The Pretense View of Fiction

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Abstract

The pretense view is a position in the philosophy of fiction which claims that the representational acts by which fictions are created involve pretense. The degree of involvement of the pretense can vary, and in this thesis I focus on the proposals of John Searle and Saul Kripke in their works from the 70’s of the previous century. The ideas of these outspoken theorists have been influential in the philosophy of fiction; for example, they form part of David Lewis’s account of fiction. However, this view has not itself been widely discussed, and it is not always clear what the view is meant to say. The potential causes for this lack of clarity include, the lack of understanding of pretense itself, and the entanglement of the pretense view with other related views. This thesis attempts to define and solve these problems through a careful consideration of Searle and Kripke’s views, and of the arguments regarding this view from Stefano Predelli, Catharine Abell, Gregory Currie, Nathan Salmon and Manuel García-Carpintero. Finally, some potential modifications of the pretense view are considered, and it’s role in Searle and Kripke’s separate projects is evaluated. The thesis then concludes with hope that the pretense view could continue to be fruitful in the philosophy of fiction.
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1 Introduction

Situated within the philosophy of language is the philosophy of fiction, and within the philosophy of fiction, there is a view which holds that the linguistic and otherwise representational acts by which fiction is generated involve pretense. This view, here called the pretense view, more specifically holds that fiction generating acts are pretended versions of ‘real,’ ‘serious,’ or regular linguistic/representational acts. The aim of this thesis will be to make clear how the pretense view was intended to be understood by its most recognizable proponents, to argue why this version of the view cannot properly be understood as a tenable (sub-)theory of fictional representation, to suggest how the pretense view could be supplemented and improved such that it could be so properly understood, and finally to evaluate how this theory fares at solving the problems its proponents intended for it to solve.

In order to achieve the above goals, the thesis begins with an introduction to the basic distinction between fiction and nonfiction, and some terminology which will be of use later in the thesis. It continues in §2 with an exposition of Searle and Kripke’s formulations of the view, as well as some discussion of related but independent views. Next, in §3, is a discussion of some effects of the pretense view on other parts of the philosophy of fiction. The above sections come together in §4, where a unified pretense view is put forth. Following this is §5, where the pretense view’s adequacy and correctness as a theory are discussed. The penultimate section, §6, discusses how the view would need to be supplemented and changed to avoid the problems of the previous sections. The thesis continues with §7, where the improved pretense theory is measured against the problems for which the pretense view was originally invoked. Finally, §8 concludes the thesis.

1.1 Basic Notions and Terminology

Giving a characterization of the distinction between fictional and nonfictional (oftentimes called “serious” following [Sea75]) representations is a difficult enterprise, and there is no existing consensus on the matter.\(^1\) Several natural ideas about this distinction may arise in one’s own consideration of these issues, and, while there may be a lot at stake with this distinction (see [KV19]), the work of this thesis does not directly rely on it. As such, it will be useful to keep in mind only a minimally constrained conception of fiction, by which fiction is understood to be representational (but not necessarily truthfully) and, perhaps, aimed at representing (authorial) imaginations.

In order to easily distinguish between the types of statements relating to fiction, I make use of the following terminology: fictional statements are those statements which constitute part of the generation of a fiction, and metafictional statements are statements about fictions; included in the category of metafictional statements are: paratextual statements, which are those statements “re-

\(^1\)See §1 of [KV19] for several attempts at this problem.
port[ing] on what goes on in a fiction,” and metatextual statements, statements which are “intuitively truth-evaluable relative to the actual world but not content reporting” [Gar22, p. 307]. In order to make these distinctions more concrete, see the following example sentences provided by García-Carpintero:

(1) Emma Woodhouse had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world.
(2) (According to/In *Emma*) Emma Woodhouse had lived nearly twenty-one years.
(3) Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character.

Sentence (1) as uttered/written by Jane Austen—the author of *Emma*—is a fictional statement. Sentences (2) and (3) are both metafictional statements, (2) being a paratextual statement and (3) being a metatextual statement. This kind of categorization is, as García-Carpintero notes, implicit in much of the literature, and making it explicit allows for a clearer discussion of which kinds of statements are at issue in the following sections.

Another useful terminological distinction is between “speech act” and “illocutionary act”. In Searle’s work in [Sea75], it seems to be that an “illocutionary act” is a meaningful utterance act with a particular illocutionary force. In other words, illocutionary acts are successful speech acts in the sense that they meet the rules/conditions to take on a particular force, like that of an assertion; in [Gre21], they define this special kind of act as “a type of act that can be performed by speaker meaning that one is doing so.” “Speech acts” are then something more general, because this term encompasses many different acts involved in language like reference and predication as well as the utterance acts which figure in the below discussions. By speech act, then something much more general and encompassing is intended here. Other writes in the literature on speech acts do not seem to have this use of terminology in mind (for example, as in [Gre21]), and I am admittedly unsure whether this distinction is actually as Searle intends it, but this will be how I use the two terms moving forward.

Finally, in several examples throughout the text I refer to an act of fiction generation of my own, which I created just for this thesis. The fiction at hand is one where I tell of a fictional character “Joe,” who is a princess in this fiction, and who also finds some frogs ugly. I use this example mixed with examples taken from the literature because sometimes it will be convenient to discuss Sherlock Holmes or whatever the writer at hand discusses, but sometimes it will be more instructive to think of a fiction which I now create and formulate without getting into the details of the Sherlock Holmes stories or Iris Murdoch’s *The Red and the Green* (these are the works most often discussed by Kripke and Searle).

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2The terminology presented here follows that which García-Carpintero draws from Bonomi for everything except ‘fictional statements’ which they call ‘textual statements.’ It is worth emphasizing here that ‘fictional statements’ refers not to hypothetical objects, like fictional characters, but rather to real statements which generate fiction.

3They call what I call “illocutionary acts,” “speech acts,” but this is a merely terminological difference.
2 The Pretense View

The pretense view can be understood to make the broad claim that fiction generating representational acts involve pretense, and that in particular the pretense views considered here hold (i) that the speech acts by which fictional statements are made, are pretended serious illocutionary acts\(^4\) and (ii) that fictional statements include pretend reference. Outspoken proponents of these pretense views in the literature on philosophy of fiction are Searle and Kripke [Sea75; Kri13] who defend (i) and (ii) respectively. A notion of a “pretense view” is also ubiquitous and its expression can be found throughout the literature on philosophy of fiction.\(^5\) One prominent pretense theorist whose views are not discussed until much later, in §3.1, is Lewis; this is because his account is centered on metafictional statements not fictional ones (so pretense is only in the background), and because the version of the view he presupposes aligns well with those of Searle and Kripke. A precise characterization of Searle’s and Kripke’s views will hopefully make clear the central claims of a pretense view, which will be considered as a singular, unified pretense view later in §4. Additionally, it will be useful to identify certain positions which, despite being often defended together with the pretense view, are independent of it; these include the view that fictional statements are empty, or have no meaning, Kripke’s ideas about fictional modality and Kripke’s ideas concerning rigid designation.

2.1 Searle’s Pretense View

First note that on Searle’s account, there is no textual distinction between fictional and serious utterances/sentences, i.e. that the utterance of one and the same sequence of words can result in one case in a serious illocutionary act like an assertion, and in another case in a fictional speech act. Additionally, the linguistic acts associated with fiction generation will have the same content and form as some “serious” (i.e. nonfictional) illocutionary act. The statement of Searle’s pretense view makes use of this fact; Searle holds that authors making fictional statements are pretending to perform the serious illocutionary act that the fictional utterance would give rise to in serious contexts. Searle seems to acknowledge that his proposal of the pretense view is vague, and before introducing this view in [Sea75, p. 324] he writes: “the idea seems to me obvious, though not easy to state precisely.” In order to make his proposal more concrete, Searle goes through a few details regarding the view, like the notion of pretense at work, the role of authorial intention in his view, and the mechanisms by which authors are able to perform this pretense. The fruits of this clarificatory effort are four points which Searle considers central parts of his pretense view, and which he calls “conclusions.”

Before getting into Searle’s four conclusions, there is one important issue of interpretation to point out. At the beginning of [Sea75], Searle briefly attacks a competing view according to which the authors perform a special illocutionary...
act of “fictionalizing” or “fiction-making” when they write or tell stories, henceforth the fiction-making view. Due to considerations relating to this argument, which will be discussed in §5.2 below, I interpret Searle’s claim that authors are “pretend[ing] to perform illocutionary acts which [they are] not in fact performing” [Sea75, p. 325] to mean that the utterance/writing acts involved in fiction generation are not illocutionary acts. They are real utterances, as seen below, but they lack illocutionary force.

Given the above point of clarification, I now focus on Searle’s own statement of his pretense view, and his first “conclusion.” This first point concerns differentiating two types of pretending, which can be thought of roughly as deceptive and non-deceptive pretense. Searle believes the pretend assertions of fiction, are pretended in the second, non-deceptive sense; fiction writers are not (generally) aiming to deceive others with their fictions. These acts of pretense are referred to by Searle as “pseudoperformances,” and this connects to a feature of pretense which Searle details: “a general feature of the concept of pretending is that one can pretend to perform a higher order or complex action by actually performing lower order or less complex actions” [Sea75, p. 327, emphasis in the original]. An implication of this claim is that all acts of fiction creation must be less complex than whatever they are pretenses of, and since the pretense at hand is non-deceptive, good fiction must be “obviously pretense” in the sense that competent members of society can easily recognize it as such.

In connection with the above point, since Searle believes fiction creators are pretending, he claims it follows that, because pretending is intentional, “whether or not a text is a work of fiction must of necessity lie in the illocutionary intentions of the author” [Sea75, p. 325]. This means, for Searle, that there is no textual property that will identify a linguistic act as fictional. Rather, the fiction/nonfiction distinction is a question of authorial intentions. One should note, though, that this point doesn’t really serve to clarify the way in which fiction is pretense, but rather assumes as such, and so defines the limits of fiction. This account of the fiction/nonfiction distinction relies on some assumptions about the relation between intending to pretend and intending to pretend-in-order-to-create-fiction, and it is so far not explicit whether Searle takes it that the intentions of a speaker/author/etc. are also sufficient (or merely necessary) to determine something as fictional.

The most interesting aspect of Searle’s account of the pretense view follows these first two points, and this is his discussion of what he supposes makes this pretense possible. The way Searle’s section on the mechanisms behind fictional pretense is interpreted is the most crucial to fleshing out the pretense view beyond Searle’s initial intuition based statement of the view; this is because,

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6This interpretation is not the only one, but hopefully the discussion of these points below will convince the reader that this interpretation is, in fact, the most charitable to Searle.

7The use of the term “illocutionary” here is potentially misleading, because ultimately Searle claims that authors’ pretended speech acts are not actually illocutionary acts (they have no force). As argued below, Searle likely means that authors must have the intention to invoke certain conventions, but this will not be, on this account, the intention to perform any particular illocutionary act.

8See [Cur90, pp. 22-3] on this idea.
while he has provided some details about the kind of pretense he is considering, and he has made the claim that the linguistic acts involved in fiction generation are pretend versions of serious linguistic acts, the question of how this pretense can work is unresolved without some explanation of the mechanisms behind it.

Searle’s initial description of the linguistic process taking place with fiction creation and reception builds off of his characterization of assertions as conforming to certain semantic and pragmatic rules [Sea75, p. 322]. Searle claims that there are rules in play which determine that the speech act get the appropriate force (the illocutionary point via the “essential rule”), whether a speech act of a certain kind is “defective” or not (by the “felicity conditions”), etc., and these are precisely the rules which are strangely absent in the case of fiction; for example, when an assertion is not true, a regular speaker can be blamed for not following the essential rule, which “commits [the speaker] to the truth of the expressed proposition,” but this does not happen in the case of fiction, where many of the statements involved are false about the real world [Sea75, p. 322]. These rules ultimately follow from assumptions about the purpose of communication, as well as the assumption that speakers are making assertions about the real world.9 So, the rules are in use in order to ensure that speech acts reflect reality in the necessary way; Searle uses the spatial metaphor of these being “vertical rules” in order to express this connection. The spatial metaphor is then that these rules move vertically between the (base) level of reality, and the (potentially higher) level of language, which then establishes a connection between these two levels. These rules concern whether the speaker is committed to the truth of his statement, can provide evidence for his statement, that he believes his statement and that the statement will be informative to state [Sea75, p. 322]; then, true assertions are uttered only by informed speakers who intend to share their justified beliefs with other speakers which they assume not to already believe the content of the thing asserted. As such, these rules are in place in an attempt to ensure that what is expressed through an assertion describes reality, it is in this way that Searle takes these rules to connect language to reality.

Building on the idea that these rules are “vertical rules that establish connections between language and reality,” Searle claims that what makes fiction possible are “horizontal conventions that break the connections established by the vertical rules” [Sea75, p. 326]. The spatial metaphor of these conventions being “horizontal” is suggestive, but limited. Because Searle does not explain this metaphor in detail, it can only be taken as far as to establish that the “horizontal conventions” serve to block the rules which are “vertical.” Searle does add that the horizontal conventions are extralinguistic and nonsemantic [Sea75, p. 326], and so they must operate on a level separate from language itself, i.e. these conventions are independent from one’s understanding of meaning (within a language).10 In the following sections of this thesis, I continue to refer to Searle’s “horizontal conventions,” as they are doing a lot of work in

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9 These ideas are discussed in more detail in §5.2.1.
10 This point is considered below in §5.1.1.
Searle’s account, but I only understand them according to this somewhat minimal description and by the role Searle assigns them. Searle states that these rules are what enable speakers to “use words with their literal meanings without undertaking the commitments that are normally required by those meanings” [Sea75, p. 326], and this is a step toward explaining the anomaly of fictional seeming-assertions where the usual rules do not apply, because some “horizontal” fiction conventions apparently block them. Still, the way the conventions are invoked, and how the pretense itself forms a part of that process, is rather opaque at this point in Searle’s account.

Searle’s first step toward clarifying the above issue is to make a contrast between fiction and lying. Searle claims that lying consists in violating one of the vertical rules mentioned above [Sea75, p. 326]. He further believes that the notion of violation of a rule is already contained within the statement of that rule; when one understands a rule, it is a part of that understanding that one understands the conditions which must be met to follow it. Thus, it is impossible to understand how to follow a rule without also understanding how to break it. As a result, Searle claims that it is enough to understand the practices involved in honest language use in order to understand how to lie. In contrast, Searle says that the practices in which fiction makers and receivers are involved go beyond basic language use. So, fiction practices, or the understanding of fiction is not a necessary part of the understanding of language. For Searle, a speaker can be competent at honest and dishonest “serious,” or non-fictional, language use, without being a competent fiction creator or receiver. Again, Searle makes use of his spatial metaphor of horizontal conventions to explain this claim. He states that it is the existence of the separate (horizontal) conventions that enable authors to make the (often untrue) statements of fiction without violating the rules, as rules which are not in place cannot be violated.

Next, Searle finally discusses the mechanisms he takes to be at play in fiction creation and reception. He does this by stating the above discussed notion that one can pretend to do a more complex action by actually doing a less complex one [Sea75, p. 327]. The way this relates to fiction, on Searle’s view, is that the pretend illocutionary acts of fiction are pretended by way of the actual performance of what he calls the “utterance act,” the speaking or writing of the sentence. So, for Searle, there is the more complex action of making an assertion (or some other illocutionary act), which consists in saying or writing whatever words make up the utterance act, and in some other components which make the illocutionary act a successful assertion, such as compliance to the rules of an assertion. Then, the pretend assertion of the same sentence is performed by performing the exact same utterance act as the assertion, but without the additional components which make the utterance a successful assertion. Rather, the pretended performance of an illocutionary act is constituted by “the performance of the utterance act with the intention of invoking the horizontal conventions,” according to Searle [Sea75, p. 327]. Since here the having of this intention is considered as a component of the pretense act, the question arises of whether this act can truly be considered a lower order/less complex
pretense that the pretend pretender intend to invoke the horizontal conventions, and, in making his fourth and final “conclusion” of the section Searle restates that “the pretended performances of illocutionary acts which constitute the writing of a work of fiction consist in actually performing utterance acts with the intention of invoking the horizontal conventions [...]” [Sea75, p. 327]. The pretense act can then be understood to involve an utterance and a certain type of authorial intention, but the question remains as to how these two components make possible the recognition of this act as a fictional/pretense act.

Despite this question, Searle seems to find this a satisfactory explanation of fictional pretense, as he gives no indication in his writing of there being open questions regarding this aspect of his account. So, the most likely interpretation is that the having of the intention to invoke the horizontal conventions is enough to actually invoke them, and that the invocation of these conventions is publicly recognizable. At first glance this seems like an impossible proposal, because the mere holding of an intention is not causally connected to public recognition of this intention in an obvious or straightforward way. However, given Searle’s larger body of work it is reasonable to believe that he wanted to fill this in along Gricean lines. Grice made a well known proposal of meaning in terms of intention, and for him “the explanatory idea is to see communication as a rational activity where audiences reason their way to beliefs or intentions via their recognition of the utterer’s intention to produce such results” [GW22]. This kind of account has its own existing criticisms (see [GW22] for some of them), and moreover, such accounts often appeal to “standard procedures” regarding the use of certain sentences, or to usual usages of certain words or other representative factors. This then raises some questions about this kind of approach’s plausibility, when what needs to be recognized is the speaker’s intention to communicate something other than what the utterance usually means. These issues and their discussion in [Abe20] are considered below in §5.2. For now, let us assume for the sake of the argument that a reasonable Gricean account of the matter can be given.

