

# Parisian Obligations

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## Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b><i>Obligationes Parisiensis</i></b>	<b>2</b>
2.1	Prologue . . . . .	2
2.1.1	Concerning <i>obligatio</i> and its types . . . . .	3
2.2	Of <i>positio</i> . . . . .	3
2.2.1	Of determinate <i>positio</i> . . . . .	4
2.2.2	Of certain rules concerning ponible <i>positio</i> . . . . .	4
2.2.3	Sophism . . . . .	7
2.2.4	A similar sophism . . . . .	8
2.2.5	Of indeterminate <i>positio</i> . . . . .	9
2.2.6	Of the twofold mode of indeterminate <i>positio</i> . . . . .	10
2.3	Of <i>dubitatur</i> . . . . .	10
2.3.1	Whether <i>dubitatur</i> is an obligation or not . . . . .	10
2.3.2	Concerning certain rules . . . . .	11
2.3.3	Sophism . . . . .	13
<b>3</b>	<b>Pseudo-Sherwood’s <i>Obligationes</i></b>	<b>13</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Commentary</b>	<b>15</b>
4.1	Some roadmaps . . . . .	15
4.1.1	Types of Obligations 1 . . . . .	15
4.1.2	Types of Obligations 2 . . . . .	15
4.1.3	Types of Positio . . . . .	16
4.2	Formalization of the rules . . . . .	16
4.3	Commentary on rule 2.4 . . . . .	16
4.4	Sophism 1 . . . . .	16
4.5	<i>Dubitatio</i> rules . . . . .	17
4.6	Formalization . . . . .	18

## 1 Introduction

This is a work-in-progress translation of and commentary on the anonymous text *Obligationes Parisiensis* edited in [dR75]. The translation and commentary are the result of one of the Latin reading groups at the Institute for Logic, Language

and Computation at the Universiteit van Amsterdam, running Fall 2006 - Spring 2007. The group was headed by Sara L. Uckelman, and consisted variously of Miguel Antonio Matamala, Jaap Maat, Katherina Rybalko, and Andreas Witzel.

De Rijk in his introduction to his edition notes that the organization of the *Parisiensis* text, into *positio*, *depositio*, and *dubitatio*, is similar to the division found in a tract on obligations ascribed by Romuald Green to William of Sherwood. Despite this similarity, de Rijk says that “a comparison of our treatise with William’s seems not to point to any relationship between them” ([dR75], p. 25). Nevertheless, he uses the Sherwood tract as a date *ante quem* for the *Parisiensis* tract, and concludes that the latter text must date from the early 13th century.

Green is tentative in his ascription of the text he edited to Sherwood. These objections were dismissed by de Rijk, who believed that the tract belonged to Sherwood without a doubt. However, Stump says that “there are other serious worries about the attribution of this treatise to Sherwood. . . Careful consideration of these worries. . . make it seem altogether possible that what we really have in the putative Sherwood treatise is an early treatise on obligations by Walter Burley” ([St82], pp. 316–317). Braakhuis in [Br98] agrees with Stump, and says that the treatise should not be dated before the end of the 13th century. If this is the case, then the dating of the *Parisiensis* text may need to be revisited.

We do not address any of the questions raised above. However, we translate the section on *dubitatio* in the Pseudo-Sherwood text in §3, in order to compare it with that found the *Parisiensis* text.

## 2 *Obligationes Parisiensis*

### 2.1 Prologue

Twofold is the aim of disputationers and following this twofold definition, twofold is disputation. The first aim is a knowledge or belief of things *simpliciter*. Hence disputation according to this aim is based on belief *simpliciter* and without stipulation. For this reason, disputationers of this type of disputations are pursuing the truth of things, either existing or apparent. The other definition is an exercise or being exercised. However disputation according to this aim is not based on belief *simpliciter* but based on belief under a condition/stipulation. For this reason, disputationers of this type of disputations are not concerned with truth of things *simpliciter* but [rather with] the truth which things have under the stipulation. For example, when there is no fact of the obligation, the opponent and respondent pursue the truth of things in opposing and responding, namely according to the belief and knowledge they have of the same. But when there is an obligation about something, the opponent opposes/argues not only about things true *simpliciter* or things believed *simpliciter*, but also the consequences according to the obligation, and in this way [it is] belief under stipulation and not true things *simpliciter*. But if the *obligatum* is true, the respondent similarly does not attend to the truth or falsity of things except compared to the obligation. Whence belief or knowledge of the consequence of things best is acquired by this type of disputation. And this type of disputation is more often used in accidental things because in these things a consequence

