $\mathcal{T}^n$ can be obtained effectively.*

Proof. This result follows easily from Fact 5 of Proposition 4. Let $\mathcal{T}^n$ be the same set that was defined in the proof of this Fact, such that every satisfiable sentence φ of quantifier rank $\leq n$ is satisfied by some $B \in \mathcal{T}^n$. Let A be any model, and let $\theta_n \in \mathrm{PM}^n$ axiomatize its PM^n-theory, again using Lemma 1. By Fact 5, there is a $B \in \mathcal{T}^n$ such that $B \models \theta_n$. This now implies that $A \sim_n B$. ■

The next result can be viewed as the modal version of the Los-Tarski theorem for finite structures. We use $\mathrm{Mod}_f(\varphi)$ [$\mathrm{Mod}(\varphi)$] to denote the class of finite [all] models of φ. EXT is the set of classes of finite models that are closed under extensions.

Proposition 7 *The existential preservation theorem for modal logic remains true over $\mathcal{F}$. That is, for all φ, if $\mathrm{Mod}_f(\varphi) \in$ EXT, then φ is equivalent to a $\Diamond$-sentence θ. Moreover, there is an effective procedure for finding the equivalent $\Diamond$-sentence.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{C} \in$ EXT be defined by some modal sentence φ, with quantifier rank n. Let $\mathcal{C}^n = \mathcal{C} \cap \mathcal{T}^n = \{D_1, \ldots, D_k\}$. For each $D_i, i \leq k$, let θ_i axiomatize the $\Diamond$-theory of D_i. By Lemma 5, $qr(\theta_i) \leq n$. Let $\theta = \bigvee_{i \leq k} \theta_i$. We claim that φ is equivalent to θ.

First we show that φ implies θ. Suppose that $A \models \varphi$. We claim that there is a $D \in \mathcal{C}^n$ such that $A \sim_n D$. By Lemma 6, there is a $B \in \mathcal{T}^n$ such that $A \sim_n B$. Since $\mathcal{C}$ is closed under $\sim_n$-equivalence, B must actually be in $\mathcal{C}$, and hence in $\mathcal{C}^n$. Let $D = B$. There is some θ_i, as defined above, such that $D \models \theta_i$. Since $qr(\theta_i) \leq n$, this implies that $A \models \theta_i$, and hence $A \models \theta$.

Now we prove the opposite direction, θ implies φ. Suppose that $A \models \theta$. Then $A \models \theta_i$, for some $i \leq k$. By Lemma 6, there is a $B \in \mathcal{T}^n$ such that $A \sim_n B$. Observe that $D_i \rightsquigarrow_\Diamond B$. We want to show that there is an A' such that (i) $B \sim A'$, and hence $A \sim_n A'$; and (ii) $D_i \subseteq A'$. As $D_i \in \mathcal{C}$, and $\mathcal{C} \in$ EXT, (i) and (ii) imply that $A' \in \mathcal{C}$. Since $\mathcal{C}$ is closed under $\sim_n$-equivalence, $A \in \mathcal{C}$, as desired. Thus, it suffices to establish the following lemma.

Lemma 7 *Let B, D be trees such that $D \rightsquigarrow_\diamond B$. Then there is a m-tree A', $m \leq n$, such that $B \sim A'$ and $D \subseteq A'$.*

By induction, on the height n of D. For $n = 0$, it is obvious that $D \subseteq B$, since D is just the single node c^D, and for all predicate symbols p, $D \models p$ iff $B \models p$. Let $A' = B$.

Consider $n > 0$. Let $\{d_1, \ldots, d_s\}$ and $\{b_1, \ldots b_t\}$ be the children of c^D and c^B, respectively. We claim that for each d_p, there is a b_r such that $F^{d_p} \rightsquigarrow_\diamond F^{b_r}$. Let ψ, with $\mathrm{qr}(\psi) \leq n$, axiomatize the $\diamond$-theory of F^{d_p}. Then $D \models \Diamond\psi$, and therefore $B \models \Diamond\psi$. Thus there is a b_r such that $F^{b_r} \models \psi$, as desired.