As support for this interpretation of Searle, note that no alternative mechanism for the invocation of the horizontal conventions fits better with his account. To begin, there is nothing in the article that supports the idea that he claims that the mechanism is some other sort of mental act than the above mentioned intention to create fiction and invoke the horizontal conventions. This is because such an account would suffer from the same opacity as the above stated one, but lack the advantage of fitting neatly into the rest of his proposal. The remaining possibilities seem to be that authors invoke the conventions either by way of some kind of additional speech act or by way of some kind of non-linguistic act. If Searle were to mean the former, his claim that there is no textual difference between fiction and non-fiction must be false, since the linguistic act invoking the horizontal conventions would be such a textual difference. However, if Searle means the latter, one must identify what kind of non-linguistic act(s) this is, and provide some details as to how this reflects the reality of literary practice.
This may be possible, but this is not present in Searle’s statement of his view. Thus, the most plausible way of understanding Searle’s pretense theory is to understand it as stating that the intention of invoking the horizontal conventions is enough to actually invoke them.

One final aspect of Searle’s view which is worth pointing out, is that in several sections Searle makes clear that in his view the pretense is not limited to illocutionary acts alone. He also claims, for example, that Conan Doyle, the author of the Sherlock Holmes books, pretends to be Watson, a main character in these books, and that authors pretend to refer when they mention characters [Sea75, p. 328, p. 330]. In the cases of pretend assertions, one is meant to understand on this account that the felicity conditions of an assertion are pretended to be met, or are met according to the pretense, but also that authors pretend to be their stories’ narrators and that fictional names pretend refer. Thus, pretense in fiction extends beyond the speech acts which were the focus of his account thus far, and these are aspects of the view that connect nicely to Kripke’s formulation of the pretense view detailed below.

In sum, Searle’s pretense view states that the linguistic acts which form fictional works are acts of pretense. Further, the pretense involved is a non-deceptive and intentional form of pretense. The pretense is performed by the true performance of the relevant utterance act, and by some additional component—probably the possession of the intention to invoke certain, unspecified horizontal conventions. The horizontal conventions are what block the vertical rules corresponding to serious illocutionary acts from being applied to fictional speech acts. Finally, Searle’s view posits widespread pretense in fiction generation, despite only discussing pretense in detail in the context of pretended illocutionary acts.

2.2 Kripke’s Pretense View

For Kripke, the espousal of the pretense view in [Kri13] is first presented as a philosophical tool in his argument concerning reference. He presents the position with extreme confidence, writing that “many philosophers have observed that fiction is a pretense, and that the names occurring in it are pretenses of being names” [Kri13, p. 24, fn. 24, emphasis added]. From this word choice it is clear that Kripke considers this view as established, but there are, as is discussed below in §5, relatively few arguments in favor of the view and there is no clear consensus on what exactly the view is meant to express. Still, for Kripke this view functions as a means to an end, which is to argue that the historical arguments against Millian theories of reference are not successful, and he calls

There is an interesting question of who it can be said that Conan Doyle pretends to be, since the reference is supposed to be pretended. On the assumption that the name Watson is either non-referring or refers to a fictional character, one is left with the claim that either there is not actually anyone who Conan Doyle pretends to be, or that he pretends to be a fictional character. One could potentially give an intentional account, by which there is a concept of Watson having certain properties, some subset of which Conan Doyle really takes on in order to pretend to have all of them, but this is not likely what Searle has in mind.
on the view with no explicit defense of it. Kripke states the pretense view and then uses it to argue for certain ends, and so, he only states his ideas about fiction as pretense with the detail necessary for it to play the proper role in his wider argument in defense of his own Millian theory of reference. Because of this, one must attempt to extract concrete details about the pretense view, as well as any arguments which could be taken as support for the view, from the way in which Kripke presents and uses it. To justify the details and arguments which I extract, I will briefly sketch the argument about reference.

The arguments to which Kripke is responding essentially consist of two statements: firstly, that Mill’s view requires the existence of a referent as an essential part of naming, and secondly, that there are many instances in language where names seem to be used, but where these names don’t have a referent, namely sentences involving fictional characters’ names. These arguments then proceed to claim that negative existential statements like “Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist,” make sense, but that “Sherlock Holmes” has no referent. The problem of negative existentials is dealt with by the descriptivists in a way which does justice to widely recognized linguistic intuitions, and so the fact that Millianism seems to imply that such statements are always meaningless appears to be a disadvantage for Millians. Millian theories must hold that negative existential statements are meaningless because all (true) names necessarily have referents. According to Kripke, Russell attempts to solve the problem of negative existentials by delineating a class of objects which can be named and which indubitably exist, and these are essentially immediate sense data [Kri13, pp.19-20]. This is supposed to avoid any issues, because in the case of this class of objects, negative existential statements don’t make sense due to the supposed indubitability of immediate sense data; Russell then claims that “genuine proper names” are what apply to this class of objects, and so there are no genuine examples of true negative existential statements on this account.

Kripke argues that this maneuver of Russell cannot save him from true negative existentials, because even when talking about this class of objects, there can be empty reference. This claim is based on the idea that one can create fiction about immediate sense data, and so introduce fictional genuine proper names. The existence of fictional genuine proper names is supposed to follow, on Kripke’s account, from the fact that one may decide to tell a story about an imaginary immediate sense datum, and within this story give the imaginary sense datum a name. Then, Kripke believes this imaginary sense datum has a fictional genuine proper name, because genuine proper names name

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13 Whether Kripke may also support the view on some independent grounds is not indicated by his writing on the subject.

14 For details about how the pretense view relates to Kripke’s Millianism and to his views on rigid designation, see §2.3.3.

15 See [Sal11] for details about methods for dealing with negative existentials.

16 Russell is discussed by Kripke in two different capacities. Call them Russell-on-naming and Russell-the-descriptivist. Kripke discusses a descriptivist view which is discussed below which he calls the Frege-Russell view, and which refers to Russell’s descriptivism, but here Kripke is arguing against Russell-on-naming which can be thought of as a separate theoretical project of Russell.
immediate sense data. From this Kripke derives his claim that one can make negative existential statements involving fictional genuine proper names. Thus, Kripke states that Russell cannot solve the problem of negative existentials by limiting naming to immediate sense data. This is supposed to show, in Kripke’s account, that fictional names do not pose more of a problem for a Millian theory than for Russell’s or for any other theory [Kri13, p. 22]. In sum, Kripke claims that since fictional names may appear even in Russell’s theory, they cannot be used as a criticism of Mill’s.

Yet in order to motivate his larger, thus far unargued, claim that fictional names cannot “adjudicate between one theory and another” Kripke appeals to the pretense view [Kri13, p. 23]. Kripke’s espousal of the pretense view, and his argument for why fiction is not able to serve as an adjudicator between theories of reference is given in the following passage:

[... when one writes a work of fiction, it is part of the pretense of that fiction that the criteria for naming, whatever they are, are satisfied. I use the name “Harry” in a work of fiction; I generally presuppose as part of that work of fiction, just as I am pretending various other things, that the criteria of naming, whatever they are—Millian or Russelian or what have you—are satisfied. That is part of the pretense of this work of fiction. Far from it being the case that a theory of the reference of names ought to make special provision for the possibility of such works of fiction, it can forget about this case, and then simply remark that, in a work of fiction, it is part of the pretense of that work of fiction that these criteria are satisfied. [Kri13, pp. 23-4]

One can see, then, that for Kripke the pretense view serves to make sense of the empty referents of fictional names. Within the work of fiction, when an author uses a fictional name, they are pretending to use a real name. So, the conditions which a theory of reference puts forth for real names are, on Kripke’s account, pretended to be met. Also, for Kripke the creation of fiction involves pretense in various ways, not just in fictional naming. Kripke does not, however, provide much detail on this matter. Another point from the above quote, is that Kripke believes that the case of fiction should be dealt with along these lines regardless of the theory of reference one supports. So, if one accepts this view, then the way one treats the fictional case should remain constant no matter the theory of reference one has. In sum, Kripke’s pretense view holds that fictional reference, along with many other unspecified parts of fiction generation, is pretended, and that any theory of reference should deal with fiction along these lines.

One may have serious doubts about this argument. Briefly, imaginary immediate sense data are not actual immediate sense data, and this calls into question whether Kripke can call their names genuine proper names. Moreover, the conclusion that fictional names cannot form part of a criticism of Mill is extremely haste.

It is worth noting that the pretense view does not deal with so-called “metafictional” statements. These are discussed below in §3.1.

See Searle also on this point.
Kripke makes three further points about his views on pretense which do not serve to clarify his views on pretense, but rather to draw some conclusions from them. The first point he makes is that his pretense view taken together with a Millian theory of reference leads to “the consequence that [...] the propositions that occur in a work of fiction would only be pretended propositions” [Kri13, p. 24]. Since this is not a direct consequence of the pretense view (even for Kripke, I believe), the relationship between and independence of these two views is discussed in §2.3. The second point he makes is an argument to the effect that since what he calls the Frege-Russell theory of reference deals with fiction in a different way than the pretense view, the Frege-Russell theory must be wrong. The details of this argument will be discussed below in §5.1. The third point relates to his remarks on fiction and modality. In this section he also extends his view to terms like “unicorn,” claiming they are pretend names for species, which are themselves rigid designators of natural kinds on Kripke’s account. Ultimately, the pretense view is essentially taken for granted by Kripke, and used as a part of his argument for a type of Millian reference. One can extract from his lectures that he takes many parts of the process of fiction generation to involve pretense, and that most importantly, the naming which is involved in the creation of fictions is pretend-naming. Additionally, by looking at the role the pretense view plays in Kripke’s arguments in defense of Millianism, one can understand what Kripke needs the view to do. The following section aims to make clear how the pretense view can be separated from these other views which Kripke advocates for on its basis.

2.3 Independence

Despite the fact that the above section characterizing Kripke’s pretense view is entangled with other arguments made by Kripke, namely arguments about empty reference, modality and rigid designation, the pretense view is separable from these other positions. Since it is not only Kripke who takes these views together, and since the pretense view and the view that fictional propositions are empty are often associated in the literature, this section is dedicated to showing how these views can be separated. In order to consider the function and success of the pretense view itself, it will be worthwhile to establish its independence from these other views. In what follows I will argue (i) that the pretense view does not (by itself) imply the view that fictional propositions are empty, (ii) that Kripke’s views about modal analyses of fictional statements/statements involving fictional entities follow from his views on empty-propositions (not from the pretense view), and (iii) that Kripke’s arguments for his theory of rigid des-

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20 Much of this section deals with the implications of the above mentioned position that the propositions expressed in fictions are only “pretend propositions,” i.e. propositions without meaning or content. So, these aspects of Kripke’s view will be dealt with in the following section (§2.3).

21 This particular venture is taken up in §7 below.

22 See [Gar23] where these views are often essentially conflated, or [Sar15] where the views are not explicitly combined but often discussed together.
ignation can be considered completely separately from his views about fiction and pretense.

2.3.1 The Pretense View vs. the Empty-Proposition View

Kripke argues throughout his discussion on fiction for several conclusions, but two of the main parts of his account of fiction are the pretense view and the view I am calling the empty-proposition view, i.e. the view that there is no proposition expressed by the spoken/textual content of fictions. While Kripke does at some points make explicit that his support of Millianism plays a role in his “derivation” of the empty-proposition view from the pretense view, for the most part this detail is obscured. Because of this, Kripke’s work suggests that the pretense view entails the empty-proposition view. Searle, on the other hand, seems not to support the empty-proposition view, but there are ways of interpreting him that could lead to the support of this view. So, understanding Searle’s position on this point is also not straightforward. Moreover, these views are often presented together in the literature (see [Gar23], [Sar15], and [Sal11]). So, disentangling these views is essential to determining which arguments are directed at the pretense view and which are directed at the empty-proposition view. The following discussion shows that the pretense view and the empty proposition view have a complicated relation in the existing literature, even though the final conclusion will be that the two views are independent.

The first time Kripke comes to the empty-proposition view in [Kri13] he writes: “I do therefore— if I go by [the pretense] principle—have to draw the consequence that, for a follower of Mill, the propositions that occur in a work of fiction would only be pretended propositions” [Kri13, p. 24, emphasis in the original]. Here it is clear that on Kripke’s account, Millians who endorse the pretense view, must also endorse the empty-proposition view. The way this works for Kripke seems to be as follows: from the pretense view proceeds Kripke’s claim that the use of fictional names in fiction generation is pretended, thus it only need be part of the pretense that within the fiction the naming conditions are met; from Kripke’s Millianism proceeds the claim that all names must have referents (since they directly refer); from this, together with the idea that fictional characters do not (at least in most cases) exist, Kripke derives that the use of fictional names in the seeming-sentences of fictions must be false, or empty uses of names; finally from some kind of compositionality principle Kripke derives that these seeming-sentences are not, in fact, sentences at all, and moreover they are meaningless.

One may still wonder, however, whether the Millianism really plays such a connecting role. Indeed, in other parts of his work Kripke leaves out any mention of its role when discussing the pretense view and the empty proposition view, as in the following remark:

Last time I argued that the types of names which occur in fictional discourse are, so to speak, “pretended names,” part of the pretense of the fiction. The propositions in which they occur are pretended
propositions rather than real propositions; or rather, as we might put it, the sentences pretend to express a proposition rather than really doing so. [Kri13, p. 29]

Kripke at no point denies the involvement of his Millianism in his arguments for these views, rather it is always in the background of his work. To see that this really is the case, consider the above outlined implication. The pretense view motivates the claim that naming conditions only need to be met at the level of the pretense, and not in reality. However, this does not imply that the conditions for naming cannot also be met at the level of reality. If, rather than a Millian theory of reference by which all names must have referents, one adopts a theory of reference the conditions of which can be simultaneously met in reality and in the pretense, then the empty-proposition view does not follow.

Take, for example, an alternative, rather trivial or primitive theory of reference which holds that the only condition for a name to refer is that it be pronounced or written. Then, when Charlotte Brontë writes, in her persona as Jane Eyre, “Mrs Reed, when there was no company, dined early” the name Mrs Reed is both pretend pronounced and really written. Then, it is both the case that the conditions of reference are met in reality and that the conditions of reference are met in the pretense. So, one can see that the pretense view is compatible with such a theory of reference, and with the supposition that fictional names are also always really referring. Then, sentences involving these names will have the capacity to express propositions (assuming no other parts of the sentence are problematic). So, Kripke’s Millianism really does play a role in arriving at the empty-proposition view, and it is worth emphasizing its role where Kripke does not, because the two views can otherwise be easily conflated.

Now, it is also worth considering Searle’s position on the matter, which appears also to be a counterexample to any claim of an implication from the pretense view to the empty-proposition view. As a first, most general point, one should see that on a speech act based theory such as Searle’s, the illocutionary force of a speech act is separate from the meaning of the words in the so-called “utterance act.” Thus, the meaning of the words uttered, and (given compositionality) of the sentence uttered, remains, even when the illocutionary force with which it is uttered is changed. Gregory Currie, who defends a different speech act based theory puts the distinction clearly: “Force can vary where meaning does not. If Doyle had been writing history instead of fiction when he wrote ‘It rained in London on January 1, 1895,’ he would have been making an assertion […] the transition [from history to fiction] is not marked by any change of meaning” [Cur90]. So, meaning should remain constant between the fictional and serious utterances of statements on Searle’s view, because the difference between them is their force, not the utterance-act. To this point, Searle states that the conventions making fiction possible “are not meaning rules,” and that “they do not alter or change the meanings of any of the words or other elements of the language” [Sea75, p. 326].

\footnote{I take this quote from [Bro47]. This example was chosen from a 1st person narrative to avoid the problems of “ubiquitous tellers” discussed below in §5.2.4.}
For the above reasons it seems that Searle, while being a clear proponent of the pretense view, cannot be a proponent of the empty-proposition view, because otherwise it would not be the case that the meaning of the utterance act remains constant between serious and fictional utterances of the same sentence. For example, given the empty-proposition view, while the utterance of the sentence “Miffy (nijntje) is white.” is true in its serious utterance as a report on the fiction, the fictional utterance of this sentence would be meaningless, as Miffy does not refer. Then, it is clear that the serious and fictional utterances must differ in meaning.

However, there also seems to be some tension between this aspect of Searle’s account, on the one hand, and his consideration of propositions and reference on the other. Searle writes that it is a condition “on the successful performance of the speech act of reference that there must exist an object that the speaker is referring to,” and that fiction authors often “[pretend] to refer” [Sea75, p. 330]. Additionally, in his original and seminal work on speech acts, [Sea69], he says that the propositional content of a linguistic structure is a product of its reference and predication. So, the empty-proposition view does not seem far off. Depending on the details of Searle’s account of reference (for example, what exactly constitutes an ‘object,’ and whether pretending to refer can happen without actually referring), one can derive the empty-proposition view here. Moreover, a Millian interpretation of Searle on reference would not be unsupported here, but despite the fact that one can arrive to the empty-proposition view by these means, Searle’s more explicit statement of the above points on meaning indicate that Searle is best understood not to support the empty-proposition view. Additionally, even if one does not believe this interpretation is faithful to Searle, the possibility of a pretense theorist who rejects the empty-proposition view remains.