is more manifest than are necessary ones. Indeed things sometimes imply each other because of a term, as in *that Socrates is an animal* implies *that Socrates is human* not on account of a natural consequence but on account of nature. Which does not happen in accidental things, because *that Socrates is colored* does not imply *that Socrates is white*.

### 2.1.1 Concerning *obligatio* and its types

The foremost of this disputation is *obligatio*. And the principle of the types of this disputation are the types of *obligatio*. Therefore, it should be said what an *obligatio* is and [what are] the types and the differences of the alternative types.

*Obligatio* is a fixing in advance<sup>1</sup> of something pertinent to the disputation.

Further, the species of *obligationes* are divided into diverse modes.<sup>2</sup> Some [are divided] according to the differences of the responding, e.g. *positio*, *depositio*, *dubitetur*. For, *positio* requires conceding, *depositio* refusing, *dubitetur* responding “prove it!”

Further, the types of *obligatio* are *institutio*, *rei veritatis*, [and] *petitio*. *Institutio* differs from the others in that this is concerning what is said<sup>3</sup> in it [i.e., the *obligatio*] fashioning new significations, but the others are concerning things. So if it is instituted that these names ‘man’ [and] ‘donkey’ are fixed to be synonymous<sup>4</sup> names, this is conceded: ‘A man is a donkey’. If it is put forward in truth, it is not conceded, for it fixes an impossibility. *Institutio* is divided into *institutio* certain and *institutio* uncertain or obscure, for example if the name ‘Marcus’ is fixed that it might be a name of Socrates or Plato, but you would not know of which. And *rei veritatis* differs from *positio* because when *rei veritatis* has been done, then concerning any thing irrelevant or not following, it is not refused, but on the other hand if *positio* has been done, then it is to be refused. Whence it is said “*rei veritatis* is that the Antichrist exists”, then concerning this: “The Antichrist is white” the response is “prove it!”, but if *positio* has been done the response to the same is: “It is false!”. And further, *petitio* differs from *positio* in that *petitio* is restricted to acts, but *positio* to holding [things] as true.

## 2.2 Of *positio*

But *positio* is a prefixing of an utterable to be held for true. Moreover, some of *positio* are determinate, some indeterminate. [A *positio* is] determinate when some determinate utterable is put down. [A *positio* is] indeterminate when some utterable indeterminate between two [things] is put down, ‘between two’ only in so far as, I say, because [it is] without disjunction<sup>5</sup>. Like when it is said that ‘it is put down that either God is or the Antichrist is’, such a *positio* may not be passed over in disjunction but in parts.

Further, determinate *positio* is sometimes certain, sometimes uncertain. It is certain when what utterable is put down is certain, uncertain when it is dubious.

<sup>1</sup>Latham s.v. *prefix/io* c. 1281, 15c., ‘pre-arrangement, fixing’.

<sup>2</sup>OR: they are divided into modes diversely

<sup>3</sup>*voces* ‘word, utterances’

<sup>4</sup>Latham s.v. *synonym/us* 790, a 1250

<sup>5</sup>‘separation’

If for instance the aforementioned *institutio* is made and put down that Marcus runs, the *positio* is uncertain or obscure.

And further, *positio* is sometimes true, sometimes false. A false *positio* is either possible or impossible. It is possible when a possible utterable is put down, impossible, when an impossible utterable is put down.

Concerning determinate certain false possible *positio* we are presently speaking.

### 2.2.1 Of determinate *positio*

Further, an utterable is sometimes possible sometimes impossible. Impossible, like ‘A falsehood is put down’ and whatever is convertible with this, possible, like ‘Socrates runs’.

