Ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες;

Rhetorical Questions in Ancient Greek

Evert van Emde Boas

Ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες;—Rhetorical Questions in Ancient Greek
Masterscriptie Griekse en Latijnse Taal en Cultuur
Evert van Emde Boas (0118478)

Scriptiebegeleider: prof. dr. A. Rijksbaron
Tweede lezer: prof. dr. I. J. F. de Jong

Datum: 31 augustus 2005

Abstract

In Ancient Greek, as in any other language, the interrogative sentence type is not always used in what we would consider 'normal' questions, those that elicit information from the addressee. If we take that function to be the default, basic value of the interrogative sentence type, the fact that questions can also be used to assert something (*rhetorical questions*), to make a request (*question-requests*), to give a command (*question-commands*), etc., calls for an explanation.

Such explanations for what I will call *non-standard questions* has normally been sought in linguistic pragmatic theory on speech acts and implicatures, the original expression of which can be found in the still influential works of Searle and Grice. This is also the approach taken in the present thesis, though I make use of a more recent pragmatic model by van Eemeren and Grootendorst. After this linguistic examination of non-standard questions, I will look at how several Ancient Greek authors used them in their works.

The thesis thus attempts to answer two general questions: "How do non-standard questions work in theory?" and "How are they used in practice in Ancient Greek?". The work falls apart into three parts:

In part I (chapters 1-2) I give an outline of the problem and the aims and structure of the thesis, followed by a brief survey of theoretical works of antiquity that have dealt with non-standard questions.

Part II (chapters 3-4) is concerned with the first of my two main questions, "How do non-standard questions work in theory?". I hope to demonstrate (chapter 3) that non-standard questions may be interpreted as 'violations' of basic communicative principles, giving rise to implicatures along the lines of Gricean pragmatic theory. I also aim to show how the 'true meaning' of non-standard questions can be 'reconstructed' from their 'literal sense' (terms such as 'true meaning' and 'literal sense' should be used with care, as will also be discussed). In chapter 4, the theoretical framework derived in this way will be applied to a corpus of Ancient Greek questions, revealing some handholds for the analysis of questions as they are encountered in Greek texts. I distinguish several types of *flouting marker*, elements that reveal that a question should be interpreted as something other than an elicitation of information, and that give clues as to how the question should be read.

In part III (chapters 5-6), I attempt to answer the second main question, "How are non-standard questions used in practice?", by looking at instances in Homer's *Iliad* and Herodotus' *Histories*. In chapter 5, I argue that most questions 'spoken' by the narrator of the *Iliad* should be interpreted as so-called *expository questions*, questions asked only to be answered by the speaker himself and designed to attract the audience's attention. Further, I examine the use of non-standard questions by Achilles, arguing that this use is indicative of certain unique features of his character. Finally, in chapter 6 I look at non-standard questions in Herodotus' *Histories*. A significant concentration of rhetorical questions in Book II of that work may be taken as a sign, I argue, of Herodotus' method of enquiry, which overlaps in no small degree with that of contemporary scientific authors. I end with a conclusion in chapter 7.

Table of Contents

PART I

PRELIMINARIES

Chapter 1

Introduction

> Since Antiquity, when it first emerged among rhetorical figures, the rhetorical question has captured the interest of rhetoricians and linguists alike, on account of its complexity and elusiveness. However, in spite of the widespread interest it attracted, there is still a great deal of fuzziness and inconsistency about the definition and interpretation of rhetorical questions.
>
> —*Cornelia Ilie*, What Else Can I Tell You?

> The quotation marks in 'rhetorical' question remind us of the somewhat suspect concept which stands behind the unsystematical and ambiguous use of that term.
>
> —*Jürgen Schmidt-Radefeldt*, On So-Called 'Rhetorical' Questions

1.1 What is a Rhetorical Question?

For a term used so routinely in everyday language, there is a surprising lack of agreement on the answer to the question in the title of this section. One definition that will habitually be found is that a rhetorical question (RQ) is a *question to which the speaker already knows the answer*. But this leaves us with a paradox: as the author of the present work, I may reasonably be expected to know the answer to my title-question, yet most will agree that it is *not* a RQ. Another suggestion often found is that a RQ is a question which *requires no answer from the person it is put to*. But again my section-title, if our instinct of not calling it a RQ is correct, thwarts the applicability of this definition. Yet another attempt is to define the RQ as *any question asked for a purpose other than to obtain the information the question asks.* This is better, but it still proves unsatisfactory: my title does not have the purpose of obtaining information (I already have it), and still I wouldn't call it a RQ. And what to think of the question "Can you pass the wine?" spoken at a dinner-table? The speaker of this question presumably knows the answer, and he doesn't want information about his table-partner's physical abilities so much as he wants a drink, but does that make the question *rhetorical*?

As it turns out, no universally accepted definition of the rhetorical question seems to exist. Yet at the same time, it is one of the most commonly used stylistic devices both in oratory and in everyday speech. Some linguists in recent decades have attempted with greater or lesser success to formulate an exhaustive definition, but the only thing that these descriptions have in common is that they are longer than one sentence (which is in itself quite an important point).[1] Simple 'quick-fix' definitions will thus not do, nor is it enough to look exclusively at rhetorical questions: a critical analyst must also look at many other uses of the question-form (such as requests disguised as questions, e.g. "Can you pass the wine?").

[1] Cf. Berg 1978, Frank 1990, Ilie 1994 (the best—eclectic—definition given to date), Meibauer 1986, Schmidt-Radefeldt 1977, Slot 1993.

1.1.1 Labeling the Greek rhetorical question

Scholars in the field of Ancient Greek philology have not steered clear of this definitional problem. The label 'rhetorical' has been applied to such diverse questions as the following:

(1) Τίς τ' ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;
Λητοῦς καὶ Διὸς υἱός·
Who then of the gods was it that brought these two together to contend? The son of Leto and Zeus; (Hom. *Il.* 1.8-9) (labelled 'rhetorical' by Kirk 1985: ad loc)[2]

(2) Τί δ' ἐκεῖνα φῶμεν, τὰς πεύσεις τε καὶ ἐρωτήσεις; ἆρα οὐκ αὐταῖς ταῖς τῶν σχημάτων εἰδοποιίαις παρὰ πολὺ ἐμπρακτότερα καὶ σοβαρώτερα συντείνει τὰ λεγόμενα;
Now what are we to say of our next subject, specifying questions and *yes-no* questions? Is it not just the specific character of these figures which gives the language much greater realism, vigour and tension? ([Longinus] 18) (both questions labelled 'rhetorical' by Russell 1964: ad loc)[3]

(3) ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν πάντα ποιοῦντες δίκην παρ' αὐτῶν τὴν ἀξίαν οὐκ ἂν δύναισθε λαβεῖν, πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ὑμῖν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἀπολιπεῖν, ἥντινά τις βούλοιτο παρὰ τούτων λαμβάνειν;
Since therefore, whatever you might do, you could not exact from them an adequate penalty, would it not be shameful of you to disallow any possible sort of penalty that a man might desire to exact from these persons? (Lys. 12.84) (labelled 'rhetorical' by Adams, 1970: 356-7)

But calling example (1) and the first question in (2) RQ's, as Kirk and Russell, respectively, have done, will surely not meet with universal and unequivocal assent. Nor would anyone consider the following Greek questions to be RQ's:

(4) οὐκ ἀποτινάξεις κισσόν; οὐκ ἐλευθέραν
θύρσου μεθήσεις χεῖρ', ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάτερ;
Won't you cast away the ivy? Grandfather, will you not free your hand of the thyrsos? (Eur. *Ba.* 253-4)

At the same time, none of the questions in (1) through (4) are what we would consider to be 'real', 'normal' or 'standard' questions. Such terms would generally be applied only to a question asked specifically to elicit information from the addressee, such as in this stichomythia:

(5) [Πενθεύς:] πότερα δὲ νύκτωρ σ' ἢ κατ' ὄμμ' ἠνάγκασεν;
[Διόνυσος:] ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα, καὶ δίδωσιν ὄργια.
[Πενθεύς:] τὰ δ' ὄργι' ἐστὶ τίν' ἰδέαν ἔχοντά σοι;
[Διόνυσος:] ἄρρητ' ἀβακχεύτοισιν εἰδέναι βροτῶν.
[Πενθεύς:] ἔχει δ' ὄνησιν τοῖσι θύουσιν τίνα;
[Διόνυσος:] οὐ θέμις ἀκοῦσαί σ', ἔστι δ' ἄξι' εἰδέναι.
Did he compel you at night, or in your sight?—Seeing me just as I saw him, he gave me sacred rites.—what appearance do your rites have?—They can not be told to mortals uninitiated in Bacchic revelry.—And do they have any profit to those who sacrifice?—It is not lawful for you to hear, but they are worth knowing. (Eur. *Ba.* 469-74)

It appears that all we can say at this point is that there is more than one use for the question-form, other than its 'standard' use of obtaining information. Much more than one, in fact: it will be seen

[2] The editions and translations from which my Greek examples are taken will be listed below in §1.3.
[3] I have altered Fyfe's rendering of this passage slightly, the reason for which will be discussed in footnote 10 on p. 13.

that questions may be used for a great diversity of purposes. We will first need some very basic terminology to describe these uses.

1.1.2 Introducing the non-standard question

Let me begin by introducing a general term: the NON-STANDARD QUESTION (NSQ). By NSQ I mean any question that does not (exclusively) aim at eliciting from the addressee the information required by the question. The rhetorical question is, as we have seen, but one type of NSQ, and must be distinguished from other types of NSQ, such as question-requests, question-promises, leading questions, exam questions, questions of desperation, expository questions, etc.[4] This list of labels could be enlarged indefinitely: because language users deal with endlessly varying situations, conversational settings, levels of knowledge, etc., no two uses of the question-form will ever be exactly the same. It is therefore perhaps a vain notion that such uses can be divided into several seemingly 'clear' categories.

It is also imperative to realize that what makes all these questions 'non-standard' is not a *syntactic* divergence from standard questions, but the way in which they are *used*. In most languages, including English and Ancient Greek, non-standard questions show no syntactical features that set them apart from standard questions, and identical utterances can fulfill both roles. Compare, for example, the following two cases:

(6) [Someone ignoring the advice of a man in whom he has little confidence:] What does *he* know?

(7) [A counter-espionage agent in a discussion about which of two spies to intercept:] What does *he* know?

Which is not to say that non-standard questions cannot be syntactically marked at all. Some languages, including Latin[5], show syntactical marking of rhetorical questions. And there are many other signs that may reveal a question to be non-standard (to be discussed at length). Nonetheless it remains an important observation that we are dealing with varying *uses* of questions, not varying *forms*.[6]

As I mentioned, it is a probably a misconception that the diverse use of the questions can be exhaustively classified under neat labels. It is for this reason, and for economy of space, that I will not try to discuss each possible use of questions in the present work. I will instead focus on some common uses of the question-form that feature frequently in a corpus of Greek interrogatives taken from four authors. This brings me to a more detailed discussion of the aims and structure of the paper.

1.2 Aims and Structure

In the present work I will examine non-standard questions in Ancient Greek, with a focus on rhetorical questions. I aim to answer two main questions about NSQ's: "How do they work in

[4] Sadock 1974 does away with the term 'rhetorical question' and uses such inventive labels as 'queclarative', 'requestion', etc.. I have opted to retain 'rhetorical question' and otherwise use terminology that more or less speaks for itself.

[5] In Latin, some types of rhetorical question are reflected in *oratio obliqua* by an acc. cum inf. construction instead of the subjunctive used for standard questions (cf. Woodcock 1952).

[6] This is one of the main theses of Meibauer 1986, a valuable work if only for Meibauer's convincing proof of this one point.

theory?" and "How are they used in practice (in ancient Greek)?". To answer the former question, I will undertake a survey of modern linguistic studies on this topic, in order to distill a theoretical framework which can support an analysis of Greek questions. This framework will subsequently be applied to a selection from four Greek authors to define the specific properties of *Greek* NSQ's.

The second question calls for a more detailed study, a 'close-reading' if you will, of the use of questions. I will limit my account to a description of the use of NSQ's in two works, Homer's *Iliad* and Herodotus' *Histories*. I aim to show that an analysis of the NSQ's in these works, along the lines of the theoretical framework laid out, may have wider implications and can offer new insights into long-debated questions about Homeric poetry and Herodotean narrative.

The paper breaks apart into three parts. The reader is currently occupied with **PART I**, which consists of this outline and an introductory discussion of ancient perspectives on the rhetorical question (**Chapter 2**). Looking at remarks in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the work *On the Sublime* ascribed to Longinus, and the works of Demetrius and Quintilian, I give a brief overview of ancient thought on the use of questions for purposes other than obtaining information.

PART II is the theoretical section of the paper, where I will try to answer the question "How do NSQ's work?". In **Chapter 3** I present an overview of modern linguistic theory on NSQ's. I will discuss the following issues:

- Why does an addressee interpret some questions as something other than questions?
- How does that addressee *realize* that he is not being asked a genuine question?
- What is the relationship between the literal question and what is meant or implied?

Chapter 4 is devoted to a more focused discussion of NSQ's in ancient Greek. Several of the features of NSQ's discussed in the previous chapter will be looked at specifically in Greek questions, in order to identify some distinguishing characteristics of Greek NSQ's as opposed to their 'standard' counterparts. These features may in turn help to analyze questions as they are encountered in Greek texts. The questions looked at come from a corpus of four authors. It comprises Homer's *Iliad*, Herodotus' *Histories*, Euripides' *Bacchae*, and Lysias' speeches 12, 16, 19, 22, 24, 25, 32 and 34.[7]

It may be noticed that the question "What is the effect of such questions?" or related questions such as "Why would someone use a question to make a request?" is not one of my principal research aims in this half of the paper. I reserve the discussion of effect mostly to **PART III**, where I will wrestle with the question "How are NSQ's used?". In **Chapter 5**, I look at Homer's use of questions in the *Iliad*. I argue that most questions 'uttered' by the narrator should be thought of as so-called 'expository questions', which has some implications for our interpretation of the narrator's role. I go on to offer my thoughts on the delicate issue of characterization in the *Iliad*, attempting to show that Achilles' use of questions is not only typical, but also 'characteristic' of him.

Finally, in **Chapter 6**, I examine the rhetorical questions used by the narrator in Herodotus. An unusually dense concentration of such questions may be found early in book II of the *Histories*, which may, I suggest, be chalked up to a shift in the narrator's style as he becomes more argumentative and discusses more controversial issues. This, in turn, may be seen as evidence for the view that Herodotus must be placed in a tradition of scientific writings, a view most fully expressed in the work of Rosalind Thomas.

[7] The selection from Lysias is the same as in Adams 1970, although I have used a different edition of the text of the speeches.

I end with a very brief conclusion in **Chapter 7**.

1.3 On notation and texts

Throughout this paper, I will use standard notation for references, citing author name and the year of the publication. I do so even in the case of commentaries (though I will in this case refer to commentary and not page numbers), as these are not separately listed in my bibliography. Only large reference works and dictionaries will be cited differently (by title or abbreviation).

Passages from Greek are cited using notation as in LSJ. The text-editions and translations used for cited passages are listed below (full references may be found in my bibliography). Some citations were taken from other editions (published online) and subsequently checked against the editions below; some errors may remain.

Author	**Text**	**Translation**
Aristotle (*Rhetoric*)	Freese (1926)	id.
Demetrius	Fyfe (rev. Russell, 1995)	id.
Euripides	Murray (1909)	Buckley (1850)
Homer	Monro and Allen (1920)	Murray (rev. Wyatt, 1999)
Herodotus	Hude (1926)	Godley (1920-4)
[Longinus]	Innes (1995)	id.
Quintilian	Russell (2001)	id.
Lysias	Lamb (1930)	id.

Chapter 2

Ancient Perspectives on Rhetorical Questions

Quid tibi aucupatiost | argumentum aut (...) uerbificatiost?
—Caecilius, fr. 58-9 (ed. Ofenloch)

2.1 FOUR TEXTBOOKS

It is no surprise to find that such a universal and effective feature of language as the rhetorical question has been discussed in the works of several thinkers in Antiquity. Many comments on the question-form survive from Antiquity, although we find such comments mostly in obscure works, more often than not with the title Περὶ Σχημάτων.[8] Yet only a few, better known works mention specifically the *rhetorical* use of questions. These discussions are aways concerned with the *effects* of RQ's and as a result we find very little in the way of 'linguistic' analysis of RQ's. Nonetheless, from the point of view of some modern linguistic approaches, especially pragmatics, such comments are not all without use (which has even led to some of these handbooks being characterized as "proto-pragmatic" (Ilie 1994: 11)). In this chapter I will briefly survey the relevant passages from Aristotle, Demetrius, [Longinus] and Quintilian.[9]

2.1.1 Aristotle

In book III of the *Rhetoric*, on style, arrangement and delivery of speeches, Aristotle gives a few guidelines on how to use interrogation to reveal contradictions and absurdities in the argument of an opponent:

> περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, εὔκαιρόν ἐστι ποιεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον εἰρηκὼς ᾖ, ὥστε ἑνὸς προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοπον, οἷον Περικλῆς Λάμπωνα ἐπήρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας ἱερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἤρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτός, φάσκοντος δὲ "*καὶ πῶς, ἀτέλεστος ὤν;*" [2] δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερὸν ᾖ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δῆλον ᾖ ὅτι δώσει· πυθόμενον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν, οἷον Σωκράτης, Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν, εἰρηκότος δὲ ὡς δαιμόνιόν τι λέγοι, ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἤτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶεν ἢ θεῖόν τι, φήσαντος δὲ "*ἔστιν οὖν*", [3] ἔφη, "*ὅστις θεῶν μὲν παῖδας οἴεται εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ οὔ;*" ἔτι ὅταν μέλλῃ ἢ ἐναντία λέγοντα δείξειν ἢ παράδοξον. [4] τέταρτον δὲ ὅταν μὴ ἐνῇ ἀλλ' ἢ σοφιστικῶς ἀποκρινάμενον λῦσαι· ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτως ἀποκρίνηται, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δ' οὔ, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὔ, ἢ πῇ μὲν πῇ δ' οὔ, θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντος. ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἐγχείρει. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐνστῇ, κεκρατῆσθαι δόξεις: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πολλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ:

---

[8] For the treatment of interrogatives in such manuals (not RQ's specifically), cf. *Rhetores Graeci* (ed. Spengel, 1854): 24-5; 64-5; 163; 179-80.

[9] One source not mentioned here is *Rhetorica ad Herrenium* 4.(xv)-22, but the comments made there are covered and expanded on by Quintilian.

> In regard to interrogation, its employment is especially opportune, when the opponent has already stated the opposite, so that the addition of a question makes the result an absurdity; as, for instance, when Pericles interrogated Lampon about initiation into the sacred rites of the savior goddess. On Lampon replying that it was not possible for one who was not initiated to be told about them, Pericles asked him if he himself was acquainted with the rites, and when he said yes, Pericles further asked, "How can that be, seeing that you are uninitiated?" [2] Again, interrogation should be employed when one of the two propositions is evident, and it is obvious that the opponent will admit the other if you ask him. But the interrogator, having obtained the second premise by putting a question, should not make an additional question of what is evident, but should state the conclusion. For instance, Socrates, when accused by Meletus of not believing in the gods, asked whether he did not say that there was a divine something; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went on to ask if divine beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. When Meletus again said yes, Socrates rejoined, [3] "Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods exist without at the same time admitting that the gods exist?" Thirdly, when it is intended to show that the opponent either contradicts himself or puts forward a paradox. [4] Further, when the opponent can do nothing else but answer the question by a sophistical solution; for if he answers, "Partly yes, and partly no," "Some are, but some are not," "In one sense it is so, in another not," the hearers cry out against him as being in a difficulty. In other cases interrogation should not be attempted; for if the adversary raises an objection, the interrogator seems to be defeated; for it is impossible to ask a number of questions, owing to the hearer's weakness. (Arist. *Rh.* 3.18.1-4)

It is clear that Aristotle is attuned to the fact that questions may be used for other purposes than asking for information only. And his remarks are keen: the uses of questions he singles out as "opportune" are used in many discussions and many a courtroom today. That being said, Aristotle offers only a limited set of rhetorical strategies, and there are no systematic distinctions between rhetorical questions and genuine questions to be found. Nor is Aristotle's "ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἐγχείρει" (3.18.4) a guideline that is generally followed by modern users of rhetorical questions (or by ancient ones for that matter, as my discussion of Quintilian will show).

2.1.2 [Longinus]

From the late Hellenistic or early Roman period we possess a long treatise entitled Περὶ Ὕψους, ascribed traditionally to Longinus. One of the 'chapters' in this work is concerned with the 'realistic and vigorous' use of questions in oratory:

> Τί δ' ἐκεῖνα φῶμεν, τὰς πεύσεις τε καὶ ἐρωτήσεις; ἆρα οὐκ αὐταῖς ταῖς τῶν σχημάτων εἰδοποιίαις παρὰ πολὺ ἐμπρακτότερα καὶ σοβαρώτερα συντείνει τὰ λεγόμενα; "*ἢ βούλεσθε, εἰπέ μοι, περιιόντες ἀλλήλων πυνθάνεσθαι· «λέγεταί τι καινόν;» τί γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο τούτου καινότερον ἢ Μακεδὼν ἀνὴρ καταπολεμῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα; τέθνηκε Φίλιππος; οὐ μὰ Δί' ἀλλ' ἀσθενεῖ., τί δ' ὑμῖν διαφέρει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὗτός τι πάθῃ, ταξέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε.*" [Dem. 4.10-1] (...) ἦν δὲ ἁπλῶς ῥηθὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα τῷ παντὶ καταδεέστερον, νυνὶ δὲ τὸ ἔνθουν καὶ ὀξύρροπον τῆς πεύσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀνθυπαντᾶν οὐ μόνον ὑψηλότερον ἐποίησε τῷ σχηματισμῷ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ πιστότερον. ἄγει γὰρ τὰ παθητικὰ τότε μᾶλλον, ὅταν αὐτὰ φαίνηται μὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὸς ὁ λέγων ἀλλὰ γεννᾶν ὁ καιρός, ἡ δ' ἐρώτησις ἡ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀπόκρισις μιμεῖται τοῦ πάθους τὸ ἐπίκαιρον. σχεδὸν γὰρ ὡς οἱ ὑφ' ἑτέρων ἐρωτώμενοι παροξυνθέντες ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸ λεχθὲν ἐναγωνίως καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀνθυπαντῶσιν, οὕτως τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πεύσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως εἰς τὸ δοκεῖν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐσκεμμένων ἐξ ὑπογύου κεκινῆσθαί τε καὶ λέγεσθαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἀπάγον καὶ παραλογίζεται.

> Now what are we to say of our next subject, specifying questions and *yes-no* questions? Is it not just the specific character of these figures which gives the language much greater realism, vigour and tension? "Tell me, my friend, do you all want to go round asking each other 'Is there any news?' For what stranger news could there be than this of a Macedonian conquering Greece? 'Is Philip dead? No, not dead but ill.' What differenece does it make to you? Whatever happens to him, you will soon manufacture another Philip for yourselves" (...) Here a bare statement would have been utterly inadequate. As it is, the inspiration and quick play of the question and answer, and his way of confronting his own words as if they were someone else's, make the passage, through his use of the figure, not only loftier but also more convincing. For emotion is more telling when it seems not to be premeditated by the speaker but to be born of the moment: and this way of questioning and answering one's self counterfeits spontaneous emotion. People who are cross-questioned by others in the heat of the moment reply to the point forcibly and with utter candour; and in much the same way the figure of question and answer actually misleads the audience, by encouraging it to suppose that each carefully premeditated argument has been aroused in the mind and put into words on the spur of the moment. ([Longinus] 18)[10]

It may be noticed that Longinus, in a chapter on questions used in oratory, opens with a set of questions that may be considered *rhetorical*.[11] And as Rijksbaron (2003: 734) has shown, this is not the only way in which the first two questions can be called a case of *'la leçon par l'exemple'*[12]: the first question, "τί ... ἐρωτήσεις;", is a πεῦσις (a specifying question) and the second, "ἆρα οὐκ ... τὰ λεγόμενα;", an ἐρώτησις (a *yes-no* question).

Longinus' explanation, as well as the examples adduced from Demosthenes' first Philippic, show that he is specifically referring to questions asked and *answered* by the orator, something that Longinus considers "inspired" (ἔνθους). On closer examination, we can now more specifically pinpoint the *leçon* in the *exemple*: Longinus, too, displays a light-footed play of question-and-answer, by answering his own first question with a second.

This closer look also reveals an awkward gap in Longinus' treatment. Notice the difference between Longinus' two opening questions: the first question actually *requires* an answer to convey the desired meaning, whereas the second question conveys meaning all by itself and can even *function* as an answer to the previous question. It turns out that Longinus *leçon* doesn't even cover his entire *exemple*: he comments only on the rhetorical effects of answering one's own questions, but not on the peculiar fact that a question can function as that answer.[13]

2.1.3 Demetrius

Longinus' contemporary Demetrius,[14] a literary critic and author of Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας, is rather more helpful when it comes to Longinus' second question (a self-answering question that conveys the meaning of an assertion):

---

[10] I have adapted the first sentence of this translation, substituting the technical terms 'specifying questions and *yes-no* questions' for Fyfe's "figure of inquiry and interrogation". Rijksbaron 2003 proves convincingly that πεῦσις and ἐρώτησις were the terms conventionally used to distinguish the two types of question.

[11] It is my contention that the first of the two questions is actually not a RQ, but an *expository question*. This will be explained in detail in §3.4.5

[12] For Longinus' affinity for this type of sort of teaching, cf. Russell 1964: ad loc.

[13] In addition, I would argue that not even all the examples from Demosthenes are asked *and* answered. In the first pair of questions, the second is not an answer but an *explanation* of the first, as is recognizable from the presence of the particle γάρ.

[14] For the relative chronology of [Longinus] and Demetrius, cf. *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, s.v. Demetrius (17), p. 450 and s.v. 'Longinus', p. 884.

> Δεινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐρωτῶντα τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἔνια λέγειν, καὶ μὴ ἀποφαινόμενον· "ἀλλ' ὁ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἐκεῖνος σφετεριζόμενος καὶ κατασκευάζων ἐπιτείχισμα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικήν, πότερον ταῦτα ποιῶν ἠδίκει καὶ παρεσπόνδει καὶ ἔλυε τὴν εἰρήνην ἢ οὔ;" [Dem. *De Cor*. 71] Καθάπερ γὰρ εἰς ἀπορίαν ἄγει τὸν ἀκούοντα ἐξελεγχομένῳ ἐοικότα καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι ἔχοντι· εἰ δὲ ὧδε μεταβαλὼν ἔφη τις· «ἠδίκει καὶ ἔλυε τὴν εἰρήνην», σαφῶς διδάσκοντι ἐῴκει καὶ οὐκ ἐλεγχοντι.
>
> It is also forceful to express some points by asking the audience questions rather than by making a statement, for example "No, he was annexing Euboea and establishing a base against Attica—and in doing this was he wronging us and breaking the peace, or was he not?" Demosthenes forces his listener into a sort of corner, so that he seems to be cross-examined and unable to reply. If you were to redraft and substitute this version, "he was wronging us and breaking the peace," it would seem an open statement rather than a cross-examination. (Demetr. *Eloc*. 279)

What is important to underline here is that Demetrius judges "asking questions rather than by making a statement" (ἐρωτῶντα καὶ μὴ ἀποφαινόμενον) to be a "forceful" (δεινόν) way of "expressing some points" (ἔνια λέγειν). That Demetrius is referring to a declarative statement by "ἀποφαινόμενον" (cf. Longinus' "ἁπλῶς ῥηθέν") becomes apparent when he spells out the different effects of the question and the corresponding declarative substitute. In modern linguistic terms, Demetrius' point is that the same assertive meaning may be conveyed by both the interrogative and the declarative sentence type, with varying effects on the audience.

This is remarkably insightful, and really only one step removed from the theoretical advances made by modern pragmaticians. On the other hand, Demetrius, like Longinus, fails to see the complete picture, as he does not mention the type of question Longinus refers to, one that is asked and answered by the orator himself.

2.1.4 Quintilian

The two previous Greek authors have been shown to be missing pieces of the rhetorical question puzzle. The picture changes when we move on to another contemporary of Demetrius and Longinus, the most important Roman writer on rhetorical figures, Quintilian. In his *Institutio Oratoris*, Quintilian displays on the one hand an impressive eye for varied uses of questions, on the other a perhaps obsessive penchant for categorization:

> *Quid enim tam commune quam interrogare vel percontari? Nam utroque utimur indifferenter, quamquam alterum noscendi, alterum arguendi gratia videtur adhiberi. At ea res, utrocumque dicitur modo, etiam multiplex habet schema: incipiamus enim ab iis quibus acrior ac vehementior fit probatio, quod primo loco posuimus. (...) figuratum autem quotiens non sciscitandi gratia adsumitur, sed instandi (...) Interrogamus etiam quod negari non possit (...) aut ubi respondendi difficilis est ratio, (...) aut invidiae gratia (...) aut miserationis (...) aut instandi et auferendae dissimulationis (...) Totum hoc plenum est varietatis: nam et indignationi convenit (...) et admirationi (...) Est interim acrius imperandi genus (...) Et ipsi nosmet rogamus (.....) Ceterum et interrogandi se ipsum et respondendi sibi solent esse non ingratae vices (...) diversum est, cum alium rogaveris, non exspectare responsum, sed statim subicere (...) quod schema quidam "per suggestionem" vocant. Fit et comparatione (...) et aliis modis tum brevius tum latius, tum de una re tum de pluribus.*
>
> For what is more common than interrogation or questioning? We use the two terms indiscriminately, although the latter is designed to obtain knowledge and the former to prove a point. Whichever name it is given, the process involves a positive multiplicity of Figures. Let us begin with those which make a proof more pointed and cogent (the type I put first) (...) A figured question [as opposed to a standard question] arises: (1) when it is used not to acquire information but to emphasize a point. We also ask (2) something that cannot be denied (...) and

> (3) something difficult to answer (...) Other objectives include (4) odium (...), (5) pity (...), (6) putting on pressure and stopping our opponent from pretending to misunderstand (...). The whole procedure is full of variety. It suits both (7) indignation (...) and (8) amazement (...). Sometimes (9) it is equivalent to a brusque command (...). (10) We even put questions to ourselves (....) Moreover, (11) to question yourself and then to answer yourself can produce variety which is not unattractive (...). It is different again (12) if you ask a question and then, without waiting for the answer, supply one yourself (...). This figure is sometimes called Suggestion. Another form (13) involves Comparison (...). There are other forms too, some shorter, some longer, some covering a single point, some a number of points. (Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.6-16)[15]

Quintilian's opening question is strongly reminiscent of Longinus,[16] but he continues on a much larger scale: he offers an enormous list of various uses and types of questions, and comments both on Longinus' self-answered questions (12) and Demetrius' rhetorical questions.

Quintilian's classification is however not entirely systematic: the addressee of the question (category 10), motives (categories 4-6) and desired effect (categories 7-9) are used as criteria without distinction. As such, his categories are far from mutually exclusive*:* for example, a question can both be 'difficult to answer' and asked to 'put on pressure'.

Nonetheless, we find some important observations in Quintilian's typology: for example, his *non sciscitantdi gratia sed instandi* (2) is a clear formulation of the shift of communicative function that modern pragmatics theory is concerned with, and his *acrius imperandi genus* (10) is to my knowledge the first theoretical comment on questions used indirectly as requests or commands. Quintilian's discussion is therefore extremely useful, and many of his categories may be found in my Greek corpus of interrogatives.

Before I return to Greek Antiquity, however, I will first make a two-thousand year leap to 20th and 21st-century linguistics.

[15] The numbering is Russell's, but expanded. The examples adduced by Quintilian (mostly from Ciceronean oratory) have been left out.

[16] Quintilian, like Longinus, begins his discussion with a question. It is strange that although Latin *percontatio* and *interrogatum* are again technical terms for specifying and *yes-no* questions (cf. Rijksbaron 2003: 736-7, n.16), Quintilian sees the verbs as used indiscriminately and distinguishes them on the basis of their 'apparent' use.