Thus, the pretense view and the empty-proposition view seem to be separable despite their relation in the literature and in Kripke’s views in particular. However, one may still wonder what exactly the “empty-proposition” view is for Kripke. The view was defined above as the view that there is no proposition expressed by the spoken/textual content of fictions, and one may think that it is incorrect to attribute this exact view to Kripke; at first Kripke only calls fictional propositions “pretended,” and this may seem different from the claim that they are “empty” or non-existent. Yet, Kripke gives a bit more detail on his views in the passage quoted above; he writes that “the sentences [in fictions] pretend to express a proposition rather than really doing so” [Kri13, p. 29, emphasis added]. So, it seems that these pretended propositions really are not propositions for him. Many more remarks of this kind can be found in Kripke’s discussion of counterfactual reasoning in the November 6 Lecture, which allow one to conclude with a high degree of certainty that for Kripke pretend propositions are not “real.” In order to convince the reader of this fact, it will be

See §3.1 below.

One should note that the term “real” is somewhat stipulatively used by Kripke in these lectures. In Kripke’s discussion of ontology he states that “the entities which one calls ‘real entities’ are the ones which one could talk about before one told any stories” [Kri13, p. 82].
useful to present another place where Kripke discusses this subject.

One such place is in the conclusion to the November 6 lecture, in a summary of how the pretense theory extends to pretend entities like unicorns:

[...] the status of the predicate ‘is a unicorn’ should be precisely analogous to that of the hypothetical proper name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in the detective story case, or (perhaps an example which might not be clear) to that of a hypothetical color, ‘plagenta’ say, which none of us has seen—and it is indescribable—but which occurs in such and such a story. Given that the storyteller is talking about nothing, one can’t say under what circumstances something would have been colored plagenta. All these things are mere pretenses. [Kri13, p. 53] (emphasis added)

Here one can see that Kripke thinks the creators of fiction are really talking about nothing through their pretense, because he explicitly states that “the storyteller is talking about nothing.”26 So, it must really be that there is no proposition expressed by all fictional statements (which involve pretended reference). There are further passages where this view is discussed and clarified by Kripke (another potentially worth mentioning being his discussion of negative existentials in the December 4 lecture), but I will leave it to the skeptical reader to seek these out.

In sum, Kripke holds both the pretense view and the so-called empty-proposition view, while Searle is best understood to hold only the former view. The latter view can be accurately attributed to Kripke, as the view that fictional propositions (as well as otherwise pretense-involving propositions) do not really exist. This view has been at points conflated with the pretense view, and rather often combined with it, perhaps due to Kripke’s deep conviction of a Millian theory of reference. Yet, while the empty-proposition view is related to the pretense view insofar as the pretense view, taken together with a Millian theory of reference, implies it, the pretense view alone does not.

2.3.2 Fiction and Modality

Kripke gives an account of how his theory of naming extends to modal cases. In doing this Kripke claims that modal claims including fictional names are never true. Kripke writes that “if statements containing ‘Sherlock Holmes’ express pretended propositions—or rather, pretend to express propositions—one can’t speak of a pretended proposition as possible” [Kri13, p. 40]. Despite the fact that the above quote is prefaced with “if,” the claim is really unconditional; Kripke explicitly defends the view that fictional propositions express pretended

26There can be some complications with real names used in fiction, which Kripke does say can really refer even in fictional works [p. 27], despite there being some subtleties to be worked out here in order to unify this point with later claims that fictional names/terms can only refer if there is the appropriate historical connection of the referent with the fiction or myth in which they occur [p. 50].
propositions, and thus also the view that they cannot be stated to be possible. Kripke also writes that “one cannot say that [propositions about Sherlock Holmes] would have been true of a certain hypothetical world: for there are no propositions to be true of this hypothetical world,” which again underlines that Kripke believes fictions are not possibilities [Kri13, p. 42]. In both of the above quoted passages Kripke presents his modal claims about fictional entities as consequences of the empty-proposition view, and so not of the pretense view directly. Kripke’s reasons for concluding that fictional entities which do not exist are not even possible really seem to be the same kind of expressive limitations also discussed in [Kri80]. Kripke’s argument proceeds on the grounds that propositions about fictional entities (including the propositions expressing their existence) cannot be true (anywhere) because they are meaningless. From this it follows that these propositions cannot be true at any possible world either, and so, fictional entities cannot be understood to be possible. Yet, as seen in the preceding section, one can hold the pretense view without supporting the empty proposition view. So, since Kripke’s claims about the modal status of fictional entities follow specifically from his support of the empty-proposition view, one can be a pretense theorist without affirming the claim that fictional entities are necessarily impossible. Thus, while these views are related in Kripke’s account of fiction, pretense theorists needn’t hold that modal claims about fictional entities are nonsensical.27

One further thing to note is that Kripke’s argument for his views on modal statements involving fictional entities also follow in part from his general (Millian) views on naming. Kripke’s Millianism inspires him to support the empty-proposition view, but it also goes further to claim, against the descriptivists, that it’s not enough that “someone might have done the deeds ascribed to Holmes in the stories,” because “Sherlock Holmes” is supposed to be the name of a unique person [Kri13, p. 41]. So, not only is there the problem discussed above that there are no propositions expressible about fictional entities which could possibly be true, but there is the additional point that what it would mean for a fictional entity to exist goes beyond that someone could have had/done all of the things attributed to him in the novel. Kripke wants to re-emphasize his claim in [Kri80] that the descriptivist account of names does not do justice to modal intuitions, just that in this case Kripke’s claim is less aligned with popular intuition.

2.3.3 The Pretense View and Rigid Designation

By “rigid designation” I mean the view that names refer to specific individuals across possible worlds, as opposed to definite descriptions, which can pick out different individuals in different possible worlds. In [Kri13], an extension of an argument for this view from [Kri80] is given, both when he argues for Millian theories of reference and when he discusses how such theories fare with counterfactual reasoning. Kripke gives his statement of the pretense view essentially

27In fact, Lewis presupposes the pretense view in [Lew78], but he also relies on modal tools to give his account of metafictional statements.
as a means to argue both against descriptivist views which he attributes to Frege and Russell, and for his own Millian theory of reference (a theory which Kripke's views on rigid designation are a part of), but while the majority of the proponents of rigid designation are also Millians, these views are separable. While the separability of Millianism from rigid designation may seem obvious, Kripke's presentation of the issues at times obscures the dependencies which he believes exist between his different views. In many places, for example his discussion of modality and fiction beginning on p. 40 of [Kri13], Kripke presents his views on rigid designation as the alternative to the descriptivism he attacks, rather than a broader sort of Millian view. By showing how Millianism and rigid designation may be separated, one can then show how the pretense view and rigid designation may be separated.

One thing to observe is that Kripke originally argues for his ideas on rigid designation in [Kri80], and these (mainly intuition based) arguments are not at all based in pretense theory. Then, as the arguments presented there were widely considered convincing, prima facie the proponents of rigid designation are in no need of the pretense view. Yet, in the first lecture of [Kri13], he espouses the pretense view as part of his response to the arguments against Millian theories of reference. The pretense view seems to serve to exclude the problematic examples from fiction from the scope of his philosophy of language, and so, it seems that in a way the pretense view is something which theoretically “makes way” for Kripke's views about reference. Because Kripke’s proposal of rigid designation is so well known to be Millian, and because these views so often are combined, one may wonder if they are separable. The question then is whether this view is needed for his views on rigid designation in particular, or just his Millianism.

An overview of the role of pretense in Kripke’s argument in defense of Mill appears in §2.2. Still, I will present a few points which may be of interest here. Firstly, Kripke’s Millianism underlies his views on rigid designation in that he believes names must pick out the same individual across possible worlds, as opposed to the view that names pick out possibly differing individuals. On the descriptivist account, names are taken to abbreviate a definite description that can only be uniquely satisfied, and so they pick out the individual meeting that description (if there is one) in each possible world. Thus, if the intuition that different people may have done different things in other possible worlds is correct, then descriptivist names do not rigidly designate, and so Kripke’s views on rigid designation are in direct reaction to descriptivism.

Recall Kripke’s defense of Millianism based on the pretense view. Kripke argues that the supposed advantage that the descriptivist view has over the Millian one, namely that it gives a unified account of reference also covering the use of fictional names, is a false advantage; in fact, Kripke argues that such a unified account must be incorrect, because it does not account for fictional naming by way of pretense. To this point he writes:

\[\text{Of course, this also depends on one's views of personal identity; if being the same individual is defined as having the same properties, then this account may not make sense.}\]
By this statement Kripke intends to argue that the descriptivist, Frege-Russell theory is wrong because they give an account of fictional names, not by appealing to pretense, but by giving a descriptivist account of fictional names. Kripke’s position is then that the descriptivists not only lack the advantage they claim, but that their theory is really worse-off because it puts what he believes are false requirements on fictional naming. Rather than requiring that even fictional names abbreviate a unique definite description, Kripke holds that the conditions of reference only need to be pretended to be met. As such, any theory which gives an alternative account of fictional naming must be wrong at least about this aspect. Aside from this criticism, Kripke makes his arguments about whether the treatment of fictional names can adjudicate between theories implicitly assuming that given the pretense view, all theories deal with fictional naming by way of it. So, Kripke on the one hand claims that the pretense view holds with no explicit argument for it, and on the basis of this claim analyses different theories of reference as if they all gave their accounts of fiction by way of the pretense view. On this basis Kripke claims that the descriptivists and the Millians can equally explain fictional naming. Thus, given the pretense view, Millianism is able to explain the problems of negative existentials, and fictional naming in general, but what about rigid designation?

The answer to this question comes by way of a demonstration that rigid designation can be non-Millian. It is possible to maintain a non-Millian source of rigid designation, e.g., by assuming names to abbreviate Russellian descriptions that always take wide scope, possibly using a two-dimensional modal framework. And, if this is indeed viable, then one needn’t defend the pretense view in order to defend rigid designation, unless rigid designation relies on the pretense view by way of some other implication, and such an implication is extremely unlikely, as rigid designation is not at all obviously conceptually related to the pretense view. Thus, defenders of rigid designation need not defend the pretense view.

Yet, the more important relation between these views for the sake of this thesis is whether the pretense view can be held independently of Kripke’s views about rigid designation. It seems that the pretense view can be coherently defended without any appeal to rigid designation. All the pretense view re-

29 There is some tension between the above claim that the Frege-Russell view is worse off and the claim here that all theories of reference are equal with respect to their treatments of fiction, but Kripke seems to make these claims when considering how rival theories actually deal with fiction, on the one hand, and how they ought to deal with fiction given the pretense view, on the other.

30 Note that some accounts of metafictional statements which presuppose the pretense view do depend on possible worlds semantics for their accounts, but only some would draw on ideas about rigid designation, depending on their ontological views concerning possible worlds.
quires, on both Kripke and Searle’s accounts is that when fictional names are used within fictional statements they be understood as pretend names or pretend references. This requirement can be met whether such fictional names are understood on Millian or descriptivist terms, as Kripke himself states: “I generally presuppose as part of [a] work of fiction [...] that the criteria of naming, whatever they are–Millian or Russellian or what have you–are satisfied” [Kri13, p. 23, emphasis added]. Still, one may note that if fictional names are understood to be pretend in the sense of non-referring, that such fictional names vacuously rigidly designate. This, however, does not mean that the pretense view implies rigid designation, because, on the one hand, the above argument only treats rigid designation with respect to fictional names, and not in general, and, on the other hand, the above argument follows from something stronger than the pretense view: the view that pretend names are empty names.

Thus, the pretense view appears as part of Kripke’s arguments in defense of his broader theory of reference, including his views on rigid designation, it serves only to defend Kripke’s Millianism. Thus, there does not seem to be any reason for believing that the pretense view in any way depends on names rigidly designating, nor vice versa. On Kripke’s own account, the pretense view is compatible with any theory of reference, and there seems not to be any logical connection between the claim that fictional statements and names are “pretended” and the claim that all (true) names pick out the same individual across possible worlds. So, while the two positions are seriously entangled in Kripke’s work, one may safely consider them separately.

3 What’s at Stake with the Pretense View

Given the above characterization of the pretense view, and its independence from certain other views, one may wonder what positions do follow from the pretense view, and what views in the philosophy of fiction draw on it. To begin with, the above authors make claims about metafictional statements, and theories dealing with the semantics of such statements must somehow draw upon an account of fictional statements themselves. Searle, Kripke, and other authors, like Lewis, all provide accounts of metafictional statements, with the pretense view as their account of fictional statements, and it will be worthwhile to see the extent to which these views then are related. Moreover, several prominent pretense theorists (Kripke and also van Inwagen in [Inw77]) have posited that there are two types of predication, the normal type and a special type applying to fictional characters. It could be of interest whether the proposal of two types of predication rest on the pretense view in any way. There are more issues besides the two mentioned, but a consideration of these issues will hopefully address how the pretense view could connect to other parts of the philosophy of fiction.

Lewis’s view thus does not draw on rigid designation.

31Recall that these are statements involving fictional entities which are not a part of the content of the fiction itself.
3.1 Metafictional statements

Beginning with metafictional statements, one may first observe that the accounts of Searle and Kripke are rather similar. They both defend something along the lines of the view that, while the fictional statements themselves are pretended, metafictional statements are “real” or serious statements about fictions. Moreover, while they hold that reference is pretended in fictional statements, both authors defend that in the case of metafictional statements, when a fictional name is used it really refers to the fictional character. To make sense of this, both authors defend that such fictional characters are created in the pretended speech acts which constitute the fiction. Kripke is an explicit realist about these characters, and Searle also seems to be a realist, without being as explicit about it. While neither author offers a very detailed account of this proposal, I will attempt to give a more concrete account of how they believe this distinction between fictional and metafictional statements works and relates to pretense.

For Searle in particular, metafictional statements fall into the category of what he calls “serious discourse about fiction” [Sea75, p. 329]. Moreover, statements of this kind really can be considered statements on Searle’s account because they “conform to the constitutive rules of statement making,” which includes their verifiability [Sea75, p. 329]. The statements Searle explicitly discusses are actually only paratextual statements, and his account, while potentially extendable to metatextual statements, seems to be intended as an account of paratextual statements alone. Such statements can be verified against the relevant fiction, and so can be true or false about that fiction. Yet, since many such statements include fictional names, names which Searle believes only pretend refer in the speech acts constituting the creation of the fiction, there arises the challenge of determining the reference of the same names in the metafictional context. In order to do this, Searle claims that authors create fictional characters:

> It is the pretended reference which creates the fictional character and the shared pretense which enables us to talk about the character in [metafictional contexts]. [Sea75, p. 330]

So, the pretend use of fictional names (in which these names do not refer on Searle’s account), on the one hand brings fictional characters into existence, and on the other hand sets the reference of these names to such fictional characters in discourse about fiction.3435

32It is important that these names be referential in order for metafictional statements to be analyzed “seriously.”

33One should note here that there are various theories of “aboutness” such as the ones discussed in [Haw18], and so, one could understand the meaning of this in several ways.

34The following fact remains true: the reference of the names of fictional characters within the fiction is not actually set, but only pretended to be set.

35Note that the ontological commitments this brings depends to some extent on the underlying theory of reference. So, while Searle makes the claim that “one of the conditions of the successful performance of the speech act of reference is that there must exist an object that the speaker is referring to” [Sea75, p. 330], which seems to express something similar to
Searle’s account of paratextual statements is then that they are serious statements about fiction. Since Searle’s account (most likely) doesn’t endorse the empty-proposition view, this kind of approach seems tenable. When a statement about the fiction says something which is actually said in the fiction, then it is true; otherwise, it is false. This is a somewhat naive or rigid account, as discussed in [Lew78], but it does lend paratextual statements the verifiability that Searle claims they have. This is because, if the speech acts by which the fiction was generated express some propositions, then any competent reader or receiver of the fiction will be able to understand the propositions expressed. When someone then makes a serious illocutionary act which expresses something about the fiction, this can be evaluated just as any report, like with a report on a scientific fact, which is widely seen as truth evaluable.

Whether or not this account seems to be the correct one, it’s relation to the pretense view appears minimal if anything. There is not any mention of it in Searle’s account of metafictional statements, and the problem which Searle sets out to solve in [Sea75] pertains to fictional statements themselves. Moreover, while such an account of paratextual statements does seem to rely on the meaningfulness of fictional statements, the independence of the pretense view from the empty-proposition view has already been established. In this way, then, the pretense view and this account of metafictional statements, even though they both serve as parts of Searle’s overall account of fiction, don’t have any logical relation.