### 2.2.2 Of certain rules concerning possible *positio*.

Moreover, two rules teach how a possible *positum* may be bound to be sustained. The first of these is concerning negations (refusals), the other concerning concessions.

**Rule 2.1.** Every *positum* which has been set down (proposed) under the same form of speech of what is [first] put down, everything following from the *positum* and a thing conceded or things conceded and everything true and not repugnant to these, is conceded.

The second of such [rules] is:

**Rule 2.2.** The opposite of the *positum* and every false thing not following from the *positum* and a thing conceded or things conceded and the opposite or opposites of things correctly denied or a thing correctly denied and every true thing repugnant to these is denied.

In order that it is correctly judged concerning whatever proposition, such a consideration is made beyond the predicated rules: When something is accepted in *positio*, if something is proposed, it should be considered of the proposition whether it may be true or false. If true, either something is previously conceded or previously negated, or nothing is. If nothing, the opposite of the true proposition is assumed and the proposition is put down in a conditional in the antecedent, and the opposite of the true proposition is in the consequent of this conditional. And likewise the regulated thing<sup>6</sup> either is true or false. If true, the true proposition is repugnant and is to be negated, if false, it is not repugnant and is to be conceded. If however something is previously conceded or previously negated, the *positum* is assumed with the thing or things conceded, if more things have been conceded, and with the opposite or opposites of the negated, and put down in the antecedent of a conditional, and the opposite of a true proposition in the consequent. This conditional will be either true or false. If true, the true proposition is repugnant and is to be negated, if false, it is not repugnant and is to be conceded. If however the proposition is false, either something is previously conceded or previously negated or nothing. If nothing, the *positum* is assumed in the antecedent of the conditional and the

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<sup>6</sup> *ordinata*

false proposition in the consequent. This conditional will be either true or false. If true, the false proposition is the consequent and conceded. If false, it does not follow, and is to be negated. If however something is previously conceded or previously negated, or some things, the *positum* is assumed with the thing or things conceded and the opposite or opposites of a thing or things correctly negated, and put down in the antecedent of a conditional and the false proposition in the consequent. This conditional either will be true or false. If true, the first *propositum* follows and is to be conceded, if false, it does not follow and is to be negated.

For example: It is put down that Antichrist exists. You must put it as ‘Antichrist is’, this is the *positum* and *propositum* under the same form of speech which which it was posed. Therefore it is conceded. If however it was put down that M[arcus] runs and it was put down before ‘Cicero runs’, it is not to be conceded, by doubt that the words ‘Marcus runs’ signify the *positum*.

Then it is put forward that ‘The Antichrist is colored’. This is something false. Therefore consider whether something may be previously conceded or previously negated or nothing. And it’s agreed that nothing except the *positum* [has been previously put down]. See therefore whether it may follow, putting it in the consequent of a conditional and the *positum* in the antecedent, in this way: ‘if the Antichrist exists, the Antichrist is colored’. It is agreed that this is true. Therefore, the Antichrist being colored is a consequences of the *positum*. Therefore it is conceded. You must put it in this way: ‘Antichrist is white’. This is something false. Consider whether something may be previously conceded or previously negated, or nothing. It is agreed that something is previously conceded. See therefore whether it follows, by fashioning a conditional, namely that ‘if the Antichrist [is] and the Antichrist is colored, the Antichrist is white’. This conditional is false. Therefore ‘Antichrist being colored’ is false and doesn’t follow from the *positum*. Therefore it is refused. Therefore it may be negated. Then in this manner ‘Antichrist is not neutral’. This is something true. And it is agreed that something is previously conceded and something previously negated. See therefore whether the Antichrist not being neutral is repugnant, putting down to the opposite of this in the consequent of a conditional, in this way ‘if the Antichrist [is], and the Antichrist is colored, and the Antichrist is not white, the Antichrist is neutral’. This conditional is false. Therefore the Antichrist being neutral does not follow. Therefore the Antichrist being not neutral is not repugnant. And it is true. Therefore it is true and not repugnant. Therefore it is conceded. With what is conceded is put forth that ‘Antichrist is black’. This is something false. It is agreed that somethings are conceded and something is negated. See therefore whether Antichrist being black is a consequence of the *positum* and the conceded things and the opposite of the negated thing, in this way: ‘if the Antichrist is and the Antichrist is colored and the Antichrist is not white and the Antichrist is not neutral, the Antichrist is black’. This conditional is true. Therefore Antichrist being black is a false sequence. Therefore it is conceded. The procedure is similar, whatever propositions are put down. If however it concerns something to be put down concerning which you should doubt whether it is true or false, see by the same judgement whether it follows or is repugnant or neither follows nor is not repugnant. And if it follows, concede it, if it is repugnant, deny it, if neutral, respond ‘prove it!’. Just as if after the aforementioned propositions, it is put down that ‘the stars are equal’, the response is ‘prove it!’, because it neither follows nor is repugnant.