By adding extra copies of families of the children of c^B to B, if necessary, we get B^0 such that $B \sim B^0$ and there is an injection $h : \{d_1, \ldots d_s\} \longrightarrow \{b_1^0, \ldots, b_{t'}^0\}$, $b_j^0 \in B^0$, such that $F^{d_i} \rightsquigarrow_\diamond F^{h(d_i)}$. By the induction hypothesis, each such $F^{h(d_i)}$ bisimulates with an $(n-1)$-tree, $T^{h(d_i)}$, such that $F^{d_i} \subseteq T^{h(d_i)}$. Let A' be obtained from B^0 by replacing each subtree $F^{h(d_i)} \subseteq B^0$, with the tree $T^{h(d_i)}$. It is easy to see that $B \sim A'$ and $D \subseteq A'$.

This also completes the proof of the proposition. ■

Corollary 1 *For every sentence φ, there is a decision procedure that determines whether* $\mathrm{Mod}_f(\varphi)$ [$\mathrm{Mod}(\varphi)$] *is closed under extensions. Therefore the set of sentences that defines such classes is recursive.*

Proof. By the proof of the previous proposition, if $\mathrm{Mod}_f(\varphi) \in$ EXT, then it is equivalent to a $\Diamond$-sentence of quantifier rank $\leq qr(\varphi)$. By Lemma 1, one can effectively list, up to logical equivalence, all such sentences, $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_l$. Then it suffices to test the validity of each sentence, $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi_i$, which is decidable. ■

We now turn to an interpolation theorem, due to Andreka, van Benthem, and Nemeti. It will be convenient to introduce briefly a fragment of second-order propositional modal logic, which allows quantification over propositions. We often use $\overline{P}$, etc., as shorthand for sequences, $(P_1, \ldots, P_n)$. We write $\psi(\overline{P})$ to indicate that the set of proposition symbols that occur in ψ equals $\overline{P}$. Also, by $\exists\overline{P}\psi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$ we mean the sentence $\exists P_1 \ldots \exists P_n \psi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$.

Definition 8 *Let $\varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$ be a sentence of* PM, *such that $\overline{P} \cap \overline{Q} = \emptyset$. Then $\exists\overline{Q}\varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$ is a Σ_1^1 modal sentence; for all A, with signature $\sigma = \overline{P}$, $A \models \exists\overline{Q}\varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$ iff there is a B, an expansion of A with signature $\tau = \overline{P} \cup \overline{Q}$, such that $B \models \varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$. Π_1^1 modal sentences, of the form $\forall\overline{Q}\varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$, are defined similarly.*

For all A, B, and n, we write $A \sim_n^{\overline{P}} B$ iff for all sentences $\varphi, qr(\varphi) \leq n$, that only contain proposition symbols from $\overline{P}$, $A \models \varphi$ iff $B \models \varphi$. Recall that every satisfiable modal sentence is satisifed by a finite model; hence φ implies θ over the class of all models iff φ implies θ over $\mathcal{F}$. By this fact, the truth of the interpolation theorem in the general case immediately yields its truth over $\mathcal{F}$.

Proposition 8 (Andreka, van Benthem, and Nemeti [1]) *Let φ and θ be sentences, with signatures σ_φ and σ_θ, such that $\sigma_\varphi \cap \sigma_\theta$ is non-empty. If φ implies θ (over $\mathcal{F}$), then there is a sentence ψ, with $\sigma_\psi \subseteq \sigma_\varphi \cap \sigma_\theta$, such that φ implies ψ and ψ implies θ. Furthermore, $qr(\psi) \leq max(qr(\varphi), qr(\theta))$.*