Kripke’s account of metafictional statements, like Searle’s, claims that paratextual statements “count as true if they are true report[s] of what is in the story” [Kri13, p. 58]. He further claims that even though in ordinary speech these sentences are not always prefixed with “In the fiction, . . . ,” they are rightly understood to be reports on the contents of the fiction. This is different from the fictional statements themselves, which have no truth value due to their not expressing propositions, and different from metatextual statements, which are discussed below. For paratextual statements, Kripke’s account holds that the only judge for their truth is the fiction itself. Kripke claims that there can be serious inquiries into what is true in a fiction, but he does not give any account of how questions which go beyond a fiction’s explicit content can be analyzed [Kri13, p. 59]. Ultimately, though, Kripke’s account of these statements holds that they are true when they are true reports on the fiction, and false otherwise, just as with Searle.38

36Millianism, on a descriptivist view one may be able to avoid these commitments, as in [Gar23]. I make this characterization of Searle based on the views expressed in [Sea75], and recognize that he is viewed as a descriptivist by Kripke because of his “cluster theory” of proper names.

37In the paragraphs just following it will become apparent that Kripke does not agree with this claim.

38Like his presentation of the pretense view, he gives his account in the context of a couple of potential objections to Millianism. Kripke is attempting to give an account of metafictional statements where statements about fictions which are intuitively true don’t come out as meaningless, and to explain why the suggestion that fictional characters propose a challenge to the Cartesian cogito argument is false. Details about these matters are omitted here; see [Kri13, Lecture III] if interested.

38One may note a potential problem with this kind of account, especially when taken to-
Kripke’s account goes beyond Searle’s in the sense that it deals with metatextual statements as well as the paratextual statements discussed above. “Hamlet was a fictional character.” [Kri13, p. 61] is an example of a metatextual statement which Kripke discusses. This kind of statement needs special treatment with an account of the kind Kripke and Searle give for paratextual statements, because such statements cannot be treated straightforwardly as being about the fiction itself. Kripke considers several ways that had already been proposed in the literature for dealing with these cases, but ultimately decides that the best way to deal with these types of sentences is through a realist ontology of fictional characters. As stated above, Searle claims that authors create characters by way of their pretended linguistic acts, and that this is what allows these names to refer in metafictional statements in general. This kind of realism by way of pretense acts fits neatly into the frameworks Searle and Kripke give, but it is rather mysterious. Rarely are linguistic acts considered to be the cause of existence of any new object, except in the cases of magical spells and religious texts, and the casual nature of this account seems to underplay the issue. A succinct criticism of this issue can be seen here:

In pretend-naming Sherlock (to no object-reaching avail) we actually do name Sherlock the character, something that actually exists. I’ll say no more about this here beyond noting that it rivals in audacity the doctrine of transubstantiation. [Woo18, p. 19]

Whether or not the ontological commitments seem to be correct, or if the process of naming of fictional characters Kripke posits is the right one, this account of paratextual statements is intended to give them a straightforward treatment. So, for Kripke they are supposed to have truth conditions which are easily verifiable against the fiction, which itself forms part of reality. Then, as with Searle, these sentences are supposed to be serious and non-pretend.

Kripke’s overall account of metafictional statements holds that such statements are meaningful and truth conditional; paratextual statements should be considered true when they are accurate reports on the fiction and metatextual statements can be evaluated as any other statement, since the fictional names used refer to fictional characters, which Kripke takes to exist. The way in which paratextual statements are supposed to be evaluated is left totally unspecified by Kripke, but it is developed by Predelli. In any case, as a clear Millian, Kripke’s account of metafictional statements relies on his realism in order to make sure that such statements do not include empty reference. Still, as with Searle, there does not seem to be any clear logical connection between the pretense view and this account of metafictional statements, and, as argued below, the fictional names which figure in fictional vs. metafictional statements seem to be unrelated.

gather with the empty proposition view, which is that there is not a good way of understanding how to check when something is a true report on the fiction when the fiction consists only in a string of mostly empty propositions. This type of criticism is developed further in §5.2.

39The use of past tense here is strange, especially given the ontology Kripke introduces.
In sum, both Searle’s and Kripke’s accounts of metafictional statements are seemingly unrelated to their support of the pretense view, but there still may be some kind of connection. For Kripke in particular his motivation for maintaining the pretense view is based in a sort of metafictional statements, namely, negative existentials. The pretense view directly concerns fictional statements alone, but the kind of metafictional accounts which are possible does depend in part on one’s account of fictional statements.\(^{40}\) In Kripke’s case, then, his adherence to the pretense view is what allows him to claim that from the perspective of the real world, in many cases the use of fictional names really is empty.\(^ {41}\) Yet, in order to make his account of why metafictional statements are non-problematic, Kripke relies also on his ontology to say that in some cases there is real reference with fictional names. Searle’s case begins more directly focused on the fictional case, but Searle also wants to show how his pretense view can connect to the larger body of linguistic data concerning fiction. It is for this reason, I believe, that he extends his account as he does. Yet, this kind of metafictional view is rather minimal.

The sense in which these metafictional accounts are minimal is in that they both simply hold that statements about a fiction are true if they are true reports of it. A potential problem with this kind of minimal account is that some statements about fictions have to do with “parts” of the fiction which aren’t explicitly said/written/represented; for example, one may reasonably conclude that a character sleeps, even if it is never explicitly part of the fiction. Dealing with problems like this as straightforward reports on the fiction which should be checked against it, leads to unintuitive results. Lewis writes: “I claim it is true, though not explicit, in the stories that Holmes does not have a third nostril […]” [Lew78, p. 41] but accounts which evaluate metafictional statements as straightforward reports may end up yielding the wrong results in cases like this. To deal with such problems are several accounts in the literature on fiction, and one prominent account is that of David Lewis himself [Lew78]. Moreover, Lewis’s account assumes the pretense view in the background, which may show some interesting ways in which the pretense view affects metafictional accounts.

It is first worth establishing that Lewis really can be considered to endorse the pretense view, and his statement of it is rather explicit:

\[\text{Storytelling is pretense.}\]

The storyteller purports to be telling the truth about the matters whereof he has knowledge. He purports to be talking about characters who are known to him, and whom he

\(^{40}\)For example, it is the view of [Abe20] that fiction generating sentences are declarations which bring a certain set of facts about; then, her account of metafictional statements can be considered in a unified manner where both paratextual statements and metatextual statements are, as with any sentence, true if the proposition they express is the case.

\(^{41}\)It is not discussed in detail here, but Kripke’s final treatment of negative existentials rests on the reinterpretation of “\(P\) is false” for some proposition \(P\), as “There is no true proposition that \(P\)” which allows him to claim statements like “Sherlock Holmes exists” are false in this extended sense, since there is no such proposition that “Sherlock Holmes exists.” At the same time, if one means to name the fictional character by such an existential statement, then it is true, but this is not what people usually mean.

\(^{42}\)This is the British spelling, which I do not adopt.
refers to, typically, by means of their ordinary proper names. But if
his story is fiction, he is not really doing these things. Usually his
pretense has not the slightest tendency to deceive anyone, nor has
he the slightest intent to deceive. Nevertheless he plays a false part,
goes through a form of telling known fact when he is not doing so.
[Lew78, p. 40]

Lewis then clearly supports the pretense view, and his formulation is rather
similar to the way that Searle and Kripke put it. That the storyteller “purports
to be telling the truth about matters whereof he has knowledge” is very similar to
Searle’s statement of the anomaly of seeming-assertions which are not assertions,
and “that he purports to be talking about characters who are known to him, and
whom he refers to,” is very similar to Kripke’s statement of pretend-reference.
Along with Searle, Lewis even affirms that the pretense is not deceptive. Thus,
Lewis clearly affirms the pretense view.

Lewis’s treatment of metafictional statements differs however, from Kripke
and Searle, in that he gives a modal account of paratextual statements, and no
account of metatextual statements. Already by the fact that Lewis’s account is
modal, one can conclude that Lewis’s account must differ from Kripke’s, which
denies that fictional characters are even possibilia, and moreover, the grounds
for omitting an account of metatextual statements are Lewis’s rejection of what
he calls Meinongianism, by which he means realism about fictional characters.43
What these views share, then, is their reliance on the pretense view.

Then, one may wonder in what way Lewis’s account makes use of the pre-
tense view. Lewis’s view has as a general basis the idea of analyzing paratextual
statements by way of a counterfactual modal semantics, where a statement of
the form “In fiction $f$, $\phi$,” is true when the closest worlds are worlds where it
is told as known fact. Ultimately, he ends up between two analyses, one which
takes into account the communal/social knowledge of the author/community of
receipt, and one which does not, but the aspect of the theory which is pretense
reliant is that of the fiction being told as known fact. Lewis writes: “Suppose
a fiction employs such names as ‘Sherlock Holmes,’ at those worlds where the
same story is told as known fact rather than fiction, those names really are what
they here purport to be: ordinary proper names of existing characters known
to the storyteller” [Lew78, p. 40]. Then, this account relies upon the pretense
view in order to create the correct parallel and correspondence between the
storytelling act in the actual world, which involves pretense, and the storytelling
act in the possible worlds where it is told as known fact and not as pretense.
It would not make sense to speak about the fiction being told as known fact
in other possible worlds if the format of the fiction were not (i) in the form
of statements of facts, and (ii) involving pretend reference to possible objects
(except in rare cases where fictions only include real reference). This is because

43 “I hasten to conclude that some truths about Holmes are not abbreviations of prefixed
sentences, and are also not true just because “Holmes” is denotationless. [...] I shall have
nothing to say here about the proper treatment of these sentences. If the Meinongian can
handle them with no special dodges, that is an advantage of his approach over mine.” [Lew78,
p. 38]
telling the content of the fiction as known fact can only happen if the fiction is something capable of being told as fact; a collection of commands, for example, could not easily be told as fact. Also, if the objects pretend referred to are not possible, then the possible worlds framework cannot deal with them.

Yet, even though this exact account takes the pretense view in the background, similar modal accounts can be given with a different account of fictional statements. To this point, it has been argued by [Gar22] (see §3) that an alternative account of fictional statements would lend a better and less ad hoc theory of paratextual statements. Without getting into the details here, it is worth noting that influential theories like Lewis’s have been built on the core ideas of the pretense view, and that the pretense view does not constrain one’s account of metafictional statements to a very large degree.

3.2 Two types of Predication

Kripke, van Inwagen, and García-Carpintero all discuss (sometimes using different terminology) two types of predication in their accounts of metafictional statements. The two types of predication they each posit are intended to differentiate the cases where something is predicated of a fictional character qua fictional character, and the cases where something is predicated of a fictional character as they are pretended to be—which usually takes place in the telling of fiction and in paratextual statements. The need for this distinction seems to stem from the need to account for the question of how to deal with the apparent mismatch between what is said of fictional characters in the stories and their status as abstract entities. García-Carpintero writes on this issue that “such entities are not easily taken to be the sort of thing capable of living in the world; for that requires, say, breathing, something that abstract objects [...] are incapable of” [Gar22, p. 7]. To deal with this kind of issue, theorists posit that there is really some kind of special-fictional predication taking place, whereas in the metatextual case it is the standard sort of predication. This type of view can come both with and without realism about fictional characters, depending on the underlying theory of reference—Millians do need to be realists on this account.

Then, one can ask the question of whether Millian pretense theorists need to posit two forms of predication, because ultimately, it seems more to be theoretical baggage than to be an advantage of one’s theory. Let us begin by seeing how the view about two types of predication arises in Kripke’s work. For Kripke the two types of predication are essentially differentiated based on the kind of object to which a predicate is applied, or rather by the context or “level” in which it is used. For example, Kripke writes that “in addition to there being people who live on Baker Street, there are also fictional people who live on Baker Street,” but that “living on Baker Street” is being used here in two senses: “In the one case one is applying the predicate straight; in the other case one is applying it according to a rule in which it would be true if the people are so described in the story” [Kri13, p. 75]. So, while Kripke never explains in detail how such a
rule which marks true reports as true is supposed to function,\textsuperscript{44} it determines the use of predicates to attribute “fictional” qualities to fictional characters, i.e. the qualities that the fictional character can be truly thought to have \textit{in the story}. On the other hand, one can use regular predication in the cases where one wants to make statements about the qualities fictional characters have in reality, i.e. in metatextual statements. Since Kripke is a Millian, he must then rely on his realist ontology.

However, there does seem to be an alternative available to the Millian pretense theorist, which is presented in [Sal11]. Salmon’s position will be discussed in much more detail in §5.2 below, but what is relevant here is his argument against the idea that there is any kind of genuine use of fictional names referring to anything other than the abstract object of the corresponding fictional character. This means that even in the pretended fictional statements, authors are using the fictional names in reference to fictional characters. Salmon then deals with the apparent mismatch between fictional characters’ status as abstract entities and the qualities which they are described as having by claiming that these statements are only pretended to be true in fictional contexts. Then, for Salmon there is no pretend reference involved in fiction generation, only the pretense that what is predicated of fictional characters is true of them (as what is said of them is largely \textit{not} true of abstract entities). The idea is then that, rather than try to account for how things are predicated of the wrong kind of thing, Salmon claims we just pretend that these qualities were predicated of the right kind of thing. In this way, Salmon seems to avoid the need for any second sense of predication. Of course, this proposal differs from that of Kripke, but it does indicate that pretense theorists, and even Millian pretense theorists, may be able to do without positing two types of predication.\textsuperscript{45}

4 What is \textit{the} Pretense View?

A question which arises after seeing the role of the pretense view in philosophy of fiction is that of giving a coherent and general characterization of the pretense view, one that delineates what essentially constitutes the view. After all, without such a concept we cannot speak of \textit{the} pretense view at all. The most central tenet of the pretense view is the idea that fictional representation takes part by way of pretense, whether that be pretended reference or pretended illocutionary acts. While this claim may align well with intuitions on the matter, on its own it is so vague that very little can really be extracted from it. Kripke and Searle both attempt to make this claim more concrete in different ways, and one may wonder, (i) what unifies these two accounts, and (ii) whether this view can properly be said to be a theory.

\textsuperscript{44}Note that this is not trivial either, since Kripke holds that most if not all sentences in a fictional story are meaningless.

\textsuperscript{45}I refrain from commenting on the views of van Inwagen and García-Carpintero here. Van Inwagen is motivated by slightly different goals, and while his account is interesting it lacks much relevance to the goals of this thesis. García-Carpintero mostly discusses the view in connection with other theorists.
To begin, recall that Searle outlines four points about his pretense view, which he calls “conclusions.” These conclusions are, it seems, meant to give detail to Searle’s account, and could lend the basis for some kind of pretense theory. They are as follows:

1. “the author of a work of fiction pretends to perform a series of illocutionary acts, normally of the representative type” [p. 325]

2. “the identifying criterion for whether or not a text is a work of fiction must of necessity lie in the illocutionary intentions of the author” [p. 325]

3. “the pretended illocutions which constitute a work of fiction are made possible by the existence of a set of conventions which suspend the normal operation of the rules relating illocutionary acts and the world” [p. 326]

4. “the pretended performances of illocutionary acts which constitute the writing of a work of fiction consist in actually performing utterance acts with the intention of invoking the horizontal conventions that suspend the normal illocutionary commitments of the utterances” [p. 327]

Thus, one can identify what Searle sees as the central aspects of his account of fiction as pretense. Moreover, the fourth conclusion can be seen as the closest thing to an espousal of Searle’s “theory”. Authors, then, do not perform illocutionary acts, but rather pretend to do so, and what makes this possible are some “horizontal” conventions which the author must intend to invoke in order to block her usual, “vertical” commitments. There are still some areas where more detail could be provided, like in how to understand the role of authorial intention, but it might seem as though these are the building blocks of a theory. This question seems to come down to one main aspect of Searle’s account, and this is having a precise understanding of what pretense actually is.

Kripke’s statement of the pretense view does not include any kind of explicit delineation of the central claims of this view, as Searle’s does. Rather, as discussed in §2.2, Kripke only really makes explicit that according to his view the conditions of reference are not met at the level of reality, but only at the level of the pretense, when fictional names are used; he writes:

Far from it being the case that a theory of the reference of names ought to make special provision for the possibility of such works of fiction, it can forget about this case, and then simply remark that, in a work of fiction, it is part of the pretense of that work of fiction that these criteria are satisfied. [Kri13, p. 23-4]

Here, as with Searle, we see that pretense is used to explain how the irregularities of fictional discourse (here fictional naming) fit into the broader understanding of language. Yet, the question of what pretense really is also remains.

So, it is worth exploring how one can answer the question of: what is pretense? While these two accounts draw some of their intuitive power from their use of this concept, making it clear is not straightforward. Moreover, while
Searle does make the points that for him pretense is non-deceptive, intentional on the part of the author, and carried out by way of the real/actual performance of a less complex act than the act which is pretended, this already draws on some kind of basic concept of pretense. The issue then is whether one can give a clear account of this more basic thing.