Further. It must be perceived that greatest attention is to the order of propositions in false *positio*. For something is conceded in the first place that in the second place is negated, and conversely, because something is repugnant in the second place which is not repugnant in the first place. For example. It is put down that you are in Rome. Thence in this way: ‘I am talking to you.’ This is something true and not repugnant. Indeed the opposite of this does not follow. Therefore it is conceded. With what is conceded is put forth that ‘I am in Paris’. This is something true and repugnant. Indeed the opposite of this follows from the *positum* and the conceded thing. Therefore it is to be denied. If however it was put down in the converse order, the responder is in the converse mode concerning this.

From the aforesaid things the truth of this rule is clear:

**Rule 2.3.** From a false, possible *positum*, any contingent thing is possible to be conceded and affirmed.

For example: In truth Socrates is black. It is put down that Socrates is white. You must put it in this way: ‘Socrates is white and you are not a bishop.’ If he conceded, *contra* you concede something false and not following. Therefore [you do] badly. Indeed it doesn’t follow ‘Socrates is white and you are not a bishop’. If he denies, it is put down that ‘It is not the case that Socrates is white and you are not a bishop’. This is the opposite of the negated thing. Therefore it is conceded. From what is conceded it may be inferred that ‘Socrates is white’. This is the *positum*. Therefore it is conceded. In this way it is inferred that ‘Therefore, it’s not the case that you are not a bishop, therefore you are a bishop.’ And similarly [for] any false contingent you may have desired to prove, you must assume the opposite of it in a copula with the false *positum* and the copulation will be false and not following from the *positum*. Whence it is to be negated. But from the opposite of this and the *positum* follows something false which you intend to prove.

Furthermore. It is known that the aforesaid rule does not hold following a consequence of names. If indeed it would hold following them, it would belong to a false possible *positum* to prove anything impossible, by supposing the opposite of the false impossible in copulation with the *positum*. For this false copulative may be made to not follow according to names. Whence it is to be negated according to those. But from the opposite of this and the *positum* follows a false impossible.

Further: From this ultimate part of the rule, “Every thing repugnant to the *positum* is to be denied”, the truth of this is had:

**Rule 2.4.** From a false possible *positum* concerning a specific instant, it must be denied that this instant exists.

Which means as much as the present time being impossible with something false in the specific instant. For as soon as that falsehood is changed from falsity into truth, so quickly ‘this instant being’ is false. Therefore let it be that Socrates in truth may be black and *A* may be the name of the specific instant. Thence this. It is put down that Socrates is white. Thereafter it is also put down *A*. If he concedes, then it may be inferred ‘therefore Socrates is white in *A*’. *Contra*. You have conceded the impossible, in a possible *tibi facta positio*. Therefore [you have done] badly. If he denies, then it is put down

that ‘A comes to be future’. If he denies, *contra* – you have denied the truth, in a possible *positum*. Therefore [you have done] badly. If he concedes, thence this: ‘A has been’. If he concedes, *contra* – you have conceded something false and not following. Therefore [you have done] badly. If he denies, then this: ‘A will be’. If he concedes, *contra* – you have conceded something impossible, in a possible *positum*. Therefore [you have done] badly. If he denies, *contra* – you have denied something which follows from the *positum*, and something conceded, and the opposites of the things denied. Therefore [you have done] badly. Indeed this, if Socrates is white and A is not and A is not [now] becoming and A becomes future, A will be.