PART II

PRAGMATICS

Chapter 3

Non-Standard Questions in Modern Linguistics

3.1 Introduction

In recent decades, new research on rhetorical questions (RQ's) and other types of non-standard question (NSQ's) has shed much light on their workings. For RQ's, two major branches of this research may be distinguished: first, theoretical linguistic research into their pragmatic function, and second, empirical research into their psychological and sociological effects.

The latter group of papers[17] present the results of surveys held with test groups and is specifically concerned with measuring and qualifying the persuasive effects RQ's have on an addressee. In short, this type of research considers only the *effect* of RQ's, not the question "How do they work?". Without doubt it is an invaluable treasure-trove of work for psychologists and advertisers alike, but it is for the time being of lesser importance to the present work. I will however return to some of its conclusions in Part III, where I will discuss how Homer and Herodotus use NSQ's.

The theoretical work on RQ's,[18] on the other hand, is the foundation for the coming two chapters. In the following pages, I will discuss the major contributions to our understanding of NSQ's that have appeared in the past thirty years. As I have outlined in my introduction, I aim to answer three questions in the process:

- Why are NSQ's interpreted as having a different function than is suggested by their interrogative form? (Why does someone interpret some questions as something other than questions?) (§3.2)
- How can NSQ's be recognized as such? (How does someone realize that he is not being asked a genuine question?) (§3.3)
- How can the actual meaning of NSQ's be reconstructed from the literal question? (What is the relationship between the literal question and what is implied?) (§3.4)

Although these questions are closely inter-related, I will by necessity discuss them one at a time. This has the unfortunate side-effect that some problems and questions that are bound to arise in earlier sections will be left unanswered until later, for which I can only beg the reader's indulgence.

In Chapter 4, I will then apply the theories developed in answering these questions to Greek non-standard questions. I aim to synthesize a theoretical framework for the analysis of Greek

[17] On RQ's: Ahluwalia & Burnkrant 2004, Boers 1997, Burnkrant & Howard 1984, Ene 1983, Hoeken & Anderiesse 1992, Ilie 1994: ch.6-7, Petty e.a. 1981.

[18] On RQ's: Berg 1978, Frank 1990, Han 2002, Ilie 1994: ch.2-5, Meibauer 1986, Schaffer 2005, Schmidt-Radefeldt 1977, Slot 1992 and 1993, Snoodijk 1995. On indirect requests and commands, the literature is infinitely more vast, but good introductory matter may be found in handbooks such as Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000, Levinson 1983 and Lyons 1977.

NSQ's which I can use in Part III to analyze them in the works of Homer and Herodotus. For any consistent analysis of the NSQ's in their works, it is prerequisite to distinguish them from 'real' questions, and to understand how they work.

Before I go on, some further introductory remarks of a practical nature need to be made, and I will also mention a few preferences regarding terminology (though most of these terms will not be introduced until later this chapter). To start with the latter: I favor 'specifying question' over '*wh*-question', 'communicative function' over 'illocution(ary force)', prefer to use 'declarative' and 'interrogative' as indications of sentence type and 'assertive' as an indication of communicative function, and I will use 'utterance' and 'speech act' nearly indiscriminately. In the following, important theoretical terms that frequently return will be CAPITALIZED when they first occur.

Next a pair of practical notices: readers will notice that I scarcely mention alternative questions (either... or...?) in the coming pages. The main reason for this is that alternative questions are rarely used as non-standard questions, and even more rarely in the Greek corpus that I have examined. Besides, alternative questions may be considered a subcategory of *yes-no* questions, a group that will receive ample attention in what follows. Also lacking will be any mention of indirect questions, an entirely separate topic in itself.

Second, as briefly mentioned above, I will reserve for later any discussion of the particular psychological *effects* NSQ's have on an addressee (in other words, why would a speaker choose to use an RQ instead of a simple assertion?): the present chapter is devoted solely to the understanding of how NSQ's can be correctly interpreted. This is perhaps a somewhat artificial distinction, but to incorporate a full discussion of the effects of NSQ's would require a thesis twice as large as it already is.

As a final remark, I wish to immediately avoid making the impression that I believe that everyday language use can be described and analyzed to complete satisfaction using the concepts developed below. Written and spoken language is simply bustling with half-expressed thoughts, overlapping meanings, implications and endless pragmatic diversity; as such it defies simple categorization and compartmentalization (this is somehow a reassuring thought). The theoretical framework described below is an analytical handhold, and I do not profess it to be more.

3.2 FORM AND FORCE

The most basic characteristic of NSQ's quickly presents itself when we examine a few examples:

(8) Did you pass your driving test today, Daisy?

(9) Yet another construction site was opened up in Amsterdam today. Doesn't the city look bad enough as it is? No wonder that so many people leave. (Adapted from Meibauer 1986: 272, example 538)

(10) Can you pass me the salt, please?

It is clear that in example (8), we are most likely dealing with a genuine question, whereas in examples (9) and (10) we are dealing with a rhetorical question and a request, respectively. Question (9) is clearly not meant to elicit information but as an assertion ("Amsterdam looks bad enough as it is"). Similarly, question (10) is not asking for information, but for action. Yet all three sentences share the same interrogative form and have a question mark. In *form*, they are all

'questions' (more specifically, *yes-no* questions), but two of them do not have the *force* of questions.

In order to understand this discrepancy between form and force, I will follow most authors on this subject and label it an inconsistency between SENTENCE TYPE and COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION (illocutionary force). I thus foray into the realm of SPEECH ACT THEORY, which will support most of my argument. In fact, nearly all discussion of NSQ's in pages to follow will be based to some extent on the works of Austin (on speech acts), Searle (on indirect speech acts) and above all Grice (on conversational implicature).[19] NSQ's, in terms of speech act theory, are INDIRECT UTTERANCES, defined by Searle as follows:

> In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by the way of relying on their mutually shared background of information, both linguistic and non-linguistic, together with the general power of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer (Searle 1975: 60)

Both Gricean and Searlean insights come into play here, and I will deal with them separately before I discuss a revision and synthesis of their work in the pragma-dialectical model of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst.

3.2.1 Grice

The heart of Paul Grice's now classic William James Lectures (reflected in his article *Logic and Conversation*, 1975) is the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE, an implicit 'contract' between the parties in a conversation, stating:

> Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice 1975: 45)

Grice expounded on this fundamental principle with his four specific MAXIMS: *quantity* (make your contribution no more and no less informative than required), *quality* (try to make your contribution one that is true), *relation* (be relevant) en *manner* (be perspicuous).[20] According to Grice, a speaker in a conversation may normally be expected to observe the overall cooperative principle: he will therefore normally observe the maxims. Yet speakers often deliberately fail to comply with the rules, blatantly flouting one or more of the maxims. Because an addressee will attempt to reconcile this 'exploitation' of a maxim with his expectation that the speaker is in compliance with the cooperative principle, such an utterance will give rise to a CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE. The addressee needs to reconstruct what is really meant (the *IMPLICATUM*[21]) by following a series of steps:

- He [the speaker] has said that *p*;
- there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the [Cooperative Principle];
- he could not be doing this unless he thought that q;

[19] For the best discussion, to this day, of these authors and their works, cf. Levinson 1983. Grice should perhaps not be included as a 'speechactian'. I do so because his work has been seamlessly integrated into speech act theory: Gricean pragmatics and speech act pragmatics are now more or less inseparably intertwined.

[20] For more detailed explanation, including 'submaxims' to go with these four, cf. Grice 1975: 45-6.

[21] Grice 1975: 44. Though a great deal of Grice's terminology is still in use today, this term has by and large disappeared from the literature I have nonetheless chosen to use it frequently.

- he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that *q* is required;
- he has done nothing to stop me thinking that *q*;
- he intends me to think or is at least willing to allow me to think, that *q*;
- and so he has implicated that *q*.

(Grice 1975: 50)

Grice offers many examples of such conversational implicatures, such as the following two where the maxim of quantity and relation, respectively, are exploited:

> A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: 'Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.' (Gloss: A cannot be opting out [of the cooperative principle], since if he wished to be uncooperative, why write at all? He cannot be unable, through ignorance, to say more, since the man is his pupil; moreover, he knows that more information than this is wanted. He must, therefore, be wishing to impart information that he is reluctant to write down. This supposition is tenable only on the assumption that he thinks Mr. X is no good at philosophy. This, then, is what he is implicating.) (Grice 1975: 52)

> At a genteel tea party, A says *Mrs. X is an old bag.* There is a moment of appalled silence, and then B says *The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't it?* B has blatantly refused to make what HE says relevant to A's preceding remark. He thereby implicates that A's remark should not be discussed and, perhaps more specifically, that A has committed a social gaffe. (Grice 1975: 54)

Yet Grice's list of examples is incomplete, as is the theory as a whole as it was 'left' by him. In fact, Grice seems not to have worked out the full explanatory potential of his cooperative principle. A few points can be made:[22]

- Grice's maxims seem only to apply to the communication of propositional information, that is to say to assertions that can be either true or false. As a case in point, the second maxim, quality, is formulated in a way that is limited to utterances that can be truth-valuated, leaving us no way to identify the flouting of maxims in utterances like "Thanks for slamming the door in my face", which is neither true or false.[23] This same problem arises when looking at the indirect use of interrogatives (as they have no truth value), and Grice's model thus fails on this account to explain the meaning of examples (9) and (10) above.
- Grice's cooperative principle is specifically designed for a conversational setting. His account, when rephrased, would certainly be applicable to other forms of interaction as well (addresses to a larger audience, monologues), but it is limited in scope in his original formulation.
- Some elements of the theory on *conversational implicature* remain ambiguous in Grice's treatment: it is for example not quite clear if Grice intended examples such as (9) and (10) above (rhetorical questions and question-requests, also cases of something being implied other than what is said) to be included in his theory (he does not include them himself). It thus remains unclear if and how exactly conversational implicature is different from any

[22] These problems have not gone unnoticed and 'listings' of them may be found in several works, e.g. Slot 1993: 59-62 and Lyons 1977: 593-4. For a radical attack on Gricean theory (one that justifiably has not generated a large following), cf. Davis 1998.

[23] The example is taken from Slot 1993: 60.

other form of indirect communication. Also, many of Grice's maxims are formulated with a considerable degree of "generality, not to say vagueness" (Lyons 1977: 594).

- Grice's steps for reconstruction (quoted above), though indeterminate enough to allow nearly any *q* (the *implicatum*) to be implied by any *p* (what is literally said), do not touch on any *relation* between *p* and *q*. For most of his examples, such as those about the letter and the tea-party quoted above, this poses no problem (in fact the lack of connection between *p* ("The weather has been nice") and *q* ("You were rude!") there seems paradigmatic of Grice's examples). Yet in the case of, for example, irony, a direct link between the meaning of *p* and the meaning of *q* is very clearly present (Grice's example: A, betrayed by his friend X, says: "X is a *fine* friend!", where the utterance of course means the direct opposite of its literal meaning: "X is *not* a fine friend").
- Also, depending on what maxims are flouted, the meaning of *q* completely replaces the meaning of *p* in some examples, canceling *p* completely ("X is not a fine friend" cancels "X is a fine friend"). Yet in others, *p* and *q* are allowed to co-exist (in the first example above on p. 20, the student's good attendance record is in no way canceled by his poor abilities as a philosophy student). Grice offers no insights on the function of the literal utterance.

Grice's framework thus holds the promise of explaining the discrepancy between form and force in NSQ's, but it requires reworking and some additions. For this, recourse may be had to the work of John R. Searle (most importantly that part of it spanning the 1960s and '70s).

3.2.2 Searle

In Searle's account of indirect language use (*Indirect Speech Acts*, 1975)[24], he builds on Grice's concept of general principles of cooperative conversation by integrating it into Austinian speech act theory. Searle begins with this example:

> Student X: Let's go to the movies tonight.
> Student Y: I have to study for an exam.

Student Y of course means "No, I can't go to the movies tonight". Searle calls this the 'primary illocutionary act', whereas the literal sense of "I have to study for an exam" is the 'secondary illocutionary act'.[25] The primary illocutionary act in the example can be derived from the secondary illocutionary act by means of an elaborate 10-step reconstructive scheme (cf. Searle 1975: 63) which incorporates facts about the conversation and background information as well as Gricean theory on principles of communication and Austinian theory of speech acts. This theoretical apparatus, according to Searle, "will suffice to explain the general phenomenon of indirect illocutionary acts" (1975: 64).

Searle devotes the larger part of his paper to indirect requests ("Can you hand me that book?") and indirect commissives, i.e. offers and promises ("I can do that for you"). In such cases, one type of illocutionary act (e.g. a question or an assertion) is used to produce another type of illocutionary act (e.g. a request or commissive). Searle argues that, in the case of such indirect illocutionary acts,

[24] This article may be seen (and is seen by Searle himself, cf. 1975: 60) as a revision and continuation of the theory on indirect speech acts presented in Searle 1969: ch.3.

[25] Note again that I prefer the term 'communicative function' for 'illocution' (cf. §3.1). I will use the latter term in this chapter interchangeably with the former only because it is the term used by Searle and others whose work I will be discussing.

the secondary illocutionary act refers to 'felicity conditions'[26] of the primary illocutionary act. For example:

> [T]he reason I can ask you to pass the salt by saying *Can you pass the salt?* but not by saying *Salt is made of sodium chloride* or *Salt is mined in the Tatra mountains* is that your ability to pass the salt is a preparatory condition for requesting you to pass the salt. But obviously, that answer is not by itself sufficient, because not all questions about your abilities are requests. The hearer therefore needs some way of finding out when the utterance is just a question about his abilities and when it is a request made by way of asking a question about his abilities. It is at this point that the general principles of communication (together with factual background information) come into play. (Searle 1975: 74)

This last sentence clarifies in Gricean terms how a question can be used as a request: since it is highly doubtful that anyone at a dinner-table will be genuinely interested in someone's ability to pass salt, communicative maxims are flouted and the question is interpreted to imply something else. Crucially, Searle adds to this a clear *relation between what is said and what is implied*: the literal utterance refers to felicity conditions of the implied 'primary illocutionary act'.

Another important feature of Searle's analysis is the possibility it leaves for an utterance to have a dual communicative function. In the words of John Lyons:

> We do not have to say, when the sentence *Can you tell me the time?* is used to make a request, it no longer has its literal meaning. We can say instead that the sentence may be used, without any change of meaning, either directly to ask a question or indirectly to make a request; and, if it is used indirectly to make a request, it has two kinds of illocutionary force. It is because it can always be understood, at least incidentally, as a question, that it can also be held, in context and in terms of what Grice (1975) calls conversational implicatures [...] to imply, or implicate, a particular request. (Lyons 1977: 785)[27]

Using Searle's model, we can thus cope with some of the problems in Grice's account discussed above (p. 20):

- the inability of Grice's model to deal with anything other than the communication of propositional information (for example, shifts from questions to requests can now be explained)
- the relation between the literal utterance and the *implicatum* (Searle: reference to felicity conditions of the *implicatum*),
- the function of the literal utterance (which is allowed by Searle to co-exist with the *implicatum*).

However, taking Searle's model, an attempt to explain examples (9) and (10) will still be only partly successful. Example (10), "Can you pass me the salt?", is one of Searle's own prime exhibits, but his model fails to explain example (9): the question "Doesn't the city look bad enough as it is?" does

[26] Also a term from Austinian-Searlean speech act theory: they are conditions that any illocutionary act must fulfill to be successful and non-defective. Cf. Lyons 1977: 733-4 for an introduction and overview. Searle admits one exception: besides referring to the felicity conditions (as defined by Searle himself (1969: ch.3) of requesting or promising A, the speaker can also make an indirect request or commissive "by stating that or by asking whether there are good or overriding reasons for doing A" (Searle 1975: 72, 82), as in "Why don't you be quiet?" (1975: 66) and "I think I had better leave you alone" (1975: 81). One might suggest, however, that there being a reason to do A is also a felicity condition of requesting or promising to do A.

[27] The notion of a *dual* communicative function was actually introduced by Sadock (cf. his treatment in Sadock 1974). Allowing the literal and the implied sense of NSQ's to coexist is problematic in the case of irony, where the sense of the *implicatum* is the opposite of the literal utterance (and the two can therefore not be valid at the same time).

not seem to refer in any way to conditions for the felicitous uttering of "Amsterdam looks bad enough as it is". In fact, Searle's model seems to lack explanatory power in cases of an indirect utterance whose 'primary illocutionary act' is an assertion (such as irony, metaphor or rhetorical questions).[28] The awkward result of this gap in Searle's theory is that it cannot explain some indirect utterances which had earlier been tackled with some success by Grice (e.g. the two examples given on p. 20).

Searle's article has, for my purposes, one overriding virtue: it incorporates Gricean principles of communication in a theoretical model which accounts for *shifts of communicative function* between the literal utterance and the implied utterance. Thus, although Searle's model itself fails to account for the disparity between interrogative form and declarative communicative function in RQ's, it can serve as a starting point for a model that *does* explain that disparity. One such model, the one which others have chosen to use as reference point for their analysis of RQ's (and I will follow them)[29], is that of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst.

3.2.3 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst

Frans van Eemeren and Robert Grootendorst have captured Gricean and Searlean insights in a single integrated model, the 'pragma-dialectical' framework of communication. It is based on a rephrased general 'Principle of Communication', summarizing five broadly formulated rules which speakers (and writers) in any type of discourse observe (as do their addressees expect them to):

1. perform no incomprehensible speech acts
2. perform no insincere speech acts
3. perform no unnecessary speech acts
4. perform no pointless speech acts
5. perform no new speech acts that are not an appropriate sequel or reaction to preceding speech acts

(Slot, 1993: 70)

It is immediately clear that these RULES OF COMMUNICATION correspond largely to Grice's maxims. At the same time, some clear advantages of these rules over their Gricean counterparts are apparent: they are now fully integrated into a theory of speech acts, and they are no longer restricted to the communication of propositional (true or false) information (thus allowing for the interpretation of indirectly used questions and other non-propositional utterances such as "Thanks for slamming the door in my face!").

Once a violation of one of these rules has been identified, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst propose the following inference scheme for the reconstruction of the implied speech act:

---

[28] Again, this problem has been noticed by others, e.g. Slot 1993: 64-5. Note, however, that much of Slot's criticism of Searlean theory is off the mark: for example, when she notes that Searle "restricts the notion of 'indirect speech acts' to forms of indirectness in which what is said and what is primarily meant are connected through a felicity condition for the performance of the intended speech act" (1993: 64) and subsequently picks apart some of Searle's examples by stating that "contrary to what Searle suggests, the reconstruction of these indirect speech acts can not be carried out with one of the felicity conditions for the intended speech act as a guiding principle" (1993: 65), she has failed to notice that Searle himself had in fact *not* limited his connection between primary and secondary illocutionary only to felicity conditions (cf. my footnote 26, p. 22). A more significant fluke is Slot's comment that Searle's account "seems to suggest [ ] two different 'routes' of reconstruction: one for indirect speech acts and one for conversational implicatures" (1993: 65); as I point out on this page, the very usefulness of Searle's method is that he has integrated the Gricean cooperative principle into his own theory of indirect speech acts, leaving only *one* 'route' of reconstruction, albeit a flawed one.

[29] In the following paragraphs I owe a constant debt to Slot 1993, and to a lesser degree to Ilie 1994.

1. The speaker/writer S has uttered U.
2. If U is taken literally, S has performed speech act 1, with communicative function 1 and propositional content 1.
3. In context C, speech act 1 is a violation of rule of communication i.
4. In context C, speech act 2 observes rule i and all other communication rules.
5. Speech act 1, speech act 2 and context C can be linked by means of rule [of communication] j.
6. Therefore, speech act 2 is a correct interpretation of U.

(van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 55)

Ignoring for now the imperfections in this model[30], we can at last proceed to explain the shift of communicative function of both examples (9) and (10). To show this, I will follow the first four steps of the above inference scheme for both examples:

1. The speaker/writer S has uttered (9): "Doesn't the city look bad enough as it is?"
2. If (9) is taken literally, S has performed *speech act 1*, with communicative function 'question' and propositional content ¬[the city looks bad enough as it is].
3. In context C, *speech act 1* is a violation of rules of communication 2 (the question is not sincere as there is no one to answer it, and the speaker does not even wish for an answer) and 3 (the speaker knows the answer and the question is therefore unnecessary).
4. In context C, *speech act 2* (with communicative function 'assertion' and propositional content [the city looks bad enough as it is] observes rule 2, 3 and all other communication rules.

1. The speaker/writer S has uttered (10): "Can you pass the salt, please?"
2. If (10) is taken literally, S has performed *speech act 1*, with communicative function 'question' and propositional content [you can pass the salt].
3. In context C, *speech act 1* is a violation of rules of communication 2 (the question is not sincere as the speaker does not wish for an answer) and 3 (the speaker knows the answer and the question is therefore unnecessary) and 5 (the utterance is unlikely to be an appropriate sequel to what preceded in the context of the table-conversation).
4. In context C, *speech act 2* (with communicative function 'request' and propositional content [you pass the salt]) observes rule 2, 3, 5 and all other communication rules.

Steps 3 and 4 in the examples are essential: the addressee notices one or more violations of communicative rules and (re)constructs an interpretation of the utterance that *does* comply with the rules. Walking through all these steps may seem pedantic, and can certainly not be thought to be reflective of mental processes going on inside the mind of the addressee when he hears (or reads) either of these utterances. And many questions remain unanswered: for example, how does the addressee know that rules are being violated? And what is the effect, why would a speaker do this in the first place? For now, let us be content to acknowledge the explanatory value of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's model and draw one preliminary conclusion: NSQ's are interpreted to have a different communicative function than their sentence type suggests because of the violation of rules of communication.[31]

[30] It should be rephrased on several points (cf. Slot 1993: 75-82): step 3 should allow for more than one violation at once, step 6 should leave open the possibility of the literal speech act coexisting with the implied speech act, and I will discuss step 5 in detail below (§3.4).

[31] Two rules of communication that any NSQ will always violate are "perform no insincere speech act" (the question is not sincerely meant to obtain the information that it is in form designed to elicit), and "perform no unnecessary speech acts" (the speaker will already know the answer to his question, so the question as a device to obtain that answer is unnecessary).

I have interrupted the reconstruction of utterances (9) and (10) halfway, after step 4 of the inference scheme. Step 5 remains, which reads: "Speech act 1 [the literal speech act], speech act 2 [the implied speech act] and context C can be linked by means of rule of communication j." Apparently Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, like Searle, suppose that the reconstruction of the implied speech act can be achieved by means of one of the rules of communication.[32] However, as I have shown above in my discussion of Searle, this works only for a limited group of indirect utterances. Whereas indirect requests, for example, are explained without problem by adducing communication rules, rhetorical questions, metaphor and irony cannot be reconstructed using the same principles. Thus, 'rule j' in this scheme should be thought of more generally as whatever reconstructive device can lead from the literal utterance to the implied utterance. In the case of RQ's, determining what that device is forms no easy task. I will partly undertake that task in §3.4. Before that, I will turn to another significant question mentioned just now: *how exactly does the addressee know that rules of communication are being violated*? (§3.3). First, however, a few more excursive remarks beg to be made about the matters discussed in the past few pages.

3.2.4 On competing theoretical models and matters of terminology

The science of pragmatics is well-populated with diverse works and it would therefore be misleading to suggest that the model opted for above (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's pragma-dialectical framework) is the only one that could explain the workings of NSQ's. Many pragmaticians have proposed competing models, some of which depart from speech act theory altogether.[33] On this matter, I submit the following:

- Although competing models exist that diverge greatly on some points, I believe that Gennaro Cherchia is correct in stating that Gricean theory still forms the basis for "virtually all current work in linguistic pragmatics" (Cherchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000: 239). Even models that are in fundamental opposition with speech act theory, such as Sperber and Wilson's 'Principle of Relevance', are much indebted to the work of Grice on a basic level. Sperber and Wilson admit as much in a preliminary remark:

  > [T]he study of implicature along Gricean lines has become a major concern of pragmatics. We believe that this basic idea of Grice's *William James Lectures* has even wider implications: it offers a way of developing the analysis of inferential communication [...] into an explanatory model. To achieve this, however, we must leave aside the various elaborations of Grice's original hunches and the sophisticated, though empirically rather empty debates they have given rise to. What is needed is an attempt to rethink, in psychologically realistic terms, such basic questions as: What form of shared information is available to humans? How is shared information exploited in communication? [...] (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 38)[34]

---

[32] Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, for example (cf. Slot 1993: 72), reconstruct 'Can you get a move on?' as a request to get a move on through the rule 'perform no pointless speech acts': by asking if the conditions for performing a request are fulfilled, the speaker ensures the implied request is *not* pointless (this explanation is thus identical to Searle's).

[33] Cf. Levinson 1983: 276-83, Sperber & Wilson 1986, Davis 1998.

[34] I find Sperber & Wilson's work highly attractive as an elegant alternative to speech act theory (where one must resort to artificial distinctions and rather complicated models of inference that are unlikely to correspond to the seemingly simple mental processes that go on when an addressee hears or reads something). I also feel greatly compelled to follow Levinson (1983: 268-6) in abandoning any notion of a literal force of various sentence types (what Levinson calls the Literal Force Hypothesis (LFH)). For my purposes, however, a model based on LFH is the only suitable choice as analytical framework.

- The theoretical discussion in the present work must, in the end, serve an analysis of *Greek* NSQ's. The point is therefore not so much to contribute to the ongoing debate on how we must understand the use of language in general, but rather to adduce whatever existing contribution can aid in defining characteristics of Greek non-standard questions. I consider Gricean pragmatics still 'the way to go' in this regard, but, as I have shown, Grice's original model is inapplicable to the analysis of indirectly used questions: an updated version such as the one of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst is therefore required.

Yet for all its analytical strengths, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's model is certainly not without problems either. One significant issue goes beyond mere questions of terminology: their Principle of Communication is formulated exclusively with prohibitions: "do not utter...", "perform no..."; communication rules, in turn, are "violated". What is apparently ignored here is that 'violations' are the rule rather than the exception: no written text or conversation is in complete agreement with all the 'rules', and such texts or conversations would be very awkward indeed. Rather, inference of what lies behind what is literally said or written is itself a basic principle of communication. Or, as Sperber and Wilson have argued (1986), the very point is that human communicative utterances *are* usually relevant, and not that they are not.

3.3 IDENTIFYING THE FLOUTING

The conclusion of the preceding discussion (§3.2) was, in short, that an addressee interprets NSQ's as having a different communicative function than their interrogative sentence type suggests because of deliberate violations of communication rules, or using Grice's original term, because rules are *flouted*. This raises a crucial issue: for an addressee (or the reader of a text) to succeed in this interpretative shift, he must *realize* that rules are being flouted. I will therefore now turn to my second main question: how can NSQ's be recognized as being non-standard?, in other words, how does someone realize that he is not being asked a genuine question? Two factors weigh heavily on the likelihood that a question will be identified as an indirect utterance:

- the interactional setting (§3.3.1)
- indicative clues in the text (§3.3.2)

3.3.1 The role of the interactional setting

How a question is interpreted is in no small part influenced by where, when, by whom, and to whom it is put. For example, the question "Who is the best man for the job?" will undoubtably be interpreted differently in the setting of a political rally for a U.S. Presidential candidate than in a discussion between two business colleagues talking about a certain position in a company. Similarly, interrogatives that belong to the closing statements of an attorney pleading a case are much more likely to be interpreted as RQ's than the same interrogatives in a dialogical setting. The question "Can you pass me the salt?" is unlikely to be used in any other setting than at a dinner table, and then unlikely to be anything other than a request (of course, the presence of salt is in this case a prerequisite for the question making any sense at all).

Specific settings thus elicit specific (uses of certain) questions. Generally, it can be said that *the less a setting allows for interaction, the more questions are likely to be non-standard*. This is easily explained: a question put to someone who cannot, or is not allowed to answer (such as a jury in a trial, or you (the reader of the present paper) addressed by me) is in itself a 'violation' of

communicative principles: if it were meant to elicit information from the addressee, it would be rather pointless. This is a pivotal factor to highlight: we will see that addressing a question to someone who cannot (or is not allowed to) answer is a heavily used method of forcing the addressee to read it as a NSQ.

Another point that I would like to make here is that there is a difference between the addressee and the NARRATEE of an utterance. The narratee(s), the audience to whom a narrative text is narrated (for written texts, the readers), is usually not the same as the addressee to which a question is put inside that narrative. The narratee who reads or hears a citation of direct speech can interpret utterances based not only on the literal text, but also by looking at the provided answer, the words the narrator uses to introduce the question, etc. Take, for example, the following exchange:

(11) Speaker A: Who else could do this job? — Speaker B: You're right, he *is* the best man for the job.

The question in (11) could, under the right circumstances, very well be a sincere question. Yet the narratee will know that it was not meant that way because Speaker B (the addressee) does not answer the question but treats it like it was an assertion. The narratee is also privileged with more information than an addressee in examples such as

(12) After the dignitaries left, images of the ghetto—a centre of cultural creativity and a staging post for Auschwitz—unfolded against a background of Jewish cantorial music. It left a haunting impression, but not everyone was satisfied. "How could they have used the word 'celebration' instead of 'commemoration'?" **complained** one survivor. (quoted in Ilie 1994: 57)

The word "complained" here clearly signals that the question is taken to imply an assertion, but that word is available only to the narratee, not to the addressee. Note also that it is actually not uttered by the speaker of the question, but by the narrator, two entities who are here not one and the same.

A narratee may at the same time be at a severe disadvantage, as he has usually no indication of intonation, gesturing, and other extra-lingual evidence that is only the addressee is privy to. These differences between the addressee and the narratee will of course prove of particular significance for the analysis of Greek NSQ's: only the role of narratee is open to us there, and we are only addressees when the two roles overlap (in those rare cases where the reader is addressed directly).

3.3.2 Flouting markers

Having discussed factors related to setting, we now come to an important *textual* feature of nearly all NSQ's: *they wear their 'non-standardness' on their sleeves*. That is to say, most NSQ's are clearly 'marked' in some way to show that they are *meant* to flout rules. These signals, or 'clues' (so called in Slot 1993) come in many different forms: some are very explicit, some implicit at best; many are found in the wording of the question itself, some must be looked for in the textual context; some rule out the possibility of the question being genuine, others need to be used in combination with other signals. I would like to introduce the term FLOUTING MARKER to cover this broad group of indicators.

The variety within the body of flouting markers is endless[35], but some order may be imposed by dividing them in different categories. I postpone an extensive discussion of each of these categories to my treatment of Greek flouting markers in §4.2, and will here only mention them and give a few examples of each category (the relevant flouting markers are highlighted in each example below). Note that in many of the following examples, we also see the importance of the interactional setting described in the previous section: those instances where an addressee cannot respond, or simply is not given the time to do so, will probably be interpreted to be non-standard regardless of the textual flouting markers present.

First, a speaker may signal that his question is not meant as a genuine question by letting the addressee know in some way that he already knows the answer and is not sincerely interested in getting that answer: he may *provide the answer to the literal question* (13). As a variation, the 'answer' may be in the form of a rhetorical question (14).

(13) And when all this was going on, where was Labour? Were they alongside the Conservative party in speaking up for human rights in the Soviet Union? **They were not**. (John Major, quoted in Ilie 1994: 143)

(14) So now that you have been released from prison, what are you going to do? **Rob another bank?**[36]

Second, the speaker can insert an *element revealing a commitment to a specific proposition*. These elements can feature in standard questions as well, but are often used by speakers to influence the addressee to supply the (mental) answer to the literal question that he desires. By steering the addressee to a specific answer in this way, the speaker can signal that he is not really asking a sincere question for information. The elements highlighted in the following examples are such 'steering devices', as I will discuss in detail below (§3.4.3):

(15) =(9) Yet another construction site was opened up in Amsterdam today. Does**n't** the city look bad enough as it is? No wonder that so many people leave.

(16) Is it **really** the task of a good newspaper to rashly take over whatever information the authorities give? (cf. example (40), rephrased as in Slot 1993: 148)

(17) Who does**n't** look forward to a well-prepared dinner after a hard day's work? (adapted from Meibauer 1986: 229, example 301)

(18) *Man on golden bike*
Sir, I wonder if any newspapers in other countries have ever been as negative as *The Times* in writing about their Olympic champions [...] If the world champion, Jens Lehman, was so generous in saying he thinks Chris Boardman would have won the gold medal without a superior machine, why **on earth** could you not have said the same? (quoted in Slot 1993: 149)

(19) Who is **better** suited for this job **than** Jack?