One thing which is important to note is that in the statement of the pretense view, as well as in natural language, one often hears of there being “a pretense.” So, you might hear something like “Joe is a princess according to the pretense,” by which one is meant to understand that the content of the pretense, whatever it is, includes the fact that Joe is a princess. This is an explicit feature of Kripke’s account, and likely an implicit feature of Searle’s, and it is important because it is really the core of the explanation of how fiction can be pretense. So, what is this pretense? A first attempt at answering this question might be to say that it is a body of information which is entertained, despite its relation to reality, as a part of the act of pretending. There are several ways of putting this, but there are some problems which need to be avoided when giving such an account, which this first attempt may not avoid. One such problem is whether there is actually any clear distinction between the concept of pretense and that of fiction; if these things are not really separable, then to say fiction is pretense is trivially true, but may also be entirely uninformative. Since the authors who are proponents of the pretense view are predominantly concerned with explaining certain linguistic data, they neither provide a detailed account of what the cognitive aspect of fiction generation and reception entails, nor do they deal with the difficult metafictional problems of how to determine the content of the fiction beyond the explicitly stated content (as in [Lew78] for example). Yet, if the answer to these kinds of questions is the same as the answer to the question of what it is to pretend, then to say fiction is pretense is not informative. Another risk, if the answer to the question of what pretense is is along the lines of saying that pretending is representing a fictional scenario, is that the pretense view’s claim that fiction is pretense is circular as an explanation of what fiction is.

Additionally, when considering one’s account of pretense, both the act of pretense and “the pretense” (as discussed above) should form a part of that account. Doing this is not trivial either, and explaining the act of pretending as putting forth information regardless of its truth, which is to be entertained by those aware of the pretense, also presents problems. Then, the distinction begins to fade between this account of pretense and the posing of the situations including the apparent linguistic anomalies which motivate Searle’s and Kripke’s accounts of fiction. Searle, for example, begins with the fact that the seeming-assertions of authors cannot be assertions because the authors are not accountable for the truth of their statements or for believing them, and so, the account of pretense which says that to pretend is to seem to do something which you don’t really do, becomes a mere description of the anomaly, not an answer to it. Thus, an account of the act of pretended apparently needs to be more nuanced than the primitive suggestion here, perhaps by construing the act of pretending as a type of representation—something I discuss just below.

One, serious attempt to make clear this concept is Currie’s discussion of
“make-believe.” Here, Currie is appealing to the terminology and to some extent to the theory of Kendall Walton, but his ideas about make-believe may also serve to clarify the concept of pretense, since these concepts seem rather related in our ordinary use of language. Make-believe, as Currie uses the term, should be taken to be “an attitude we take to propositions,” like belief and desire [Cur90, p. 20]. So, for Currie, make-believe should be taken to be another type of propositional attitude. This idea is discussed in more detail below in §6, and it is at least a start toward a clarification of pretense.

Another conception of pretense which could prove useful is one hinted at above: that pretense is a sort of representation of some act or scenario which the audience of that act is supposed to entertain. While this does have some risk of circularity as an explanation, it seems to be the closest notion to what Searle and Kripke write about. Authors supposedly pretend to refer and pretend to assert, by which we are to understand that these authors go through some gesture of these speech acts without actually performing them. Then, understanding pretense as a kind of potentially gestural representation may at least give an approximation of what these authors intended by their appeals to pretense.

Ultimately, this quick discussion is meant to show that the concept of pretense requires some development, and it is of central importance to the pretense view if it is to ever be taken seriously as a theory of the process which goes on in fiction generation. Yet, several authors ignore this question altogether, and those which do address it still presuppose a good amount. For this reason the pretense view is more properly considered as a “view”; it relies heavily on intuitions which need development, and the task of defining pretense in a suitable way to make sense of the linguistic data on which the authors focus is not trivial.

Still, it could be that one can make sense of the notion of pretense in a way which allows for the essence of the pretense view as Searle and Kripke present it to remain intact. Then, what would be the features which both accounts share and which unify the view as one pretense view? One feature both accounts share is the idea that on the level of the pretense the associated linguistic acts are successful. So, for Searle, it seems, an author’s pretended performance of an assertion, despite not really being an assertion, is an assertion in the pretense [Sea75, p. 330]. In other words, from the “external perspective” of wondering the force of an author’s writing some sentence of a novel one will find that such an act, while a real utterance act, is not an illocutionary act, but from the “internal” perspective of the pretense it is an assertion and the conditions of an assertion are pretended to be met. Similarly, and more explicitly, Kripke claims that the reference involved in fiction is not real reference in that on the level of reality the conditions of reference are not met, but on the level of the pretense these same conditions are met. In this way, pretense views induce a sort of “perspective shift” making it possible to both maintain that the conditions of real assertion/reference need not be met in the fictional case, but that the fictional act does not constitute a violation of these conditions. Rather,

46Admittedly, this idea is much more explicit in Searle than in Kripke.
the conditions are pretended to be met, or are met at the level of pretend. Additionally, the pretense view concerns the linguistic or representational acts which constitute the creation or telling\textsuperscript{47} of a fiction, and not the statements made about fictions or fictional entities. Thus, finally, the pretense view in general aims to explain apparent linguistic anomalies due to fiction, by claiming that the linguistic acts by which fictions are created are pretense or involve pretense.

5 Is the Pretense View Tenable (as is)?

After the above discussion of the pretense view, its relation to other views, and its implications for the broader philosophy of fiction, it is now worth considering what arguments the authors who put forth the view have presented in defense of the view, and it is also worth considering what counterarguments and criticisms of the view exist already in the literature. In [Sea75], Searle makes one argument against a competing view, which is meant to at least make his view seem more plausible, as well as the argument that the pretense view explains certain puzzles, without departing in any significant way from his broader framework.\textsuperscript{48} Kripke doesn’t appear to make explicit arguments for his position, but rather defends it by way of showing how it supports his larger framework; since Kripke’s ideas about reference were already widely appreciated, and still are, this can be considered as an argument for the position. The main counterarguments to this position which are considered below are: (i) an argument against the Gricean intention based approach to Searle’s “horizontal” conventions, (ii) an argument to the effect that Kripke’s pretense view is incompatible with a suitable account of metafictional statements, an argument which can be found in [Sal11], and (iii) an argument against the disconnect in Searle and Kripke’s pretense views between the (non-referential) uses of fictional names in fictional statements and the referential uses of fictional names to refer to fictional characters/entities in metafictional statements, an argument also voiced by Salmon. Additional points against the pretense view (at least in conjunction with a Lewisian account of metafictional statements) made in [Gar23] are also considered. Finally, I also argue that Searle and Kripke’s formulations of the view are not sufficiently easily extendable to non-linguistic forms of fictional representation, a point that has been made before, but never specifically as an argument against the views of Searle and Kripke.

5.1 Existing Support for the Pretense View

This section covers arguments which are provided in support of the pretense view, in particular those provided by Searle and Kripke themselves. Additionally, I will not argue this point, but the fact that this view has had somewhat

\textsuperscript{47}At least it seems like it should extend to these cases, since they have the same linguistic form.

\textsuperscript{48}Currie describes (his interpretation of) these arguments in [Cur90, p. 14].
widespread acceptance in the philosophy of fiction could be considered as a factor in support of the view, despite not being an explicit argument for the view. This kind of popular support could be what Kripke intends to call on when he states the view.

5.1.1 Searle’s Arguments

As is discussed above, Searle first makes a brief argument against the fiction-making view; proponents of this view are broadly drawing on the speech act based approach which Searle advocates, but Searle rejects this view anyway in [Sea75]. He does this based on the claim that the fiction-making view requires words to have different meanings in fictional and serious contexts. This argument can be considered as support for his own view, as the broader theory of speech acts is somewhat widely supported, and speech act theorists must choose among rather few alternative accounts of fictional statements. Another argument Searle makes in favor of his account is to the effect that his theory is able to explain certain linguistic anomalies arising in fictional settings for proponents of speech act based linguistic theories.

The first argument Searle makes is that the fiction-making view violates a kind of “Determination Principle” (this terminology is, I believe, from Predelli). Searle states that “the illocutionary act (or acts) performed in the utterance of the sentence is a function of the meaning of the sentence,” [Sea75, p. 324] which is his first formulation of the determination principle. He uses this principle to conclude that if the sentences of fiction “were used to perform some completely different speech acts from those determined by their literal meaning, they would have to have some other meaning,” or in other words, that any account which claims that the literal utterance of one and the same sentence can acquire more than one illocutionary force must posit that the words have distinct meanings in their utterances for distinct acts. Given that the fiction-making view does claim that fictional statements are used to perform distinct speech acts from those determined by their literal meaning, Searle argues that readers of fiction would have to “[learn] a new set of meanings for all the words and other elements contained in a work of fiction,” if the fiction-making view were correct [Sea75, p. 324]. One point of contention with this argument is the strength of the determination principle, which is debated by Currie and Predelli.

On Currie’s account, the determination principle is as strong as it seems in the above quote; Currie characterizes Searle’s position (on the determination principle) as claiming that: “(token) sentences with the same meaning must be used to perform the same illocutionary acts” [Cur90, p. 14]. One can also see from Currie’s rejection of the determination principle, and his arguments against it, that he really understands the determination principle to claim that the same sentence with the same meaning must have the same illocutionary force on all occasions [Cur90, pp. 14-5]. Firstly, it is apparent that Currie disregards contextual factors (like the ifids—“illocutionary force indicating devices”)

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49Recall that this refers to positions which posit a new fictionalizing speech act.
discussed by Predelli below, and by Searle in other work) as a determining factor of force. Currie argues that “the same sentence can be used to perform distinct illocutionary acts” by way of an example sentence which can be either an assertion or a request, [Cur90, p. 15, emphasis in the original] and this is something which Searle’s account actually agrees upon because it draws upon such contextual factors to explain this linguistic phenomenon. Because Currie ignores this fact, he interprets the principle to mean that the same sentence will determine a single illocutionary force in all contexts. Moreover, Currie’s second point against the determination principle is the claim that Searle’s own account of fiction would be defeated by such a principle because in the fictional case the same sentence which should be an assertion comes out as something else (in other words, it definitely is not an assertion) [Cur90, p. 15]. From this, Currie concludes that the principle must be wrong, and that the meaning of a sentence cannot determine the force after all. Then, by looking at the points Currie makes use of in order to come to this conclusion, one can see that Currie understands the principle such that a given sentence cannot fail to have the force determined by it’s meaning, i.e. the meaning of a sentence necessarily entails that it have a certain force. So, it is safe to say that Currie’s statement of the Searle’s determination principle is rather strong.

On the other hand, Predelli claims that this stronger version of the principle is “blatantly false, for reasons amply discussed by Searle himself in his previous work on speech acts” [Pre19, p. 312, emphasis in the original]. Instead of Currie’s strong version, then, Predelli puts forward the weaker formulation of the determination principle claiming that “uses of expressions of the form f(s) are candidates for the successful performance of exactly one type of speech act F(C), where F is the illocutionary force conventionally related to f” [Pre19, p. 312, emphasis in the original]. The formal notation here only serves to denote, by f(s) an “illocutionary force indicating device”(ifid) (f) together with a “content-bearing construct”(s), and by F(C) a “speech act with semantic content C and force F” [Pre19, p. 311, p. 312]. So, rather than the force being a necessary product of the utterance of a certain sentence in a certain context, on Predelli’s weaker formulation of the principle, the sentence and context together make it such that only one possible illocutionary force could apply. It is worth noting that this principle is then weaker in two ways; on the one hand it only holds that utterance meaning constrains the possible illocutionary forces to one, rather than that every utterance necessarily takes on a particular force, and on the other hand it holds that there is more to the determination of force than just the sentence itself—the context also comes into play.

Ultimately, Predelli’s principle is much more likely to be what Searle had in mind with his statement of the so-called “determination principle.” This is

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50 One could also think that Currie understands the seeming-fictional-assertions to have a concrete force of something like “pretend-assertion,” and so to say that this example shows that meaning doesn’t even determine a unique possible force. However, what he writes indicates that he does understand the principle to hold that force is necessarily determined; e.g. “[the principle] is wrong; for here we have a case of two literal utterances of one and the same sentence one resulting in an assertion, the other not” [Cur90, p. 15, emphasis added].
because, for one thing, the stronger claim rather obviously defeats Searle’s own account of fiction. Moreover, as Currie and Predelli both acknowledge, and as is in line with Searle’s broader theory, the context in which a sentence is uttered also plays a role in determining force; the speaker must adhere to certain rules, etc., in order for an illocutionary act to actually be performed, and the context can lead to its failure to be performed in various ways. Addressing the first point, if the principle is taken to represent a necessary connection between the meaning of a sentence and the force of the illocutionary act resulting from its utterance, then there is no room for context at all, and this goes contrary to Searle’s general theory of speech acts. Certain rules must be met and possibly other factors in place for an illocutionary act to be successful, and if force were a simple function of meaning then this would not be possible.

Yet, it may seem that the problem here is really Currie’s decision not to consider context as a factor in this relation. This is a problem for the above reason, and it may still be that one should consider Searle’s principle to reflect a necessary connection between meaning and context, and force. Here it is important to understand what the context is taken to encompass, but let us first consider the context to be those factors which, along with the sentence’s meaning, differentiate between the non-controversial illocutionary forces (as in the example given by Currie). It is this kind of thing which Predelli seems to have in mind when he states his version of the principle. Then, the meaning and the context still do not necessarily determine the force of an utterance of the sentence in that context; rather, the meaning and the context uniquely determine a single force, which the speech act could have. This does not defeat Searle’s own theory because, while the force can only be one possible force, it must not be the case that the speech act actually has any force at all. Then, the speech act does not result in an illocutionary act, but it does not violate the determination principle.

However, making a distinction between context which differentiates between the standard illocutionary forces and the context which determines whether an illocutionary act is successful may be difficult to do. Since the presence of a certain rule or intention may be what differentiates between an assertion and a request, but the violation or conformity to these rules or intentions is what determines the success of the illocutionary act, it seems there might not be a straightforward way to divide the context of a speech act along these lines. If this cannot be done, and one must rely on an understanding of context which is more encompassing, then one could, it seems, view the connection between meaning and context, and force to be a necessary one. If the context is understood to include all of the above factors plus all relevant contextual factors, then these factors are also enough to determine whether the possible force of the utterance actually applies or not; on this broader understanding of context, then, the force or absence thereof is completely determined by the meaning of the sentence and the context. This, kind of stronger principle is not what either author seems to have in mind, but it would also seem to be compatible with Searle’s intentions when he presents the principle. In either case, it is clear that something weaker than Currie’s principle must be what Searle intends to put forward.
Still, both authors agree that Searle’s original argument based on the determination principle—that this would entail that speakers learn all new meanings for the words of a language in order to understand fictions—is grossly overstated. For Currie, the determination principle itself must be rejected. As discussed above, he understands this principle to be stronger than Searle likely intended, and on these grounds concludes that since Searle himself cannot accept such a principle, then it cannot be used in an argument against his own position either [Cur90, p. 16]. Even Predelli, who is himself defending a position very similar to Searle’s, claims that Searle’s argument from the determination principle is overstated. In response to Searle’s “Ambiguity Outcome,” or the claim that readers of fiction would have to “[learn] a new set of meanings for all the words and other elements contained in the work of fiction” [Sea75, p. 324], Predelli writes:

But would that be that bad? Surely, Searle overstates his case when he speaks of a new set of meanings for ‘all the words,’ since nothing in his argument intimates that, say, ‘run’ or ‘mile’ would have to take on a new meaning […] Searle’s Ambiguity Outcome seems to be of a relatively limited import: [illocutionary force indicating devices] such as the indicative mood would ambiguously bear on the responsibility for assertive or fictional illocutionary results […] [this] hardly appears to be a disastrous result. [Pre19, p. 314]

Predelli goes on to make another argument against views like Currie’s based on a different sort of ambiguity outcome, but the point here is that Searle is overstating the outcome of his argument against these views. Rather than needing to learn all new meanings “for all words and other elements” in a fiction, consumers of fiction would really only need to learn a new set of meanings for illocutionary force indicating devices like those Predelli mentioned, and this is an outcome many would be willing to accept. So, this particular argument of Searle doesn’t really serve to show the superiority of Searle’s theory over those theories proposing a new fictionalizing speech act. And, given that this argument based on the determination principle is actually rather weak, Searle’s account of fiction seems far from excluding that the fiction-making view is the case.

Still, based on this conviction that such a fictionalizing force does not exist, Searle makes the claim that fictional speech is parasitic on serious speech. This is consistent with his wider account in the sense that in it he claims that to pretend to assert requires that the speaker knows what an assertion is, and then performs some simplified version of it. However, nothing about his wider speech act theory or in the arguments presented in [Sea75] indicates that this should have to be the case. Yet, an argument of Predelli may save Searle from the conclusion that fictionalizing could be more-or-as basic as serious speech acts (i.e. not parasitic on serious speech acts), and defend his claim that serious language use is more basic than fictional language use.51 The idea that fiction is parasitic

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51 This argument, which he calls the Uniformity Argument, will be discussed below in §5.1.2.
on serious speech can be supported by the claim that within the pretense of fiction serious speech acts are represented; in other words, fictional discourse does not take place by way of the performance of serious speech acts, but it represents them as part of the pretense. Thus, it seems plausible that they must be known to the author of fictions before the fiction can be produced. This would then indicate that there should not be a way of defining the pretend versions of serious illocutionary forces without reference to their serious counterparts. Additionally, this kind of account draws on many different pretend illocutionary forces, not just a single fictionalizing force, and it is less clear how accounts making use of only one additional force deal with the intuition that fiction contains (in some sense) serious discourse.