Solution: ‘A is’ is denied, the second proposition is conceded, the third is denied, the last, namely ‘A will be’, is conceded. Indeed it follows from the *positum*. If however this ‘A comes to be future’ is put down lastly, all premises are denied. It does not follow ‘You have conceded or denied an impossible *non possibili facta positione*, therefore [you have done] badly’. Indeed it is a double impossibility, it is evidently impossible *per se* and *per accidens*. Similarly it is a double necessity, it is evidently necessary *per se* and *per accidens*. An impossible *per se* is not conceded, in a possible *positum*. However, an impossible *per accidens* correctly is able to be conceded in a possible *positum*. Whence when ‘A will be’ will have been impossible *per accidens* – indeed whenever A had been able to be true, but now is neither able nor will be able to be true, – it itself had been able to be conceded in a possible *positum* when it might have followed. Similarly in a possible *positum*, a necessity *per se* is not bound to be denied, but a necessity *per accidens* is able to be denied. But ‘A having been future’ is necessary *per accidens*, however it has been possible to be false, but [now] it is neither possible nor will be possible to be false. Whence finally the proposition is denied, [though] not in opposition to the opposite of the things correctly denied.

### 2.2.3 Sophism

Consequently, the previously supposed rule may be applied concerning this sophisma

**It is possible that you are obliged to concede that A is not.** Proof. It is possible for a false possible to be put down. But if a false possible is put down, you are required to deny ‘A is’. And if you are required to deny that ‘A is’, you are required to concede that ‘A is not’. Therefore it is possible for you to be required to concede ‘A is not’. Therefore it may be put down. If he accepts it, *cedat tempus*. The *positum* either was true or was false. If true, then ‘A is’ was true. However a true thing is not repugnant to a true thing. Therefore ‘A is’ was not repugnant to the *positum*. Therefore ‘A is’ didn’t have to be denied. Therefore ‘A is not’ didn’t have to be conceded. Therefore you were not being required to concede ‘A is not’. Therefore it was false that you are required to concede ‘A is not’. And this was the *positum*. Therefore the *positum* was false. And it was said that it was true. Since [it is] false and possible, therefore the *positum* was a false possible. But from a false possible *positum*, ‘A is’ must be denied. Therefore ‘A is’ had to be denied. Therefore, ‘A is not’ had to be conceded. Therefore you were being required to concede ‘A is not’. Therefore it was true that you are required to concede ‘A is not’. And this was the *positum*. Therefore the *positum* was true. And it was said that [it was] false.

Solution. The *positio* need not be accepted. For example it is converted with ‘a falsehood is put down’. Indeed it follows that if you are required to concede ‘A is not’, you are required to concede a falsehood. And if you are required to concede a falsehood, the *positum* is false. Therefore, from the first, if you are required to concede the falsehood ‘A is not’, the *positum* is false.

Moreover. Conversely if the *positum* is false, it must be denied that ‘A is’. From this you are required to concede ‘A is not’. Therefore, from the first, if the *positum* is false, you are required to concede ‘A is not’.

Further. Suppose it is put down that you deny something. Thence in this way: ‘A is’. If he concedes, *contra*—you deny something [which] was a false possible. And it was the *positum*. Therefore the *positum* was a false possible. But from a false possible *positum* ‘A is’ must be denied. And you conceded it. Therefore [you have done] badly. If he says ‘prove it!’, similarly something insuitable follows. If he denies, *contra*—you deny something [which] was true. And it was the *positum*. Therefore the *positum* was true. But in a true *positum*, nothing true must be denied. Truly, nothing true is repugnant to truth. And ‘A is’ was true. Therefore ‘A is’ didn’t have to be denied. And you denied it. Therefore [you have done] badly. If he distinguishes diverse times, saying that the *positum* was false before the time of response and for that time ‘A is’ must be denied, then he may be challenged as soon as he answers before the time of response.