[35] Note that I discuss only flouting markers in *written* texts (that may however reflect spoken dialogue). The assertive communicative function of some rhetorical questions may also be gauged from patterns of intonation, but I leave this matter out of consideration.

[36] The rhetorical force of the first question hinges on the fact that the second question is an RQ and functions as *answer* to the preceding question (in a world where robbing banks is taboo, this question can only imply "You must not rob another bank"). If the speaker had continued with a genuine question, such as "What type of work will you be looking for?", the first question would not be rhetorical either.

Third, an addressee may be confronted with a *reference to the communicative function of the implied utterance* in the question itself or in the context. These markers show that the question is not genuinely meant to obtain information by revealing what it *is* meant to do. Such references may be *explicit* (the communicative function is literally expressed in the wording of the question, such as in example (20)) or *implicit* (elements are used that can only function in utterances of a certain communicative function, such as the elements highlighted in (21)-(23)):

(20) **I must object**: what on earth has this to do with the proceedings?[37]

(21) Why, **after all**, would you not choose to make the most of all the tax-benefits your insurer has to offer? (quoted in Slot 1993: 155)

(22) = (10) Can you pass me the salt, **please**?

(23) But isn't each album they release a copy of something they did before? And **that** is just because they have their own style. (quoted in Slot 1993: 152)[38]

Fourth, especially in requests, *idiomatic and conventionalized formulations* that are 'normally' used in specific contexts to imply an utterance of a certain communicative function can help to identify the violation of communication rules. As Slot argues (1993: 157), "[w]hen a specific formulation has been commonly used to convey an indirect meaning, it then in itself becomes a clue for the indirectness". In other words, the very presence of a conventionalized phrase signals that the addressee is dealing with a request, a command, etc., rather than with a genuine question, and this in turn clearly marks the violation of communicative rules. Examples of such conventional formulae in English are "Why not...?", "Would you...?", "Can you...?" , etc.:

(24) **Why not** stop here?

(25) **Would you** open the door for me?

(26) =(10) **Can you** pass me the salt, please?[39]

As a fifth and final group of flouting markers, I wish to focus attention on a broad variety of sentence constituents that can be said to increase the rhetorical force of a certain utterance.The more a speaker shows that he has an opinion about things, the less likely it is for his questions to be interpreted as neutral requests for information. For these clues (perhaps best considered

[37] This category is closely similar to, but must be distinguished from, the use of 'quoting verbs' explicitly referring to the communicative function of an utterance, such as described in §3.3.1: such quoting verbs add to the interpretation of the *narratee*, not the addressee, and they are used by the *narrator*, not by the speaker (two entities that must be kept apart even in sentences like "So I complained: "What kind of ridiculous behavior is that?").

[38] Note in this example, if we assume it is taken from spoken text, the speaker immediately goes on after asking the question: this, again, is in itself a violation of communicative rules.

[39] As opposed to "**Are you able to** pass me the salt?", an utterance that is unlikely to act as a request. Conventionally and idiomatically used questions (mostly as requests) are highly problematic: two utterances with the exact same meaning can have entirely different implications. This difficulty has led to rather divergent solutions, and some even go so far as to discard Gricean theory altogether because of this problem (e.g. Davis 1998: 59-60). Searle (1975: 76) proposed another maxim of conversation that states: "Speak idiomatically unless there is some special reason not to". I would rather argue that the very presence of a conventionalized phrase signals that the addressee is dealing with a request/command/etc., that this in turn clearly marks the violation of communicative rules, and that it is this mark that distinguishes the idiomatic phrase from the non-idiomatic phrase with the same literal meaning. One problem, of course, is that the idiomatic phrase *can* be used in genuine questions: the question "**Can you** read a thousand words in a minute?" is completely legitimate. This remains, in short, a troublesome species of indirect questions.

'circumstantial evidence' of the violation of communication rules), such as elaborate and emotional forms of address or adverbial word groups, I will use the term RHETORICALITY-ENHANCING ELEMENTS. These are sometimes not easily distinguished from elements revealing the speaker's commitment to a certain proposition, such as in examples (28) and (29) :

(27) **You unspeakable turd**, what have you done?

(28) = (18) If the world champion, Jens Lehman, was so generous in saying he thinks Chris Boardman would have won the gold medal without a superior machine, why **on earth** could you not have said the same? (quoted in Slot 1993: 149)[40]

(29) Yes, some of the 'spirituality' seems spurious—but **just** where is true spirituality to be found **anyway**? (quoted in Slot 1993: 181)

Again, I will discuss each of these categories in more detail in the next chapter, my discussion of Greek NSQ's.

3.4 RECONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS

We are now able to explain reasonably well the communicative function shift in NSQ's as the result of a *deliberate* and *marked* violation of the rules of communication. In this section, I will attempt to tackle the final of the three questions laid out at the outset of this discussion: How can the actual meaning of NSQ's be reconstructed from the literal question? (What is the relationship between the literal question and what is implied?). This aspect of the pragmatic analysis of NSQ's, the 'reconstruction' of the *implicatum*, requires both the communicative function and the propositional content of the implied utterance to be determined. I will first touch on some clues facilitating the reconstruction of the communicative function (§3.4.1) , and subsequently move on to discuss the reconstruction of three types of NSQ separately: requests/commands/commissives/etc. (§3.4.2), rhetorical questions (§3.4.3 and §3.4.4), and expository questions (§3.4.5).

3.4.1 Reconstruction clues

Some of the elements that assist in identifying the indirectness of an utterance (flouting markers, cf. §3.3) do more than that: they also expose the actual force of the implied utterance. These RECONSTRUCTION CLUES facilitate the correct reconstruction of the *implicatum* because they are elements that can exist only within utterances of a certain communicative function. Consider, for example, this explicit reference to the communicative function of the *implicatum*:

(30) = (20) **I must object**: what on earth has this to do with the proceedings?

[40] The words 'on earth' can certainly be said to enhance the rhetoricality of a certain phrase. At the same time, they constitute a so-called 'negative polarity item' (NPI), an element that is 'licensed' only in negative semantic environments (other examples are 'a red cent', 'at all', 'a damn', etc.) (cf. Chierchia 2000: 517-22). In rhetorical questions, NPI's can exist *exclusively* in positively phrased questions that require a negative answer and imply a negative assertion (cf. Sadock 1974: 82-3; Han 2002). These elements can therefore also be said to steer the addressee towards a specific answer, as they reveal the commitment of the speaker to the negative proposition (this commitment to a proposition will be fully explained in §3.4.3).

The words 'I must object' signal that the question following them is definitely *not* meant as a standard information-eliciting question, and therefore act as flouting marker. At the same time, they reveal how the question *is* supposed to be interpreted, viz. as an assertion used to object to whatever preceded. The *implicatum* must therefore have the communicative function of an assertion.

Another type of flouting marker that functions as a reconstruction clue is the use of conventionalized and idiomatic phrases. Question-requests, question-commissives, etc., that begin with "May I?" or "Could you?" are marked by those formulae as indirect, and the phrases simultaneously steer the reconstruction of the *implicatum* towards the communicative function commonly identified by the idiom.

Finally, reconstruction clues may be found in the interactional setting and certain contextual information available only to the narratee of a text. For example, the setting of a political speech is in itself a clue suggesting that questions will not be meant as genuine questions.[41] And just like in example (30) above, the use of 'QUOTING VERBS' explicitly referring to the communicative function of the utterance can aid the narratee in reconstructing the implied meaning:

(31) = (12) After the dignitaries left, images of the ghetto—a centre of cultural creativity and a staging post for Auschwitz—unfolded against a background of Jewish cantorial music. It left a haunting impression, but not everyone was satisfied. "How could they have used the word 'celebration' instead of 'commemoration'?" **complained** one survivor.

Again, the word "complained" signals that we are dealing with a question meant to function as a complaint. The narratee will understand that the question is insincere, but more than that, he will also correctly reconstruct the communicative function of the implied utterance.

3.4.2 Question-requests, question-commands and question-commissives

I now turn to the reconstruction of several distinct types of non-standard question. Reconstructing the communicative function and propositional content of question-requests, question-commands, question-commissives, etc. seems to be pretty straightforward as soon as that 'ingredient' of it that makes it function as a request/command/commissive is isolated. Take for example, the following pairs (all based on examples in Searle 1975):

(32) a. **Can you** pass me the salt?
b. I request that you pass me the salt.

(33) a. **Will you** quit making that awful racket?
b. I request that you quit making that awful racket.

(34) a. **Would you be willing to** write a letter of recommendation for me?
b. I request that you write a letter of recommendation for me.

(35) a. **Why don't you** try it just once?
b. I request that you try it just once.

(36) a. **Would you mind awfully if I asked you if you could** take off your hat?
b. I request that you take off your hat.

In all of the above examples, the questions under *a* will under normal circumstances imply the requests under *b*. Their communicative function as requests is indicated by a REQUEST FORMULA

[41] Cf. Ilie 1994: ch. 7 for more information on rhetorical questions in political speeches.

(or an inflation of request formulae such as in (36)): a conventional interrogative phrase that is idiomatically used to make requests. Once an addressee recognizes the relevant words as a request formula, he will conclude that the utterance is not meant to elicit information, but action.

The propositional content of the request is easily reconstructed: it is identical to the propositional content of the question once the request formula is deleted. In all of the above examples, the request formula can simply be replaced by "I request that".[42] This method of reconstruction works equally well for question-commands, question-commissives (and other variations on this 'spectrum' of language use[43]) as is illustrated by two more pairs:

(37) a. **Why don't I** carry that bag for you?
b. I offer to carry that bag for you.

(38) a. **Will you** leave your little brother alone?
b. I command that you leave your little brother alone.

3.4.3 Rhetorical questions: polarity reversal

When we turn to rhetorical questions we are confronted with a much more difficult process of reconstruction. The complexities involved with reconstructing both the communicative function and the propositional content of the *implicatum* of a RQ will become apparent from the following series of examples:

(39) Young people should not ignore this notion. Isn't the fact that it is widely held to be true proof of its validity? (adapted from Meibauer 1986: 273, example 550)

(40) = (16) Is it really the task of a good newspaper to rashly take over whatever information the authorities give?

(41) = (17) Who doesn't look forward to a well-prepared dinner after a hard day's work?

(42) What did John ever do for Sam anyway?

(43) Sir, could it be the proliferation of hippies trespassing on an innocent farmer's land having their social security forms delivered to them that causes the queues of hard-working tax-payers outside the Passport Office? (quoted in Slot 1993: 101)

(44) Jill cheated on her husband: isn't she an excellent wife?!

(45) [Speaker A asks: "Can you swim?". Speaker B then answers:] Is the Pope Catholic?

(46) You coward, have you no honor?

(47) He was fired from every one of his last six jobs, so what do you think will happen this time?

---

[42] It is, of course, clear that the utterances under *a* and those under *b* will have different effects on the addressee. To describe the precise effects of indirect requests (and other indirect utterances), and the reasons for using them, would constitute another paper in itself, and I will therefore mostly refrain from discussing these matters (as I announced in §1.2). One general remark that may be made in the case of question-requests is that the interrogative sentence type engages the addressee more closely than the declarative type, and also allows the addressee to respond (question-requests are polite because they offer the addressee a possibility of 'opting out', cf. Brown and Levinson 1975 on 'face-saving acts'. For an interesting attempt at integrating Brown & Levinson and study of ancient Greek texts, cf. M.A. Lloyd forthc.). But I must leave this discussion unresolved.

[43] What all these questions have in common is that they elicit some form of action, either on the part of the speaker or that of the addressee.

It is, I hope, clear that there is no simple, single method of reconstructing the *implicatum* of all of the above examples. An exhaustive discussion would take another thesis in itself, and in a (perhaps already fledgling) effort not to veer too far off from my course towards *Greek* NSQ's, I will not attempt to give that end-all solution here. Some broad strokes will have to suffice.

The most important thing that may be noticed is that many RQ's show a reversal of polarity between the form of the question and the form of the implied assertion. Thus, question (39), phrased negatively, implies an assertion with the same propositional content but then positively formulated: "The fact that this notion is widely held to be true *is* proof of its validity". Similarly, a positively phrased *yes-no* question (especially ones containing words like 'really'), such as (40), implies an assertion of negative polarity ("It is*n't* the task of a good newspaper, etc."). This means that in many *yes-no* questions, the propositional content of the implied assertion may be simply derived from the wording of the question by reversing the polarity. A similar effect may be witnessed in negatively formulated specifying questions (which usually have the null set as their desired answer): a negation added to the wording of the question, such as in example (41), has the effect that the implied assertion is made up, in logical terms, of the universal quantifier and the positive propositional function of the question (which means as much as that the implied assertion of (41) is "Everyone looks forward to a well-prepared dinner after a hard day's work"). Conversely, a positively phrased has the reverse effect: question (42) implies that John has done *nothing* for Sam.

However, reversal of polarity leaves a fair amount of exceptions and problems unsolvede. Question (43), for example, is phrased positively ("Could it be the proliferation... ?") yet it clearly implies a positive assertion ("It *is* the proliferation...) which means that the polarity stays the same.[44] Nor can the question in (44) be reconstructed as "She *is* an excellent wife" (for entirely different reasons).[45] Question (45) doesn't even imply an assertion that has anything to do with the religion of the Pope, nor is the polarity in any way reversed (quite the opposite, in fact).[46] Question (46) reveals another problem: "Have you no honor?" does not imply "You have honor", but "You should have honor".[47] Finally, example (47) shows that polarity reversal cannot account for the implications of all rhetorical specifying questions: those that do not take the 'null set' as their desired answer work in an entirely different fashion. And I have left unmentioned rhetorical alternative questions. Again, discussing all these peculiarities would take up too much space here. Still, on two matters which will play a recurring role in later on, I will say a bit more.

[44] This is an exceedingly difficult example to analyze. It may be noticed that the words 'Could it be' are normally used to express uncertainty in genuine questions, and that this value is transformed in this rhetorical question to a measure of sarcasm Grice's maxim *manner* (which has, surprisingly, no exact equivalent in van Eemeren and Grootendorst's rules of communication) is flouted here, because the question is asked with an expression of doubt where doubt is clearly absent.

[45] The most effective way to interpret *ironical* rhetorical questions is to subject them to two 'rounds' of reconstruction: "Isn't she an excellent wife" would then first be reconstructed as "She's an excellent wife" and subsequently as "She isn't an excellent wife". The last step is not easily explained, however, and one can begin to question the validity of speech act theory's methodology when confronted with such elaborate inference patterns (cf. my footnote 34, p.25).

[46] Rhetorical questions can function as retorts to questions, and in that case imply an answer to the original question that is exactly the same as the obvious answer to the rhetorical question (cf. Schaffer 2005).

[47] Rhetorical questions can imply propositions of different *types*: descriptive, evaluative or inciting (cf. Slot 1992; Slot 1993: 102-13). Another approach (Ilie 1994) is to assume that a rhetorical question conveys a *commitment* on the speaker's part to a certain proposition, and can, by force of that commitment, "induce, reinforce, or alter assumptions beliefs or ideas in the addressee's mind" (Ilie 1994: 128).

First, on polarity reversal. It is not hard to hypothesize that this characteristic of RQ's is in some way related to the effect a negation (and words such as 'really') has on standard questions. It is commonly recognized that questions can be phrased in a non-neutral way, expressing a certain expectation towards a particular answer on the speaker's part. Adding a negation signals the speaker's commitment to the answer 'yes': someone who asks "Isn't it raining?" in fact expects it to be raining. Alternatively, a question with a stress on the *positive* polarity of its proposition expects a *negative* answer: the questions "*Is* it raining?" and "Is it *really* raining?" reveal the speaker's expectation to be a lack of rain. In general, it is possible to say that the polarity of the proposition in the question is reverse to that of the proposition the speaker wishes to point his addressee towards.

This feature has been noticed by nearly everyone writing on the workings of (rhetorical) questions, yet, strangely enough, things have been mostly left at that. To my knowledge, only one attempt at explaining the polarity shift has been made, by Chung-Hye Han in his impressive article *Interpreting Interrogatives as Rhetorical Questions* (2002). Once again, Gricean pragmatics play an all-important role. Han seems to have got it in one try, and I cannot improve on his words:

> A possible explanation for the polarity reversal effects as to the speakers expectation towards the answer in *yes-no* questions may come from Gricean maxims (Grice, 1975). The speaker's expectation may be the result of an instantiation of the first part of the Gricean maxim of Quantity: [Make your contribution as informative as is required.] I take the notion of 'informativeness' to be relative to the individual's degree of belief in a certain proposition *p* in a given context *c*. [...] If a speaker believes that it is very likely that *p* holds in *c*, the most informative proposition in *c* is ¬*p*. For instance, assume that you believe that it is very likely that it is raining and someone says to you *It is raining* (*q*). Then *q* is not adding much to what you already know. But if someone says to you *It is not raining* (*q'*) and you believe him to be truthful, then you have to change your beliefs if you accept *q'*. I speculate that when a speaker is formulating a question to find out whether *p* or ¬*p*, s/he formulates the question in the form of the proposition that would be the most informative if it turned out to be true. This means that if a question has the form ¬*p*?, the speaker believes that ¬*p* is the most informative proposition if it turned out to be true. This in turn means that in such a context, the speaker believes that it is likely that *p* holds. In other words, the likelihood that a speaker will use a negative question ¬*p*? is equal to the speaker's assessment of the probability of *p*. (Han 2002: 215)

In short, a speaker will formulate a question with a proposition opposite to what he believes, because that proposition is most informative to him. Thus, when a speaker asks "Isn't it raining outside?", he signals that he believes "It is raining outside". In other words, *a negatively phrased* yes-no *question implies a commitment on the speaker's part to the positively phrased proposition, and vice versa*.

Now, when an addressee interprets a *yes-no* question as violating rules of communication and reconstructs the communicative function of the implied utterance as assertive (i.e. when a rhetorical question is asked), the propositional content of the implied utterance will be equal to the proposition the speaker has signaled his commitment to. It is now clear why (48)*a*, when asked rhetorically, implies (48)*b*.

(48) a. Does**n't** the city look bad enough as it is?
b. The city looks bad enough as it is.

This mechanic is present in specifying questions as well. As Han explains (2002: 216-8), a speaker asking a *genuine* specifying question expects the set of individual answers that satisfy the question to be smaller than the set of individual answers that do *not* satisfy the question. For example, the

speakers of (49)*a* and (50)*a*, when stressed as below, most likely expect (49)*b* and (50)*b*. In rhetorical specifying questions, the consequence of this mechanic is that the 'empty set' or 'null set' is elicited as the answer and the resulting implications will be (49)*c* and (50)*c*:

(49) a. Who *didn't* finish the paper?
b. Most people did finish the paper.
c. Everyone finished the paper.

(50) a. Who *finished* the paper?
b. Most people didn't finish the paper.
c. No one finished the paper.[48]

In specifying questions, a speaker can show his commitment to a specific proposition by isolating a single member from the set of possible answers, using a construction with a comparative adjective or words such as 'other than', 'better than' (these are sometimes called EXPRESSIONS OF EXCLUSIVE ABSOLUTENESS[49]). Because the null set is required as the answer to the rhetorical question, the speaker signals a commitment to the notion that the *secundum comparationis* satisfies the open

[48] Han's rather technical explanation runs as follows (2002: 217-8): "A *wh*-question *Whx*[*Px*]? contributes an open proposition *Px*. For instance, the *wh*-question in [(49)] contributes an open proposition *x didn't finish the paper*. In a context where most people finished the paper, the probability of an arbitrary person in the domain of context to be included in the WITNESS SET of the open proposition is low. The witness set of an open proposition is the set of individuals that satisfies the proposition. If we assume that the probability of an arbitrary individual in the domain of context to be included in the witness set of the given open proposition to be inversely proportional to the informativeness of that proposition, then we can provide a similar explanation regarding the speaker's expectation in *wh*-questions in terms of informativeness as for *yes-no* questions. For instance, if the speaker believes that most people in the domain of context finished the paper, then the probability of an arbitrary person in the domain of context to be included in the witness set of the open proposition *x finished the paper* is high, and so the informativeness of the open proposition is low. However, given the same context, the probability of an arbitrary person in the domain of context to be included in the witness set of *xi did not finish the paper* is low, and so the informativeness of this open proposition is high. The intuition behind this assumption is that in a situation where the speaker already believes that most people finished the paper, the information that some individual *x* did not finish the paper is more informative than the information that some individual *x* finished the paper. Thus, just as in *yes-no* questions, when a speaker is formulating a *wh*-question, s/he formulates the question with an open proposition that is most informative. This means that if a *wh*-question is in the form of *Whx*[¬*Px*]?, then the speaker's assessment of the probability of an arbitrary individual being included in the witness set of ¬*Px* is low. This in turn means that the speaker believes that most individuals in the domain of context satisfies [*sic*] *Px*. In other words, the likelihood that a speaker will use a negative *wh*-question *Whx*[¬*Px*]? Is equal to the speaker's assessment of the probability of an arbitrary individual being included in the witness set of *Px*.

Returning to rhetorical *wh*-questions, [...] the question I ask is how we compute that a rhetorical *wh*-question expresses an assertion in which the value of the *wh*-phrase is the empty set and not some other set. In principle, the semantics of *wh*-questions makes available all the possible answers as the assertion expressed by a rhetorical *wh*-question, where the possible answers differ with respect to the possible values for the *wh*-phrase. According to the pragmatics of *wh*-questions, given a *wh*-question *Whx*[*Px*]?, the speaker believes that the probability of an arbitrary individual being included in the witness set of *Px* is low. Among the choices of propositions presented by the semantics of *wh*-questions, the proposition that is consistent with the pragmatics of *wh*-questions will be selected as the one being asserted by the rhetorical *wh*-question. Thus, the proposition in which the value of the *wh*-phrase denotes the unit set will not be selected because it implies that there is the highest probability of an arbitrary individual in the domain of context to be included in the witness set, namely 1. On the other hand, propositions in which the *wh*-phrase denotes one of the smaller sets can be selected because the propositions are consistent with the pragmatics of *wh*-questions. Among these propositions, the proposition in which the value of the *wh*-phrase denotes the empty set, the bottom element of a boolean algebra, is selected because it corresponds to the lowest probability of an arbitrary individual being included in the witness set, namely zero."

[49] Cf. Schmidt-Radefeldt 1977: 381-2.

proposition contributed by the specifying question. Let me clarify this with a couple more examples:

(51) Who is **better** suited for this job **than** Jack?

(52) What **other** course of action remains **than** to attack the enemy?

These could perfectly well be genuine questions, but *if* they are meant as RQ's, they *must* be answered by the null set, and the implications of (51) would be "No one is better suited for this job than Jack" and thus "Jack is the best man for the job". Question (52), of course, would assert "Our only course of action is to attack the enemy". Such RQ's with expressions of exclusive absoluteness are often found in elliptical form:

(53) What **else** can I tell you?

3.4.4 Rhetorical questions, part two: asking for the obvious

The second broad category of RQ's that I will discuss is illustrated by the last of the series of RQ's I gave above:

(54) = (47) He was fired from every one of his last six jobs, so what do you think will happen this time?

We can immediately see that polarity reversal has nothing to do with the correct interpretation and reconstruction of this RQ. Nor can polarity reversal clarify matters in examples such as these:

(55) What kind of behavior could we expect from a man who had proven himself an incorrigible liar?

(56) If you cannot even support yourself and your ex-wife has everything under control, who do *you* suppose the judge will appoint custody of your child to?

Finally, polarity reversal is no help in reconstructing the *implicatum* of the first of this pair of questions:

(57) = (14) So now that you have been released from prison, what are you going to do? Rob another bank?

The RQ's in (54)-(57) are all specifying questions, but unlike those dealt with in the previous section, they do not require the null set as their answer. Instead, the answer that the speaker is after is what could be called *the most obvious answer*.

When a speaker effectively steers the addressee towards the null set (using a negation, an expression of exclusive absoluteness, or elements like "on earth"), he eliminates in one stroke all the other possible answers that are available (specifying questions, in theory, have an unlimited number of possible answers). Yet if the speaker chooses not avail himself of this method, he still needs to ensure that the addressee (mentally) supplies the answer he desires. Simply leaving millions and millions of possible answers 'out there' for the addressee to choose from is not a viable method of asking a RQ.

Imagine that we know *absolutely nothing* about the world and someone asks us the question "What will happen?". That question can hardly imply "He will get fired from his job", as (54) does. The difference between the two questions is that in the world of (54), the set of possible answers is limited to one single *obvious* answer. Limitations on answer-sets are, of course, imposed by default due to the setting, rational thinking, shared knowledge, etc. (no one will answer the question "What is the capital of Italy" with "A dog"). Yet in RQ's, the speaker has to put in enough extra work so that the number of possible answers will be brought down to the absolute minimum: one.

To achieve this goal, the speaker will usually *qualify* the context in which the question is valid in some way: in (54), the speaker does so by using the words "He was fired from every one of his last six jobs, so...": by qualifying the unfortunate subject of the question as someone who cannot keep a job, the speaker eliminates all answers that have to do with him keeping his next job. The only remaining answer relevant to the question is that he will lose this job too.

Questions (55) and (56) reflect some other common ways of 'meddling' with the context: the use of conditional, temporal or relative clauses. In question (57), the speaker takes a different approach altogether and simply provides the answer himself (in the form of another RQ). In each of these cases, the context (both textual and non-textual) leaves the addressee no other option than to supply the answer the speaker desires. That answer is at the same time exactly what the speaker wishes to assert: (54) implies "He will get fired", (55) implies "He could be expected to prevaricate", and so forth.

3.4.5 What is an expository question?

The last type of NSQ I would like to discuss actually requires very little in the way of 'reconstructive work'. Let me give a pair of examples (other than the one given in the paragraph title), specifically the first sentences in Sperber & Wilson 1988:

(58) How are non-declarative sentences understood?

(59) How do they differ semantically from their declarative counterparts?

Sperber and Wilson later discuss expository questions in general:

> Often, a writer or speaker asks a question to arouse the audience's interest in an answer that she plans to give herself. At the beginning of this paper we asked two such expository questions. They are better seen as offers of information than as requests for information. (Sperber & Wilson 1988: 91)

Most certainly, the questions in (58) and (59) are not meant to elicit information from the supposed addressee (the reader). In terms of speech act theory, therefore, these questions cannot be considered genuine questions, as all kinds of communicative rules are violated (the question is not effective as the speaker already knows the answer, the question is not sincere as he does not desire an answer from the addressee).

Yet at the same time, expository questions have one characteristic that other non-standard questions lack: like genuine questions, they are meant first and foremost to elicit information. The difference is that the information is not elicited from the addressee, but from the *speaker*.[50] Expository questions are more or less cases of the speaker 'acting' like his partner(s) in the interactional setting: the speaker puts a 'genuine' question to himself just like an interlocutor would, and later follows it up with an answer (an expository question that remains unanswered is pointless—unless it is meant to imply something else again). They do not really 'imply' anything other than an elicitation of information, and are therefore best reconstructed to 'mean' exactly what they mean.[51]

[50] The term 'self-addressed question' fits, although expository questions are *implicitly* self-addressed.

[51] An elaborate reconstruction of their pragmatic force would run something like: "I will now talk/write about how non-declarative sentences are understood I will now talk/write about how they differ semantically from their declarative counterparts". But such reconstructions seem to me inappropriate.

One other characteristic of expository questions remains to be discussed: their function in the discourse. As the etymology of 'expository' suggests, they are used to 'put out' something, in other words, to introduce a new theme or topic that has not yet been dealt with. In general, they are used as a transition or introduction, when the speaker aims to advance a chunk of information that is not known to the addressee. This function can be observed in the examples discussed above, and it is a universal feature of such questions.[52] In terms of *Discourse Analysis* and *Functional Grammar* approaches (without venturing too far into these territories), this means that they form the beginning of a new unit in the discourse and that the 'topic' of that unit is usually formed by the propositional content of the expository question (which is, within the question, the focus of new information).[53]

This discourse function, incidentally, distinguishes expository questions from *rhetorical* questions asked and answered by the addressee, such as:

(60) = (13) And when all this was going on, where was Labour? Were they alongside the Conservative party in speaking up for human rights in the Soviet Union? They were not.

Such questions do not present new information, nor are they like questions an interlocutor would ask on a new topic. Whereas (60) is very clearly meant to imply an assertion ("Labour didn't speak up for human rights"), the addressee of an expository question will not be expected to infer any implication from a question such as "How are non-declarative sentences understood?".

On the other hand, I think there *is* an overlap between expository questions and RQ's of this type:

(61) = (14) So now that you have been released from prison, what are you going to do? Rob another bank?

The question "What are you going to do?" in itself implies nothing (as discussed in the previous paragraph) and needs the 'answer' by the speaker to mean what he wants it to mean. It, too, can be said to introduce a new topic and to be phrased like the interlocutor would phrase a question.[54] Of course, there are also differences, the most important of which is that the interactional setting is vastly different (the addressee of expository questions such as (58) and (59) *cannot* answer). Also, the sense conveyed by (61) is *evaluative* ("You *shouldn't* rob another bank"), whereas most expository questions will be answered with *descriptive* information ("The difference between a non-declarative and a declarative sentence is...").

As said, expository questions must be answered by the speaker. We may also find this answer in the form of a RQ. For the best illustration of this, I would like to recall an example discussed in §2.1.2: Longinus' pair of opening questions:

(62) And what must I say next about specifying questions and *yes-no* questions? Is it not... ?

The first of these questions now turns out to be a classic example of an expository question: it has a genuine information-eliciting function and introduces a new topic. The answer is given in the form of a rhetorical question meant to imply an assertion of opposite polarity, such as discussed in §3.4.3.

---

[52] Cf. Ilie 1994: 9, n. 4, "An *expository question* is a question used to point out an issue in order to introduce a new topic in the discussion or to advance a line of argumentation. It is a question usually followed by a clarifying self-answer.

[53] For the relevant concepts in discourse approaches and functional grammar, I refer to Dik 1997/1997a, Givón 1984 and Kroon 1995.

[54] With a change of person, of course: "Now that I have been released from prison, what will I do?".

From the above we can conclude that expository questions are used to introduce a new discourse topic, that they must be answered by the speaker, and that they are formulated exactly like an interlocutor would phrase the same question. This means that 'reconstructing' the *implicatum* of the question is unnecessary, the meaning and communicative function can stand as they are, although there is a shift of addressee.

3.5 SUMMARY — GUIDELINES FOR FORMULATING NSQ'S

From the preceding paragraphs, it is now possible in conclusion to compose a set of guidelines that a speaker will follow when formulating an effective NSQ. These guidelines may function 'in reverse' as an analytical framework for the examination of my corpus of Greek questions. It will be clear that many of the instruments at a speaker's disposal can fulfill more than one requirement of the guidelines: for example, phrasing a rhetorical question with a negation signals a commitment to the positive proposition, and at the same time it gives away the fact that communicative rules are violated. Similarly, a conventionalized request formula, by signaling that the question should be read as a request, at once points to the fact that an utterance violates rules. I propose general guidelines that run as follows:

For question-requests, question-commands and question-commissives:

- *Use a formula:* use a conventionalized formula to introduce your request, command or commissive.
- *Use flouting markers*: signal to the addressee that you violate rules of communication by uttering the question-request, question-command or question-commissive.

For rhetorical questions:

either:

- *Signal a commitment to a certain proposition:* formulate your *yes-no* question (steering the addressee towards either 'yes' or 'no') or specifying question (steering the addressee towards the null set) so that the proposition you imply a commitment to is the proposition you wish to convey.

or:

- *Limit the possible answers to one*: ensure that only one obvious answer is open as answer to your specifying question.

and (in both cases):

- *Use flouting markers*: signal to the addressee that you violate rules of communication by uttering the rhetorical question.

For expository questions:

- *Introduce a topic:* formulate a question that is concerned with a topic not yet introduced in the discourse.
- *Act as your interlocutor:* formulate the question exactly as an interlocutor would phrase a genuine question about your new topic.
- *Answer your own question*: use this particular flouting marker to show that the question is insincere.