The second argument Searle makes is, as Currie puts it, “to the effect that [his] theory has important explanatory power” [Cur90, p. 14]. Searle claims in the third section of [Sea75] that his account of fiction “should help us solve some of the traditional puzzles about the ontology of a work of fiction,” but it is also clear that Searle believes his theory is able to also solve the linguistic anomalies he begins with [p. 329]. For a statement of the kind of puzzle which motivates Searle, recall the following passage:

If, as I have claimed, the meaning of the sentence uttered by Miss Murdoch [an author] is determined by the linguistic rules that attach to the elements of the sentence, and if those rules determine the literal utterance of the sentence is an assertion, and if, as I have been insisting, she is making a literal utterance of the sentence, then surely it must be an assertion; but it can’t be an assertion since it does not comply with those rules that are specific to and constitutive of assertions. [Sea75, p. 323]

From this, it is clear that Searle wants to be able to provide an account of how the fictional case differs from the serious case, when so many aspects remain constant between the two cases. Searle believes the pretense view can do this because it posits an additional factor which are the “horizontal conventions” which block the usual rules of the illocutionary act in serious contexts. So, as long as Searle, or pretense theorists more generally, were able to provide a suitable account of pretense (such that the concept of pretense goes beyond a mere description of this puzzle), it seems his theory is able to deal with this problem. The question of whether such an account of pretense is available is not settled, and a further consideration is the hashing out of how the horizontal conventions are supposed to work. Ultimately, as could be expected, the strength of this argument depends on the strength of the pretense view itself. So, it can only lend support for the view if the view is coherent and tenable on its own.

The further claim is that Searle’s pretense view can aid in solving certain ontological puzzles related to fiction. From Searle’s writing it becomes clear that what he means by this is that his pretense view allows him to put forward his ideas about fictional ontology and metafictional statements. It seems that what Searle has in mind when he speaks of solving these puzzles, is his account of the generation of fictional characters by way of pretense. Searle says “[i]t is
the pretended reference [of an author] which creates the fictional character and the shared pretense which enables us to talk about the character,” and, together with his views on metafictional statements, he seems to believe that this makes sense of certain intuitions about fiction. This particular account is criticized in §3.1 above for its mysterious nature, but more important here is that this account is something on top of the pretense view itself. The claim made is that the pretense view “helps us solve” [Sea75, p. 329] some ontological puzzles, but this “helps” must be rather weak. While the pretense view is obviously compatible with the idea that fictional characters are created through authorial pretense, and the later view does certainly rely on some kind of pretense view, it is not in any way the view itself which does the work here. Thus, if one is inclined to think that fictional characters and worlds really are created by way of authorial pretense, then it’s true that one needs some kind of pretense view. However, if one finds other fictional ontologies more appealing, or otherwise disagrees with Searle’s extension of the pretense view, then this certainly does not stand as an argument in favor of it. Thus, we have again come to an argument which relies upon readers finding its conclusion intuitive in order for the argument to be convincing. This means that ultimately, regardless of the strength of the view Searle formulates in [Sea75], the arguments he presents in favor of his own view fail to be especially convincing beyond their intuitive appeal.

5.1.2 Predelli’s Uniformity Argument

Another argument which is presented in favor of Searle’s pretense view is the “uniformity argument” by Predelli. Predelli begins the argument by considering the somewhat anomalous (serious) discourse fragment:

John can run the mile. Yet, can John run the mile? [Pre19, p. 315]

He claims that even though this combination of what seems to be an assertion with what seems to be a question of whether what was asserted is the case is anomalous, it may be interpretable by way of some backtracking and reinterpretation [Pre19, p. 315]. So, while on the first reading such a combination of utterances is nonsensical, one can reinterpret the first seeming-assertion as “echoic or ironical” in order to make sense of the discourse fragment [Pre19, p. 315]. Predelli emphasizes here that “the urge for reinterpretation is motivated by the relationships between the prima facie speech acts at issue in that fragment” [Pre19, p. 315]. What this means is that the apparent tension here stems from speakers’ understanding of how different illocutionary forces relate to each other and go together in normal speech. So, Predelli claims that such a discourse fragment is interpretable despite the prima facie illocutionary forces, but that there is a recognizable tension between them which is what motivates the need for reinterpretation.

Predelli then goes on to claim that just the same kind of situation can be reproduced in fiction: “occurrences of those sentences in a fictional narrative initially engender a sense of illocutionary tension parallel to that ensu-
ing in everyday conversation” [Pre19, p. 315]. So, if there would be such a reinterpretation-causing tension between the serious utterance of two sentences, the fictional counterparts of these same sentences would create the same tension in a fictional context. From this Predelli wants to establish that the relations between serious illocutionary acts must be somehow reflected in their fictional counterparts, whatever they are. He argues that there is a kind of structural parallel between serious and fictional discourse which a theory of fiction should be able to explain and account for.

Predelli then goes on to claim that the fiction-making view does not have the resources to explain the parallelism between serious illocutionary acts and fictional ones. The basic idea here is that if the fiction-making force is really separate from that of an assertion, and the fiction-asking force from that of a question, etc., then there is no clear way to explain why the fiction-making act and the fiction-asking act should relate in a parallel way to asserting and questioning. This does rely on a certain interpretation of the fiction-making view, and one may argue that proponents of that view have non ad hoc ways of explaining this, but regardless of how the fiction-making view may or may not stand up to this objection, it seems like a reasonable criterion for the success of a theory of fictional language use.

Predelli claims that Searle’s pretense view does have this structural feature because it holds (on Predelli’s interpretation and on my interpretation above) that the conditions associated with whatever illocutionary act is being pretended are met at the level of the pretense. Then, on this level, all of the relations between illocutionary forces must be as they are in serious discourse, which means that when readers/hearers/recievers of a fiction pretend the content of the fiction that they will have imported their understandings of the relations between the difference illocutionary forces. It is worth noting that this depends on the idea that there is a level of pretense which the recievers of fiction are to be understood to somehow “entertain.” If Searle is interpreted in the above way, then it seems that the Searlian pretense view does, indeed, have this feature that Predelli points out as necessary for a good account of fictional language. This uniformity argument then stands as a strong existing argument in favor of Searle’s pretense view, and it seems to extend also to Kripke’s version of the view.

5.1.3 Kripke’s Implicit Argument

Kripke essentially just states the pretense view as a part of his larger defense of Millianism against the challenge of negative existentials, and so one may only attribute implicit arguments for the view to Kripke. It seems that for Kripke either the pretense view is so well accepted that he doesn’t believe it needs any argument, or he believes the fact that it supports his larger venture, which has been and remains well-respected, is argument enough for the view. I here consider this second possibility. In order to see how the pretense view’s support role for Kripke’s larger theory may serve as an implicit argument in its favor, it will be helpful to recall the inter-dependencies between the pretense view and
other parts of Kripke’s larger theory of meaning, which have been detailed above in §2.3. In that section I conclude that the pretense view is independent from the empty-proposition view, Kripke’s views on modality and Kripke’s ideas on rigid designation, and conclude that ultimately the aspect of Kripke’s theory which truly relies on the pretense view is his Millianism. As such, one should understand that, while Kripke’s Millianism is well-liked, there are further commitments which must be made on top of the pretense view in order to arrive at these other aspects of Kripke’s theory. So, the pretense view does in a way “make way” for Kripke’s other views, but it only one among several commitments which Kripke needs. Still, it does seem to play a genuine role in Kripke’s arguments for Millianism and as a defense from the counterarguments against it based on negative existential statements, and this may be enough reason for those who find Kripke’s larger picture convincing to accept the pretense view. At the same time, Kripke does not really present this as a defense of the pretense view, and the fact that it makes way for other, well-liked theoretical commitments does not serve as a good argument in favor of the view itself.

5.2 Existing Counterarguments and Criticisms

Here I consider some of the existing arguments against the pretense view as it has been presented by Searle and Kripke. The arguments to follow concern potential problems with Searle’s reliance on author intentions, Kripke’s account of metafictional statements and fictional names, and a shared problem of a so-called “ubiquitous teller.” Each of these arguments have varying impact on Searle’s and Kripke’s own views, and can serve to indicate potential weak points in the view.

5.2.1 Abell’s Remarks on Intention

Recall that Searle discusses some “horizontal” conventions which he believes serve to block the usual rules from being in place when authors make fictional statements. He additionally claims that “the pretended performances of illocutionary acts which constitute the writing of a work of fiction consist in actually performing utterance acts with the intention of invoking the horizontal conventions [. . . ]” [Sea75, p. 327], and this was ultimately interpreted as indicating that Searle believes that the author’s having of this intention is enough for the conventions to actually be invoked. It was noted above that it’s not clear how such an account should function, and it was suggested that some kind of Gricean development could be of use. Ultimately, such “intentionalist” positions which rely on readers to “work out what authors communicatively intend [readers] to imagine” in order to account for the content of fictional statements [Abe20, p. 66] are criticized by Abell in favor of another approach, which still gives a

52In the following section I consider an argument from Salmon claiming that Kripke’s pretense view actually fails to give a coherent account of negative existentials. For the purposes of this section, it is only worth noting that the pretense view in any case plays a role in the arguments Kripke presents.
role to intention, but a weaker one. And, while Searle’s account isn’t focused on the meaning of fictional statements, he does rely on some kind of inference of authorial intention in order to account for how fictional speech acts can be identified and treated as such.

To begin her argument against intentionalist approaches, Abell formulates the following epistemological constraint.

If fictive utterance $u$ has content $c$ iff $p$, any audience who is able to identify the content $c$ of $u$ must have access to the resources required justifiably to infer that $p$. [Abe20, p. 60]

Then, she notes that the appeal to Gricean “communicative intentions” in intentionalist accounts is intended to ensure that such a constraint can be met [Abe20, pp. 60-61]. Such a communicative intention is characterized by Abell, following Grice, as “a reflexive intention to elicit a certain mental state in one’s audience, for them to recognize this intention, and for their recognition of this intention to function as a reason for the relevant mental state being elicited in them” [Abe20, pp. 60-61]. The reason that this seems like a good approach is that it “constr[u]es the interpretation of fictive utterances as involving an inferential process similar to that which is often taken to be involved in interpreting ordinary illocutionary acts” [Abe20, p. 61]. Since it is by way of communicative intentions that normal communication is explained by a Gricean account, if fictional communication can also be explained in this way, then it may seem like a nice approach.

Despite the intuitive appeal of this account, though, Abell argues that this particular approach cannot work. The basic reason she identifies for this is that “imaginings have neither a mind-to-world nor a world-to-mind direction of fit,” [Abe20, p. 65] and this means that this account, which is supposed to explain fictional communication as the communication of authorial imaginings, fails to meet some of the requirements Grice outlines for audiences to be able to perform the inferential process described above. Abell summarizes the requirements as follows:

First, the goal of communicating imaginings must be a common goal. Secondly, there must be constraints on how this common goal is pursued that provide a role for audiences’ background knowledge in drawing inferences about authors’ communicative intentions to elicit imaginings. Finally, the resources available to help audiences to identify those intentions must be commonly believed by authors and their audiences to be available. [Abe20, p. 64]

Abell states that the first requirement really is met in the fictional case, which may seem totally reasonable, or may seem strange in certain cases where something isn’t necessarily announced as fiction. This means that the people involved in fiction creation and reception will adhere to Grice’s cooperative principle, by which speakers are required to “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction.
of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” [Gri89, p. 26]. However, the conversational maxims which Grice derives from this principle are derived on the assumption that the purpose of communication is to maximize the amount of accurate information about the world which is communicated [Abe20, p. 62]. Given that this is not the case for fiction, rather, on intentionalist accounts the purpose of communication is to convey authorial imaginations, one encounters difficulties saying what role background knowledge can play, since imaginings lack any direction of fit.

These considerations can be taken as a reasonable motivation for avoiding basing one’s account of fictional content or meaning directly on authorial intention, but this is not the case for Searle anyway. Then, does his appeal to authorial intention in order to explain why some special conventions are in place which block the rules of serious illocutionary acts suffer from any of the problems discussed above? It seems that Searle may reasonably escape these criticisms, because the fact that fiction creators and audiences apparently share in the communicative goal of engaging with fiction means that there is room for the audience’s recognition of the author’s desire to invoke some conventions. In fact, the account of Abell in her §3.4 develops a concrete account of the rules involved in fiction making, which could be likened to Searle’s horizontal conventions.53

In sum, while there certainly exist some problems with relying too heavily on intention when giving an account of fictional representation, reliance on it to some extent is aligned with the influential account of Grice and seemingly no more problematic than in serious discourse. Abell argues against the use of authorial intention in accounts of fictional meaning, but invoking intention on the more basic level that Searle does appears to escape the criticisms which weigh against intentionalist accounts. Finally, a good account of fiction appears to have fair access to authorial intention, and potentially even ought to rely on intention in parts which in some way “mirror” serious language use.

5.2.2 Problems with Kripke’s Ideas on Metafictional Statements

In [Sal11], Salmon attempts to clarify Kripke’s initial proposal about metafictional statements. Recall that Kripke holds that statements which are making reports on fictions “[count] as true if [they are] true report[s] of what is in the story” [Kri73, p. 58] (I will turn to the question of “what is in the story” just below.) This proposal is intuitive but somewhat vague, and Salmon clarifies it by making use of a distinction between the two uses of names which Kripke considers and by appealing to Kripke’s second form of predication (see §3.2). Salmon then uses Character1 to denote the pretend use of the name by the fiction creator, and Character2 to denote the actual (referential) use of the name to refer to the fictional character as an abstract object. Additionally, Salmon explains Kripke’s two forms of predication along the following lines, where by “extended sense” he means Kripke’s special, fictional predication:

53Actually, Searle’s suggestion is rather vague. And in order to have confidence that such conventions could be in place, a concrete development like Abell’s might be necessary.
understanding the predicate ‘used cocaine’ in this extended sense, [the sentence “Sherlock Holmes used cocaine.”] is true. According to the stories, Holmes1 used cocaine. In virtue of that fact we may say that Holmes2 “used cocaine.” [Sal11, p. 61]

In this passage, when the predicate appears between double quotation marks it is to be understood as the second form of predication posited by Kripke. On this account, regular, but pretended, predication appears in the pretended fictional statements (which ultimately have no meaning on Kripke’s account), and the second, extended form of predication appears in paratextual statements. Moreover, these two types of predication along with the two distinct uses of names, are connected in Kripke’s account of paratextual statements; the paratextual statements—which involve the second use of fictional names and the second form of predication—are true whenever the corresponding sentence, involving the first use of the same name and the regular predication of the same predicate, is part of the content of the fiction. To this point Salmon writes that “[t]he truth conditions of [‘Sherlock Holmes used cocaine.”] on this reading are exactly the same as the conventional truth-in-the-fiction conditions of the sentence interpreted as ‘Holmes1 used cocaine’.” [Sal11, p. 61]. This clarifies Kripke’s proposal because it explains how the two different uses of a fictional name could be understood to figure in his idea that paratextual statements are true if and only if they are true reports on the fiction. Yet, there is a lingering problem with this kind of account, which is that Kripke is a self-declared proponent of the empty-proposition view, and this raises questions about how anything can be understood to report on the empty content of a fiction.

How could one evaluate when a statement is a true report on a fiction if fictions are composed of (at least mostly) only empty propositions? On the assumption that most of the sentences uttered in the course of the production of a fiction express no proposition whatsoever, what is one to understand to be “the fiction” on Kripke’s account? In other words, if fictions have no content then no statement can be understood to be a true report on a fiction. Salmon formulates this objection in several more questions:

The ‘that’ clauses ‘that Holmes1 uses cocaine’ and ‘that Holmes1 exists’ are no less problematic than ‘Holmes1’ itself […] On Kripke’s account, it is true that according to the stories Holmes1 used cocaine, and that on Le Verrier’s theory Vulcan1 influences Mercury’s orbit. How can these things be true if there is no proposition that Holmes1 used cocaine and no proposition that Vulcan1 influences Mercury? What is it that is the case according to the stories or the theory? […] [Sal11, pp. 63-4]

His questions continue, see, e.g., the next subsection, §5.2.3, but the general idea is that the empty proposition view does not easily combine with Kripke’s account of metafictional statements (and in Salmon’s view some other aspects

54To clarify, this sentence is to be interpreted as meaning “Holmes2 “used cocaine.””
of Kripke’s theory). Moreover, Kripke attempts to give an account of negative existential statements’ truth by reinterpretting “‘false’ to mean that there is no true proposition of a given kind” [Kri13, p. 159]. Then, for Kripke “[i]n the case of the existential statement, if there is no true proposition, there is no such proposition at all, either” [Kri13, p. 159]. Applied to negative existentials with fictional characters, Kripke continues, “[t]he negative existential says that there is no such true proposition as that Sherlock Holmes exists—in fact, really no such proposition at all exists,” [Kri13, p. 159] and it is really not at all clear how an empty proposition theorist can formulate a view which itself includes these supposedly empty propositions. Salmon writes that “[t]he ‘that’ clauses ‘that Holmes uses cocaine’ and ‘that Holmes exists’ are no less problematic than ‘Holmes’ itself,” and it seems correct, that Kripke, as a proponent of the empty-proposition, should not be able to formulate this account of negative existential statements.