#### 2.2.4 A similar sophism

A entirely similar sophism is: **It is possible that you must concede something and the proposition is that, A is not.**

First solution: The *positio* is accepted. If he responds before a time other than before the time of response, it must be denied that ‘A is’. But before the time of response it is not possible to respond. Therefore when he says that you deny that something was false, you must say: It is true before the time before the response; but in the time of response it was true, but it doesn’t follow that I responded badly, because I did not respond before the time of response, but before another. Therefore if he asks that the response be allowed before the time of response, the petition is not accepted. Indeed he asks when the response may depend on this itself. Similarly the petition may be accepted, and this ‘A is not’ may be conceded before before a time other than the time of response. And when it is said *contra* you concede something false [as] true, you must say that it was true in the time of response, false in the time before the response, and it doesn’t follow therefore that I answered badly, because the response was not done before the time of response in which the *positum* was true and ‘A is not’ was to be negated, but before a time other than the time in which the *positum* was false and in which ‘A is not’ must be conceded.

Moreover, an enuntiable is sometimes ponible, sometimes imponible. An imponible is that which is ‘a falsehood is put down’ and everything convertible with this. A ponible is that which is not convertible with this, that is, ‘a falsehood is put down’, as long as it is not convertible with that. Indeed some enuntiable is not convertible with ‘a falsehood is put down’ before the *positum*, but [if] the *positio* is made, then it becomes convertible with this. For example, call A ‘something is the *positum*’, B ‘*apparet* the *positum* is dissimilar to A’. It is put down that B. *Cedat tempus*. B either was true or was false. If true,

$A$  was true. Therefore the *positum* was similar to  $A$ . Therefore it was false that the *positum* was dissimilar to  $A$ . And this was the *positum*. Therefore the *positum* was false. If false, then  $A$  was true. Therefore it was dissimilar to  $A$ . Therefore it was true that the *positum* was dissimilar to  $A$ . And this was the *positum*. Therefore the *positum* was true.

Solution.  $B$  was not able to be put down, not because it was convertible with ‘a falsehood is put down’, but because, if it is put down, it is convertible with itself. Indeed before the time of the *positio*,  $A$  is false. Whence ‘the *positum* is dissimilar to  $A$ ’ is ‘the *positum* is true’. But in the act of the *positio*  $A$  was true. Whence ‘the *positum* is dissimilar to  $A$ ’ is ‘the *positum* is true’ [sic]<sup>7</sup>. But in the act of the *positio* it was true. Whence ‘the *positum* is dissimilar to  $A$ ’ was convertible with ‘the *positum* is false’.

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### 2.2.5 Of indeterminate *positio*

Likewise: Indeterminate *positio* is when one of two things is put down under disjunction, but it is not known which. For example. It may be put down that Socrates is white or Plato is white. This is duplex, because a disjunction is able to be included in ‘it may be put down’, and so a determinate *positio* is made disjunctively of what was said. Indeed the disjunction can be included. Whence this may be put down ‘It may be put down that Socrates is white or Plato is white’. When it has been received in *positio*, for each of these ‘Socrates is white’, ‘Plato is white’, the answer is ‘prove it!’, unless in truth Socrates may be white or Plato. Indeed concerning both it is unclear which is the *positum*.

But contra. Every disjunction falls between concepts of the mind and not between mental acts. If indeed it was between mental acts, this would be false: ‘The stars are even or odd’, because then the truth of this would be forced: ‘I believe the stars are even or the stars are odd.’ Therefore when it is said that ‘it may be put down that Socrates is white or Plato is white’, the alternative only falls between concepts and not between acts or exercises. But *positio* is here as it is exercised. Therefore a disjunction is not of a *positio ad positio*. Therefore only a disjunction is included. Therefore only a determinate thing is put down disjunctively there.