Chapter 4

Non-Standard Questions in Ancient Greek

4.1 Introduction

I return to Ancient Greek, applying the analytical framework described in the previous chapter. I will do two things in the present chapter:

- discuss in detail flouting markers (§4.2) and reconstruction clues (§4.3) that may be used in Greek, so as to isolate characteristics of questions (e.g. the presence of certain particles, adverbial word groups, etc.) that distinguish Greek NSQ's from standard questions,
- analyze in detail a series of Greek NSQ's to show how the theory described above applies to Greek questions (§4.4).

4.2 Flouting markers in Greek

I have argued above (§3.3.2) that the discrepancy between interrogative form and non-information-seeking communicative function in NSQ's is usually signalled in the wording of the question itself (or in the context) by what I have called flouting markers. As in English, flouting markers in Greek can be roughly divided into the following groups:

- elements providing an answer to the question,
- elements revealing the speaker's commitment to a certain proposition,
- references to the actual communicative function of the NSQ,
- conventionalized and idiomatic phrases,
- rhetoricality-enhancing elements.

In the following paragraphs I will discuss each type of flouting marker as found in Greek NSQ's and give several examples of each.

4.2.1 Elements providing an answer to the question

Perhaps the most obvious way for a speaker to signal that his question is insincere is to provide the answer to that question himself. The speaker asks a question, yet immediately follows it with his own answer. The speaker thus makes it quite clear that he is in fact not asking a genuine question: he knows the answer himself, and lets the addressee know that he knows it. The addressee is then left no other option but to (mentally) supply the answer literally given by the speaker. As noted above (§3.3.2), a special type of this category is the use of another RQ as the provided answer. Thus, instead of simply asking "Who did this?", a speaker can say "Who did this? John did!" or "Who did this? Who else but John?", clearly signalling the insincerity in both cases.

This is a common device in Greek rhetoric. It is however quite rare in its simplest form, where the answer is given in the form of a declarative utterance:

(63) = (1) Τίς τ᾽ ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;
Λητοῦς καὶ Διὸς υἱός·
(Hom.*Il.* 1.8-9)

(64) εἰδέναι δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἐόντα κῶς χρὴ τὸ βέβαιον; **δοκέω μὲν οὐδαμῶς**.
(...) and how shall one that is but man know where there is security? It is, I think, impossible. (Hdt. 7.50.2)

The question in (63), which will be discussed in detail below in §5.2, is immediately answered by the narrator. Likewise, in (64), Xerxes (who is here speaking to Artabanus) literally provides the answer to his question. Both the Homeric narrator and Xerxes thus leave no doubt that they doesn't need anyone to answer for them, thereby clearly signaling that they are flouting rules of communication. The words "Λητοῦς καὶ Διὸς υἱός" therefore constitute a flouting marker, as do the words "δοκέω μὲν οὐδαμῶς".

Much more common in my corpus is the use of question-pairs, the second question of which is a RQ providing the answer to the first:

(65) φέρε δή, τί ἄν, εἰ καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ὄντες ἐτύχετε αὐτοῦ ἢ καὶ υἱεῖς; **ἀπεψηφίσασθε**;
Now I would ask the court, even supposing that you had happened to be brothers or sons of this man, what would you have done? Acquitted him? (Lys. 12.34)[55]

(66) ἆ δειλώ, τί σφῶϊ δόμεν Πηλῆϊ ἄνακτι
θνητῷ, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ἐστὸν ἀγήρω τ᾽ ἀθανάτω τε;
ἦ ἵνα δυστήνοισι μετ᾽ ἀνδράσιν ἄλγε᾽ ἔχητον;
Ah unhappy pair, why did we give you to king Peleus, a mortal, while you are ageless and immortal? Was it so that among wretched men you should have sorrows? (Hom. *Il.* 17.443-5)[56]

As the second questions in these examples provide an answer to the questions preceding them, their speakers flout the same communicative principle as Xerxes did above. Note that in these particular cases, there are also other factors that force a reading as NSQ: for example, in both examples the addressee(s) are unable of responding to the question.

Needless to say, these question-pairs must be read together for their full meaning to come across: their *combined* effect is distinctly rhetorical, more so than the simple questions would have been. However, it is worth noting that not all question-pairs are rhetorical in this fashion. In Homer especially, many question-pairs retain at least part of their information-eliciting function (Homeric question-pairs will be discussed in more detail in §5.3.3).

4.2.2 Elements revealing the speaker's commitment to a certain proposition

Answering one's own questions can be an effective rhetorical ploy, but a speaker can avail himself of other options that do not require a 'literal' answer to his question. As discussed above (§3.4.3), he can also steer the addressee towards a certain answer by phrasing a question in a non-neutral way. He can express his commitment to a certain proposition by reversing the polarity of that proposition in the wording of his question.

[55] For the absence of a verb in the first question, cf. Adams 1970: ad loc.: "the Greek hearer was no more conscious of the loss of a verb than we are with our own "what if."

[56] A fine yet complicated example: Zeus addresses, or better yet apostrophizes, the horses in a monologue. The horses cannot hear him, nor of course can they answer, which all adds to the pathos of the questions.

Thus, *yes-no* questions may be introduced by a negation[57] to signal a commitment to the positively phrased proposition ("Isn't Jane beautiful?" expects an affirmation of "Jane is beautiful"). Accordingly, Greek questions introduced by οὐ(κ) expect an answer affirming the proposition negated by that οὐ(κ).[58] It is important to note that this device *may* act as a flouting marker, but *need not* do so (not all questions introduced by οὐ(κ) are RQ's). For example, compare the following questions: οὐ in (67) clearly introduces a RQ, whereas the two folloeing questions (from the *Bacchae*) are not as easily labelled that way: the question with οὐχί in (68) seems to be a RQ but retains its information-eliciting function, and οὐκέτι in (69) expresses surprise but certainly does not force a RQ-reading.

(67) σκέψασθε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοὺς προστάντας ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν, ὁσάκις δὴ μετεβάλοντο· **οὐ** Φρύνιχος μὲν καὶ Πείσανδρος καὶ οἱ μετ' ἐκείνων δημαγωγοί, ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐξήμαρτον, τὰς περὶ τούτων δείσαντες τιμωρίας τὴν προτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατέστησαν, πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν τετρακοσίων μετὰ τῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς συγκατῆλθον, ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν ἐκείνους ἐκβαλόντων αὐτοὶ αὖθις τῶν τριάκοντα ἐγένοντο;

For consider, gentlemen of the jury, how many times the leaders of both governments changed sides. Did not Phrynichus, Peisander and their fellow demagogues, when they had committed many offences against you, proceed, in fear of the requital that they deserved, to establish the first oligarchy? And did not many of the Four Hundred, again, join in the return of the Peiraeus party, while some, on the other hand, who had helped in the expulsion of the Four Hundred, actually appeared among the Thirty? (Lys. 25.9)

(68) [Πενθεύς:] τί φαίνομαι δῆτ'; **οὐχὶ** τὴν Ἰνοῦς στάσιν
ἢ τὴν Ἀγαύης ἑστάναι, μητρός γ' ἐμῆς;
[Διόνυσος:] αὐτὰς ἐκείνας εἰσορᾶν δοκῶ ς' ὁρῶν.
How do I look? Don't I have the posture of Ino, or of my mother Agave?—Looking at you I think I see them. (Eur. *Ba*. 925-7)

(69) [Διόνυσος:] ἐγὼ στελῶ σε δωμάτων ἔσω μολών.
[Πενθεύς:] τίνα στολήν; ἦ θῆλυν; ἀλλ' αἰδώς μ' ἔχει.
[Διόνυσος:] **οὐκ**έτι θεατὴς μαινάδων πρόθυμος εἶ.

---

[57] In Greek, questions of the opposite kind, that is questions that expect a negative answer and signal a commitment to the positive proposition, are also introduced by a negation, viz. μή (or the cognate forms ἆρα μή and μῶν). No rhetorical questions with these forms appear in my corpus, and therefore I will not dwell on μή beyond this footnote. I would speculate, however, that a pragmatic explanation for the two different 'question particles' (οὐ and μή) needs to take two fundamentally different approaches. Οὐ (the *neutral* negation) negates the propositional content; the negative propositional content is subsequently subjected to questioning: "Is it the case that [not-proposition]?". Its pragmatic function may be explained along the lines of Han 2002 on polarity reversal, as described in §3.4.3. Μή (the *subjective* or *apprehensive* negation), on the other hand, would have to be thought of as exercising a sort of deontic modal function over the proposition: "Let it be the case that [not-proposition]", which, in question form, comes close to the English "It *isn't* raining, is it?" and Dutch "Het regent *toch niet*?". A cursory review of some μή-questions does seem to indicate that such questions express a *hope* rather than an *expectation*, but more research would be required to assert this claim with any confidence. I am, of course, not suggesting that Greek speakers had this distinction in mind at all times when they uttered such questions (nor do we conventionally think about the pragmatics behind what we say). Yet to retain Han's explanation of polarity reversal (and I would like to), μή requires some explanation.

[58] If we accept Han's explanation (cf. §3.4.3 and the previous footnote), it is perhaps not entirely correct to call οὐ a 'question particle' (as is customary in modern grammars, cf. Rijksbaron e.a. (2000), 105; Rijksbaron (2002), 8 n.1; Crespo e.a. (2003), 218-9). It functions simply as a negation of the entire proposition (and is therefore always found at the beginning of the question, allowing only theme-constituents and the particle ἆρα to precede it); the question-reading is in principle not forced by οὐ but by other factors (word order, perhaps; presumably intonation, and the presence of ἆρα). On the other hand, this is a matter of sensibility: we can assume that this use of οὐ was so engrained in language-use that to call it a question particle is no more ill-considered than calling, for example, the Latin word *causa* a preposition.

I will go inside and dress you.—In what clothing? Female? But shame holds me back.—Are you no longer eager to view the maenads? (Eur. *Ba*. 827-9)

In specifying questions, the speaker can signal a commitment to a certain proposition by steering the addressee towards the null set. One effective way of doing this is adding a negation to the open proposition, which clearly signals that the question is asked in a non-neutral way:

(70) αὗται αἱ πᾶσαι οὐδ' εἰ ἕτεραι πρὸς ταύτῃσι προσγενόμεναι στρατηλασίαι μιῆς τῆσδε οὐκ ἄξιαι. τί γὰρ **οὐκ** ἤγαγε ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης ἔθνος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης; κοῖον δὲ πινόμενόν μιν ὕδωρ **οὐκ** ἐπέλιπε, πλὴν τῶν μεγάλων ποταμῶν;

All these expeditions and whatever others have happened in addition could not together be compared with this single one. For what nation did Xerxes not lead from Asia against Hellas? What water did not fail when being drunk up, except only the greatest rivers? (Hdt. 7.21.1)

(71) (...) ὥστε ὁρῶν ὑμᾶς ταύτην τὴν γνώμην ἔχοντας τίς **οὐκ** ἂν ἐπαρθείη πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως;

So who, on seeing you so minded, would not be stimulated to work and speak for the benefit of the State? (Lys. 16.21)

As discussed in §3.4.3, the negation in these specifying questions forces the addressee to answer with the null set. In other words, the speaker compels the addressee to answer in a particular way, which means that he violates communicative rules. In this way a negation added to a specifying question acts as flouting marker.

A much-used variant of this last type is the question introduced by πῶς οὐ(κ). Strictly speaking, these questions are fundamentally different at a syntactic level from *yes-no* questions with a negation. In practice, however, their function is roughly the same: they elicit affirmation of the negated proposition, though πῶς οὐ-questions do so with much more emphasis than οὐ-questions (I have not, in fact, come across a question introduced by πῶς οὐ that appeared not to be a RQ). The difference therefore appears to be the same as in the English equivalents, such as in "Didn't you know that?" and "*How* did you *not* know that?" (the latter being much stronger). The rhetorical force of this combination is also apparent from the retort πῶς γὰρ οὐ (which appears hundreds of times in Platonic dialogue[59]) and is perhaps best rendered by "Of course!", or "Naturally!":

(72) τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε ἄστεα μήτε τείχεα ἡ ἐκτισμένα, ἀλλὰ φερέοικοι ἐόντες πάντες ἔωσι ἱπποτοξόται, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ' ἀρότου ἀλλ' ἀπὸ κτηνέων, οἰκήματα τε σφι ἢ ἐπὶ ζευγέων, **κῶς οὐκ** ἂν εἴησαν οὗτοι ἄμαχοί τε καὶ ἄποροι προσμίσγειν;

For when men have no established cities or forts, but are all nomads and mounted archers, not living by tilling the soil but by raising cattle and carrying their dwellings on wagons, how can they not be invincible and unapproachable? (Hdt. 4.46.3)

(73) [Διόνυσος] εἰς ἀθυμίαν ἀφίκεσθ', ἡνίκ' εἰσεπεμπόμην,
Πενθέως ὡς ἐς σκοτεινὰς ὁρκάνας πεσούμενος;
[Χορός] πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
Dionysus: Did you despair when I was sent to fall into Pentheus' dark dungeon? — Chorus Leader: How not? (Eur. *Ba*. 611-2)

[59] It is far less frequent in other authors (e.g. 3x in Euripides—of which example (73) is one—, 1x in Sophocles), and then usually not used as an independent exclamation as in Plato.

The speaker of a specifying question can also steer the addressee towards the null set by using what I have above called an expression of exclusive absoluteness (cf. §3.4.3, examples (51)-(53)). Such expressions in Greek always feature the adverb of comparison ἤ or a construction with a comparative genitive. The comparison can apply to a single constituent of a sentence, as in examples (74) and (75), or even to the sentence as a whole, as in example (76):

(74) ἔπειτα τῷ **ἧττον** εἰκὸς ἦν προσταχθῆναι **ἢ** ὅστις ἀντειπών γε ἐτύγχανε καὶ γνώμην ἀποδεδειγμένος;
And then, who was less likely to be given such orders than the man who was found to have spoken in opposition to what they wanted done? (Lys. 12.27)

(75) τῶν δὲ Κροτωνιητέων οἳ μὲν καταρρωδέοντες τὰ Περσικὰ πρήγματα προϊέναι ἕτοιμοι ἦσαν, οἳ δὲ ἀντάπτοντο καὶ τοῖσι σκυτάλοισι ἔπαιον τοὺς Πέρσας προϊσχομένους ἔπεα τάδε. "ἄνδρες Κροτωνιῆται, ὁρᾶτε τὰ ποιέετε· ἄνδρα βασιλέος δρηπέτην γενόμενον ἐξαιρέεσθε. κῶς ταῦτα βασιλέι Δαρείῳ ἐκχρήσει περιυβρίσθαι; κῶς δὲ ὑμῖν τὰ πιεύμενα ἕξει καλῶς, ἢν ἀπέλησθε ἡμέας; **ἐπὶ τίνα δὲ τῆσδε προτέρην στρατευσόμεθα πόλιν; τίνα δὲ προτέρην ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι περιησόμεθα;** ταῦτα λέγοντες τοὺς Κροτωνιήτας οὔκων ἔπειθον."
Some Crotoniats, who feared the Persian power, would have given him up; but others resisted and beat the Persians with their sticks. "Men of Croton, watch what you do," said the Persians; "you are harboring an escaped slave of the King's. How do you think King Darius will like this insolence? What good will it do you if he gets away from us? What city will we attack first here? Which will we try to enslave first?" But the men of Croton paid no attention to them;" (Hdt. 3.137.2-3)

(76) εἴ σφι θέλοι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, ἡ χώρη ἡ ἔνερθε Μέμφιος (αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶ ἡ αὐξανομένη) κατὰ λόγον τοῦ παροιχομένου χρόνου ἐς ὕψος αὐξάνεσθαι, **ἄλλο τι ἢ** οἱ ταύτῃ οἰκέοντες Αἰγυπτίων πεινήσουσι;
(...) if (as I have already said) the country below Memphis—for it is this which rises—should increase in height in the same degree as formerly, will not the Egyptians who dwell in it go hungry (...)? (Hdt. 2.14.1)[60]

To sum up, we have seen that a speaker can steer an addressee towards a specific answer (signalling his commitment to that answer), by asking the question in a non-neutral way using one of the following methods:

- In *yes-no* questions, by negating the proposition with οὐ(κ).
- In specifying questions, by negating the propositional function with οὐ(κ): the speaker expects the null set as answer (which entails the proposition plus a universal quantifier: "who didn't do *x*?" implies "no one didn't do *x*" which entails "everyone did *x*").
- In specifying questions, by using an expression of exclusive absoluteness (a comparative adjective or words such as ἄλλο, combined with the word ἤ or a comparative genitive): the speaker expects the null set as answer (which entails that the *secundum comparationis* satisfies the question: "who but *x* did *y*?" implies "no one but *x* did *y*" implies "*x* did *y*").

[60] Note that Godley renders the RQ (posed by the primary narrator) by means of another type of RQ introduced by a negation. Though the meaning is obviously similar, the Greek seems to me slightly more emphatic than the English equivalent chosen here. In any case, I do not believe ἄλλο τι ἤ to be simply interchangeable with οὐ(κ), as is suggested by Rijksbaron e.a. 2000: 105.

These ways of phrasing questions clearly show that the speaker has a non-neutral attitude towards the answer, and *may* therefore function as flouting markers (when a speaker signals that he knows that the answer to his question is "Yes", he has asked neither a sincere question (he isn't interested in the answer) nor an effective one (the answer "Yes" isn't informative to him)). There are, besides this group, many questions that are asked in a non-neutral way (often specifying questions expecting the null set as answer) that are not as clearly marked. Some examples:

(77) Τὸν δ' ἠμείβετ' ἔπειτα ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς·
Ἀτρεΐδη κύδιστε, φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων,
πῶς γὰρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί;
Then in answer to him spoke noble Achilles, swift of foot: "Most glorious son of Atreus, most covetous of all men, how shall the great-hearted Achaeans give you a prize? (Hom. *Il.* 1.121-3)

(78) = (75) τῶν δὲ Κροτωνιητέων οἳ μὲν καταρρωδέοντες τὰ Περσικὰ πρήγματα προϊέναι ἕτοιμοι ἦσαν, οἳ δὲ ἀντάπτοντο καὶ τοῖσι σκυτάλοισι ἔπαιον τοὺς Πέρσας προϊσχομένους ἔπεα τάδε. "ἄνδρες Κροτωνιῆται, ὁρᾶτε τὰ ποιέετε· ἄνδρα βασιλέος δρηπέτην γενόμενον ἐξαιρέεσθε. κῶς ταῦτα βασιλέι Δαρείῳ ἐκχρήσει περιυβρίσθαι; κῶς δὲ ὑμῖν τὰ πιεύμενα ἕξει καλῶς, ἢν ἀπέλησθε ἡμέας;
(Hdt. 3.137.2-3)

The rhetorical question-reading of (77) and the pair of questions in (78) is not forced by a clearly marked non-neutrality on the speaker's part (none of the instruments described above are present: there is no negation and no expression of exclusive absoluteness). Nonetheless, the addressee is forced to supply the null set as the answer to each of these questions ("The Achaeans can in no way give a prize" and "King Darius will in no way like this insolence", etc.). In these particular cases, the RQ-reading is forced by different factors, such as the insulting form of address and the particle γάρ in (77), and the warning "ὁρᾶτε τὰ ποιέετε" in (78). These are not steering devices that signal a speaker's commitment, but rather references to the communicative function of the implied utterance, as I will describe now.

4.2.3 References to the actual communicative function of the question

The insincerity of a question is also clearly evidenced by references to its actual (non-information-seeking) communicative function. Through the use of particles or contextual references, the speaker 'treats' his question as he would a declarative utterance, thereby signaling the discrepancy between form and force. Such references may be *explicit* (the question is specifically mentioned as something else), but most of them are *implicit* (sentence-constituents that are normally reserved for utterances of a non-information-seeking communicative function are used in the question or in the context). I will here discuss such references made both by the speaker and by the narrator, since they are closely similar (but cf. §3.3.1 for the difference).

Explicit references to the non-information-eliciting communicative function of a question are seldom found in my corpus, and always in the sentence either directly preceding or directly following the question.[61] For example, a NSQ may be introduced by a 'quoting verb' referring to it as a declarative utterance or as a request/command:

(79) Ἰδομενεὺς δ' ἔκπαγλον **ἐπεύξατο** μακρὸν ἀΰσας·

[61] Note that in written texts in modern languages, the use of an exclamation mark is another way to explicitly signal a declarative communicative function, in this case in the question itself.

"Δηΐφοβ' ἦ ἄρα δή τι ἐΐσκομεν ἄξιον εἶναι
τρεῖς ἑνὸς ἀντὶ πεφάσθαι;
But Idomeneus exulted over him terribly and cried aloud: "Deïphobus, shall we now think perhaps that fair requital has been made—three men slain for one (...)? (Hom. *Il.* 13.445-7)

(80) ἐννέα τοῖς ὁ γεραιὸς ὁμοκλήσας **ἐκέλευε**·
(...)
οὐκ ἂν δή μοι ἅμαξαν ἐφοπλίσσαιτε τάχιστα,
ταῦτά τε πάντ' ἐπιθεῖτε, ἵνα πρήσσωμεν ὁδοῖο;
To these nine the old man [Priam] called aloud, and gave command: "(...) Will you not make me ready a wagon, and that quickly, and lay all these things in it, so that we may speed on our way? (Hom. *Il.* 24.252-64)

The quoting verbs[62] used by the narrator in these two passages of the *Iliad* rule out that the questions following them are sincere. For instance, the verb κελεύω, rarely used to introduce direct speech, leaves no doubt that Priam's speech in (80) is meant to incite his sons into action. Consequently, no other avenue of interpretation remains than to take his question as a question-command.

Similarly, a NSQ may be followed by a reference to it revealing its communicative function. In the following example, the words "ταῦτα λέγοντες" suggest that the questions of Darius soldiers are hardly meant as an invitation to provide them with information:

(81) = (75) κῶς ταῦτα βασιλέι Δαρείῳ ἐκχρήσει περιυβρίσθαι; κῶς δὲ ὑμῖν τὰ πιεύμενα ἕξει καλῶς, ἢν ἀπέλησθε ἡμέας; ἐπὶ τίνα δὲ τῆσδε προτέρην στρατευσόμεθα πόλιν; τίνα δὲ προτέρην ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι περιησόμεθα;" **ταῦτα λέγοντες** τοὺς Κροτωνιήτας **οὔκ**ων **ἔπειθον**.
(Hdt. 3.137.3-4)

Again, it is important to note here that it is the primary narrator who refers to these questions as something else, not the speaker of those questions. These flouting markers therefore work on a different level: the narrator is aware, so to speak, of the communicative function of his character's question and uses the quoting verb appropriate for that function.

In (81), another kind of reference to the communicative function of the questions is found in the words "οὔκων ἔπειθον". The verb πείθω is unsuitable as a description of a character's response to a genuine question: it, too, signals that the questions just quoted were RQ's. This type of reference is not as explicit as the quoting verbs mentioned, but it leaves us with equal certainty that the preceding questions cannot have been sincere. We find many of such clues in Greek; I offer three more examples:

(82) = (67) **σκέψασθε** γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοὺς προστάντας ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν, ὁσάκις δὴ μετεβάλοντο· οὐ Φρύνιχος μὲν καὶ Πείσανδρος καὶ οἱ μετ' ἐκείνων δημαγωγοί, ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐξήμαρτον, τὰς περὶ τούτων δείσαντες τιμωρίας τὴν προτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατέστησαν, πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν τετρακοσίων μετὰ τῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς συγκατῆλθον, ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν ἐκείνους ἐκβαλόντων αὐτοὶ αὖθις τῶν τριάκοντα ἐγένοντο;
(Lys. 25.9)

[62] It seems best to take ἐπεύξατο in (79) as a verb introducing direct speech. Another possibility would be to take it as having absolute meaning and μακρὸν ἀΰσας as the *verbum dicendi*, in which case my claim would need to be weakened slightly. Yet (ἐπ)εὐχεσθαι very frequently appears as the introduction of (in)direct speech, and should be read that way here Cf. *Lexikon des frühgriechises Epos*, s.v. (ἐπ)εὐχομαι, 2aαaa.

(83) καίτοι τί αὐτὸν οἴεσθε πεποιηκέναι περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ σύνοιδεν ἀλλ' αὐτὸς μόνος διεχείριζεν, ὃς ἃ δι' ἑτέρων ἐπράχθη καὶ οὐ χαλεπὸν ἦν περὶ τούτων πυθέσθαι, ἐτόλμησε ψευσάμενος τέτταρσι καὶ εἴκοσι μναῖς τοὺς αὑτοῦ θυγατριδοῦς ζημιῶσαι; καί μοι **ἀνάβητε τούτων μάρτυρες**.

Now, what do you suppose he has done in cases of which nobody else has had cognizance, and where he managed the business alone, when in those which were conducted through others and of which information could easily be obtained he did not shrink from falsehood in mulcting his own daughter's children to an amount of twenty-four minae? Please come forward, witnesses, in support of this. (Lys. 32.27)

(84) (...) ἀτὰρ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη
χειρὸς ἑλοῦσ' ἐπέεσσι προσηύδα θοῦρον Ἄρηα·
"Ἄρες Ἄρες βροτολοιγὲ μιαιφόνε τειχεσιπλῆτα
οὐκ ἂν δὴ Τρῶας μὲν ἐάσαιμεν καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς
μάρνασθ', ὁπποτέροισι πατὴρ Ζεὺς κῦδος ὀρέξῃ,
νῶϊ δὲ χαζώμεσθα, Διὸς δ' ἀλεώμεθα μῆνιν;"
ὣς εἰποῦσα μάχης ἐξήγαγε θοῦρον Ἄρηα.

And flashing-eyed Athene took furious Ares by the hand and spoke to him, saying: "Ares, Ares, you bane of mortals, you blood-stained stormer of walls, would it not be best to leave the Trojans and Achaeans to fight, so that father Zeus may grant glory to whichever side he wishes? But for the two of us, let us withdraw, and avoid the wrath of Zeus." So she spoke, and led furious Ares forth from the battle. (Hom. *Il.* 5.30-4)

In (82), Lysias alerts the jury that he is about to make a point of which they should take good notice by using the word "σκέψασθε". This is a common Lysianic device, used 14 times in his oratory. Lysias combines it either with a a ὅτι-clause or with an indirect question (as here with ὁσάκις) to introduce his point, and this introduction is always followed by an elaboration in the form of a declarative utterance—Lysias' point. That we find it introducing a question in this instance is a clear signal that that question is an RQ: σκέψασθε functions as flouting marker.[63]

In (83), the fact that Lysias asks witnesses to come forward "in support of this" (τούτων), where the demonstrative pronoun refers to content of the question just asked, makes it evidently clear that this question has assertive force, as only assertions can be supported by witnesses.

Finally, in (84), the hortative subjunctives "χαζώμεσθα" and "ἀλεώμεθα" placed concurrently with the οὐκ ἂν δή-question leave no doubt that it is meant to spur Ares into action, not as an information-seeking question. But there is another clue pointing to this communicative function: Athena takes Ares by the hand, a gesture that occurs in this form 12 times in all of Homer (*Iliad* and *Odyssey*).[64] In each of these cases, the gesture is a prelude to the character whose hand has been taken being led away by the one who has taken it.[65] Here, we find the gesture introducing a question (which, by the way, is never answered): this suggests that the question is meant to get Ares to leave and makes it at the very least doubtful that it is meant to get information from him.

[63] This also occurs at Lys. 14.6, where σκέψασθε is again followed by an RQ introduced by οὐ.

[64] This figure is based on the occurence of the genitive χειρὸς together with a form from the root ἑλ- (it does not occur with other forms of αἱρέω).

[65] This is keenly noticed by Ameis-Hentze (ad loc.): "χειρὸς ἑλοῦσα, nicht zu freundlicher Begrüßung [...], sondern um Ares fortzuführen". Kirk (1990: ad loc.) adds: "Taking someone by the hand can imply firmness as well as kindness", although it is not entirely clear how Kirk comes to this conclusion. Agamemnon clasps Menelaus by the hand to hold him back at *Il.* 7.108, and the exact meaning of the gesture is to me unclear at *Od.* 17.263. For detailed discussion of this and other hand gestures, cf. Sittl 1890: 28-33.

What I would call an 'implicit' reference to the communicative function of a NSQ is the use of certain particles that can fulfill their function only in (or following) sentences with a certain communicative function. The most significant specimen of this is the particle γάρ: I submit that γάρ can appear only in and following assertive utterances, by virtue of its semantic properties: an utterance with γάρ is used to support or explain a preceding utterance, or as an elaboration of that utterance. It is crucial to note that only assertive utterances can perform these roles: only an assertion can explain, support or elaborate something. Additionally, it is also much more common for assertions to elicit such utterances than any other type: normally, only an assertion will be explained or supported. Thus, when we find γάρ in or following a question (as in (85) and (86) respectively), it is simply impossible that it functions as an information-eliciting, genuine question. The very presence of γάρ forces the question to be read as a RQ:

(85) ἡμεῖς μὲν πιεζόμενοι ἢ ἐκλείψομεν τὴν χώρην ἢ μένοντες ὁμολογίῃ χρησόμεθα. τί **γὰρ** πάθωμεν μὴ βουλομένων ὑμέων τιμωρέειν; ὑμῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἔσται ἐλαφρότερον.
(...) we shall either be driven out of our country or stay and make terms. For what is to become of us if you will not help us? And afterward it will not be easy for you, either; (Hdt. 4.118.3)

(86) εἰ ὧν ἐθελήσει ἐκτρέψαι τὸ ῥέεθρον ὁ Νεῖλος ἐς τοῦτον τὸν Ἀράβιον κόλπον, τί μιν κωλύει ῥέοντος τούτου ἐκχωσθῆναι ἐντός γε δισμυρίων ἐτέων; ἐγὼ μὲν **γὰρ** ἔλπομαί γε καὶ μυρίων ἐντὸς χωσθῆναι ἄν·
Now if the Nile choose to turn his waters into this Arabian gulf, what hinders that it be not silted up by this stream in twenty thousand years? [For] I think that ten thousand would suffice for it. (Hdt. 2.11.4)

Besides their semantics, an important thing to note regarding γάρ and other particles in NSQ's is the manner in which they structure a discourse. Many particles function as an expression of how utterances relate to each other, outlining the overall structure of the discourse they are found in. The following passage from Lysianic oratory may serve as an illustration:

(87) κατηγόρηται δὴ Ἐρατοσθένους καὶ τῶν τούτου φίλων, οἷς τὰς ἀπολογίας ἀνοίσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν αὐτῷ ταῦτα πέπρακται. ὁ μέντοι ἀγὼν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου τῇ πόλει καὶ Ἐρατοσθένει. οὗτος μὲν **γὰρ** κατήγορος καὶ δικαστὴς αὐτὸς ἦν τῶν κρινομένων, ἡμεῖς δὲ νυνὶ εἰς κατηγορίαν καὶ ἀπολογίαν καθέσταμεν. **καὶ** οὗτοι μὲν τοὺς οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντας ἀκρίτους ἀπέκτειναν, ὑμεῖς δὲ τοὺς ἀπολέσαντας τὴν πόλιν κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦτε κρίνειν, παρ' ὧν οὐδ' ἂν παρανόμως βουλόμενοι δίκην λαμβάνειν ἀξίαν τῶν ἀδικημάτων ὧν τὴν πόλιν ἠδικήκασι λάβοιτε. (a) τί **γὰρ** ἂν παθόντες δίκην τὴν ἀξίαν εἴησαν τῶν ἔργων δεδωκότες; (b) πότερον εἰ αὐτοὺς ἀποκτείναιτε καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὐτῶν, ἱκανὴν ἂν τοῦ φόνου δίκην λάβοιμεν, ὧν οὗτοι πατέρας καὶ υἱεῖς καὶ ἀδελφοὺς ἀκρίτους ἀπέκτειναν; (c) ἀλλὰ εἰ τὰ χρήματα τὰ φανερὰ δημεύσαιτε, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι ἢ τῇ πόλει, ἧς οὗτοι πολλὰ εἰλήφασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἰδιώταις, ὧν τὰς οἰκίας ἐξεπόρθησαν; (d) ἐπειδὴ **τοίνυν** πάντα ποιοῦντες δίκην παρ' αὐτῶν τὴν ἀξίαν οὐκ ἂν δύναισθε λαβεῖν, πῶς οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ὑμῖν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἀπολιπεῖν, ἥντινά τις βούλοιτο παρὰ τούτων λαμβάνειν;
Such is the accusation against Eratosthenes and those friends of his, on whom he will fall back in his defence, as his abettors in these practices. Yet it is an unequal contest between the city and Eratosthenes: for whereas he was at once accuser and judge of the persons brought to trial, we to-day are parties engaged in accusation and defence. And whereas these men put people to death untried who were guilty of no wrong, you think fit to try according to law the persons who destroyed the city, and whose punishment by you, even if unlawfully devised, would still be inadequate to the wrongs that they have committed against the city. For what would they have to suffer, if their punishment should be adequate to their actions? If you put them and their children to death, should we sufficiently punish

> them for the murder of our fathers, sons and brothers whom they put to death untried? Or again, if you confiscated their material property, would this be compensation either to the city for all that they have taken from her, or to individuals for the houses that they pillaged? Since therefore, whatever you might do, you could not exact from them an adequate penalty, would it not be shameful of you to disallow any possible sort of penalty that a man might desire to exact from these persons? (Lys. 12. 81-4)

This passage can be structurally analyzed using the highlighted particles as handholds. It consists of a position supported by a pair of arguments, the second of which is further explained and elaborated. All of this is finally capped off by a conclusion. The particles mark the transition to each next step, as is illustrated in this figure:



It is my contention that had the questions in (87) been genuine, information-eliciting questions, they could not have performed the role they do in this argument and therefore they could not have featured the particles γάρ and τοίνυν. I would suggest, in fact, that particles which structure the flow of an argument have little place in truly genuine questions (there seems to me to be a conflict between the character of an elaborately designed argument and the purpose of obtaining a piece of information).