It might now seem, though, that this objection really only weighs against the empty-proposition view, and I have already argued that these views should be considered separately. But, there is a worthwhile observation to be made. This is that a theory of fictional statements needs to be suitable as a basis for, or at the very least compatible with, a reasonable account of metafictional statements. So, this argument does not serve as a direct criticism of the pretense view, which can be taken without the empty-proposition view, but it does serve as a criticism of Kripke’s account of fictional representation, which seems to undermine itself.

I would quickly like to further suggest that the idea of pretend reference itself is conceptually problematic. It is this idea, which also allows one to seemingly arrive at the empty-proposition view from Searle’s account (which, as seen in §2.3.1, is likely not truly meant to support the empty-proposition view). The reason for this issue is that many theories of meaning rely on there being true reference as part of linguistic structures in order to account for their meaning, and if pretend reference can take place in the absence of real reference, it’s not clear how sentences involving pretend reference can be meaningful.

5.2.3 Problems with Two Names

As seen in the preceding section, there seems to be a conceptual reliance, in Kripke’s account, on a non-referential use of fictional names, what Salmon writes as “Character1.” This creates the problems discussed above, and potentially others, and Salmon concludes that this is the mistake of Kripke’s account.

Kripke’s contention that names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ are ambiguous is almost certainly mistaken. In particular, there is no obvious necessity to posit a use of the name by Conan Doyle and his readers that is non-desigingating (in any sense) and somehow prior to its use as a name for the fictional character and upon which the latter use is parasitic. The alleged use of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ on which it is thoroughly non-desigingating was supposed to be a pretend use, not a real one. [Sal11, p. 66]
So, it is clear that Salmon thinks that understanding pretended uses of fictional names as some kind of nondesignating use, is misguided. Salmon’s conviction seems to be based in part on the considerations of the previous sections, but there is a further problem one might find with the position that fictional names are used ambiguously, and that there are actually two names. This is that there seems to be nothing connecting these two names; Salmon calls them “Holmes$_1$” and “Holmes$_2$,” and it is clear that for them to be understood as ambiguous that they must be homophones, but for theoretical purposes the two names might as well be “Holmes” and “Betsy.” What I mean here is that there is no easy way to account for the fact that the truth conditions of the sentences involving Holmes should be dependent on what sentences are uttered about Betsy. The two distinct uses of the names are so distinct that there isn’t an obvious reason that they should have the connection authors like Kripke and Searle declare that they have.

For this reason and for the reasons which stem from positing two names which are discussed in the previous section, it seems that any successful view of fictional representations must either explain how fictional names appearing in fictional statements relate to fictional names appearing in metafictional statements or deny that there is any ambiguity between fictional names in the two contexts, that there are two such uses of names.

5.2.4 García-Carpintero’s Remarks on a Fictional Utterer

Some further objections to the pretense view as it appears in Lewis’s account (as discussed in §3.1 above) are presented by García-Carpintero in [Gar23, §3]. Two of the objections he makes are focuses on problems with this particular combination of the pretense view with a Lewisian approach to metafictional statements, and I will not discuss these here, as one has many alternatives to a Lewisian account of metafictional statements. One of García-Carpintero’s arguments, however, seems to apply more directly to the pretense view, regardless of one’s account of metafictional statements. This is essentially the objection that views which rely on some kind of implicit teller, or what García-Carpintero calls a “ubiquitous teller,” in their accounts of fictional statements [Gar23, p. 316]. In advocating his own alternative view, which I won’t discuss here but which is related to Currie’s view, García-Carpintero writes that “on [his view] we do not need any fictional utterers: fictional contents may not be conveyed by the author portraying somebody’s speech acts, but directly by her act of fictionalizing” [Gar23]. The reason for which García-Carpintero believes such a ubiquitous teller is problematic are some examples of fictions where such a teller doesn’t fit our intuitions about our understanding of that fiction. The example which he discusses is a short story by Cortázar called “The Continuity of Parks” where the main character is a man, who is understood to be unwittingly reading the story, which the actual audience is also reading, about him, specifically about his own murder. García-Carpintero claims that such a plot “conflict[s] with the assumption that a teller is presenting contents that he knows” presumably because the main character is supposed to be both (a) reading the same sequence
of events as the actual audience, and (b) unaware that the story is about himself. While (I believe) I grasp García-Carpintero’s point here, I have two doubts regarding it. Firstly, it does not seem like a true conflict or contradiction that the man described in the story is reading a story about himself and still not realizing it is about himself. If the main character were supposed to also be the narrator, then surely there would be an issue, but as it stands it seems that the supposed conflict is actually just a description of the story’s plot. Secondly, this sort of argument which relies on our intuitions about a rather unusual fiction in order to make an argument about what kind of account of fictional representation is given is dubious. One can certainly make counterarguments to general rules by example, but the reliance on some kind of intuitive understanding of the intended plot of a purposefully philosophically challenging story seems doubtful. Still, if one finds this argument convincing, or has some other reason to doubt that there is such a ubiquitous teller in all fictions, then the pretense view as we have seen it may be in trouble.

This point hasn’t been discussed thus far in this thesis, but the pretense view as it is advocated by Searle and Kripke does rely on a ubiquitous teller. This is because their views posit that the pretended speech acts of fiction creators are understood to be real, successful speech acts on the level of the pretense. The less problematic case is when a fiction is written in the first person. Then whatever the author pretends to do, should be actually done by the first person narrator, who on the pretense view is pretending to be the character who narrates. But the pretense view also implies that if the author of a third person narrative pretends to assert something about a character, like in my example of “Joe is a princess,” then the speech act of reference, which was in reality pretended, must be real and successful in the fiction. If there were no ubiquitous teller, then there would be no clear person to attribute this speech act to. As such, the pretense view as advocated above does rely on a kind of ubiquitous teller. So, for those who find this commitment unacceptable, this is a further criticism of the pretense view.

5.3 Extending the Pretense View to Non-linguistic Media

Given that very little has been said here about what exactly constitutes fiction, one may question whether the pretense view covers all kinds of fiction generation. While there may be some who think all fiction must be linguistic (as in spoken or written) in nature, it’s not overly controversial that there can be non-linguistic visual representations of fiction. Moreover, there can be media which involves some linguistic elements, but which does not fit the paradigm of written fiction, like video games or some movies, where much of the presentation of the fiction’s content is not in any linguistic form. Currie writes, on this point, that “[w]hen we watch a play or a movie we seem to be in direct, unmediated contact with the characters and events” [Cur90, p. 93]. Searle does touch on plays as part of his account (by which play writing is understood as a recipe for pretense), but he does not venture into the non-linguistic. Kripke’s account similarly lacks any discussion of non-linguistic fictions.
It is actually somewhat understandable that neither Searle nor Kripke venture beyond the bounds of linguistic fiction, as they have particular linguistic motivations for giving the accounts they do. One should note, however, that this lack of attention to non-linguistic fictions may be to the pretense view’s detriment. This is because there is no easy or obvious way of extending either of their views to the non-linguistic. Both authors essentially focus on the idea that the fiction creator pretends to perform some linguistic acts which he does not really perform, but in the case of a movie, for example, the director can be totally absent and unknown to the audience. Certainly the director is in some part the cause of the representation, but what parts of a movie can easily said to be pretended? Such a question points to the underlying problem one may find when wanting to extend the pretense view as Searle and Kripke put it, which is the focus on the pretense of the fiction creator in order to account for anomalous speech acts or uses of names. Without the clear presence of any such speech act or non-referential name (both of which are linguistic in nature) the thing which is supposed to be pretended is absent, but yet visual media is supposed to also be fiction. One may resist by pointing to both author’s suggestions that fictional pretense is rather broad, but because this particular suggestion is incredibly vague, I don’t believe an extension to non-linguistic cases is easily provided. I don’t explore this question in much detail, but merely wish to draw attention to this as a possible problem with the pretense views advocated by Searle and Kripke.

6 The Pretense View 2.0

From the above sections several considerations for a good theory of fictional representation have emerged:

(i) A good theory of fictional representation ought to account for parallelisms—of the kind considered in Predelli’s uniformity argument—between fictional and serious representations (illocutionary acts).

(ii) A good pretense view must give some account of what pretense actually is which is intuitive but also detailed enough to serve as a basis for this view.

(iii) A good theory of fictional representation should allow for a sensible account of metafictional statements on its basis, or in conjunction with it.

(iv) A good theory should include an account of fictional naming which does not suffer from the problem of positing two apparently unrelated names, one for the fictional uses and one for (serious) metafictional uses—either by providing a satisfactory account of the connection between these names or by only positing one name.

(v) A good theory of fictional representation should extend to or be easily extendable to all kinds of representations, and not be limited to written or spoken expression.
A good theory of fictional representation should potentially avoid positing a “ubiquitous teller” as in §5.2.4.

Then, if one is able to formulate a pretense view which meets all of these requirements for a theory of fictional representation, then it seems that this theory stands a good chance. As seen above, Searle’s and Kripke’s theories do not meet all of these requirements, but perhaps a modified pretense view developed from their views could.

Towards this goal I propose two modifications to the pretense view, which are based on some of the views discussed above. Firstly, I propose that pretense is explained, along the lines of Currie’s account of make-believe, as a propositional attitude. This modification should allow the view to meet requirements (ii) and (v), and the potential requirement (vi). Secondly, I propose to understand the pretense view—similarly to Salmon’s proposal—to hold that the pretense is not the representational act itself, but rather that the content expressed during fiction generation (by way of successful, usual illocutionary acts) is pretended in the above sense. This allows the view to meet requirements (iii) and (iv). Finally, requirement (i) is met on the pretense view (under certain interpretations) anyway.

The first modification would be to give an explanation of pretense as a propositional attitude. In order to do this, I will first present Currie’s account of make-believe as a propositional attitude, and discuss how it relates to pretense. Because Currie is not satisfied with the pretense view as he interprets it, he suggests a shift to understanding fiction generation as the authorial intention that “the [readers of fiction] take a certain attitude toward the propositions uttered in the course of his performance” [Cur90, p. 18]. What Currie has in mind here, is that the propositions which the sentences in a fiction express are intended by the author, not to be believed, but rather to be “made-believe,” and that this is a separate kind of stand alone propositional attitude. At this early stage Currie knows his suggestion is somewhat vague, but he takes the notion of make-believe to be “well-known” and writes that “make-believe plays a quite pervasive role in our lives” [Cur90, p. 19]. So, it is a vague concept which he resists defining beyond one’s intuitive grasp of the concept. Working with this sketch of make-believe, he formulates his idea that “make-believe [is] itself an attitude we take to propositions,” and continues, writing that “[w]e can believe that $P$, desire that $P$, and make believe that $P$” [Cur90, p. 20]. Currie seemingly presupposes that one understands how propositional attitudes are used in philosophy, and also defends that while there may be some skepticism about this notion, this does not cast special doubt on the attitude of make-believe, but on all propositional attitudes [Cur90, p. 21]. Finally, Currie uses this notion to define fiction by way of this propositional attitude.

There may be several reasons for skepticism about this account; firstly, the notion of make-believe is taken as basic, and in no clear way is it shown what

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55By make-believe Currie has in mind the sense of this which relates to the imaginative exercise often thought of in relation to children’s games, and not that anyone is literally made to believe anything.
kind of propositional attitude it must be, and secondly, one may doubt how Currie intends the notion of make-believe to differ from that of pretense. To begin with, Currie’s objection to the pretense theory seems to be on a particular interpretation he has of the concept of pretense, which he only defines in a much later section of [Cur90]. He writes: “I suspect the pretense theory is more likely wrong than redundant. A writer who types out his work and sends it to the publisher is surely not pretending to do anything” [Cur90, p. 23, emphasis in the original], but such an objection seems misguided, as Searle never denies that writers are actually typing or actually sending things off. Ultimately, Currie’s qualms may be rooted in a one-dimensional interpretation of pretense as a kind of mimical representation. This sense of the word pretense is discussed in the following paragraphs, and I believe Currie’s statement that “pretense [in this sense] has little or nothing to do with fiction” [Cur90, p. 51] is overstated. Moreover, Currie himself says that “if someone wants to use ‘pretense’ in so wide a sense as to encompass make-believe, I have no particular objection” [Cur90, p. 51]; so, my suggestion for pretense along these lines may be something Currie in a way anticipates. Ultimately, because Currie never explicitly defines make-believe and pretense, and because he doesn’t give an indication of what kind of propositional attitude make-believe really is, I can only take away a rather minimal understanding of this proposal for my suggested modification.

This modification is, however, not entirely straightforward due to some ambiguities regarding the notion of pretense. There seem to be two senses in which the word “pretend” is used: a representational sense of pretending, like what Searle has in mind when he speaks of pretending to punch someone by way of actually moving one’s arm, and also an attitudinal sense of pretending, like what Currie discusses in relation to make-believe. The first, representational, sense of pretend is what both Searle and Kripke seem to have in mind when they propose their pretense views. On the interpretations I gave above, both authors are positing a kind of leveling or perspective shift between an “internal” view where all regular linguistic requirements are pretended to be met and an “external” view where the requirements are not, in reality, met. So, one can say things, as these authors do, like “Conan Doyle pretended to refer to Sherlock Holmes,” and mean that from this internal perspective “Sherlock Holmes” successfully names, but that from the external perspective the name does not refer. This account of fiction as pretense corresponds to the representational sense of “pretend” because on the (external) level of reality one uses pretense to represent the (internal) level of the pretense. In other words, in an attempt to explain how it can be that fiction creators aren’t doing what they seem to be doing, one can answer that they are pretend-representing as if they were doing the thing it appears they are doing.

The problem, I believe, is that, while such an account can aid in explaining certain questions like that of negative existentials and fictional reference, it cannot on its own make sense of the whole of fictional representation. Put broadly,
the fiction as pretense-as-representation view can answer questions about why fictional representations are able to be so similar to serious representations while still being (recognizably) distinct. Note that, pace Currie, this seems to indicate that the representational sense of pretense does still have a role in giving an overall account of fictional representation. However, too much of a focus on this sense of pretense, or the equivocation of these two senses, leads to some positions which stop short of providing a full explanation of fictional representation. So, while the above account can account for the linguistic anomalies of obviously untrue apparent assertions and (for Millians) apparent naming without a referent, what it cannot seem to account for is the fact that fictions very much seem to have propositional content, and, as a result, consideration (iii) above.

To see the explanatory power the pretense-as-representation view does have, consider the example of the “Joe is a princess” fiction, which I created for this thesis. When I write that “Joe is a princess,” the pretense-as-representation view can account for the apparent reference to Joe as my pretend-representation of reference/naming, which does not involve real naming, but rather is a representation of naming. Similarly, my pretend-assertion of “Joe is a princess” is a representation of asserting, but it is not a real assertion. This kind of explanation is exactly what Searle and Kripke want to be able to provide, because they both motivate their accounts of fiction with linguistic data which are anomalous for their larger theories in rather similar ways: for Searle the problem is that fiction authors seem to be making assertions but aren’t being held to the usual rules, which on his wider account means that such utterances cannot be assertions, and for Kripke the problem is that some negative existential statements involving fictional names seem to be true, which is inexplicable on a Millian theory of reference. Then, the account outlined above which is at least primarily reliant on a representational sense of pretend, allows these authors to explain their anomalies. What arises as a result of such an account, though, is the conclusion that, in the above example, I am not actually naming and that I am not actually asserting. This is the conclusion both Searle and Kripke seem to accept in similar cases, and as seen above in §5.2.3, this can lead to problems in the form of violating requirement (iv) above, because it leads to the positing of a non-referential use of names in fictional statements.

In order to avoid this problem, and also in an effort to lend a more explanatory account, I suggest that the pretense-as-representation view is largely erroneous. While this representational pretense does really seem to form a legitimate part of some fiction generation, it alone cannot form a good basis for the pretense view. I will now argue that in order to lend the pretense view the basis it needs to be sufficiently explanatory and intuitive, the emphasis must shift to pretense in its second sense as a kind of propositional attitude. While one may still want to explain some of the anomalous parts of fictional representation by way of pretend-representation, it is pretense understood as a propositional attitude which allows the pretense view to stand up as a tenable theory.