Moreover. As often as it happens that this disjunction ‘Your run or you dispute’ is verified, so often it happens that this petition ‘Run or dispute!’ suffices. Therefore by equal reason as often as it happens that this disjunction ‘You concede that Socrates is white or you concede that Plato is white’ is verified, so often it happens that this petition ‘It may be put down that Socrates is white or Plato is white’ suffices. But by two ways the first disjunction is verified, namely in the deduction of this ‘Socrates is white’ or of this ‘Plato is white’. Therefore it is also satisfied in the first petition, either it is conceded that Socrates is white or it is conceded that Plato is white. Therefore it is not the case that concerning both of which, when determinate *positio* has been made, the response is ‘prove it!’, on the contrary, he responds to either of which he desires, [and] it must be conceded.

Solution. In this fashion it may be put down ‘Socrates is white or Plato is white’ to be disputed, ‘or’ is understood in indeterminate *positio*. If indeed ‘it is

<sup>7</sup>This really should be ‘the *positum* is false’.

put down' may include a disjunction, what is said is put down disjunctively [and] determinately. If however conversely, then the disjunction is made between two entreaties. Whence just as according to truth of a disjunctive proposition the truth of one part is weighed and *gratia* of one that is known to the respondent is able to be conceded, just as for a disjunctive request whichever of one part the respondent wishes will suffice for our desires. So the respondent in *positio* made in this way is obliged to concede *ut cuius posito* what is admitted and to deny what is denied, according to its quality.

### 2.2.6 Of the twofold mode of indeterminate *positio*

However an indeterminate *positio* occurs in a twofold mode. In the first out of equivocation of some term which the opponent uses and the respondent, not knowing in which signification. As in if it is put down 'a dog runs'. In the second as if Marcus may be a name of Cicero but you do not know which, and it may be put down 'Marcus runs'. However in either mode the response is 'prove it!' for each of the indeterminate *posita*.

## 2.3 Of *dubitatur*

Like the three-fold responses, threefold is the obligation: *positio*, committing to concession, *depositio*, committing to denial, *dubitatur*, for the response 'Prove it!'. Therefore I have spoken of the first two, [and] following of the third.

### 2.3.1 Whether *dubitatur* is an obligation or not

In the first case concerning which, whether to doubt is able to be an obligation or not. However it is generally said that it is. Indeed by whatever method someone is able to be obliged to concede or deny, by the same method [he can be obliged] for responding 'Prove it!'.

But contra. Certain probation is not of wisdom, according which kind of probation of wisdom is concession or negation. Indeed a wise man is not in doubt over something, but when true knows it and concedes it, however falsity the opposite of truth he flees and denies. Whence it is clear that the method of the wise is artifice, however the method of the ignorant is not artifice. However [this] artifice is not made through reason of extrinsic things or through doubting or through ignorance existing in the mind of the respondent. Therefore when the method is artifice, as in concession and negation, it has art in itself, the third method, namely doubting, because it is inartifice, is not required to have art in itself. Therefore no art is required to be concerning doubting.

Moreover. In a disputation either demonstrative or doctrinal, the doctor and the disciple, one is wise while the other is ignorant. However in dialectic disputation both of the disputants are wise having reason in their own part. Whence dialectic art has two parts, namely the art of the opponent and the art of the respondent. But demonstrative art has no art except the art of the opponent. Whence it is clear that nothing is required to be an art rectifying doubt or ignorance.

Solution. Disputation is twofold, namely absolute and restricted. Absolute disputation has art in itself, rectifying the opponent and respondent in conceding and negating, but not however in responding 'prove it!' Indeed this response is

of ignorance, therefore not having art, if indeed it was having art, it would not be ignorance. Whence dialectic has the art of the respondent in the tradition of the eight [book] of the *Topics*. Indeed the dialectician responding must be wise and withstand the opponent. Whence he must only concede or deny. In truth demonstrative science does not have the art of the respondent. Indeed the disciple does not have something from which he would be able to withstand in teaching but he is only receiving, not contradicting. By this way the method of doubting has no art in itself in absolute disputation.