A great deal more can be said about other particles in RQ's, but I'm afraid it would take simply too much space to treat them in depth here. It appears to me that besides γάρ and τοίνυν, questions introduced by such particles as καίτοι, ἔτι δέ and ἐπεί are almost certain to be RQ's, because utterances with these particles fulfill a particular role in a discourse which rules out the possibility of them being neutral and genuine requests for information. However, much more research would be required to sustain this claim, and I must get back to my own argument.

To recapitulate, we find references to the actual communicative function of NSQ's in Greek in the form of:

- ✶ quoting verbs explicitly reflecting the communicative function (such as ἐπεύχομαι and κελεύω),

[66] For γάρ as a 'PUSH-particle', cf. Slings 1997.

[67] Cf. Sicking 1993: 31: "by τοίνυν the speaker marks a new section of the text as being outside or beyond the expectations of his audience in content, or indeed by its very presence. This will usually apply to sections of particular importance to the argument."

- other signals in the context refering to the utterance, in the form of elements which can normally be used only in connection only with a certain communicative function (such as the Lysianic use of σκέψασθε and the grasping of a hand in Homeric poetry),
- particles which can normally be used in utterances of assertive communicative function only (such as γάρ and τοίνυν).

4.2.4 Conventionalized and idiomatic phrases

I now turn to a category of flouting markers that harbors some argumentative hazards: to claim that a question is marked as insincere by the fact that certain word-combinations in it are often used in insincere questions is obviously circular reasoning. Nevertheless, we can point to certain constructions in Greek questions that appear to be the standard way of uttering requests and commands. When we encounter such constructions (I have above called them 'request formulae'), it is therefore an indication that the question is actually meant as something other than a question: in other words, these formulae function as flouting markers.

What are these formulae in Greek? I would count among them, at the very least, Homeric questions with οὐκ ἂν δή + 2nd/3rd person optative, and questions in classical Greek with οὐ (μή) + 2nd/3rd person future indicative:

(88) = (80) ἐννέα τοῖς ὁ γεραιὸς ὁμοκλήσας ἐκέλευε·
(...)
οὐκ ἂν δή μοι ἅμαξαν **ἐφοπλίσσαιτε** τάχιστα,
ταῦτά τε πάντ' ἐπιθεῖτε, ἵνα πρήσσωμεν ὁδοῖο;
(Hom. *Il.* 24.252-64)

(89) = (4) **οὐκ ἀποτινάξεις** κισσόν; **οὐκ** ἐλευθέραν
θύρσου **μεθήσεις** χεῖρ', ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάτερ;
(Eur. *Ba*. 253-4)

(90) **οὐ μὴ φρενώσεις** μ', ἀλλὰ δέσμιος φυγὼν
σώσῃ τόδ';
Do not instruct me, but be content in your escape from prison. (Eur. *Ba*. 793-4)

Οὐκ ἂν δή + optative in a question (as in example (88)) occurs 9 times in Homer,[68] and each time it is used when a character wants something to be done. What is especially telling is the manner in which characters respond to such questions: we *never* find an answer to the *literal* question. Rather, there is in most cases no verbal response to the question at all[69]: for example, Priam's question in (88) is immediately followed by Priam's sons readying his wagon.[70] It is thus safe to say

[68] Οὐκ ἂν δή also occurs three times where it is not used in questions: with a counterfactual indicative at *Il.* 19.271, and twice (in identical passages) with an optative at *Od*. 18.414 and 20.322.

[69] In four cases there is a verbal response: at *Il.* 3.52, 10.204, *Od.* 6.57 and 22.132. Interesting especially are two cases: *Od.* 22.132, where the only response is an explanation of why the request is not acted upon, and *Il.* 3.52, where Hector tells Paris to stay and fight Menelaus ("οὐκ ἂν δὴ μείνειας ἀρηΐφιλον Μενέλαον;") and Paris responds that *if Hector wants him to fight* (a reaction to the request), he will do so on the condition he can fight him in a duel (*Il.* 3.67-70: " (...) εἴ μ' ἐθέλεις πολεμίζειν ἠδὲ μάχεσθαι, | ἄλλους μὲν κάθισον Τρῶας καὶ πάντας Ἀχαιούς, | αὐτὰρ ἔμ' ἐν μέσσῳ καὶ ἀρηΐφιλον Μενέλαον | συμβάλετ'").

[70] The passage continues as follows (Hom.*Il.* 24.265-6): ὣς ἔφαθ', οἳ δ' ἄρα πατρὸς ὑποδείσαντες ὁμοκλὴν | ἐκ μὲν ἅμαξαν ἄειραν ἐΰτροχον ἡμιονείην (So he spoke, and they, seized with fear of the rebuke of their father, brought forth the light-running, mule-drawn wagon).

that these questions are commonly used not to obtain information, but rather to coax someone to *do* something.

Similar findings emerge from a cursory examination of the use of οὐ (μή) + second person future indicative. Such questions are never 'literally' answered in my corpus. Their function as requests (and prohibitions) is in fact commonly recognized in most grammars:

> In questions introduced by οὐ the 2nd and, sometimes, the 3rd person of the future indicative expresses an emphatic command or request [...]. The speaker asks 'won't the state of affairs be carried out by you?' which implies 'the state of affairs will surely be carried out?' and this functions, pragmatically speaking, as a command or request: 'carry out the state of affairs!' [...] The negative variant of this construction, introduced by οὐ μή, expresses an emphatic prohibition [...] (Rijksbaron 2002: 34)

We may note the close similarity between these formulae and their English counterparts: οὐ + second person potential optative mirrors closely the English "Couldn't you ..." as in "Couldn't you close the window for me please?" and questions with οὐ + second person future indicative are just like questions in English with "Won't you ..." as in "Won't you please stop doing that" (the non-negated forms are actually somewhat more colloquial in English).

The presence of these formulae in questions are thus strong indications that they are NSQ's. To once more quote Slot (1993: 157): "[w]hen a specific formulation has been commonly used to convey an indirect meaning, it then in itself becomes a clue for the indirectness".

4.2.5 Rhetoricality-enhancing elements

Finally, the last category of Greek flouting markers to be examined consists of a varied group of elaborate forms of address, adverbial and predicative phrases, interjections, particle groups, etc. that strengthen the rhetorical force of an utterance. These elements, when found in a question, make it highly improbable that it is designed as a sincere request for information. For example, it is almost inconceivable that an addressee will be stimulated to release information by a question with a form of address that is effectively an insult:

(91) Τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς·
"Ὤ μοι, **ἀναιδείην ἐπιειμένε, κερδαλεόφρον**,
πῶς τίς τοι πρόφρων ἔπεσιν πείθηται Ἀχαιῶν
ἢ ὁδὸν ἐλθέμεναι ἢ ἀνδράσιν ἶφι μάχεσθαι;
Then with an angry glance Achilles swift of foot spoke to him: "What, you clothed in shamelessness, you crafty of mind, how can any Achaean eagerly obey your words either to go on a journey or to do battle? (Hom. *Il.* 1.148-51)

(92) ὡς δὲ ἄρα πανοικίῃ μιν περιέλαβε, ἔλεγε ὁ Ἑρμότιμος τάδε. "**ὦ πάντων ἀνδρῶν ἤδη μάλιστα ἀπ' ἔργων ἀνοσιωτάτων τὸν βίον κτησάμενε**, τί σε ἐγὼ κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐμῶν τίς σε προγόνων ἐργάσατο, ἢ σὲ ἢ τῶν σῶν τινα, ὅτι με ἀντ' ἀνδρὸς ἐποίησας τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι;
When Hermotimus had gotten the man and all his household into his power, he said to him: "Tell me, you who have made a livelihood out of the wickedest trade on earth, what harm had I or any of my forefathers done to you or yours, that you made me to be no man, but a thing of naught? (Hdt. 8.106.3)

The forms of address "ἀναιδείην ἐπιειμένε, κερδαλεόφρον" in (91) and "ὦ ... κτησάμενε" in (92) are so unabashedly malignant that even if the questions following them were meant to obtain information, it is but a remote chance that an honest response would be drawn out. These

'salutations' thus ensure that any question following them cannot perform the function of a genuine question and should be read as an RQ.

Another example of what I would call a rhetoricality-enhancing element is highlighted below:

(93) Τὸν δ' ἠμείβετ' ἔπειτα Θέτις κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσα·
"**Ὤ μοι**, τέκνον ἐμόν, τί νύ σ' ἔτρεφον αἰνὰ τεκοῦσα;"
Then, shedding tears, Thetis answered him: "Alas, my child, why did I rear you, cursed in my child-bearing? (Hom. *Il.* 1.413-4)

In (93), the exclamatory interjection "ὤ μοι" lends a pathos to Thetis' lament which is quite unsuitable for genuine questions, a pathos that is further enhanced by the predicative "αἰνὰ τεκοῦσα".[71] As such, ὤ μοι marks the discrepancy between the question form and its actual force.

It would be too strong a claim to say that such elements cannot exist in genuine questions, yet their very presence does change the character of the questions in which they are found. Their reading as NSQ's is facilitated, if not required, by these flouting markers.

4.3 Reconstruction clues in Greek

As mentioned in the previous chapter (§3.4), noticing the insincerity and irrelevance of a NSQ is only one part of the process of correctly interpreting it. The next step is *reconstruction*: deriving the implication from the utterance as it is presented by the speaker. Once again, we find in Greek that this process is sometimes (but certainly not always) facilitated by clues, steering the addressee towards the implied communicative function and propositional content.

These clues overlap with those that give away the insincerity and irrelevance of a question (flouting markers), specifically with the category of references to the actual communicative function of the NSQ. For example, the particle γάρ simultaneously signals that relevancy and sincerity maxims are being violated (functioning as flouting marker) *and* reveals the implication to be an assertion (functioning as reconstruction clue). Similarly, a form of the verb κελεύειν used to introduce a question simultaneously reveals the insincerity of the question and its true communicative function.

Another category of flouting marker that functions concurrently as clue for the correct reconstruction of the *implicatum* is the group of conventionalized and idiomatic formulae used to introduce requests, commands and commissives. Take, for example, questions introduced by οὐ μή and with a verb in the second person and future tense indicative: these questions are revealed to be insincere by the fact that such a formula is present in it. At the same time the formula facilitates the reconstruction of the *implicatum*, ensuring that the utterance is heard or read as a request or command.

Finally, narratees of certain texts have additional handholds for reconstructing the force of NSQ's: for example, when a question is not answered, but rather immediately succeded by a description of the addressee doing something, it may become clear to the narratee that the question was a NSQ meant as request. Thinking along the same lines, when a question is met with an angry censure, it is inferable (for the narratee) that the question was itself a NSQ designed to function as, for instance, a reproach.

[71] The exclamation "ὤ μοι" occurs 6 times in the *Iliad* to introduce a question, all RQ's by my consideration. The phrase αἰνὰ τεκοῦσα and the variant αἰνά παθοῦσα appear in the *Iliad* only in this type of RQ performed by women in utter despair, cf. Griffin 1986: 41.

4.4 THREE EXAMPLES OF GREEK NON-STANDARD QUESTIONS

In conclusion to this chapter, to illustrate how the matters dealt with above may together provide a framework for an adequate analysis of NSQ's, I will now attempt to completely investigate three examples from my corpus of questions, identifying all relevant flouting markers and reconstructing the *implicata*. I start with an indirect command, move on to an expository question, and subsequently discuss a pair of Greek rhetorical questions. The interpretative process I describe may seem pedantically precise and overly complicated, but I aim, again, to show, not that this is the *best* way to understand the use of language, but that it is a *practical* way of isolating some analytical handles on Greek NSQ's

4.4.1 Example one: an indirect request

(94) = (80) ἐννέα τοῖς ὁ γεραιὸς ὁμοκλήσας ἐκέλευε·
(...)
οὐκ ἂν δή μοι ἅμαξαν ἐφοπλίσσαιτε τάχιστα,
ταῦτά τε πάντ' ἐπιθεῖτε, ἵνα πρήσσωμεν ὁδοῖο;
ὣς ἔφαθ', οἳ δ' ἄρα πατρὸς ὑποδείσαντες ὁμοκλὴν
ἐκ μὲν ἅμαξαν ἄειραν ἐΰτροχον ἡμιονείην
(Hom. *Il.* 24.252-66)

The question in (94) contains a formula conventionally used for requests and commands in Homeric verse, οὐκ ἄν δή + a 2nd person optative (ἐφοπλίσσαιτε, ἐπιθεῖτε). This conventional formula, as well as the explicit reference to the communicative function of the utterance in "ἐκέλευε", act as flouting markers, signaling that the question is not meant as a sincere elicitation of information. Also, the fact that no answer is given and Priam's sons immediately move to action is a significant indicator of the discrepancy between form and force. The question is thus identified as an indirect utterance.

Once the violation of communicative rules has been determined, the reconstruction of the implied utterance is the next analytical step. This reconstruction is facilitated by the presence of the conventional formula for requests, plus the fact that no answer is given: the communicative function can be reconstructed as 'command'. The reconstruction of the propositional content of the request is then easily completed. In Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's inference scheme, the steps run as follows.

1. The speaker S has uttered U: οὐκ ἂν δή μοι ἅμαξαν ἐφοπλίσσαιτε τάχιστα
2. If U is taken literally, S has performed speech act 1, with communicative function 'question' and propositional content ¬[you potentially make ready wagon].
3. In context C, speech act 1 is a violation of rules of communication 2 (the question is not sincere).
4. In context C, speech act 2, with communicative function 'command' and propositional content [you make ready wagon] observes rule 2 and all other communication rules.
5. Speech act 1, speech act 2 and context C can be linked by means of communication rules; the proposition of speech act 2 can be reconstructed by deleting the formula '¬[potentially]'.
6. Therefore, speech act 2 is a correct interpretation of U.

4.4.2 Example two: an expository question

(95) Ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης καὶ πρὸς ἐκ Φοινίκης κέραμος ἐσάγεται πλήρης οἴνου δὶς τοῦ ἔτεος ἑκάστου, καὶ ἓν κεράμιον οἰνηρὸν ἀριθμῷ κεινὸν οὐκ ἔστι ὡς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν ἰδέσθαι. Κοῦ δῆτα, εἴποι τις ἄν, ταῦτα ἀναισιμοῦται; Ἐγὼ καὶ τοῦτο φράσω. (...)

Earthen jars full of wine are brought into Egypt twice a year from all Greece and Phoenicia besides: yet one might safely say there is not a single empty wine jar anywhere in the country. What then (one may ask) becomes of them? I shall explain this too. (Hdt. 3.6.1-2)

The question in (95) is explicitly phrased as an expository question. It 'looks' and 'feels' like a genuine question such as an interlocutor could ask on a new topic, and this is literally expressed by the words 'εἴποι τις ἄν'. Its discourse function of introducing a new topic is underlined by the words 'καὶ τοῦτο φράσω' and the answer to the question immediately follows. In terms of discourse, the open proposition introduced by κοῦ is the most important new information in the sentence, introducing a new topic in a new discourse unit.

In terms of the violation of communicative rules, what gives the question away as a NSQ is the fact that the it is answered by the speaker itself (a flouting marker) together with again the words εἴποι τις ἄν and the announcement φράσω. Also, the interactional setting makes genuine questions highly improbable (the addressee cannot answer).

As explained above in § 3.4.5, a 'reconstruction' of this question is unnecessary: it has the function of a genuine question exactly phrased as this one, but with a shift of addressee (the speaker answer's his own question as if it were addressed to him).

4.4.3 Example three: a pair of rhetorical questions

(96) = (70) αὗται αἱ πᾶσαι οὐδ' εἰ ἕτεραι πρὸς ταύτῃσι προσγενόμεναι στρατηλασίαι μιῆς τῆσδε οὐκ ἄξιαι. τί γὰρ οὐκ ἤγαγε ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης ἔθνος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης; κοῖον δὲ πινόμενόν μιν ὕδωρ οὐκ ἐπέλιπε, πλὴν τῶν μεγάλων ποταμῶν;

(Hdt. 7.21.1)

Several factors rule out the possibility that the Herodotean questions in (96) are genuine. First, the interactional setting (the primary narrator addressing an audience that cannot answer) doesn't really allow for any real questions to be asked. Second, several flouting markers point to the violation of communication rules: the particle γάρ can only be used in *rhetorical* questions, and δέ in the second of two consecutive questions indicates that their communicative function is presumably identical. The addition of the negation οὐκ in both questions signals that the speaker is commited to a certain proposition (the open proposition, positively phrased, with a universal quantifier: "Xerxes led every nation from Asia against Hellas"). This commitment in turn can be interpreted as a flouting of communication rules (but it is, as I have shown (§4.2.2), not enough by itself to rule out a sincere question).

Now that the questions have been identified as insincere, the reconstruction of their actual communicative function and propositional content leads to the assertive statement of the propositions that the speaker has implied his commitment to. The questions are thus taken to mean (staying close to Godley's translation): "For Xerxes led every nation from Asia against Hellas. Every water failed when being drunk up, except only the greatest rivers."

So much for the theoretical background: in the coming chapters, I will examine the use of NSQ's by Homer (in the *Iliad*) and Herodotus.

PART III

PRACTICE

Chapter 5

The Homeric Question[72]

Non-Standard Questions in the *Iliad*

Mother Simpson: [sings] How many roads must a man walk down / Before you can call him a man...
Homer: Seven.
Lisa: No, dad, it's a rhetorical question.
Homer: OK, eight.
Lisa: Dad, do you even know what "rhetorical" means?
Homer: Do *I* know what "rhetorical" means?
—The Simpsons*, episode 7.8: 'Mother Simpson'*

5.1 Introduction

Where else to begin my examination of Greek authors' usage of rhetorical questions than at the very beginning? And it is good place to start: indeed, in the language of the *Iliad*, even though it is to a degree strictly patterned by formulaic phrases and repeated elements, the degree of variation in the uses of interrogative sentences is startling. Unlike his cartoon-televised namesake, Homer uses rhetorical questions intentionally and to great effect.

Of course, nearly all questions in Homer, whether they are genuine questions or not, are found in passages of direct speech. Homeric gods and men press each other for information just like any other 'cast' of characters in literature. Yet some of the most interesting questions in the *Iliad* come from the narrator-text, from the very mouth of Homer himself, so to say. This category, Homer's 'own' questions, is at the same time an enigmatic feature of his language that has sparked quite some debate.

In this chapter, I will examine NSQ's in the *Iliad*, beginning with those questions that are found in narrator-text. In the course of my discussion, I will constantly refer back to the linguistic theory on RQ's dealt with in Part II. I aim to show two things:

- Questions posed by the narrator of the *Iliad* are examples of a standard rhetorical device aimed at eliciting the audience's attention: to consider them appeals for help from the Muses (as some have done) is to ignore their basic rhetorical effect.
- The use of questions by characters of the *Iliad* is varied, yet it is so within the framework of certain patterns and therefore not as developed as it may be shown to be in other authors.

[72] The title of this chapter is of course deceptive (though not entirely inappropriate). It does however allow me to do what any interpreter of Homeric poetry should be so prudent to do, namely to state my position on several delicate issues upfront. Therefore, let me stress that when I use the name 'Homer' or 'the poet' it is metonymical for 'poet of [the particular passage under examination]', and used primarily for the sake of brevity, not to imply a commitment to any stance on *the* Homeric Question, the oralism debate, etc. However, a few of my remarks in this chapter will likely betray parts of that stance, and it will become all the clearer just from the mention of two of my two 'idols' in Homeric criticism: Bassett 1938 and Griffin 1980.

Characters can break out of this strait-jacket, however, most notably Achilles, whose language, shown by scholars to be highly individual to him, is exceptional also in his use of RQ's.

5.2 THE NARRATOR, HIS MUSES AND THE GRUFFALO

If we were to organize a 'contest' to name the first rhetorical question of Western Literature, and begin our search at the first line of the first book of Homer's *Iliad*, two already familiar candidates would come forward:

(97) = (1) Τίς τ' ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι;
Λητοῦς καὶ Διὸς υἱός·
(Hom. *Il.* 1.8-9)

(98) = (77) Τὸν δ' ἠμείβετ' ἔπειτα ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς·
Ἀτρεΐδη κύδιστε, φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων,
πῶς γὰρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί;
(Hom. *Il.* 1.121-3)

Some may instinctively object to calling (97), a question 'spoken' by the primary narrator of the *Iliad*, a rhetorical question, and they would be right: it is not, strictly speaking, a *rhetorical* question. Yet it isn't a standard information-seeking question either, even though this is how many scholars, ancient and modern, have interpreted it. According to this tradition, (97) is a genuine question, addressed to and answered by the Muses. In this view, "all the invocations are essentially *questions*, appeals to the Muse for specific information to which the poet clearly expects an *answer*" (Minton 1960: 292-3). What has given credence to this notion is a group of indirect questions specifically addressed to the Muses, such as[73]:

(99) ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μοῦσαι, Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,
ὅς τις δὴ πρῶτος βροτόεντ' ἀνδράγρι' Ἀχαιῶν
ἤρατ', ἐπεί ῥ' ἔκλινε μάχην κλυτὸς ἐννοσίγαιος.
Tell me now, you Muses who have dwellings on Olympus, who was first of the Achaeans to carry away the bloodstained spoils of warriors when once the famed Shaker of Earth had turned the battle.(Hom. *Il.* 14.508-10)

(100) ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μοῦσαι, Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,
ὅππως δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔμπεσε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.
Tell me now, Muses, who have dwellings on Olympus, how fire was first flung on the ships of the Achaeans. (Hom. *Il.* 16.112-3)

The immediate problem with this interpretation is that it sees the poet as a helpless mouthpiece, incompetent when it comes to mnemonic ability, who needs to turn to the Muses for help when confronted with subject matter that has "such quantity of factual information as would not be easy for him to muster without some external assistance" (Minton 1960: 293, n. 3). Thus, when the poet asks:

[73] Cf. also 11.218-20 and 2.484-7 (the *locus classicus* for scholars who see the poet turning to the Muses for help; for discussion cf. De Jong 1987: 46-7, 51-2).

(101) Ἔνθα τίνα πρῶτον, τίνα δ' ὕστατον ἐξενάριξαν
Ἕκτωρ τε Πριάμοιο πάϊς καὶ χάλκεος Ἄρης;
Who then was first to be slain and who last by Hector, Priam's son, and brazen Ares? (Hom. *Il.* 5.703-4)

we are expected to believe that the poet is in genuine danger of having to break off his story if the Muse does not come to his aid. This notion becomes patently absurd in one case where the addressee of the question is specifically mentioned to be someone other than the Muse:

(102) ἔνθα τίνα πρῶτον, τίνα δ' ὕστατον ἐξενάριξας
Πατρόκλεις, ὅτε δή σε θεοὶ θάνατον δὲ κάλεσσαν;
Then whom first, whom last did you slay, Patroclus, when the gods called you deathward? (Hom. *Il.* 16.692-3)

Surely the poet is not asking the spirit of Patroclus to catalogue his triumphs. No, it is rather the case that these questions, with or without Muse-invocation, serve the same cause as the invocations of noble Patroclus in the second person: rhetorical effect.

Let me support this by examining these questions in the light of the theory developed in the previous chapters. Three things now stand out: first, the interactional setting (a narrator singing his tale to an audience that cannot answer) makes genuine questions quite impossible. The notion that the Muses 'answer' requires a fundamental change in our conception of (these passages of) the *Iliad*: it becomes a sort of *dialogue* with the Muses, which leaves the narratee in an awkward position witnessing this dialogue from afar. Second, questions such as (97), (101) and (102) are immediately followed by an answer (which, as flouting marker, again makes it implausible that the questions are meant sincerely, unless of course we take them as being 'answered' by the Muses). Third, and most importantly, the questions introduce new subject matter, often a description of a battle, and they are nearly all formulated to elicit a catalogue of sorts ("who was first?, who last?"). In terms of discourse, the question word[74] in these questions introduces the most significant new information that forms the topic of the discourse unit to follow.

Taking the above in account, these questions turn out show all the signs of being *expository questions*, as defined in §3.4.5.[75] Two revealing comments on this type of question in Homer appear in Irene de Jong's *Narrators and Focalizers* (1987):

> [On *Il.* 1.8:] According to Ameis-H. this is "eine Frage aus der Seele des Hörers", which is triggered by ἐρίσαντε in the proem (6). I find this interpretation more attractive than to take the question as being put by the poet to the Muses (so e.g. Minton 1960: 295) or as a rhetorical question (Kirk). (De Jong 1987: 91)

> Comparable [to a rhetorical question] are Ε 703-4, Λ 299-300 and Π 692-03: Ἔνθα τίνα πρῶτον τίνα δ' ὕστατον ἐξενάριξεν/-αν/-ας ('There who first and who last did he/they/you kill?'). Although here an answer follows, the question can be said to be *posed* rather than *asked* (for this distinction see Lyons 1977: 755). In other words, the illocutionary force of the question-form is not so much a request for information as an expressive statement. Such an expressive

[74] More specifically, what for English questions is called the *wh*-phrase: the question word plus anything that defines it (τίς, ποῦ, τίς θεός, etc.).

[75] Because of this discourse function, expository questions cannot feature the particle καί in its function as connective, which works only *within* units of discourse (cf. Kroon 1995: 27), not as a transition between them. The presence of particles such as δῆτα and ἄρα is, conversely, appropriate to define relations between the expository question and what preceded. Note also that in the Homeric expository questions above, the introduction of a new topic is also signalled by the word ἔνθα.

> formulation can "enhance the significance of a particular scene or the glory of a particular fighter" (Willcock 1978: ad E 703-4). (De Jong 1987: 49)[76]

I would prefer to treat the questions that De Jong discusses separately rather as the very same phenomenon, and I suggest that the description "aus der Seele des Hörers" is more or less applicable to all of them (cf. my 'guideline' in §3.5: "formulate the question exactly as an interlocutor would phrase a genuine question about your new topic"). As to the shift of communicative function, De Jong is very close, but I would disagree that these questions are *posed* under Lyons' definition of that term (which is that no answer is required; expository questions do need an answer, given by the speaker himself, to be meaningful, and all such questions in Homer *are* answered). Furthermore, the words "expressive statement" are perhaps not entirely well-chosen to describe the function of these questions. The narrator uses expository questions not to 'state' something but rather to shift emphatically to a new topic or a new step in the narrative.[77] Or as Mabel Lang put it in an insightful essay on questions in Homer and Herodotus:

> Although the invocations to the Muses seem to lend a higher authority to what follows, the poet's use of the question with his own answer has as its chief function the focusing of attention on new material or a change in the direction of the narrative. (Lang 1984: 38-9)

The effect such questions have on an audience, in a work that is meant to be performed aloud, is not hard to imagine: questions, by virtue of their basic characteristic of eliciting a response, capture the audience's attention in a much more engaging way than a simple introduction ("I will now narrate of the man who was killed first..." or "As to the order of the killings... ") could.[78] By engaging the audience this strongly, we may suppose that the emotions and narrative tensions conveyed are enhanced as well.

Such questions are still a viable device for authors of orally performed works today: compare the following question from a popular modern children's book, *The Gruffalo*, a work obviously written to be read aloud to (or with) wide-eyed younglings:

> But who is this creature with terrible claws
> And terrible teeth in his terrible jaws?
> He has knobbly knees and turned-out toes
> And a poisonous wart at the end of his nose.
> His eyes are orange, his tongue is black,
> He has purple prickles all over his back.
> "Oh help! Oh no!
> It's a gruffalo!"
> (Donaldson & Scheffler 1999: 12-13)

[76] The quote from Willcock may be found ad 11.299-300 instead of 5.703-4.

[77] Cf. also Latacz 2000: ad 1.8, "Suggestivfrage, scheinbar "aus der Seele des Hörers; wird nicht an die *Muse* gerichtet, sondern ist "ein in die Rede hineingenommener fingierter (also monologischer) Dialog [sc Mit dem Auditorium] mit Frage und Antwort [...] zur Belebung der Gedankenfolge" (LAUSBERG §771); leitet zum geplanten Erzählungsbeginn über."

[78] Empirical psychological research has rendered supporting evidence for this claim: studies show the attention-grabbing effect of expository questions to be stronger than that of simple declarative announcements: cf. Hoeken & Anderiesse 1992 and especially Burnkrant & Howard 1984.

In any case, it is clearly the narrator "himself who in fact pulls the strings" (De Jong 1987: 49), not the Muses. To claim that he 'needs their help' is to miss the rhetorical point of such questions and does not give the narrator enough credit: the poet displays craftsmanship, not inability.[79]

Most of the questions performed by the primary narrator of the *Iliad* can thus be classified as expository questions: does this mean that the narrator never asks any other kind of question? There are, in fact, two divergent examples of questions posed by the narrator of the *Iliad*. The narrator uses these questions, both RQ's, to intervene in the flow of his narrative, and he does so in a rather personal way. We are seldom confronted with the authorial persona as closely as when he resorts to this device.[80]

The first of these two questions occurs at a point in the narrative where Menelaus has just held a rousing speech:

(103) ὣς ἔφατ', ὀξὺ δ' ἄκουσεν Ὀϊλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας·
πρῶτος δ' ἀντίος ἦλθε θέων ἀνὰ δηϊοτῆτα,
τὸν δὲ μετ' Ἰδομενεὺς καὶ ὀπάων Ἰδομενῆος
Μηριόνης ἀτάλαντος Ἐνυαλίῳ ἀνδρειφόντῃ.
τῶν δ' ἄλλων τίς κεν ᾗσι φρεσὶν οὐνόματ' εἴπoι,
ὅσσοι δὴ μετόπισθε μάχην ἤγειραν Ἀχαιῶν;
So he spoke, and swift Aias, son of Oïleus, heard him clearly, and was the first to come running to meet him through the battle, and after him Idomeneus and Idomeneus' comrade, Meriones, the peer of Enyalius slayer of men. But of the rest, what man from his own mind could name the names of all who came after these and roused the battle of the Achaeans? (Hom. *Il*. 17.256-61)[81]

Again, the addressee of this question cannot respond and we are therefore dealing with a NSQ. This time, however, it is clearly not an expository question (the speaker, for instance, does not answer his own question). Rather, this question is rhetorical[82]: the desired answer is the null set and the conveyed implication is "No one could name all of the warriors". The function of the question is dual (De Jong 1987: 47): it stresses the magnitude of Menelaus' force and at the same time breaks off the enumeration of warriors in lines 257-9. It is distinctly different from the examples discussed above in that this question *is* meant to imply an assertion and *doesn't* introduce a new topic.