I claim that make-believe and pretense (in the second sense) are already rather similar concepts, and even if the account should differ in some minor
way, it seems reasonable that pretense is also a propositional attitude. When one speaks of "the level of the pretense,..." or something similar, what follows is usually the content of what is supposed to be pretended. In other words, such an expression is often intuitively equivalently expressible in terms of "the content of the pretense." For example, if one says, "at the level of the pretense, Isabella’s utterance of ‘Joe thinks the frog is ugly’ is an assertion," it would mean the same thing as stating that part of the content of “the pretense” is that Joe thinks that the frog is ugly. So, in either case we draw on some body of propositional content in order to speak about pretense. Moreover, regular language use also points to this as one of the meanings of pretense; sentences of the form “pretend like..."57 are rather common and appear not to be representational in the above sense. For this reason, I believe the ideas that there is a sense of pretense as a kind of propositional attitude and that this sense of pretense is a necessary part of discussions involving fictional pretense, are right.58

How intuitive this claim is depends on the kind of propositional attitude one claims pretense is, but giving a complete description would be difficult and controversial. So, what follows are some points which could form part of a working definition, some of which could be specified in several ways. One less controversial point may be that pretense, like fiction, does not aim at describing reality, and so pretending a proposition is independent of one’s assessment of the likelihood of that proposition. A second claim would be that the pretense of some set of propositions together usually conforms to some kind of consistency requirement, which needn’t be classical but which would probably prevent counterlogical statements or sets of statements from being pretendable. Here, those who disagree could specify this differently, as the authors of [BB19] do, for example. As a final point for a working definition, one may hold that the pretense of some proposition includes the importation or holding fixed in the pretense of certain background facts or knowledge, along with the explicitly pretended proposition. This requirement seems to match popular intuition about pretense, and it aids in providing a good account of metafictional statements (requirement (iii) above). To check whether you share this intuition, consider the scenario where a friend arrives late to dinner and says “pretend like I was on time.” In this case, it seems that what people do, and what the speaker intends for them to do, is to hold everything fixed which does not contradict with them being on time, and to change only those things which do, within the pretense. I believe these considerations about pretense-as-a-propositional-attitude could lend intuitive and explanatory power to the pretense view as a whole. Moreover, if one finds that this propositional attitude is not sufficiently connected to the popular concept of pretense, or if one prefers the make-believe terminology of Walton, what is important is not really the terminology, but whether one agrees that a propositional attitude of the kind outlined is involved in fictional representation.

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57 As in the below example of saying “Pretend like I was on time.” after arriving late.
58 Note that the claim is not that none of the proponents of the pretense view recognize this sense of pretense, but rather that the pretense views thus far considered rely on representational-pretense to explain aspects of fictional representation which are better explained in terms of pretense as a propositional attitude.
representation.

Now, I come to the virtues of this account of pretense. As I argued above, some kind of attitudinal sense of pretense is required in order to think of something like “the pretense,” which appears throughout the literature on the pretense view. Moreover, even though writers like Kripke affirm the empty-proposition view, there seems to be a kind of reliance on this concept; how else could the conditions of reference be met according to the pretense? Writers like Searle, on the other hand, are able to less problematically rely on this concept. In either case, it’s intuitive that there is some kind of attitudinal feature to pretense, and also to fiction.

Secondly, as I have argued, on Searle’s account some “horizontal” fiction conditions are brought into place by way of an author’s intention to invoke them. Additionally, these conventions are what allow the pretend speech acts to be recognized as such and serve as part of a fiction generation. Whether or not one believes such an intention based account is correct, it seems that Searle, who must himself accept such an account, could just as easily invoke it in order to explain why fictional statements, which appear to be unqualified assertions, are actually understood as assertions about the pretense. This would allow one to explain why false assertions made during fiction generation are not criticized as such, but are instead uncontested by audiences. Even though these are false assertions, it may be that, due to the horizontal conventions, audiences don’t object to them, but instead take the pretense-attitude toward the propositions they express. Such an account seems not to come at any additional cost to Searle, and it appears to solve the surface level problem of why the apparent-assertions of fiction are not criticized in line with the usual rules of assertions.

Before explaining the details of how this modification beneficially combines with the second proposed modification, I wish to quickly note how understanding pretense as a type of propositional attitude aids in meeting requirement (v) and potential requirement (vi) above. As Currie argues in [Cur90, §2.9], understanding fictional representation as the communication of some propositional content which the audience acquires a certain attitude toward (in his case that of make-believe) allows for an obvious extension of the view beyond written and spoken fiction. Regardless of how the content of the fiction is portrayed, for it to be fiction is for the representation to be intended to be pretended by its audience, and for the audience to actually do so. Again, the intentional components of such an account may be problematic, but the medium of communication or representation is not relevant for pretense-as-a-propositional-attitude, which allows an account of fiction based on it to be easily extended beyond the case of written or spoken fictions. Regarding requirement (vi) for similar reasons a propositional attitude based account of pretense allows for the content of the pretense to be conveyed by way of the kind of representational pretense discussed above, but also by other means. This means that there is no need for a ubiquitous teller to exist as part of the fiction, because audiences need only take a particular attitude of pretense toward what is expressed by a fictional representation.

The further virtues of this proposed modification only become apparent to-
gether with the second proposed modification, which is to understand the representational actions of fiction creators as real, and that what is expressed by way of them, despite being actually false, is pretended by the audiences of fictions. The most important aspect of this modification is the idea, taken from Salmon, that fictional names are all along referring to the abstract entity which is the fictional character, which is what allows for one to claim that the representational actions of fiction creators are real. Both Searle and Kripke posit such entities as fictional characters, but neither claim that fictional characters’ names refer to these entities in fictional statements. As is seen in §3.1, both authors claim that a somewhat mysterious process of character generation takes place by way of the pretense-representations that they posit. The alternative proposed here instead holds that

the only genuine, non-pretend use that we ever give [a fictional name] [...] is as a name for the character. And that use, as a name for that very thing, is the very use it has in the story – though according to the story, that very thing is a human being and not an abstract entity. [Sal11, p. 69]

On this kind of account, one may understand the reference in fictional statements as real-reference to abstract entities, and one may understand, as hinted at above, that real, but false, assertions are made about the abstract entity, with the intention that the content of these assertions is believed about the pretense, or is pretended. This is not the proposal of Salmon himself, who wishes to defend a more Kripkean pretense view, but this shift in understanding of fictional naming, along with the idea that what is pretended is, at least in part, that the content of fictional statements is true, is due to him.

There are several benefits to making this change: it allows for a very straightforward account of metafictional statements as reports, either on the content of the fiction, the content of the pretense, or on the abstract entities named by fictional names; it meets requirement (iv) above by only positing one name which is used in both fictional and metafictional statements; and it works well together with the above proposed account of pretense.

The way in which this understanding of fictional pretense aids in providing a metafictional account is that it claims, contrary to the pretense views considered before, that fictional statements are being made about fictional characters. So, the fictional statements which make up a given fiction directly ascribe properties to the abstract entities which are the fictional characters. In the case of Joe the princess, then, when I write “Joe is a princess.” I am saying of Joe-the-character that it has the property of being a princess. Such a statement, taken as an unqualified assertion is false, but according to this view, fiction conventions allow my audience to understand it as a qualified sentence.

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59 One may ignore the qualification of “non-pretend” here, as Salmon does not take the above account of pretend, and like Kripke settles on the representational form of pretend.

60 Here I use the word true because this is more faithful to Salmon’s account, but in general I avoid this because I believe that to pretend something, is to have a certain attitude toward it which can be expressed without appeal to truth.
about the pretense. Momentarily ignoring any potential problems with these "fiction conventions", it should be recognized that any account which claims that fictional representations directly ascribe properties to fictional characters (or other fictional entities) has a clear way of explaining metafictional statements. By claiming that metafictional statements either report on the pretense (or on the fiction itself)—in the case of paratextual statements—or report on the abstract entity of a fictional character directly—in the case of metatextual statements, theories of this kind easily meet requirement (iii).

One may also take special interest in the type of metafictional statement which motivates much of Kripke’s account: negative existentials. On an account of this kind, it could be that you end up which true-seeming negative existentials coming out, not as meaningless, but as false. Salmon proposes a way in which one might attempt to account for these statements:

We may use ‘Sherlock Holmes’, for example, to mean something like: *Holmes more or less as he is actually depicted in the stories*, or *Holmes replete with these attributes* (the principally salient attributes ascribed to Holmes in the stories), or best, *the person who is both Holmes and Holmesesque*. In uttering [“Sherlock Holmes is nonexistent”], one means that the Holmes of fiction, Holmes as depicted, does not exist in reality, that there is in reality no such person – no such person, no person who is both Holmes and sufficiently like that, sufficiently as he is depicted. [Sal11, p. 74, emphases in the original]

On this account, then, there is an appeal to some kind of descriptivist understanding of names in these statements, one which Salmon claims is both nonstandard and secondary to the primary Millian use of the name. One can see why it could be said to be secondary, because it appeals to the qualities attributed to the fictional character as it is named by it’s usual name. Moreover, as is part of this account, the fictional character does not actually have many of the properties the fiction ascribes of it (like being a human, being born in a particular year, etc.). So, it will be true that there is no such fictional character that is as the fiction describes it. Then, this is one possibility for how to deal with negative existentials.

The second benefit I claimed of this account is that it easily meets requirement (iv) of not positing two disconnected fictional names for the different settings of fictional and metafictional statements. I think that this benefit really clearly follows from the fact that it posits and relies upon only one kind of fictional name, that which names the abstract entity of the fictional character. So, if the above argument for why two separate names are problematic is convincing, then the fact that this account posits only one name is a clear benefit.

The final advantage of this modification that I will argue here, is that this kind of account blends well with an attitudinal understanding of pretense. The most obvious benefit of the combination is that it allows for an account of fictional statements by which authors actually perform a standard illocutionary
act, which is false, but understood to be relative to a particular body of propositional content, due to the invocation of some fiction conventions. This then means that there is a clear content of different fiction works, which can be understood as propositions predicating certain properties of abstract entities which are the fictional characters and other fictional objects. The audience of the fiction is then intended to believe what the author says, just not in an unqualified way; rather, the audience should believe what the author says relative to the pretense. This is in line with the idea that assertions are made with the intention to incite belief. Additionally, one can then understood the propositional attitude of pretense as the belief of certain propositions’ truth relative to a certain body of propositional facts which are called the pretense. In other words, to pretend that $P$ is to believe that $P$ is a member of some set of propositions which are expressed by the author.

Ultimately, these modifications which I propose to the theory are meant to indicate a way in which some of the existing objections and requirements for a good pretense view, and for a good theory of fictional representation in general, can be met. There is certainly room for disagreement about these suggestions, and the formulation of this modified pretense view is not meant as a formulation of a complete theory of fictional representation. So, while acknowledging that there are gaps in this account and much remaining room for disagreement, I hope that this formulation of the Pretense View 2.0 serves as a demonstration of how the modern proponent of the pretense view could avoid some of the known objections in the literature.

7 Does the Pretense View do what Searle and Kripke Need it to?

One may now wonder: if there is a tenable version of the pretense view, can this view do what Searle and Kripke, two of its main champions, invoke it to do? In Searle’s case the goal seems to be to give a coherent account of the anomalous seeming-assertions of fiction within the broader speech acts framework. He appeals to a sort of public pretense in order to explain the apparent mismatch between what is uttered and the rules to which the utterer is held. In Kripke’s case, pretense is called upon as a defense of Millianism against the challenge of negative existential statements. The role it is supposed to play is to explain away the most problematic sort of negative existentials: those which seem to be true. This section will explore whether a pretense view which meets the requirements of the previous section is able to achieve what Searle and Kripke want from the pretense view.

Beginning with Searle, it seems that despite the focus his version of the pretense view has on the authorial act of pretend-representing serious illocutionary acts, versions of the pretense view which shift in focus toward an attitudinal understanding of pretense also achieve what he needs from the view. It needn’t be the pretense view 2.0 which Searle would accept, but this view would still
achieve something similar to what Searle’s original pretense view is intended to do. Such a view allows for an explanation of how fictional speech acts differ from serious speech acts without violating Searle’s determination principle, which was anyway overstated in his own work. Moreover, it would be compatible with Searle’s ideas about fictional ontology and metafictional statements. So, it seems that any tenable version of the pretense view which can achieve these tasks should be acceptable for Searle’s purposes.

Kripke’s project, on the other hand, may not be so easily done by a re-envisioned pretense view. Arguably, despite the problems with defending Kripke’s original pretense view from some of the above objections, Kripke’s pretense view doesn’t even achieve what he claims it does. But if one looks past this feature, it seems like an account like Salmon’s is rather true to Kripke’s project, and it avoids the above objections (other than maybe the objection that one needs a clear and intuitive account of pretense). Still, such an account is in conflict with Kripke’s characterization of the pretense view’s role in giving an account of meaning, and it is in tension with his claim that the pretense view implies fiction cannot adjudicate between theories of reference. On the first point, Kripke states that for any theory of reference whatsoever, it should account for fictional statements and fictional reference by way of the pretense view: i.e. by saying that the fictional name only pretend refers, and that the conditions of reference are only met at the level of the pretense. On Salmon’s account, the pretense is elsewhere, in that the author and audience pretend that fictional statements are true about the character, but the fictional names are taken to actually refer to the fictional characters as abstract objects. This kind of account relies then on a Millian account of reference in how it deals with fictional statements. This would be requiring too much by Kripke’s own measure; recall that he writes of the so-called Frege-Russell theory of naming that it “solves the problems that it raises about fictional works incorrectly” because “one should just say that it is part of the pretense of the story that there are such properties that pick the objects out, known to the narrator” [Kri13, p. 28]. So, Salmon’s account seems guilty of a charge he makes against his opponents, even if it gives a coherent Millian account of fiction as pretense.

There is an even deeper worry with such a view, which is the second tension listed above: such a pretense view does not live up to Kripke’s claim that fiction cannot serve as an adjudicator between theories. As seen in the previous paragraph, because Salmon’s view gives a separate Millian account of fictional statements, it does not any longer fit with Kripke’s idea that the pretense view should combine equally well with all different theories of reference. Yet, this was the idea on which Kripke’s claim that fiction could not adjudicate between theories of reference rested. This claim seemed to be of the form that, given the pretense theory, no theory of reference which is able to explain fictional naming in it’s own terms has any advantage, because all theories can and ought to explain fictional statements by way of pretense. Yet, as is seen in the above section, Salmon’s account relies on some kind of intentional account of names

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61 This is one of the things [Sal11] argues.
in order to give the right result of negative existential statements. While this may be a coherent account, which is also compatible with Millianism, it seems the descriptivist is once again able to claim that their theory is more uniform in its treatment of naming. So, for this reason and the above reason it is unclear whether a theory which stands up to the problems raised in §5 is able to achieve what Kripke aims to achieve with the pretense view.

Ultimately, the pretense view was put forward by these authors in order to achieve the goals discussed here, and just to give an account of fictional statements. The view as they put it forward suffers from some problems which are identified in the literature, and a version of the view which avoids these problems may or may not be equally suited to perform the tasks these authors wish it to. Still, a clear and tenable account of the pretense view may have a role in the future of the philosophy of fiction.

8 Conclusion

In order to conclude this thesis, I would like to simply bring back into view the goal I attempt to achieve with it. This goal is that of understanding and clarifying what is meant by the pretense view, mainly in the work of Searle and Kripke, who are the view’s most well-known supporters, and of determining whether this view (a) is tenable and (b) achieves what these authors want it to achieve. The first undertaking, then, was to establish what Searle and Kripke mean when they put the view forward in their works [Sea75] and [Kri13]. The principal results of this part of the thesis were that these authors both intend to give an account of fictional statements by way of pretended speech acts, whether that be serious illocutionary acts or reference. Additionally, their accounts do posit a kind of leveling or perspective shift between the fiction as viewed from reality and the fiction as understood internally. Then, on this internal level, everything which was pretended in reality, is real/successful. The pretense view was also seen to be independent from some views with which it is often seen intertwined, namely the empty-proposition view, Kripke’s views on modality, and rigid designation. Finally, the view is considered in a unified manner, and determined to be lacking in a basic account of pretense itself.

Moving on from this characterization of the view’s main claims and the identification of a need for an account of pretense, the thesis considers some arguments about the pretense view which exist in the literature. By considering these arguments, I was able to list what things would be required of a good view in order to avoid the objections considered before. These requirements are put together in order to form a new version of the pretense view, which I believe meets the requirements listed. Finally, I consider whether such an improved

62Actually, even in Kripke’s original statement of the pretense view, this argument seems to be question begging. By this argument, if the pretense view is correct, then fiction cannot adjudicate between theories of reference. But without any external argument for the pretense view the conclusion does not follow, and the descriptivist never need accept it. It’s an argument which is only convincing to those already on board.
view is still able to do what the authors intended for the pretense view to do. In taking up this project, I aimed to clarify the pretense view and to make known some of the features of the view which I thought to be unsatisfactory.

By way of this thesis I have come to some insights which I will share rather briefly. Firstly, some of the things which at first glance seem to be wrong with this kind of view are actually baggage from some of the views with which the pretense view is often associated, the main culprit being the empty-proposition view. I don’t argue against it here, but I believe it to be rather problematic. Moreover, the view seems to be somehow incomplete or uninformative, and in the later stages of this thesis I have come to believe that this is due to the focus on fiction as a type of representation performed by the creators of fiction. As I have argued, this kind of account seems to play some role in understanding fiction, but on its own it seems to be more of a characterization of the problems these authors wish to engage with than a solution to them. Finally, while the pretense view put forward by Searle and Kripke may fall short of the kind of account of fictional statements we hope for, the intuitive power of this view seems to indicate that pursuing something along this path nevertheless remains a fruitful venture.
References