Proof. Suppose that $\varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$ implies $\theta(\overline{P}, \overline{R})$, where $\overline{P}, \overline{Q}$, and $\overline{R}$ are pairwise disjoint sequences of propositions symbols. Equivalently, $\exists \overline{Q} \varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$ implies $\forall \overline{R} \theta(\overline{P}, \overline{R})$. Thus, we consider models over the signature $\sigma = \overline{P}$. Let $n = max(qr(\varphi), qr(\theta))$. Recall that, by Lemma 1 or 6, there are only finitely many $\sim_n^{\overline{P}}$ equivalence classes. We claim that it suffices to show that for any $\sim_n^{\overline{P}}$ class $\mathcal{C}$, if there is an $A \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $A \models \exists \overline{Q} \varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$, then for all $B \in \mathcal{C}$, $B \models \forall \overline{R} \theta(\overline{P}, \overline{R})$. If this is true, for each $\sim_n^{\overline{P}}$ class $\mathcal{C}$ containing an A that satisfies $\exists \overline{Q} \varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$, let ψ_i be a sentence with signature $\overline{P}$, $qr(\psi_i) \leq n$, that defines the class. (Here we use that $\overline{P}$ is non-empty, since no sentence contains no proposition symbols.) Then $\psi = \bigvee \psi_i$ is an interpolant.

Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there are A and B such that $A \sim_n^{\overline{P}} B$, $A \models \exists \overline{Q} \varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$ and $B \models \exists \overline{R} \neg \theta(\overline{P}, \overline{R})$. Let A' and B' be expansions of A and B such that $A' \models \varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$ and $B' \models \neg \theta(\overline{P}, \overline{R})$. By Lemma 6, there are n-trees A'' and B'' that are $\sim_n$-equivalent to A' and B', respectively. Finally, let A_1 and B_1 be the σ-reducts of A'' and B''. It is clear that $A_1 \models \exists \overline{Q} \varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$ and $B_1 \models \exists \overline{R} \neg \theta(\overline{P}, \overline{R})$. We now want to find a D such that $D \models \exists \overline{Q} \varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q}) \wedge \exists \overline{R} \neg \theta(\overline{P}, \overline{R})$. This will establish the contradiction.

D is constructed by extending A_1 and B_1 'simultaneously' by iteratively adding copies of families of elements. First we show that for any model M, if M' is obtained from M by adding a copy of a family F^m, for any $m \in M$, then every Σ_1^1 sentence satisfied in M is also satisfied in M'. Suppose that $M \models \exists \overline{P} \psi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$. Let N be an expansion of M that verifies the (first-order) modal sentence $\psi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$; and let N' be obtained from N by adding a copy of the family of m. It is clear that $N \sim N'$; thus $N' \models \psi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$. Since N' is an expansion of M', $M' \models \exists \overline{P} \psi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$, as desired.

We now describe the construction of D. As in the proof of Lemma 3, $\sim_{n-1}$ induces an equivalence relation on the set of children of c^{A_1} and c^{B_1} such that every equivalence class has at least one member in each model. Let A_2 and B_2 be obtained from A_1 and B_1 by adding enough copies of families of these children so that there is a bijection $g_1(x)$ from the children of c^{A_2} to those of c^{B_2} such that for all a_i, $F^{a_i} \sim_{n-1} F^{g_1(a_i)}$. Observe that $N_1(c^{A_2}) \cong N_1(c^{B_2})$. Repeat this procedure at each level $m \leq n$ of the trees, on pairs of subtrees in A_m and B_m determined by the bijection $g_{m-1}(x)$ at the previous level. By the argument of the preceding paragraph, for all m, $A_m \models \exists \overline{Q} \varphi(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$ and $B_m \models \exists \overline{R} \neg \theta(\overline{P}, \overline{R})$. Furthermore, $N_m(c^{A_{m+1}}) \cong N_m(c^{B_{m+1}})$ This construction yields trees A_{n+1} and B_{n+1} such that $A_1 \sim A_{n+1}$, $B_1 \sim B_{n+1}$, and $A_{n+1} \cong B_{n+1}$. Let $D = A_{n+1}$. ■

3 Conclusion

In this paper, we have begun investigating the finite model theory of modal logic. Our results indicate that modal logic remains 'well-behaved' over the class of finite structures. In contrast, it is well-known that most results from classical model theory, including various preservation theorems, become false when relativized to the class of finite structures. One way to extend this work would be to prove that other theorems of modal logic remain true over $\mathcal{F}$. Another line of research involves investigating the behavior, over $\mathcal{F}$, of somewhat stronger fragments of FO, e.g. the bounded quantifier fragments from [1].

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