The last question spoken by the primary narrator of the *Iliad* is a surprising conflation of a typical Homeric narrative device and a rhetorical question. I quote the question with some context:

(104) ὣς ὃ τὸν οὐ δύνατο μάρψαι ποσίν, οὐδ' ὃς ἀλύξαι.
πῶς δέ κεν Ἕκτωρ κῆρας ὑπεξέφυγεν θανάτοιο,
εἰ μή οἱ πύματόν τε καὶ ὕστατον ἦντετ' Ἀπόλλων
ἐγγύθεν, ὅς οἱ ἐπῶρσε μένος λαιψηρά τε γοῦνα;

[79] *Pace* Richardson 1990: 178-82: "The image that emerges from these questions and invocations is of one with great limitations on his ability to reach into the world of the story. The implication of the proems is that the knowledge of the story must be supplied by the Muses before the narrator can even begin; the questions that follow remind the reader that the narrator is not absolute master of the proceedings" (p. 180).

[80] Cf. De Jong 2001: 527, 119: "When used by the narrator the device [RQ's] becomes a forceful narratorial intervention [i.e. a point where the narrator explicitly presents his judgement]".

[81] This question should be laid alongside 2.488-93; cf. De Jong 1987: 47-8.

[82] One hint for the RQ-reading is, I suggest, the potential optative (the question is not aimed at finding out if anyone *will* effect the state of affairs, but is concerned with the very possibility that the state of affairs *could* be effected).

> λαοῖσιν δ' ἀνένευε καρήατι δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς, (...)
> (...) so Achilles could not overtake Hector in his fleetness, nor Hector escape. And how could Hector have escaped the fates of death, had it not been that Apollo, though for the last and latest time, came up to him to rouse his might and make swift his knees? And to his men noble Achilles made sign with a nod of his head (...) (Hom. *Il.* 22.201-5)

We have here in my opinion one of the most masterfully executed non-standard questions in my entire corpus of Greek interrogatives. It is an example of an *if not*-situation, a typical form of storytelling in the *Iliad* (38x), but it is singularly unique within this group because the counterfactual is expressed by a rhetorical question. It is equally unique among RQ's because the focus of the sentence is not so much on the question-part, but on the conditional sentence defining it (the new information presented is that Apollo came to Hector's aid[83]).[84] The *if not*-situation, incidentally, is unique in one other regard as well: the saving of a hero's life is only temporary (Hector's death is postponed, not averted). And again, note that this is one of only two RQ's performed by the narrator of the *Iliad*. That these unique characteristics would converge at this highly dramatic point in the narrative seems to me no coincidence: the narrator goes beyond the limits of the typical with a bold use of otherwise standard elements.

It is possible to make a general conclusion about all of the narrator-questions discussed above, and I do so in the words of Samuel Bassett:

> [The] effect is upon the *listener*. To him [...] most of the poet's interpositions are addressed. Even the rare rhetorical question in Homer cannot be addressed to the circumambient ether, much less to the poet himself. These, and other remarks by the narrator, are made to the audience which is immediately before him. (Bassett 1938: 85)

5.3 A QUESTION OF CHARACTER

Looking at the questions posed by the narrator of the *Iliad*, we have of course covered only a small section of the questions in the poem. The *Iliad* has, in the Oxford text of Monro and Allen, 230 questions, seven of which are posed by the narrator. The vast majority of questions is thus found in character-text, i.e. passages of direct speech. About two-fifths of those questions can be quickly discarded for my purposes: they are neutrally formulated, genuine questions designed by one character to elicit information from another.[85] These are used, again in the words of Lang,

[83] Note that for all the elaborate phrasing (the rhetorical question, an *if not*-situation), the sentence has the narrative force of simply telling that Apollo helped Hector (and leaving it at that). This is clear from the way the narrative continues: we switch to Achilles and his comrades without any further mention of Apollo's intervention.

[84] The effect of the *if not*-situation is in this case, according to De Jong (1987: 71, 79), to indicate that the course of events was different from what the listener might have expected, and why: the narrator answers a question that might have arisen in the audience ("How could Hector outrun Achilles if the latter was so much faster?"). This question is literally adapted by the narrator as a rhetorical question and then answered, and this is surely a dose of rhetoric "aimed at the [narratee]" (De Jong 1987: 79).

[85] I must admit that it is not always easy to summarily 'dismiss' a question as genuine. As emphasized above (§3.1), the pragmatic variety in the use of questions defies simple definition: the difference between standard questions and RQ's is sometimes more one of scalarity than it is black-and-white. Not all rhetorical questions are clearly set apart by flouting markers and not all genuine questions are without a share of rhetoricality.

> both to dramatize personal interaction and to introduce relevant material in a natural and realistic fashion. Thus Priam's questions to Helen about the Greek warrior in *Iliad* 3 (162-242) not only motivate characterizing descriptions for the benefit of both Trojans and epic audience but also point up Helen's situation and relationship with the Trojans. (Lang 1984: 37)

Another group of questions that I will pass over here without much more ado is the group of question-requests already discussed a bit above (§4.2.4 and §4.4.1), with a conventional οὐκ ἄν δή + 2nd person optative construction.[86] Two cases are not entirely regular:

(105) = (84) (...) ἀτὰρ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη
χειρὸς ἑλοῦσ' ἐπέεσσι προσηύδα θοῦρον Ἄρηα·
"Ἄρες Ἄρες, βροτολοιγὲ μιαιφόνε τειχεσιπλῆτα
οὐκ ἂν δὴ Τρῶας μὲν **ἐάσαιμεν** καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς
μάρνασθ', ὁπποτέροισι πατὴρ Ζεὺς κῦδος ὀρέξῃ,
νῶϊ δὲ χαζώμεσθα, Διὸς δ' ἀλεώμεθα μῆνιν;"
ὣς εἰποῦσα μάχης ἐξήγαγε θοῦρον Ἄρηα.
(Hom. *Il.* 5.30-4)

(106) τοῖσι δὲ μύθων ἦρχε Γερήνιος ἱππότα Νέστωρ·
"ὦ φίλοι, **οὐκ ἂν δή τις ἀνὴρ πεπίθοιθ'** ἑῷ αὐτοῦ
θυμῷ τολμήεντι μετὰ Τρῶας μεγαθύμους
ἐλθεῖν, (...);
(...) and among them the horseman, Nestor of Gerenia, was first to speak: "My friends, is there then no man who would trust his own venturous spirit to go among the Trojans (...)?
(Hom. *Il.* 10.203-6)

Question (105) could perhaps be called an indirect self-adhortation (though it effectively has the force of a request directed at Ares). Example (106) is a request addressed to a group, but within this group to no single person in particular (hence the indefinite τις) . Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the formula οὐκ ἄν δή + optative is used in Homer exclusively in indirectly used questions with the pragmatic function of requests, adhortations or commands (cf. §4.2.4 above).[87]

The remaining group consists of questions that are used as RQ's or in another non-standard way.[88] In analyzing this group, we are again confronted with the endless pragmatic diversity in which questions can be used: they function as argument or conclusion in an argumentative speech, as taunts or reproaches, sometimes as genuine questions for information 'loaded' with rhetorical meaning. Yet through all this diversity, the questions can be seen to be variations of recurring types:[89]

- ✷ specifying questions that can be answered only by the null set, used argumentatively to undermine the position of the addressee (§5.3.1),

[86] It occurs at 3.52, 5.456, and 24.263.

[87] One other question that can be considered to have the pragmatic force of an adhortation is found at 8.352-2: "ὦ πόποι αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος οὐκέτι νῶϊ | ὀλλυμένων Δαναῶν κεκαδησόμεθ' ὑστάτιόν περ;" ("Well now, child of Zeus who bears the aegis, shall we two not take thought any longer of the Danaans who are perishing, even for this last time?"). The formula here is οὐ + future indicative, common in later Greek (cf. §4.2.4).

[88] As announced in my introduction (p. 8), I have not covered *all* types of NSQ in the theoretical part of this work. This inevitably means that not all the questions under examination in this paragraph fall neatly under the categories discussed (and we must seriously doubt whether it is even possible to categorize all uses of questions).

[89] Cf. Lang 1984: 42-51 for a classification that is similar but based on different criteria.

- ✷ pseudo-genuine questions that retain their information-eliciting character but are at the same time used to implicitly assert something (§5.3.2),
- ✷ instances of *suggestio*, yes/no questions introduced by a variant of the particle ἦ, used by the speaker to impose something on the addressee, often combined with a preceding question to form question-pairs/triplets/etc. (§5.3.3),
- ✷ *yes-no* questions implying an assertion of opposite polarity: introduced either by οὐ(κ) or ἦ οὐ(κ) (in the case of an implied positive proposition), or without question particle (in the case of an implied negative proposition) (§5.3.4),

5.3.1 Improbability and absurdity

The second candidate in our 'First RQ-contest' above was this one (quoted here with some context):

(107) = (77) αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ γέρας αὐτίχ᾽ ἑτοιμάσατ᾽ ὄφρα μὴ οἶος
Ἀργείων ἀγέραστος ἔω, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικε·
λεύσσετε γὰρ τό γε πάντες ὅ μοι γέρας ἔρχεται ἄλλῃ."
Τὸν δ᾽ ἠμείβετ᾽ ἔπειτα ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς·
"Ἀτρεΐδη κύδιστε, φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων,
πῶς γάρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί;
οὐδέ τί που ἴδμεν ξυνήϊα κείμενα πολλά·
ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πολίων ἐξεπράθομεν, τὰ δέδασται,
λαοὺς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπέοικε παλίλλογα ταῦτ᾽ ἐπαγείρειν.
(Hom. *Il.* 1.118-26)

In lines 124-6, with several heavily rhetorical arguments,[90] Achilles rules out the possibility that Agamemnon will be given anything, as there is nothing to give. The addressee's answer to this rhetorical question (marked by γάρ) can therefore only be the null set: giving Agamemnon a prize will in no way happen. As such, Achilles implies with implacable logic that Agamemnon's demand at lines 117-9 is absurd, and "ridicules by means of a question the preposterous nature of the other's position" (Lang 1984: 47). Using such rhetoric, Homeric characters can greatly undermine the convictions and the authority of others. Specifying questions (particularly those with πῶς and/or with a potential optative) aimed at the null set are especially well suited to implement this rhetorical technique, as is shown by several other examples:

(108) τὸν δ᾽ ἠμείβετ᾽ ἔπειτα βοῶπις πότνια Ἥρη·
αἰνότατε Κρονίδη ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες.
καὶ μὲν δή πού τις μέλλει βροτὸς ἀνδρὶ τελέσσαι,
ὅς περ θνητός τ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τόσα μήδεα οἶδε·
πῶς δὴ ἔγωγ᾽, ἥ φημι θεάων ἔμμεν ἀρίστη,
ἀμφότερον γενεῇ τε καὶ οὕνεκα σὴ παράκοιτις
κέκλημαι, σὺ δὲ πᾶσι μετ᾽ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάσσεις,
οὐκ ὄφελον Τρώεσσι κοτεσσαμένη κακὰ ῥάψαι;
Then made answer to him the ox-eyed queenly Hera: "Most dread son of Cronos, what a word have you said! Even a human being, I suppose, is likely to accomplish what he wills for another man, one who is only mortal and knows not all the wisdom that is mine. How then was I, who say that I am the best of goddesses—doubly so, since I am eldest and am

[90] The rhetoricality of this passage is increased by a number of elements (such as *hapax legomena*, cf. Griffin 1985) that are typical of 'Achilles-speak', on which I will have more to say later (§5.3.5).

called your wife, and you are king among immortals—how was I not in my resentment against the Trojans to stitch evils for them? (Hom. *Il.* 18.360-7)

(109) ἀνδρῶν δ' ἐν πολλῷ ὁμάδῳ **πῶς κέν τις ἀκούσαι**
ἢ εἴποι; βλάβεται δὲ λιγύς περ ἐὼν ἀγορητής.
Πηλεΐδῃ μὲν ἐγὼν ἐνδείξομαι· αὐτὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι
σύνθεσθ' Ἀργεῖοι, μῦθόν τ' εὖ γνῶτε ἕκαστος.
πολλάκι δή μοι τοῦτον Ἀχαιοὶ μῦθον ἔειπον
καί τέ με νεικείεσκον· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι,
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐρινύς,
οἵ τέ μοι εἰν ἀγορῇ φρεσὶν ἔμβαλον ἄγριον ἄτην,
ἤματι τῷ ὅτ' Ἀχιλλῆος γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπηύρων.
ἀλλὰ τί κεν ῥέξαιμι; θεὸς διὰ πάντα τελευτᾷ.
[Agamemnon:] And among the uproar of many how should a man either hear or speak? Hampered is he, clear-voiced talker though he may be. To the son of Peleus will I declare my mind, but you other Argives give heed, and mark well my words each man of you. Often have the Achaeans spoken to me these words and reproached me; but it is not I who am at fault, but Zeus and Fate and Erinys, that walks in darkness, since in that place of assembly they cast on my mind fierce blindness on that day when on my own authority I took from Achilles his prize. But what could I do? It is a god that brings all things to their end. (Hom. *Il.* 19.81-90)

In both these examples, the speaker defends himself against an accusation (explicitly voiced or not) by pointing up the flawed reasoning behind that accusation. Hera claims that Zeus' complaint is unfounded simply because she couldn't have done anything different, which is also literally what Agamemnon is saying in (109). Again, RQ's with a potential optative or with πῶς are ideally suited for this type of argument, because the formulation logically forces the addressee to answer with the null set ("There was nothing I could have done (differently)").

5.3.2 'Loaded' questions

A second category (by far the most frequently occurring type of RQ in the *Iliad*) is formed by a group of specifying questions that still (partly) retain their information-eliciting function but are at the same time 'loaded' (to a lesser or greater degree) with a rhetorical implication. Such questions can be said to have a *dual* communicative function (cf. §3.2.2). These questions are characterized by the fact that they do not *force* the addressee to answer with the null set, leaving open the theoretical possibility that he can answer with anything. At the same time, the questions have a clear implication, one that is often supported by arguments, or taken as a starting point for an argument or as a bridge to another argument. The questions are often used as a form of reproach, taunt or slight.

A recurring example of this category is the pseudo-exclamative RQ "ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες;" (cf. e.g. example (108) above), which editors conventionally print without a question mark. I believe that all instances are in fact interrogatives, as the exclamatory word would strictly speaking be οἷον. When this 'question' is asked, the addressee is not forced, logically, to answer with the null set (as in the previous section); yet the implication is clear: the speaker is unhappy about what was just said and exclaims it loudly.

I give two further examples of 'loaded' questions, with what appear to me different shades of rhetorical force:

(110) τῷ δὲ μάλ' ἐγγύθεν ἦλθε Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων,
καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·

“Αἰνεία, τίς σ᾽ ὧδε θεῶν ἀτέοντα κελεύει
ἀντία Πηλεΐωνος ὑπερθύμοιο μάχεσθαι,
ὃς σεῦ ἄμα κρείσσων καὶ φίλτερος ἀθανάτοισιν;
ἀλλ᾽ ἀναχωρῆσαι ὅτε κεν συμβλήσεαι αὐτῷ,
μὴ καὶ ὑπὲρ μοῖραν δόμον Ἄϊδος εἰσαφίκηαι.”
Then close to his side came Poseidon, the shaker of earth, and he spoke, and addressed him with winged words: “Aeneas, what god is it that urges you in blindness of heart in this way to face in fight the high-hearted son of Peleus, who is a better man than you, and dearer to the immortals? But draw back, whenever you meet him, lest even beyond your fate you reach the house of Hades. (Hom. *Il.* 20.330-6)

(111) Αὐτὰρ ὃ μακρὰ βοῶν Ἀγαμέμνονα νείκεε μύθῳ·
“Ἀτρεΐδη, τέο δ᾽ αὖτ᾽ ἐπιμέμφεαι ἠδὲ χατίζεις;
πλεῖαί τοι χαλκοῦ κλισίαι, πολλαὶ δὲ γυναῖκες
εἰσὶν ἐνὶ κλισίῃς ἐξαίρετοι, ἅς τοι Ἀχαιοὶ
πρωτίστῳ δίδομεν εὖτ᾽ ἂν πτολίεθρον ἕλωμεν.
But shouting loudly [Thersites] reviled Agamemnon: “Son of Atreus, what are you unhappy about this time, or what do you lack? Your huts are filled with bronze, and there are many women in your huts, chosen spoils that we Achaeans give to you first of all, whenever we take a city. (Hom. *Il.* 2.224-8)

In (110), Poseidon asks Aeneas which of the gods blinded him. This is on the one hand a perfectly reasonable question: in the Homeric world, we may well assume that Aeneas’ behavior is ‘inspired’ by a divine presence. On the other hand, the answer to the question is not what Poseidon is after; the formulation of the question presupposes that Aeneas is in fact blinded, which is exactly what Poseidon wishes to impart to him.

A similar, but perhaps slightly more ‘rhetorical’, question is Thersites’ derision in (111). Again, the presupposition contained in the question is what Thersites is eager to convey: that Agamemnon is complaining, *again* (αὖτε). It is also quite possible to read this question as a RQ aimed at the null set: the implication would then be “You are unhappy about trivialities and lack absolutetly nothing”, which is then supported by the following lines (“Your huts are filled...”).

What sets this type of question apart from the previous type is that the rhetorical implication lies not so much in the answer to the literal question as in the presupposed premises ‘loaded’ in it.

5.3.3 *Suggestio* and question-pairs

The *Iliad* has many examples of what Quintilian calls a figure *per suggestionem* (cf. §2.1.4), asking a question and immediately answering it for the addressee, in the *Iliad* normally by means of another question. That second question is by standard a *yes-no* question introduced by the particle ἦ, and it is often rhetorical. Such suggestive questions are used to ‘impose’ something on the addressee, in essence a very presumptuous way of speaking ‘for’ him (Lang 1984: 43: “attributing motives in a very personal way, speaking as it were *ad hominem*”).

The question-pair forms a sort of one-two-punch: first the speaker asks a genuine (but often ‘loaded’) question, immediately following-up by imposing all sorts of answers on the addressee (with an ἦ-question). The result is that the speaker interrupts the normal process of question-and-answer and makes all kinds of implications without spelling them out in declarative form:

(112) καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·
“Τίπτ᾽ αὖτ᾽, αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος, εἰλήλουθας;
ἦ ἵνα ὕβριν ἴδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο;

Then [Achilles] spoke to her with winged words, and said: "Why have you come this time, daughter of Zeus who bears the aegis? Was it so that you might see the insolence of Agamemnon, son of Atreus? (Hom. *Il.* 1.201-3)

(113) υἱάσι δὲ Πριάμοιο διοτρεφέεσσι κέλευεν·
"ὦ υἱεῖς Πριάμοιο διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος
ἐς τί ἔτι κτείνεσθαι ἐάσετε λαὸν Ἀχαιοῖς;
ἦ εἰς ὅ κεν ἀμφὶ πύλῃς εὖ ποιητῇσι μάχωνται;
κεῖται ἀνὴρ ὃν ἶσον ἐτίομεν Ἕκτορι δίῳ
Αἰνείας υἱὸς μεγαλήτορος Ἀγχίσαο·
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγετ᾽ ἐκ φλοίσβοιο σαώσομεν ἐσθλὸν ἑταῖρον."
To Priam's sons, nurtured by Zeus, [Ares] called, saying: "You sons of Priam, the king nurtured by Zeus, how long will you continue to allow your army to be slain by the Achaeans? Will it be until such time as they fight around our well built-gates? The man lies low whom we honored like noble Hector, Aeneas, son of great-hearted Anchises. But come, out of the din of conflict let us save our noble comrade." (Hom. *Il.* 5.463-9)[91]

(114) ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπὲ καὶ ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον·
"πῇ δὴ οὕτως ἐπὶ νῆας ἀπὸ στρατοῦ ἔρχεαι οἷος
νύκτα δι᾽ ὀρφναίην, ὅτε θ᾽ εὕδουσι βροτοὶ ἄλλοι;
ἦ τινα συλήσων νεκύων κατατεθνηώτων;[92]
ἦ σ᾽ Ἕκτωρ προέηκε διασκοπιᾶσθαι ἕκαστα
νῆας ἔπι γλαφυράς; ἦ σ᾽ αὐτὸν θυμὸς ἀνῆκε;
τὸν δ᾽ ἠμείβετ᾽ ἔπειτα Δόλων (...)"
[Odysseus to Dolon:] But come, tell me this and declare it truly. Where are you going to the ships from the camp alone like this in the murky night, when other mortals are sleeping? Is it with intent to strip one of the corpses of the dead? Did Hector send you to the hollow ships to spy out all, or did your own heart set you to it?" To him then Dolon made answer (...) (Hom. *Il.* 10.384-10)

I am, by the way, very hesitant to call the suggestive questions in this last example 'rhetorical': Odysseus is genuinely interested to know where Dolon is going and why. Their function as genuine questions is signalled by the words ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον. Yet by putting words in his mouth the questions imply more than a purely neutral question would; in a courtroom, such questions would be considered *leading questions*.[93]

The suggestive questions with ἦ also appear independently, without a preceding question. The effect of such questions is more or less the same: it is a way of attributing motives and reasoning to the addressee (or, in the case of (116), on someone else).

(115) Τὸν δ᾽ ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων·
Μὴ δ᾽ οὕτως, ἀγαθός περ ἐών, θεοείκελ᾽ Ἀχιλλεῦ,
κλέπτε νόῳ, ἐπεὶ οὐ παρελεύσεαι οὐδέ με πείσεις.
ἦ ἐθέλεις ὄφρ᾽ αὐτὸς ἔχῃς γέρας, αὐτὰρ ἔμ᾽ αὖτως

[91] Note that κέλευεν in line 463 does not, parallel to example (80) on p. 47, point to a communicative function 'command' of the questions The quoting verb refers to the imperative in line 469.

[92] I very much disagree with Monro and Allen's accentuation ἦ in this line, and would opt for ἦ, perhaps followed by ἦ in the next lines. West reads ἦ followed by ἦ.

[93] And there are examples of Homeric question-pairs to which the label 'rhetorical' is even less applicable, e.g. *Il.* 6.376-80.

ἦσθαι δευόμενον, κέλεαι δέ με τήνδ' ἀποδοῦναι;
Then in answer to him lord Agamemnon spoke: "Do not in this way, valiant though you are, godlike Achilles, try to deceive me by your cleverness, for you will not outstrip nor persuade me. Do you really intend, so long as you yourself keep your prize, that I sit here like this lacking one, since you ask me to give her back? (Hom. *Il.* 1.131-4)

(116) **ἦ μένει εἰς ὅ κε δὴ νῆες θοαὶ ἄγχι θαλάσσης**
Ἀργείων ἀέκητι πυρὸς δηΐοιο θέρωνται,
αὐτοί τε κτεινώμεθ' ἐπισχερώ; οὐ γὰρ ἐμὴ ἶς
ἔσθ' οἵη πάρος ἔσκεν ἐνὶ γναμπτοῖσι μέλεσσιν.
[Nestor about Achilles:] Does he wait indeed until the swift ships near the sea, in spite of the Argives, blaze with consuming fire, and we ourselves are slain one after the other? For my strength is not such as it once was in my supple limbs. (Hom. *Il.* 11.666-9)[94]

Because these questions are a way of simply speaking 'for' the addressee, it is sometimes not easy to determine if they really *are* questions and whether or not a question-mark should be printed (no editor is consistent in this matter, and editors must deal with inconsistent manuscript traditions).[95] This is especially true when the proposition of the question is not concerned with the addressee but with the speaker (the verb will be in the first person). For example, (117) would be a perfectly legitimate utterance if it were printed with a period instead of a question mark:

(117) Τὸν πρότερος προσέειπεν Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδής·
"ἠθεῖ', **ἦ μάλα δή σε καὶ ἐσσύμενον κατερύκω**
δηθύνων, οὐδ' ἦλθον ἐναίσιμον ὡς ἐκέλευες;"
Then godlike Alexander was first to speak to him, saying: "Brother, I must be holding you back in your haste by my long delaying, and came not at the proper time (Hom. *Il.* 6.517-9)[96]

5.3.4 Surprise, dismay, resignation and defiance

The fourth category of Homeric RQ's is made up of *yes-no* questions that imply an assertion of opposite polarity. Negatively phrased questions are introduced by οὐ(κ) and frequently by ἦ οὐ(κ). These questions are used by characters in Homer usually to express a shade of surprise and/or dismay at the situation, and imply an assertion of the opposite (positive) polarity, an assertion that is often *evaluative* ("You should...", "It should..."):[97]

[94] Nestor is here not speaking for the addressee, but for Achilles (the verb is accordingly in the 3rd person). Notice also the sarcastic tone.

[95] Note that the particle provides no help, as it is used in declarative utterances as well (often translated with 'verily', 'in truth' cf. *LSJ* I). If these are rhetorical questions, we can at least say that their pragmatic force is nearly indistinguishable from assertions.

[96] In his rendering Murray (revised by Wyatt) has even opted for a declarative sentence type rather than a question.

[97] The line between genuine questions and rhetorical questions is again not easily drawn. Note, however, that most cases of such questions contain a verb in the second person. Because οὐ-questions imply a certain commitment, this means that in these cases the questions imply a certain commitment to a proposition *about the addressee*. Therefore such questions can hardly be without at least some rhetorical effect.

(118) τοὺς μάλα νεικείεσκε χολωτοῖσιν ἐπέεσσιν·
"Ἀργεῖοι ἰόμωροι, ἐλεγχέες, **οὔ νυ σέβεσθε;**
(...) these he would rebuke strongly with angry words: "You Argives that rage with the bow, you men of dishonor, have you no shame? (Hom. *Il.* 4.241-2)[98]

(119) ἀλλὰ φίλος θάνε καὶ σύ· τίη ὀλοφύρεαι οὕτως;
κάτθανε καὶ Πάτροκλος, ὅ περ σέο πολλὸν ἀμείνων.
οὐχ ὁράᾳς οἷος καὶ ἐγὼ καλός τε μέγας τε;
πατρὸς δ' εἶμ' ἀγαθοῖο, θεὰ δέ με γείνατο μήτηρ·
ἀλλ' ἔπι τοι καὶ ἐμοὶ θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή·
[Achilles to Lycaon:] No friend, you too die; why lament you thus? Patroclus also died, and he was better far than you. And do you not see what manner of man I am, how fair and how tall? A good man was my father, and a goddess the mother that bore me; yet over me too hang death and resistless fate. (Hom. *Il.* 21.106-10)

Agamemnon, in (118), is dismayed at the Argives' lack of shame, and Achilles may be said to feign surprise at Lycaon's lack of insight by means of the οὐχ-question (which conveys, I believe, as much as "If you knew the way of the world (everyone, no matter how mighty, dies), you would not be lamenting thus"). Thus, many of the οὐ-questions in the Iliad may be said to ask something which, according to the speaker, should be the case, but isn't ("You should have shame but don't"/"You should understand how things work, but don't").

The questions introduced by ἦ οὐ(κ) seem to me to have the added force of the *suggestio*-questions introduced by ἦ described above (§5.3.3): the combined effect would then approximately be: "*to my surprise/dismay* (οὐ) it is *apparently* (ἦ) not the case that...".

(120) τῇ δ' ἐπὶ μακρὸν ἄϋσε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης·
"εἶκε Διὸς θύγατερ πολέμου καὶ δηϊοτῆτος·
ἦ οὐχ ἅλις ὅττι γυναῖκας ἀνάλκιδας ἠπεροπεύεις;
But over [Aphrodite] shouted aloud Diomedes good at the war cry: "Keep away, daughter of Zeus, from war and fighting. Is it not enough that you deceive weakling women? (Hom. *Il.* 5.347-9)[99]

For rhetorical *yes-no* questions implying an assertion of *negative* polarity we might expect to find μή as the introductory particle,[100] yet it is (in Homer and in my larger corpus) nowhere found that way. In Homer such questions are without any introductory question-particle, but often with a demonstrative adverb (οὕτω, τοὔνεκα). It appears that such questions often convey a sense ranging between resignation and defiance. They imply an assertion of negative polarity, again usually with evaluative undertones ("It shouldn't be the case that..."):

(121) Τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων·
"Ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, γέρον, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες·
ἀλλ' ὅδ' ἀνὴρ ἐθέλει περὶ πάντων ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,

[98] Note that the correct reconstruction of this RQ is not "You have shame" but "You should have shame". Taking this type of example in account, it is better to say that οὐ-questions express a species of *commitment* to the proposition of reverse polarity than to define them as requests for *affirmation* of the proposition of reverse polarity (as is commonly done). The speaker does not ask for affirmation of "You have shame", but claims that "You have shame" is a proposition he would like to see become reality. Cf. also my footnote 47, p. 33.

[99] The combination ἦ οὐ(κ) lends itself particularly well for use in sarcastic questions, though ἦ by itself can easily convey sarcasm (cf. example (116) above).

[100] Cf. my footnote 57, p. 43.

πάντων μὲν κρατέειν ἐθέλει, πάντεσσι δ' ἀνάσσειν,
πᾶσι δὲ σημαίνειν, ἅ τιν' οὐ πείσεσθαι ὀΐω·
εἰ δέ μιν αἰχμητὴν ἔθεσαν θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες
τοὔνεκά οἱ προθέουσιν ὀνείδεα μυθήσασθαι;"
Then in answer to him spoke lord Agamemnon: "Old man, in all this you have surely spoken properly. But this man is minded to be above all others; and to all give orders; in which there is one, I think, who will not obey him. If the gods who are forever made him a spearman, is it on that account that his revilings rush forward for utterance?" (Hom. *Il.* 1.285-91)[101]

(122) ἀγχοῦ δ' ἱσταμένη προσέφη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη·
διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ,
οὕτω δὴ οἶκον δὲ φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν
φεύξεσθ' ἐν νήεσσι πολυκλήϊσι πεσόντες,
κὰδ δέ κεν εὐχωλὴν Πριάμῳ καὶ Τρωσὶ λίποιτε
Ἀργείην Ἑλένην, ἧς εἵνεκα πολλοὶ Ἀχαιῶν
ἐν Τροίῃ ἀπόλοντο φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἴης;
(...) and flashing-eyed Athene came up to him, and said: "Son of Laertes, sprung from Zeus, Odysseus of many wiles, is the way indeed you will fling yourselves on your benched ships and flee to your dear native land? And would you leave a boast to Priam and the Trojans, Argive Helen, for whose sake many Achaeans have perished in Troy, far from their dear native land? (Hom. *Il.* 172-8)

(123) δαιμόνι' οὕτω που μάλα ἔλπεαι υἷας Ἀχαιῶν
ἀπτολέμους τ' ἔμεναι καὶ ἀνάλκιδας ὡς ἀγορεύεις;
εἰ δέ τοι αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐπέσσυται ὥς τε νέεσθαι
ἔρχεο· πάρ τοι ὁδός, νῆες δέ τοι ἄγχι θαλάσσης
ἑστᾶσ', αἵ τοι ἔποντο Μυκήνηθεν μάλα πολλαί.
ἀλλ' ἄλλοι μενέουσι κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοὶ
εἰς ὅ κέ περ Τροίην διαπέρσομεν. (...)
Strange man, do you really think that the sons of the Achaeans are so unwarlike and lacking in valor as you proclaim? If your own heart is eager to return home, go; before you lies the way, and your ships stand beside the sea, all the many ships that followed you from Mycenae. But the other long-haired Achaeans will remain here until we have sacked Troy (Hom. *Il* 9.40-6)

5.3.5 Characterization

The above overview of RQ's spoken by characters in the *Iliad* shows variety, but at the same time a large degree of standardization. A reader that works through the *Iliad* from beginning to end will consistently be confronted with the same types of questions, though spoken by different characters. In other words, the questions (standard and non-standard) of the *Iliad* are to a certain degree formulaic. Yet in this last sentence the importance of the words "to a certain degree" cannot be stressed enough. Some scholars have adduced the formulaic nature of speech and behavior to claim that the characters of the *Iliad* lack characterization.[102] I will here take as my guide Jasper Griffin,

[101] I can offer no new insights on the problematic προθέουσιν in this question, but I do not think that the passage is "hopelessly corrupted" (Leaf 1900: ad loc.); for discussions of the problem, cf. Leaf, Kirk 1985: ad loc., etc.
[102] For an overview of scholarly opinions on characterization in the *Iliad*, cf. Griffin 1980: 50-1.

part of whose important book *Homer on Life and Death* (1980) is aimed at showing that the characters of the *Iliad* have immense psychological depth, complexity, and the ability to "hide one thing in their heart and speak another"[103]. Keeping on topic, I argue that the RQ's uttered by some characters are 'characteristic', not only in their *content* (as Griffin has shown also in his article *Homeric Words and Speakers* (1986)) but also in *use*.

My prime exhibit is, as was to be expected, Achilles, an Homeric hero who "reveals his character not only by his actions but also, still more, by his utterances" (Griffin 1980: 75). Achilles is also the only character in the *Iliad* on whose language an entire bibliography can be written.[104] We have already come across several of Achilles' rhetorical questions that Griffin for one reason or another considers typical of Achilles-speak. For example, just before he kills Lycaon in book 21, a RQ reveals much of what preoccupies the tormented hero:

(124) = (119) ἀλλὰ φίλος θάνε καὶ σύ· **τίη ὀλοφύρεαι οὕτως;**
κάτθανε καὶ Πάτροκλος, ὅ περ σέο πολλὸν ἀμείνων.
οὐχ ὁράᾳς οἷος καὶ ἐγὼ καλός τε μέγας τε;
πατρὸς δ' εἴμ' ἀγαθοῖο, θεὰ δέ με γείνατο μήτηρ·
ἀλλ' ἔπι τοι καὶ ἐμοὶ θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κραταιή·
(Hom. *Il.* 21.106-8)

Griffin comments:

> Like all the other suppliants in battle, Lycaon is killed. The manner of his death brings out the character of his opponent. [...] Achilles kills in a passionate revenge, but not in blind ferocity. He sees his action in the perspective of human life and death as a whole, the perspective which puts slayer and slain on a level, so that it is more than a mere colloquialism that he calls Lycaon 'friend' as he kills him. [...] Achilles sees further; his dispute with Agamemnon leads him to bitter reflections on the life of heroism itself, [...] his career of victory and slaughter makes him recognize his fundamental kinship with those whom he kills. (Griffin 1980: 55)

In and around the two RQ's Achilles fires at Agamemnon in book 1, we find several typical Achilleanisms as well:

(125) = (77) Ἀτρεΐδη κύδιστε, φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων,
πῶς γάρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί;
(Hom. *Il.* 1.122-3)

(126) = (91) "Ὤ μοι, ἀναιδείην ἐπιειμένε, κερδαλεόφρον,
πῶς τίς τοι πρόφρων ἔπεσιν πείθηται Ἀχαιῶν
ἢ ὁδὸν ἐλθέμεναι ἢ ἀνδράσιν ἶφι μάχεσθαι;
(Hom. *Il.* 1.149-51)

The forms of abuse used to address Agamemnon are entirely unique to Achilles (and both speeches have no less than four *hapax legomena* in them in total). Partly because of these vocative forms, the questions may well be the most forceful uses of pointing up the absurdity of an opponent's position (a technique that admittedly isn't used in the *Iliad* that much to begin with).

Yet strong language and pathetic content still do not set apart Achilles' *use* of RQ's from other characters. In the Embassy-scene of book 9, however, we find a use of RQ's by Achilles that is

[103] Cf. Hom. *Il.* 9.313.
[104] Cf. Richard Martin's *The Language of Heroes* (1989: 146-60) for an overview, which for reasons unclear does not include Griffin 1986 (it is—albeit incorrectly—cited in Martin's bibliography).

literally unparalleled elsewhere in the *Iliad*. In a speech, "the longest stretch of continuous argument in the *Iliad*" (Hainsworth 1993: 100), that is judged by Griffin to be "the most splendid speech in Homer, in range and power" (Griffin 1995: ad 307-429)[105], Achilles rages:

(127) (...) ἐμεῦ δ' ἀπὸ μούνου Ἀχαιῶν
εἵλετ', ἔχει δ' ἄλοχον θυμαρέα· τῇ παριαύων
τερπέσθω. **τί δὲ δεῖ πολεμιζέμεναι Τρώεσσιν**
Ἀργείους; τί δὲ λαὸν ἀνήγαγεν ἐνθάδ' ἀγείρας
Ἀτρεΐδης; ἦ οὐχ Ἑλένης ἕνεκ' ἠϋκόμοιο;
ἦ μοῦνοι φιλέουσ' ἀλόχους μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
Ἀτρεΐδαι; ἐπεὶ ὅς τις ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐχέφρων
τὴν αὐτοῦ φιλέει καὶ κήδεται, ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν
ἐκ θυμοῦ φίλεον δουρικτητήν περ ἐοῦσαν.
νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ἐκ χειρῶν γέρας εἵλετο καί μ' ἀπάτησε
μή μευ πειράτω εὖ εἰδότος· οὐδέ με πείσει.
(...) but from me alone of the Achaeans he has taken and keeps my wife, the darling of my heart. Let him lie by her side and take his joy. But why must the Argives wage war against the Trojans? Why has he gathered and led here an army, this son of Atreus? Was it not for fair-haired Helen's sake? Do they then alone of mortal men love their wives, these sons of Atreus? Whoever is a true man, and sound of mind, loves his own and cherishes her, just as I too loved her with all my heart, though she was but the captive of my spear. But now, since he has taken from my hands my prize, and has deceived me, let him not tempt me who know him well; he will not persuade me. (Hom. *Il.* 9.335-45)[106]

I interpret Achilles' argument as follows: 'I came to fight for Agamemnon, over a woman, which is in principle justified. Yet Agamemnon is a hypocrite since he will fight a war over his brother's wife, but expects the rest of us not to mind when our own wives are taken (If I were to follow his example, I should now wage war on him) This hypocrisy has undermined the entire credibility of this expedition, and I will therefore not fight for him.'

No other character in the Iliad is given such an extensive barrage of RQ's to utter, and the sequence is also unequalled in structure: the repetition of τί-questions (variations expecting the same answer)[107] never recurs.[108] The ἦ οὐχ-question is nowhere else used to *answer* questions, only independently. More importantly, notice the peculiar pragmatics of the first three questions: they do not fit any of the types described above, nor are the first two questions strictly *rhetorical* when analyzed along the lines of Part II of this work. Achilles asks the τί-questions not to imply anything (that would have to be "The Greeks fight this war for nothing", but Achilles fully acknowledges that Menelaus' love for Helen is a reason to go to war, he just feels that his love for Briseïs should not be treated any less:. Rather, the questions are neutral, and asked with the sole purpose of

[105] The discussion of this speech in Lohmann 1970: 236-45 is still invaluable. Other significant contributions may be found in Hainsworth 1993: ad 307-429, Griffin 1995: ad 307-429, and Martin 1989: 160-71.
[106] Again, there is uniqueness in the vocabulary here: nowhere else in Homer do we find the word δεῖ.
[107] *Pace* Hainsworth (1993: ad 337-8): "Akhilleus is asking 'Why are we here?' The implicit answer, for the sake of the argument, is that they are there to uphold the rights of Menelaos. He then sharpens the point and asks 'Why is Agamemnon here?', so as to bring out the falsity of Agamemnon's position." But Achilles answer is neither implicit nor is the answer to the two questions different. Besides, I think the second question should be read "Why did Agamemnon *gather* us and *bring* us here?" rather than "Why did *Agamemnon* gather us and bring us here?".
[108] Cf. Martin 1989: 168 where he marks these questions as non-formulaic.

immediately answering them. The answer (the ἦ οὐχ-question) is also divergent from other question-pairs, where an answer is *suggested*, not *given* as here.[109]

Achilles *knows* the answer, and the only reason why he asks the questions is to introduce the subject of Helen, in order to finally get to the punch of the RQ-sequence with the *suggestio* ("ἦ μοῦνοι..."). This is entirely unparalleled in the *Iliad*, something that has been commented on only by Martin:

> there is innovation in Achilles' words, and it is worth noting. Only Achilles asks essentially the same question three times in succession (9.337-39). Achilles can be seen as uttering a conventional rhetorical strategy, in order to foreground his own answer to the question "Why fight?" What is not conventional, however, is the expanded form he gives to the strategy. (Martin 1989: 205)

I have only one slight change to make: the questions aren't asked *three* times in succession, but *twice* and subsequently *answered* by the third RQ (which is different in type). The questions resemble with uncanny likeness another succession of questions that I have already discussed: Longinus' opening questions in chapter 18 of Περὶ Ὕψους (cf. §2.1.2): there too, the first question is asked only to introduce the answer which is in the form of a RQ. I would argue, therefore, that the two τί-questions are much like expository questions: they are information-eliciting questions asked and answered by the speaker himself and they the discourse in a new direction (the issue of fighting for a woman); they are, I believe, the only instances of this in the *Iliad*.[110]

So what does this peculiar use of questions say about the *character* of Achilles? We must of course be very careful in drawing such conclusions rashly. What we *can* say is that the very fact that Achilles can use rhetorical techniques that no other character can supports claims like "Achilles is the most impressive user of language in the *Iliad*" (Griffin 1986: 51) and "Achilles can be seen to use devices familiar in formal rhetoric, but only to transcend them or put them do daring and startling new uses" (R. B. Rutherford, quoted in Griffin 1995: ad 307-429). The continuation of Martin's quote above is also telling:

> Nor is this a minor factor. [...] [I]t is this one innovation—an ability to ornament by expansion—that characterizes Achilles' speech in contrast to the rhetoric of all other Iliadic heroes. (Martin 1989: 205)[111]

Yet I would add one last point. It is not strange that but for this exception we find expository questions only in the narrative: they are used normally to introduce in an engaging way knowledge that is *not* known to the addressee but *is* known to the speaker ("How are non-declarative sentences understood?", "Who then of the gods was it that brought these two together to

[109] I believe this ἦ οὐχ-question to be one of two in the *Iliad* (the other being 14.472) that does not convey a sense of dismay or surprise, but is simply meant to affirm the positive proposition.

[110] The question-pair that comes closest is my example (66) on p. 42, 17.443-5, Zeus' bewildered questions 'to' Achilles' pair of horses. Yet both the setting and the pragmatic force of those questions are different: they are self-addressed because Zeus is speaking to himself (προτὶ ὃν μυθήσατο θυμόν, 17.444), whereas Achilles' questions are 'self-addressed' (with emphasized quotation marks) because he *chooses* to use this technique, in a conversational setting. And whereas Zeus' questions are meant to imply something, Achilles' first two questions, again, are completely neutral.

[111] Martin goes on to argue that "the language of Achilles is actually the undisguised voice and the rhetoric of Homer himself" (p. 230), which is a bit too sweeping an assertion for my taste. It is true that this particular character *sometimes* uses language that is in many ways reminiscent of the narrator, just like the narrator *sometimes* uses language of a style that is normally reserved for his characters (cf. the invective description of Thersites 2.212-9, and examples mentioned in Griffin 1986). Those cases are exceptions however, and to say that Achilles speaks with the narrator's *undisguised* voice is taking things too far.

contend?") That Achilles uses them here to introduce information that we can consider not only to be known to all the addressees, but even rather obvious ("Helen is the reason for this war") has, I think, some meaning. It is comparable to, say, an army general scolding his subordinate with "Who is in charge here? I am! Why don't you let me do the decision-making?" or one person angrily quibbling with another "What did I tell you last time when you were robbed in the subway? I told you to keep your bags in front of you! You never listen!" This is a rhetorical strategy, but also an exhuberantly emotional outburst.

All this seems to me quite 'in character' for Achilles to do in this speech. He is strongly rejecting Agamemnon's peace-offering as his own and very specific traits do not allow him to sell out for money. He is in a fit, and he is 'shooting the messenger'. Perhaps the best way I can try to convey the force I think Achilles' questions have is by offering my own extremely liberal (and angry) paraphrase of 9.336-341:

> Let him enjoy her! But: why again are the Greeks here fighting the Trojans, why did Agamemnon lead them here? For Helen's sake, right? Right! So, what then, are the sons of Atreus supposed to be the only men who love their wives?

A paraphrase that doesn't even come close to the mastery of language by Homer's Achilles.

Chapter 6

The Inquisitive Historian

Rhetorical Questions in Herodotus

"Herodotus was an author who *answered* questions, not one who *asked* them."
— *Luuk Huitink*

6.1 Introduction

Herodotus' narrative, like Homer's, comprises narrator-text and direct speech. I will devote this chapter to a discussion of the questions in the former, because there doesn't appear to be very much 'at stake' as regards the latter category. I doubt if many students of Herodotus can be found who will argue that his characters intrinsically lack characterization: this is in itself an important point to make when comparing Herodotus' work to Homer, but comparison between these two is not my principal aim here. Suffice it to say that the questions performed by the characters of the *Histories* are much less standardized than in Homer. The questions are in fact so diverse both in style and in effect that categorization seems to me quite pointless.[112]

About the questions performed by the Herodotean narrator, I wish to make three general points:

- There is a difference between the language of Herodotus 'the storyteller' and that of Herodotus 'the ethnographer/geographer'. Herodotus' style intensifies where there is controversy, and his use of rhetorical questions reflects this.
- The rhetorical questions used by the narrator serve specific roles in his logical argumentation, and the syntactic/pragmatic features of different types of questions are exploited for different purposes.
- Herodotus use of rhetorical questions mirrors their use in scientific writings of the same period.

6.2 Herodotean Polemic and Persuasion

Of the 117 questions in the *Histories* (in Hude's text), 14 are 'spoken' by the narrator. Unlike Homer's narrator-questions, these 14 are not primarily expository questions, quite the opposite in fact. Only one Herodotean question seems to me to qualify for the title 'expository question':

(128) = (95) Ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πάσης καὶ πρὸς ἐκ Φοινίκης κέραμος ἐσάγεται πλήρης οἴνου δὶς τοῦ ἔτεος ἑκάστου, καὶ ἢν κεράμιον οἰνηρὸν ἀριθμῷ κεινὸν οὐκ ἔστι ὡς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν ἰδέσθαι. Κοῦ δῆτα, εἴποι τις ἄν, ταῦτα ἀναισιμοῦται; Ἐγὼ καὶ τοῦτο φράσω. (...)

[112] For some interesting notes on the differences and similarities between characters' usage of RQ's in Homer and Herodotus, cf. Lang 1984: 41-51.

(Hdt. 3.6.2)

As I have discussed in §4.4.2, this question is a clear example of an expository question in terms of the explicit formulation (εἴποι τις ἄν) and the equally explicit mention of its discourse function (καὶ τοῦτο φράσω). It is the only instance of such questions performed by the narrator in Herodotus.

Each of the other narrator-questions is a rhetorical question. These RQ's are not evenly distributed throughout the *Histories*: one is found in Book I, one in Book IV, a pair in Book VII, and a total of nine rhetorical questions is found in Book II, in Herodotus' long ethnographical and geographical 'digression'[113] on Egypt. This dense concentration of RQ's in one section of Herodotus' narrative does not come entirely as a surprise for at least one simple reason: the description of Egypt is simply the longest stretch of narrator-text in the whole work. In none of the other books does Herodotus 'have the floor' as much as here. But this in itself is not a sufficient explanation, and the concentration remains peculiar. If we consider the RQ a *stylistic* device, the conclusion must be that in the earlier half of book II, we are treated to a unique concentrated block of a particular Herodotean style. In other words, his style changes in the Egypt-*logos*.

Why would Herodotus' style change, and why does it do so precisely *here*? To answer these questions I turn to two influential works in Herodotean scholarship: Alan B. Lloyd's commentary on Book II (1975), and Rosalind Thomas' *Herodotus in Context* (2000).

6.2.1 Herodotus the debater

In his long digression on Egypt, Herodotus painstakingly picks apart conflicting theories about the origins of the Egyptian people, the history of the Nile, etc. On Herodotus' narrative in this discussion, Lloyd remarks:

> One of the most impressive features of Book II is the great skill which Herodotus shows in argument, evincing at the same time considerable versatility, an easy mastery of contemporary science, a circumspection and sheer common sense which would do credit to any modern scholar. (A.B. Lloyd 1975: 160)

This argumentative skill translates into many different types of argument. Lloyd, using a distinction introduced by Aristotle (Arist. *Rh.* 1355b), divides the arguments into πίστεις ἄτεχνοι and πίστεις ἔντεχνοι. Most of Herodotus' proofs, he argues, belong to the category of πίστεις ἄτεχνοι ('given' proofs, such as witnesses and documents), but there are also many examples of πίστεις ἔντεχνοι (artificial proofs created by rhetorical techniques). Among them are such proofs as are known in rhetorical theory as reasoning by likelihood (εἰκός), *reductio ad absurdum*, enthymemes, *Modus Tollens*, etc.[114] These latter figures go beyond what Herodotus claims his own business to be, viz. simply 'λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα' ("to set down that which is told me", Hdt. 7.153.3) and it is here that his "sheer common sense", his faculties of logical reasoning, and also his use of RQ's come in.

Rosalind Thomas notices a shift in Herodotus' style in the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι: Herodotus uses, in such cases, a more argumentative language, what Thomas calls the 'language of proof'. This language is used, as is entirely to be expected, when Herodotus debates controversial issues, where no simple evidence can be brought to bear on the situation (precisely where πίστεις ἔντεχνοι would be used rather than πίστεις ἄτεχνοι):

[113] Cf. De Jong 2002 for some reservations on the use of the term 'digression'. I use it for lack of a better word.
[114] For definitions, cf. Thomas 2000: 175-6.

> It is striking [that Herodotus] tends to use the language of proof not for relatively straightforward cases where (for example) a monument or inscription attests to a particular statement, but [...] for far more complex arguments where, on the contrary, he deals with either obscure cosmological problems or controversial arguments about the gods (in the present and the remote past) or inferences drawn from *nomoi* in which understanding of other peoples' customs allow one to draw certain inferences. In other words, it seems to be precisely where Herodotus offers a difficult, uncertain, or controversial issue that he resorts to the language of proof. (Thomas 2000: 198)

No other stretch of argument in the *Histories* deals with as many controversial issues as the Egypt-logos, and, as a result, nowhere else do πίστεις ἔντεχνοι occur as frequently as there. Consistent with the high level of controversy, Herodotus' language here is, according to Thomas, polemical, the tone "agonistic and combative" (paraphrased thus in Bakker 2002: 9).

The combative tone mentioned is reflected by Herodotus' use of rhetorical questions. Many of his RQ's are used explicitly to debate an opposing view. In Book II, we find a concentration of such questions: Herodotus first presents the position of someone whom he doesn't believe, and subsequently attacks that position with a rhetorical question. The πίστις he uses in this case is the so-called *reductio ad absurdum*.

Reductio, an effective device of rhetorical polemic, is aimed at showing that the position taken up by the opposition is false by developing that position to an unacceptable conclusion, completely undermining the credibility and authority of the opponent in the process. The speaker 'accepts' the premise that is offered by his opponent and logically reasons from that premise towards an absurd conclusion. The most explicit example of such deductive reasoning in Herodotus is this one, a "good example of both his intellectual curiosity and of his critical approach to attempted explanation" (Gould 1989: 8):

> (129) εἰ ὦν βουλόμεθα γνώμῃσι τῇσι Ἰώνων χρᾶσθαι τὰ περὶ Αἴγυπτον, οἳ φασὶ τὸ Δέλτα μοῦνον εἶναι Αἴγυπτον, ἀπὸ Περσέος καλεομένης σκοπιῆς λέγοντες τὸ παρὰ θάλασσαν εἶναι αὐτῆς μέχρι Ταριχηίων τῶν Πηλουσιακῶν, τῇ δὴ τεσσεράκοντα εἰσὶ σχοῖνοι, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης λεγόντων ἐς μεσόγαιαν τείνειν αὐτὴν μέχρι Κερκασώρου πόλιος, κατ' ἣν σχίζεται ὁ Νεῖλος ἔς τε Πηλούσιον ῥέων καὶ ἐς Κάνωβον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα λεγόντων τῆς Αἰγύπτου τὰ μὲν Λιβύης τὰ δὲ Ἀραβίης εἶναι, ἀποδεικνύοιμεν ἂν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ χρεώμενοι Αἰγυπτίοισι οὐκ ἐοῦσαν πρότερον χώρην. ἤδη γάρ σφι τό γε Δέλτα, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκέει, ἐστὶ κατάρρυτόν τε καὶ νεωστὶ ὡς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν ἀναπεφηνός. εἰ τοίνυν σφι χώρη γε μηδεμία ὑπῆρχε, τί περιεργάζοντο δοκέοντες πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων γεγονέναι; οὐδὲ ἔδει σφέας ἐς διάπειραν τῶν παιδίων ἰέναι, τίνα γλῶσσαν πρώτην ἀπήσουσι.
>
> Now if we agree with the opinion of the Ionians, who say that only the Delta is Egypt, and that its seaboard reaches from the so-called Watchtower of Perseus forty *schoeni* to the Salters' at Pelusium, while inland it stretches as far as the city of Cercasorus, where the Nile divides and flows to Pelusium and Canobus, and that all the rest of Egypt is partly Libya and partly Arabia—if we follow this account, we can show that there was once no land for the Egyptians; for we have seen that (as the Egyptians themselves say, and as I myself judge) the Delta is alluvial land and but lately (so to speak) came into being. Then if there was once no land for them, it was an idle notion that they were the oldest nation on earth, and they need not have made that trial to see what language the children would first speak. (Hdt. 2.15.1-2)

Herodotus accepts, for the sake of argument, the γνῶμαι of the Ionians, but goes on to show that accepting them inevitably leads to absurd conclusions (an 'idle notion'[115]). Herodotus formulation of this conclusion is in the form of an RQ, in the form "If we accept X, than how can Y be true/why does Y also occur?" The RQ steers the addressee to the null set, and the addressee is forced to answer "In no way/For no reason", which is in direct opposition to what both speaker and addressee know: that Y *is* true. The logical result is that X, the if-clause (containing the attacked view), must be rejected. Two other examples of this type of argument appear:

(130) ἄνωθεν τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἀρξάμενον διώρυχα βαθέαν ὀρύσσειν, ἄγοντα μηνοειδέα, ὅκως ἂν τὸ στρατόπεδον ἱδρυμένον κατὰ νώτου λάβοι, ταύτῃ κατὰ τὴν διώρυχα ἐκτραπόμενος ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥεέθρων, καὶ αὖτις παραμειβόμενος τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐς τὰ ἀρχαῖα ἐσβάλλοι· ὥστε ἐπείτε καὶ ἐσχίσθη τάχιστα ὁ ποταμός, ἀμφοτέρῃ διαβατὸς ἐγένετο, οἳ δὲ καὶ τὸ παράπαν λέγουσι καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ῥέεθρον ἀποξηρανθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ προσίεμαι· κῶς γὰρ ὀπίσω πορευόμενοι διέβησαν αὐτόν;

Starting from a point on the river upstream from the camp, he dug a deep semi-circular trench, so that the stream, turned from its ancient course, would flow in the trench to the rear of the camp and, passing it, would issue into its former bed, with the result that as soon as the river was thus divided into two, both channels could be forded. Some even say that the ancient channel dried up altogether. But I do not believe this; for in that case, how did they pass the river when they were returning? (Hdt. 1.75.5-6)[116]

(131) πελειάδες δέ μοι δοκέουσι κληθῆναι πρὸς Δωδωναίων ἐπὶ τοῦδε αἱ γυναῖκες, διότι βάρβαροι ἦσαν, ἐδόκεον δέ σφι ὁμοίως ὄρνισι φθέγγεσθαι· μετὰ δὲ χρόνον τὴν πελειάδα ἀνθρωπηίῃ φωνῇ αὐδάξασθαι λέγουσι, ἐπείτε συνετά σφι ηὔδα ἡ γυνή· ἔως δὲ ἐβαρβάριζε, ὄρνιθος τρόπον ἐδόκεέ σφι φθέγγεσθαι, ἐπεὶ τέῳ ἂν τρόπῳ πελειάς γε ἀνθρωπηίῃ φωνῇ φθέγξαιτο; μέλαιναν δὲ λέγοντες εἶναι τὴν πελειάδα σημαίνουσι ὅτι Αἰγυπτίη ἡ γυνὴ ἦν.

I expect that these women were called "doves" by the people of Dodona because they spoke a strange language, and the people thought it like the cries of birds; then the woman spoke what they could understand, and that is why they say that the dove uttered human speech; as long as she spoke in a foreign tongue, they thought her voice was like the voice of a bird. For how could a dove utter the speech of men? The tale that the dove was black signifies that the woman was Egyptian. (Hdt. 2.57.1-2)[117]

A slightly different type of argument is that which takes the form "If we accept X, then how can Y be true?", where an opponent's position is inserted for Y and an obvious truth for X. The reader is forced, again, to answer with the null set, and because he knows X to be true, he is forced to conclude that Y is false. Again, as Y is the opposing view, the view under attack is rendered impossible to maintain by the question. The two examples of this figure are:

(132) ἡ δὲ τρίτη τῶν ὁδῶν πολλὸν ἐπιεικεστάτη ἐοῦσα μάλιστα ἔψευσται· λέγει γὰρ δὴ οὐδ' αὕτη οὐδέν, φαμένη τὸν Νεῖλον ῥέειν ἀπὸ τηκομένης χιόνος· ὃς ῥέει μὲν ἐκ Λιβύης διὰ μέσων Αἰθιόπων, ἐκδιδοῖ δὲ ἐς Αἴγυπτον. κῶς ὦν δῆτα ῥέοι ἂν ἀπὸ χιόνος, ἀπὸ τῶν θερμοτάτων ῥέων ἐς τὰ ψυχρότερα τὰ πολλά ἐστι; ἀνδρί γε λογίζεσθαι τοιούτων πέρι οἵῳ

[115] Godley's translation makes explicit the function of the rhetorical question.

[116] Herodotus 'acceptance' of the opposing position for the sake of argument here is not as explicit as in (129). It is clear however, that Godley's "in that case" is what Herodotus means.

[117] The argument is here not explicitly presented in the form "If we accept X, than how can Y be true", but the reasoning is the same. We could paraphrase "If we accept that they were real doves, than how could they utter the tongue of men?".

τε ἐόντι, ὡς οὐδὲ οἰκὸς ἀπὸ χιόνος μιν ῥέειν, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον μαρτύριον οἱ ἄνεμοι παρέχονται πνέοντες ἀπὸ τῶν χωρέων τουτέων θερμοί·

The third opinion is by far the most plausible, yet the most erroneous of all. It has no more truth in it than the others. According to this, the Nile flows from where snows melt; but it flows from Libya through the midst of Ethiopia, and comes out into Egypt. How can it flow from snow, then, seeing that it comes from the hottest places to lands that are for the most part cooler? In fact, for a man who can reason about such things, the principal and strongest evidence that the river is unlikely to flow from snows is that the winds blowing from Libya and Ethiopia are hot. (Hdt. 2.22.1-2)

(133) λέγουσι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀνεπισκέπτως οἱ Ἕλληνες, εὐήθης δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὅδε ὁ μῦθος ἐστὶ τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέος λέγουσι, ὡς αὐτὸν ἀπικόμενον ἐς Αἴγυπτον στέψαντες οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι ὑπὸ πομπῆς ἐξῆγον ὡς θύσοντες τῷ Διί· τὸν δὲ τέως μὲν ἡσυχίην ἔχειν, ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τῷ βωμῷ κατάρχοντο, ἐς ἀλκὴν τραπόμενον πάντας σφέας καταφονεῦσαι. ἐμοὶ μέν νυν δοκέουσι ταῦτα λέγοντες τῆς Αἰγυπτίων φύσιος καὶ τῶν νόμων πάμπαν ἀπείρως ἔχειν οἱ Ἕλληνες· τοῖσι γὰρ οὐδὲ κτήνεα ὁσίη θύειν ἐστὶ χωρὶς ὑῶν καὶ ἐρσένων βοῶν καὶ μόσχων, ὅσοι ἂν καθαροὶ ἔωσι, καὶ χηνῶν, κῶς ἂν οὗτοι ἀνθρώπους θύοιεν; ἔτι δὲ ἕνα ἐόντα τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ ἔτι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς δὴ φασί, κῶς φύσιν ἔχει πολλὰς μυριάδας φονεῦσαι; καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τοσαῦτα ἡμῖν εἰποῦσι καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡρώων εὐμένεια εἴη.

And the Greeks say many other ill-considered things, too; among them, this is a silly story which they tell about Heracles: that when he came to Egypt, the Egyptians crowned him and led him out in a procession to sacrifice him to Zeus; and for a while (they say) he followed quietly, but when they started in on him at the altar, he resisted and killed them all. Now it seems to me that by this story the Greeks show themselves altogether ignorant of the character and customs of the Egyptians; for how should they sacrifice men when they are forbidden to sacrifice even beasts, except swine and bulls and bull-calves, if they are unblemished, and geese? And furthermore, as Heracles was alone, and, still, only a man, as they say, how is it natural that he should kill many myriads? In talking so much about this, may I keep the goodwill of gods and heroes! (Hdt. 2.45.1-3)

I should briefly address the question why Herodotus would use RQ's to make his point in these cases, and not simply write an assertion like "This position is absurd because so-and-so". In this regard, it is interesting to note that the narrator uses only τί-question and πῶς-questions with the null set as desired answer for this figure. I would suggest that such questions force the addressee into a state of *aporia* (in a somewhat Socratic manner): none of the endless possible number of answers to the question is satisfying—on the contrary, each answer besides the null set would be absurd (hence the position is reduced *ad absurdum*). The question is thus a particularly suitable form for showing the absurdity of a position: the reader can search for an answer all he wants, but will come up short every time. This feeling of *aporia* is transferred by the reader to the 'real' addressees of the questions, the proponents of the views under attack. Were the opponent present to answer, he would be found wanting, unable to solve Herodotus' enigma. In this way, Herodotus not only proves the opposing position to be false, but also undermines the authority of the opponent. We can thus say that the specific syntactic and pragmatic features of these RQ's make them particularly effective as debating tools.

6.2.2 Herodotus the orator

The seven remaining Herodotean RQ's, where there is no opponent whose position Herodotus wants to undermine, but rather a reader/hearer to persuade, are of an entirely different character. Interestingly, these questions share many properties with the Lysianic rhetorical questions in my corpus (to which I have not devoted a separate chapter, but examples may be found in Chapter 4 and via my appendix). These questions always form the conclusion of a section where the narrator tries to prove a point, and Herodotus uses the questions to force the reader to come to the same logical conclusion as he himself has come. As Lang writes,

> [t]heir phrasing as questions instead of as simple declarations is presumably to arouse interest and, in the words o[f] one handbook on rhetoric, to take "the reader into partnership with the writer, as it were, in conducting the investigation." [...] The reader is swept along by means of the questions to which he can give only the answers the argument requires and is thereby convinced [to a greater extent than when] they had been simply asserted" (1987: 40) (Lang 1987: 40)[118]

Apparently, the standard way for doing so is by posing a specifying question with a negation (or an implicit negation such as in the verb-form κωλύει), one of the most frequent types of Lysianic RQ, and five times attested in Herodotus:

(134) = (86) εἰ ὧν ἐθελήσει ἐκτρέψαι τὸ ῥέεθρον ὁ Νεῖλος ἐς τοῦτον τὸν Ἀράβιον κόλπον, τί μιν **κωλύει** ῥέοντος τούτου ἐκχωσθῆναι ἐντός γε δισμυρίων ἐτέων; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἔλπομαί γε καὶ μυρίων ἐντὸς χωσθῆναι ἄν· κοῦ γε δὴ ἐν τῷ προαναισιμωμένῳ χρόνῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐμὲ γενέσθαι **οὐκ** ἂν χωσθείη κόλπος καὶ πολλῷ μέζων ἔτι τούτου ὑπὸ τοσούτου τε ποταμοῦ καὶ οὕτω ἐργατικοῦ;
(Hdt. 2.11.4)

(135) τῷ δὲ Σκυθικῷ γένει ἓν μὲν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπηίων πρηγμάτων σοφώτατα πάντων ἐξεύρηται τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν, τὰ μέντοι ἄλλα οὐκ ἄγαμαι· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον οὕτω σφι ἀνεύρηται ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τε μηδένα ἐπελθόντα ἐπὶ σφέας, μὴ βουλομένους τε ἐξευρεθῆναι καταλαβεῖν μὴ οἷον τε εἶναι. τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε ἄστεα μήτε τείχεα ἡ ἐκτισμένα, ἀλλὰ φερέοικοι ἐόντες πάντες ἔωσι ἱπποτοξόται, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ' ἀρότου ἀλλ' ἀπὸ κτηνέων, οἰκήματα τε σφι ᾖ ἐπὶ ζευγέων, κῶς **οὐκ** ἂν εἴησαν οὗτοι ἄμαχοί τε καὶ ἄποροι προσμίσγειν;
But the Scythian race has made the cleverest discovery that we know in what is the most important of all human affairs; I do not praise the Scythians in all respects, but in this, the most important: that they have contrived that no one who attacks them can escape, and no one can catch them if they do not want to be found. For when men have no established cities or forts, but are all nomads and mounted archers, not living by tilling the soil but by raising cattle and carrying their dwellings on wagons, how can they not be invincible and unapproachable? (Hdt. 4.46.2-3)

(136) = (70) αὗται αἱ πᾶσαι οὐδ' εἰ ἕτεραι πρὸς ταύτῃσι προσγενόμεναι στρατηλασίαι μιῆς τῆσδε οὐκ ἄξιαι. τί γὰρ **οὐκ** ἤγαγε ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης ἔθνος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης; κοῖον δὲ πινόμενόν μιν ὕδωρ **οὐκ** ἐπέλιπε, πλὴν τῶν μεγάλων ποταμῶν;
(Hdt. 7.21.1)

The negation in these examples is used (because of the polarity reversal discussed in §3.4.3) to assert the proposition in its positive form (with a universal quantifier: "Every river was drunk up"). Again, we see that a particular type of rhetorical question (specifying questions with a negation) is

[118] Lang quotes the unknown author of Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως, cf. *Rhetores Graeci* (ed. Spengel), 1.163-68.

suitable for a particular goal (persuasion of the audience). Rhetorical questions with a negation stress that *logically*, only one position is valid, as every position that diverges from the one Herodotus supports cannot be maintained.[119] As noted this type of question is frequently found in Lysias, and seems to belong to a language of oratorical persuasion.

Only one Herodotean RQ remains to be discussed. It is this one:

(137) σεσήμανται δὲ διὰ γραμμάτων Αἰγυπτίων ἐν τῇ πυραμίδι ὅσα ἔς τε συρμαίην καὶ κρόμμυα καὶ σκόροδα ἀναισιμώθη τοῖσι ἐργαζομένοισι· καὶ ὡς ἐμὲ εὖ μεμνῆσθαι τὰ ὁ ἑρμηνεύς μοι ἐπιλεγόμενος τὰ γράμματα ἔφη, ἑξακόσια καὶ χίλια τάλαντα ἀργυρίου τετελέσθαι. εἰ δ' ἔστι οὕτω ἔχοντα ταῦτα, κόσα οἰκὸς ἄλλα δεδαπανῆσθαι ἐστὶ ἔς τε σίδηρον τῷ ἐργάζοντο καὶ σιτία καὶ ἐσθῆτα τοῖσι ἐργαζομένοισι, ὁκότε χρόνον μὲν οἰκοδόμεον τὰ ἔργα τὸν εἰρημένον, ἄλλον δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκέω, ἐν τῷ τοὺς λίθους ἔταμνον καὶ ἦγον καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ γῆν ὄρυγμα ἐργάζοντο, οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον;

There are writings on the pyramid in Egyptian characters indicating how much was spent on radishes and onions and garlic for the workmen; and I am sure that, when he read me the writing, the interpreter said that sixteen hundred talents of silver had been paid. Now if that is so, how much must have been spent on the iron with which they worked, and the workmen's food and clothing, considering that the time aforesaid was spent in building, while hewing and carrying the stone and digging out the underground parts was, as I suppose, a business of long duration? (Hdt. 2.125.6-7)

This question may be compared to this example discussed earlier:

(138) = (47) He was fired from every one of his last six jobs, so what do you think will happen this time?

As discussed in §3.4.4, such questions are characterized by the fact that it is the *most obvious* answer rather than an answer of reverse polarity to the question that is sought. Herodotus ensures that the desired answer is given to (137) by all kinds of qualifications (the conditional and temporal clauses). Such questions are not very frequent; what can be said, however, is that this case again finds most of its syntactic/pragmatic parallels in Lysianic oratory. As to their effect, it appears that the addressee's interest should be aroused by the question-form and that he is more or less allowed to think 'with' the narrator about the answer. In this particular case, the effect of the question may also be thought to be one of convenient indefiniteness: had Herodotus used an assertion, he would have had to said something like "very much was spent on iron". Just how much that was, he leaves up to the reader's imagination by means of this 'open' rhetorical question.

6.3 HERODOTUS THE SCIENTIST

We have seen that Herodotean RQ's are used for two main purposes: to undermine and attack an opposing view, and to persuade the audience to accept Herodotus' reasoning. These uses tie in neatly to another important part of Rosalind Thomas' work and that of others (especially Lateiner 1986 and 1989): the view that the *Histories* should be read in the light of a group of scientific writings, such as the works of Hecateaus, Xenophanes, Anaxagoras, and the texts collected in what we now call the

[119] Cf. How and Wells on my example (134) (1928: ad loc.): "H[erodotus] seems, from his rhetorical tone, to be answering some criticisms on his geological views."

Hippocratic corpus. According to Thomas, the argumentative language seen in some polemical passages of the *Histories* is much like the type of language used by these scientific writers. This view is diametrically in opposition to the views on Herodotus of some other scholars, most importantly Gregory Nagy.[120]

I do not wish here to enter too deeply into this complex discussion, but it should be mentioned, if only very briefly, that the RQ's used by the Herodotean narrator offer some strong support for Thomas' views. For example, Herodotus uses a question introduced by 'τί κωλύει' above in example (134) to persuade his readers to share his logical reasoning.[121] Philip van der Eijk has shown (1997: 118-9) that the use of RQ's with 'τί κωλύει' is typical of scientific writings from the Hippocratic corpus (and later frequently used by Aristotle). More directly in line with Thomas' point about polemical passages, we may see that the use of RQ's in cases of *reductio ad absurdum*, aimed explicitly at undermining an opposing view, is also a device used quite often by the scientific writers she refers to. Thomas points to the use of this figure by several writers of the Hippocratic corpus, such as the authors of *'On the Sacred Disease*', '*Airs, Waters, Places*', '*On the Nature of Man'*, etc. (Thomas 2000: 180-8).

Interestingly, the phrase τί κωλύει is entirely absent in the rest of my own corpus, and none of the other authors examined show the same extensive use of *reductio*-RQ's (a few examples appear in Homer's speeches—but not in narrator-text!—cf. §5.3.1). This is of course due to the significant generic differences between Homeric epic, Herodotean narrative, Euripidean tragedy and Lysianic oratory; nonetheless, that such questions would appear only in Herodotus in my corpus, and also frequently in scientific writing, points to some shared features of these works that call for exactly these uses of questions.

The very fact that the Herodotean narrator uses *rhetorical* questions with some frequency is at odds with any conception of him as merely a storyteller. To again use a term applied by De Jong to RQ's in Homer, the use of this device is a *narratorial intervention*: the narrator comes to the fore and personally, intensively, offers his own opinions. But we should not at all be surprised to see such behavior from this narrator: any description of Herodotus' business as simply the telling of a good story would be fatally short-sighted. In the *Histories*, we find a researcher at work, someone who sometimes speaks about controversial issues, and sometimes simply does not have enough material evidence to support his own views about matters. This inevitably means that he will at times be combative, at other times use delicate language aimed at being persuasive. It means, in short, that he will use rhetoric.

[120] Cf. Bakker 2002 for extensive discussion of the opposing positions.

[121] This is the only occurrence of the phrase in Herodotus.

Chapter 7

Epilogue

The reader may have felt that what precedes these concluding remarks is two completely unrelated works rather than one coherent whole: first, an enumeration of linguistic phenomena occurring in varying uses of questions and, second, a study of questions as used in Homer and Herodotus. This impression is perhaps inherent in the approach I have aimed at taking, an approach that is best described by two book-titles, *Grammar as Interpretation* (ed. Bakker 1997) and *Linguistics into Interpretation* (Ophuijsen & Stork 1999). As the text on the dust-jacket of the latter work proclaims, the ancient Greek text under examination

> has been made the object of a systematic effort to distill and analyze the linguistic characteristics relevant to its interpretation, by confronting it with the rest of the work as well as with [other] writings. This is done with the primary aim of placing the interpretation of a major author on the firmest ground available, the author's *ipsissimi* (sic!) *verba*.

This is precisely what I have tried to do. It should be stressed that Part III of my work, the study of Homer's and Herodotus' non-standard questions, must be considered the heart of this work. I hope to have shown that by looking closely at exactly what these questions are and how they work, the understanding of why and how an author *uses* them is also increased.

In the case of the *Iliad*, there is quite a bit of controversy about how we should view questions in the narrator's text. I believe this controversy to be *caused*, and not *solved* by the role Homer's Muses play in his work. Certainly, the Muses are much more than a simple literary device, and that the *Iliad* begins with a reference to them is indicative of the pervasive function they perform, belonging to the very fabric of Homeric poetry. Yet the expository questions in the *Iliad*, are, linguistically, far from isolated incidents when we look at other literature. If we encounter any other writer using exactly such questions, we consider it a case of the narrator prodding along his audience, and Homer's use of such narrative-structuring questions should not be conceived of any differently. That would be underestimating the narrator and the rhetorical skill that he exhibits.

It is another underestimation of Homeric poetry, in my view, to say that its characters lack character. Again, by making a link between the linguistic peculiarities of questions to what they say about the ones who use them, I believe that it is possible to show that Achilles , for instance, breaks free from the standardization that is to some extent basic in Homer.

Moving on to Herodotus, we can again see that there is a correlation between the linguistic features of his rhetorical questions and the purposes for which they are used. The variety of these purposes in turn reveals Herodotus' narrative to be multi-faceted: Herodotus shows the signs of being a storyteller, an orator, a scientist and probably a lot more, all at the same time.

I have little doubt that this approach, a close-reading of an author's use of questions, may yield similar results when applied to other texts. Such studies would be fruitful especially in the case of works of entirely different genres, particularly those where we are confronted with a reflection of spoken dialogue (tragedy, comedy, the Platonic dialogues). There too, looking at linguistic

characteristics of questions may bring us slightly closer to answering long-standing questions about how we should read them.

Bibliography

Editions and translations Used

ARISTOTLE, *The Art of Rhetoric*, with an Engl. transl. by J.H. Freese. London: Heinemann (1926)

ARISTOTLE, *Poetics*, ed. and transl. by S. Halliwell; LONGINUS, *On the Sublime*, transl. by W. H. Fyfe, rev. by D. Russell; DEMETRIUS, *On Style*, ed. and transl. by D. C. Innes, based on W. Rhys Roberts. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP (1995)

CAECILII CALACTINI *Fragmenta*, colleg. E. Ofenloch. Stuttgart: Teubner (1967)

EURIPIDES, *The Tragedies of Euripides*, transl. by T. A. Buckley. London: Bohn (1850)

EURIPIDIS Fabulae, Tomus III insunt: Helena, Phoenissae, Orestes, Bacchae, Iphigenia Aulidensis, Rhesus; recogn. brevique adnot. crit. instrux. G. Murray. Oxford: Clarendon (1909)

HOMERI Opera, ed. alt., recogn. brevique adnot. crit. instrux. D. B. Monro et T. W. Allen. Oxford: Clarendon (1920)

HERODOTI Historiae, ed. 3-a, recogn. brevique adnot. crit. instrux. C. Hude. Oxford: Clarendon (1926)

HERODOTUS, *Histories*, with an Engl. transl. by A. D. Godley. London: Heinemann (1920-4)

LYSIAS, with an Engl. transl. by W. R. M. Lamb. London: Heinemann (1930)

QUINTILIAN, *The Orator's Education*, ed. and transl. by D. A. Russell. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP (2001)

RHETORES GRAECI, vol. 3, ex recogn. L. Spengel, Leipzig: Teubner (1854)

Dictionaries and reference works

Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3d ed. revised, ed. by S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth. Oxford UP (2003)

Lexikon des Frühgriechischen Epos, in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, hrsg. von B. Snell. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht (1955-...)

A Greek-English Lexicon, compiled by H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, rev. and augm. throughout by Sir H. S. Jones, with the assistance of R. McKenzie, Oxford: Clarendon (1968)

Other works

ADAMS, C.D.

1970 *Lysias: Selected Speeches*, repr., 1st ed. 1905, ed. with intr., notes, and app. Norman: Univ. of. Oklahoma Press

AHLUWALIA, R. & R.E. BURNKRANT

2004 'Answering Questions about Questions: A Persuasion Knowledge Perspective for Understanding the Effects of Rhetorical Questions', in *Journal of Consumer Research*, 31, 26-42

BAKKER, E.J.

2002 'The Making of History: Herodotus' *Historiēs Apodeixis*', in —, I.J.F. de Jong & H. van Wees (eds.) *Brill's Companion to Herodotus*. Leiden: Brill, 3-32

BASSETT, S.E.

2003 *The Poetry of Homer*, new ed. (1st ed. 1938), with an introduction by Bruce Heiden. Lanham, Md.: Lexington

BERG, W.

1978 (diss.) *Uneigentliches Sprechen: Zur Pragmatik und Semantik von Metapher, Metonymie, Ironie, Litotes und Rhetorischer Frage*. Tübingen: TBL.

BOERS, P.

1997 'De Interpretatie van Retorische Vragen in Betogende Teksten: Resultaten van een Pilotonderzoek', in H. van den Bergh, D. Janssen, N. Bertens & M. Damen (eds.), *Taalgebruik Ontrafeld*, bijdragen van het zevende VIOT-taalbeheersingscongres gehouden op 18, 19 en 20 december 1996 aan de Universiteit van Utrecht. Dordrecht: Foris, 75-86

BRUEGEMANN, W.A.

1973 'Jeremiah's Use of Rhetorical Questions', in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 92, 3, 358-74

BURNKRANT, R.E. & D.J. HOWARD

1984 'Effects of the Use of Introductory Rhetorical Questions Versus Statements on Information Processing' in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 47, 6, 1218-30

CHIERCIA, G. & S. MCCONNELL-GINET

2000 *Meaning and Grammar: An Introduction to Semantics*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press

CRESPO, E., L. CONTI & H. MAQUIEIRA

2003 *Sintaxis del Griego Clásico.* Madrid: Gredos

DAVIS, W.A.

1998 *Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory*. Cambridge UP

DENNISTON, J.D.

1954 *The Greek Particles*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon

DIK, S.C.

1997 *The Theory of Functional Grammar I*: *The Structure of the Clause*, 2nd rev. ed., ed. by K. Hengeveld. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter

1997a *The Theory of Functional Grammar II*: *Complex and Derived Constructions*, ed. by K. Hengeveld. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter

DONALDSON, J. & SCHEFFLER, D.

1999 *The Gruffalo*. London: Macmillan Children's Books

DOVER, K.J.

1980 (ed.) *Ancient Greek Literature*, by —, E.L. Bowie, J. Griffin & M.L. West. Oxford UP

EEMEREN, F.H. VAN & R. GROOTENDORST

1992 *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

EDWARDS, M.W.

1991 = Kirk 1991

EIJK, P.J. VAN DER

1997 'Towards a Rhetoric of Ancient Scientific Discourse: Some Formal Characteristics of Greek Medical and Philosophical Texts (Hippocratic Corpus, Aristotle)', in E.J. Bakker (ed.), *Grammar as Interpretation: Greek Literature in its Linguistic Context*. Leiden: Brill, 77-130

ENE, C.

1983 'Text Analysis of Rhetorical Questions', in *Revue Roumaine de Linguistique*, 28, 4, 307-16

FRANK, J.

1990 'You Call That a Rhetorical Question?: Forms and Functions of Rhetorical Questions in Conversation', in *Journal of Pragmatics*, 14, 723-38

GIVÓN, T.

1984 *Syntax: A Functional-Typological Introduction*, vol. I. Amsterdam: John Benjamins

GOULD, J.

1989 *Herodotus*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson

GRICE, H.P.

1975 "Logic and conversation", in P. Cole & J.L. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech acts*. London: Academic Press, 59-82

GRIFFIN, J.

1980 *Homer on Life and Death*. Oxford: Clarendon

1986 'Homeric Words and Speakers', in *Journal of Hellenistic Studies*, 106, 36-57

1995 (ed.) *Homer: Iliad Book Nine*. Oxford: Clarendon

HAINSWORTH, B.

1993 = Kirk 1993

HAN, C.-H.

2002 'Interpreting Interrogatives as Rhetorical Questions', in *Lingua*, 112, 201-229

HOEKEN, H.

1994 Review of Slot 1993, in *Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing*, 16, 2, 140-5

HOEKEN, H. & ANDERIESSE, R.

1992 'Het Effect van de Positie van Retorische Vragen op de Overtuigingskracht van een Persuasieve Tekst', in *Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing*, 14, 4, 257-269

HOW, W.W. & J. WELLS

1928 *A Commentary on Herodotus*, 2 vols., with introd. and append. Oxford: Clarendon

ILIE, C.

1983 = Ene 1983 (published under maiden name)

1994 (diss.) *What Else Can I Tell You?: A Pragmatic Study of English Rhetorical Questions as Discursive and Argumentative Acts*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell

JANKO, R.

1992 = Kirk 1992

JACQUINOD, B.

1997 'Sur le rôle pragmatique de kaitoi', in A. Rijksbaron (ed.), *New Approaches to Greek Particles*. Amsterdam: Gieben, 131-49

JONG, I.J.F. DE

1987 *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad.* Amsterdam: Grüner

2001 *A Narratalogical Commentary on the Odyssey*. Cambridge UP

2002 'Narrative Unity and Units', in E.J. Bakker, — & H. van Wees (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Herodotus.* Leiden: Brill, 245-66

KIRK, G.S.

1985 *The Iliad: A Commentary,* vol. I, Books 1-4. Cambridge UP

1990 *The Iliad: A Commentary,* vol. II, Books 5-8. Cambridge UP

1991 (ed.) *The Iliad: A Commentary*, vol. V, Books 17-20, by M.W. Edwards. Cambridge UP

1992 (ed.) *The Iliad: A Commentary*, vol. IV, Books 13-16, by R. Janko. Cambridge UP

1993 (ed.) *The Iliad: A Commentary*, vol. III, Books 9-12, by B. Hainsworth. Cambridge UP

1993a (ed.) *The Iliad*: *A Commentary*, vol. VI, Books 21-24, by N.J. Richardson. Cambridge UP

KROON, C.H.M.

1995 (diss.) *Discourse Particles in Latin: A Study of* nam, enim, autem, vero *and* at. Amsterdam: Gieben

KÜHNER, R. & B. GERTH

1898-1904 *Ausführliche Grammatik der Griechischen Sprache*, 2. Teil: Satzlehre, 2. Band. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung

LANG, M. L.

1984 'How Could Herodotus Imitate Homer?', in —, *Herodotean Narrative and Discourse*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 37-51

LATACZ, J.

2000 (ed.) *Homers Ilias: Gesamtkommentar*, band I: Erster Gesang (A), faszik. 2: Kommentar, von —, R. Nünlist und M. Stoevesandt. München: K. G. Saur

LATEINER, D.

1986 'The empirical element in the methods of early Greek medical writers and Herodotus: a shared epistemological response', in *Antichton*, 20, 1-20

1989 *The Historical Method of Herodotus*. Toronto UP

LAUSBERG, H.

1990 *Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft*, 3. Aufl., band I-III. Stuttgart: Steiner

LEAF, W.

1900 (ed.) *Homer*: *The Iliad*, ed., with apparatus criticus, prolegomena, notes, and appendices. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan (reprint 1960 Amsterdam: Hakkert)

LEEMAN, A.D. & BRAET, A.C.

1987 *Klassieke Retorica*. Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff

LEVINSON, S.C.

1983 *Pragmatics*. Cabridge UP

LLOYD, A.B.

1975 *Herodotus: Book II*, 3 vols. Leiden: Brill

LLOYD, M.A.

forthc. 'Sophocles in the Light of Face-Threat Politeness Theory'

LOHMANN, D.

1970 *Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias*. Berlin: de Gruyter

LYONS, J.

1977 *Semantics*, vols. I & II. Cambridge UP

MARTIN, R.P.

1989 *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP

MEIBAUER, J.

1986 (diss.) *Rhetorische Fragen*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag

MINTON, W.W.

1960 'Homer's Invocation of the Muses: Traditional Patterns', in *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 91, 292-309

OPHUIJSEN, J. VAN & P. STORK

1999 *Linguistics into Interpretation: speeches of war in Herodotus VII 5 & 8-18*. Leiden: Brill

PETTY, R.E.; J.T. CACIOPPO & M. HEESACKER

1981 'Effects of Rhetorical Questions on Persuasion: A Cognitive Response Analysis' in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 40, 3, 432-40

RAAFLAUB, K.A.

2002 'Philosophy, Science, Politics: Herodotus and the Intellectual Trends of his Time', in E.J. Bakker, I.J.F. de Jong & H. van Wees (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Herodotus*. Leiden: Brill, 149-87

REEVE, M.D.

1973 'The Language of Achilles', in *Classical Quarterly*, 23, 3, 193-5

RICHARDSON, N.J.

1993 = Kirk 1993a

RICHARDSON, S.

1990 *The Homeric Narrator*. Nashville, Tenn. : Vanderbilt University Press

RIJKSBARON, A.; S.R. SLINGS; P. STORK & G.C. WAKKER

2000 (eds.) *Beknopte Syntaxis van het Klassiek Grieks*. Lunteren: Hermaion

RIJKSBARON, A.

1991 *Grammatical Observations on Euripides' Bacchae*. Amsterdam: Gieben

2002 *The Syntax and Semantics of the Verb in Classical Greek: An Introduction*, 3d edition. Amsterdam: Gieben

2003 'A Question of Questions: Peusis, Erôtêsis and [Longinus] Περὶ Ὕψους 18.1', in *Mnemosyne*, 56, 6, 733-7

RUIJGH, C.J.

1971 *Autour de "Te Épique": Etudes sur la Syntaxe Grecque*. Amsterdam: Hakkert

RUSSELL, D.A.

1964 (ed.) '*Longinus': On the Sublime*, ed. with introduction and commentary. Oxford: Clarendon

SADOCK, J.M.

1974 *Towards a Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts*. New York: Academic Press

SCHAFFER, D.

2005 'Can Rhetorical Questions Function as Retorts? Is the Pope Catholic?', in *Journal of Pragmatics*, 37, 433-60

SCHMIDT-RADEFELT, J.

1977 'On So-called Rhetorical Questions' in *Journal of Pragmatics*, 1, 375-92

SEARLE, J.R.

1969 *Speech Acts : an Essay in the Philosophy of Language.* Cambridge UP

1975 'Indirect Speech Acts', in P. Cole & J.L. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech acts*. London: Academic Press, 59-82

SICKING C.M.J.

1993 'Devices for Text Articulation in Lysias I and XII', in — & J.M. van Ophuijsen, *Two Studies in Greek Particle Usage: Lysias and Plato*. Leiden: Brill, 1-66

1997 'Particles in Questions in Plato', in: A. Rijksbaron (ed.), *New Approaches to Greek Particles*. Amsterdam: Gieben, 157-74

SITTL, C

1892 *Die Gebärden der Griechen und Römer*. Leipzig: Teubner

SLINGS, S.R.

1997 'Adversative Relators Between PUSH and POP', in: A. Rijksbaron (ed.), *New Approaches to Greek Particles*. Amsterdam: Gieben, 101-29

1997a 'Figures of Speech and their Lookalikes: Two Further Exercises in the Pragmatics of the Greek Sentence', in E.J. Bakker (ed.), *Grammar as Interpretation: Greek Literature in its Linguistic Context*. Leiden: Brill, 169-214

2002 'Oral Strategies in the Language of Herodotus' in E.J. Bakker, I.J.F. de Jong & H. van Wees (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Herodotus*. Leiden: Brill, 53-78

SLOT, P.

1992 'Hoe Kan Je Dat Nou Doen?: De Reconstructie van Retorische Vragen' in *Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing*, 14, 1, 1-16

1993 (diss.) *How Can You Say That: Rhetorical Questions in Argumentative Texts.* Amsterdam: IFOTT

1996 'Waar is dat nu voor nodig?', in *Onze Taal*, 65, 5, 136-8

1997 Review of Ilie 1994, in *Argumentation* 11, 383-6

SNOODIJK, D.

1995 'The Answer is Evident: Clues for Argumentatively Used Rhetorical Questions', in F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair & C.A. Willard (eds.), *Reconstruction and Application*, proceedings of the third ISSA conference on arumentation (University of Amsterdam, June 21-24, 1994). Amsterdam: Sic Sat

SPERBER, D. & D. WILSON

1986 *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell

1988 'Mood and the Analysis of Non-Declarative Sentences', in J. Dancy, J.Moravcsik & C. Taylor (eds.), *Human agency: Language,Duty and Value*. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 77-101

STAINTON, R.J.

1996 Review of Ilie 1994, in *Language*, 72, 2, 429-30

THOMAS, R.T.

1993 'Performance and Written Publication in Herodotus and the Sophistic Generation', in W. Kullmann and J. Althoff (eds.), *Vermittlung und Tradierung von Wissen in der griechischen Kultur*, Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 225-44

2000 *Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion*. Cambridge UP

WERKGEM, F.G. VAN

1994 ''Héél Kilo Aardbeien: 4 Gulden', Of Heeft FG Retorische Functies Nodig?', in —, *Dubbel Nederlands*: *23 opstellen voor Simon C. Dik*, hoogleraar in de algemene taalwetenschap bij de Universiteit van Amsterdam van 1 april 1969 tot 1 april 1994. Amsterdam: IFOTT

WILLCOCK, M.M.

1978 (ed.) *The Iliad of Homer:Books I-XII*, ed., with an introd. and comment. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education

WILSON, C.H.

1996 *Iliad books VIII and IX*, ed. with an introduction, translation and commentary. Warminster: Aris & Phillips

WOODCOCK, E.C.

1952 'Rhetorical Questions in *Oratio Obliqua*' in *Greece & Rome*, 21, 37-42

Appendix

Listed here are the places of every interrogative sentence in my corpus (more specifically, every question mark, as in the editions listed on p. 10). Interrogatives that I consider to be rhetorical questions (including those that (partly) retain their information-eliciting function) have been put in **boldface**, question-requests in *italics* and expository questions have been underlined. Questions performed by the narrator of the Iliad or the Histories have been marked with *. In Lysias, questions addressed at a witness rather than the judges are marked with +. The one question that is reported by Lysias in the narratio of a speech (Lysias describes someone else asking a question) is marked with #. Indirect questions have not been taken into account.

HDT.
1.8.3
1.27.4
1.30.4
1.32.1
1.35.3
1.35.3
1.37.2
1.37.3
1.37.3
1.39.2
1.71.3
1.75.6*
1.87.3
1.88.2
1.88.3
1.109.2
1.109.4
1.115.2
1.117.2
1.120.3
1.155.1
1.159.3
1.159.3
1.159.4
2.11.4*
2.11.4*
2.14.1*
2.15.2*
2.22.2*
2.45.2*
2.45.3*
2.57.2*
2.114.2
2.125.7*
3.6.2*
3.29.2
3.34.2
3.35.4
3.50.3
3.53.3
3.62.2
3.63.3
3.72.1
3.73.1
3.80.3
3.81.2
3.82.5
3.82.5
3.120.3
3.127.2
3.127.3
3.137.3
3.137.3
3.137.3
3.137.3
3.140.2
3.151.2
3.155.3
3.155.3
4.46.3*
4.80.3
4.118.2
4.118.3
4.126.1
4.155.4
5.33.4
5.33.4
5.33.4
5.49.8
5.79.2
5.79.2
5.106.1
5.106.2
5.106.3
5.106.3
6.12.3
6.85.2
6.85.2
6.97.2
7.9A.1
7.9A.1
7.9A.1
7.9Γ.1
7.12.2
7.14.1
7.17.2
7.21.1*
7.21.1*
7.39.1
7.47.1
7.48.1
7.48.1
7.50.2
7.56.2
7.95.1
7.101.3
7.103.1
7.103.3
7.136.2
7.140.2
7.147.3
7.147.3
7.234.3
8.68A.2
8.68A.2
8.84.2
8.88.2
8.106.3
8.140A.3
9.16.4
9.27.6
9.48.4
9.58.2
9.91.1
9.109.2
9.111.3
9.122.2

HOM. *IL.*
1.8*
1.123
1.134
1.151
1.202
1.203
1.291
1.362
1.362
1.365
1.414
1.540
1.552
3.51
3.52
3.227
3.399
3.405
4.33
4.242
4.249
4.340
4.350
4.352
4.371
5.34
5.172
5.349
5.374
5.421
5.457
5.465
5.466
5.472
5.634
5.704*
5.761
5.764
5.873
6.56
6.57
6.123
6.145
6.254
6.377
6.380
6.519
7.25
7.27
7.36
7.447
7.450
8.94
8.140
8.237
8.273*
8.294
8.353
8.413
8.413
8.447
9.41
9.77
9.338
9.339
9.339
9.341
9.438
9.675
10.37
10.38
10.61
10.63
10.83
10.84
10.85
10.141
10.159
10.161
10.167
10.304
10.386
10.387
10.389
10.389
10.406
10.407
10.408
10.409
10.410
10.425
10.432
10.534
11.300*
11.313
11.404
11.407
11.606
11.657
11.668
11.793

11.821
11.838
11.838
12.244
12.314
12.409
13.220
13.250
13.252
13.275
13.307
13.309
13.448
13.771
13.772
13.811
14.43
14.89
14.192
14.264
14.266
14.298
14.335
14.365
14.472
15.20
15.90
15.131
15.134
15.203
15.245
15.245
15.247
15.250
15.404
15.441
15.505
15.508
15.553
15.554
15.555
15.736
16.12
16.13
16.18
16.32
16.422
16.441
16.627
16.693*
16.721
16.859
16.861
17.99
17.170
17.261*
17.328
17.444
17.445
17.450
17.470
17.478
17.586
18.7
18.73
18.73
18.82
18.182
18.188
18.287
18.367
18.386
18.425
18.431
19.58
19.82
19.90
19.227
19.343
19.420
20.16
20.17
20.85
20.88
20.179
20.181
20.186
20.190
20.299
20.334
21.106
21.108
21.150
21.153
21.360
21.370
21.395
21.398
21.436
21.474
21.482
21.510
21.562
22.9
22.122
22.180
22.204*
22.385
22.432
23.95
23.409
23.458
23.474
23.670
24.34
24.90
24.130
24.197
24.203
24.205
24.240
24.242
24.264
24.363
24.365
24.367
24.387
24.521

Eur. *Ba.*
68
68
170
185
191
195
205
214
247
253
254
265
287
344
373
378
465
467
469
471
473
477
481
485
492
501
533
533
552
559
579
593
599
605
611
612
612
613
615
639
645
646
648
649
650
654
654
663
721
793
793
803
803
806
811
813
815
819
822
822
826
828
828
829
830
832
834
840
877
880
897
900
922
925
926
942
946
950
986
987
1029
1029
1032
1032
1033
1042
1168
1176
1177
1178
1181
1182
1184
1192
1198
1208
1211
1212
1258
1263
1265
1266
1268
1271
1273
1275
1277
1280
1280
1283
1286
1286
1290
1290
1290
1292
1294
1298
1300
1302
1320
1321
1351
1365
1366

Lys.
12.25+
12.25+
12.25+
12.25+
12.25+
12.26+
12.26+
12.26+
12.27
12.27
12.28
12.29
12.34
12.34
12.36
12.40
12.40
12.49
12.52
12.82
12.83
12.83
12.84
12.88
12.89
16.21
16.21
19.17
19.23
22.5+
22.5+
22.5+
22.10
22.16
22.17
22.18
22.21
25.9
25.14
32.15#
32.27