However, in restricted disputation, or through a constructed hypothesis, it has art in itself which rectifies the respondent not only in conceding or denying but indeed in the third response. Indeed just as in some *positum* it is necessary for every sequence following from it to be put down and repugnant things to be destroyed, according to which bequeathed art may teach in false *positio*, which is necessary for a correctly sustained *positum* – just as for some *dubitatum* it is necessary to doubt something. Whence for a correctly sustained *dubitatum* an art is necessary, teaching what will be sustained in some *dubitatum*. Whence it is clear that although in an absolute disputation, the response of doubting does not have art in itself, it is able to have it only in prefixing something for doubt.

### 2.3.2 Concerning certain rules

Which [that is, the art of doubting] consists in the rules subsequently put down. The first of such is

**Rule 2.5.** Everything antecedent to the *dubitatum* must be held true or doubtful, that is [not] false.

The second of such is

**Rule 2.6.** Everything following from the *dubitatum* must be held not false, that is true or doubtful.

However these rules, it must be understood, are concerning things which are not convertible with the *dubitatum*. Indeed everything convertible with the *dubitatum* must be doubted whether it is true or whether it is false. But because these rules are too general – indeed they do not teach determinately some art of the response – in the following special rules are summed up below these which teach concerning which of the propositions may be answered by which special response.

Therefore it is known that

**Rule 2.7.** Certain things antecedent to the *dubitatum* are true, certain are false.

Moreover

**Rule 2.8.** Of enuntiatives, some are antecedent to the *dubitatum* through themselves (*per se*), some are antecedent to the *dubitatum* with a conceded thing or conceded things or the opposite of a denied thing or opposites of denied things.

And

**Rule 2.9.** Everything convertible with the *dubitatum* and every opposite of the *dubitatum* must be doubted.

Moreover

**Rule 2.10.** Every false antecedent of the *dubitatum* the opposite of which the opposite of which is not a true thing being doubted must be denied.

Further

**Rule 2.11.** Of things following from the *dubitatum*, some are true, some are false. However every truth following from the *dubitatum* must be conceded, but every falsehood following from the *dubitatum* must be doubted.

For example. In the truth of things Socrates is white. It may be doubted whether Socrates is white or black. In this way: ‘Socrates is colored’, this is a certain truth following from the *dubitatum*. Therefore it is conceded. Thence this: Socrates is not neutral. This is a certain thing preceding with the conceded thing from the *dubitatum*. Indeed this follows correctly: ‘if Socrates is colored and Socrates is not neutral, then Socrates is white or black’. Therefore it must be doubted.

However

**Rule 2.12.** Of things repugnant to the *dubitatum*, some are repugnant through themselves, some through an accident, such as through a consequence of the *dubitatum*.

Just as when it is doubted ‘Socrates is white’, ‘Socrates is not white’ is through itself repugnant with the *dubitatum*, but ‘Socrates is not colored’ is repugnant to the same *per accidens*, because through ‘Socrates is colored’, that is a consequence of doubt.

Similarly

**Rule 2.13.** Of things repugnant to the *dubitatum*, some are contradictory opposites or convertible with them, some are contraries.

Moreover

**Rule 2.14.** Everything repugnant to the *dubitatum* through itself and contradictorily must be doubted, repugnant in truth through itself and contrary must be held to be not true, as false, if it is known to be false, and as doubtful, if it is doubted. Also everything repugnant *per accidens* and contradictorily similarly must be held to be not true,

indeed the opposite of which, when a consequent of the *dubitatum*, must be held not false,

**Rule 2.15.** also similarly for things repugnant *per accidens* and contrarily.

Further. In as many modes *insolubilia* are able to occur in *positio* and *depositio*, in that many modes [they are able to occur] in *dubitatio*. And therefore in the same way caution must be had in accepting an obligation of doubting, and in the motive of the same, which is in *positio* and *depositio*.

### 2.3.3 Sophism

According to this we may dispute of this sophism: ‘I ask that you do not respond to something doubtful unless you doubt it or by the method of *obligatio* it must be doubted and you do not concede something unless it is seen to be true.’ Let it be doubted that the Antichrist is white. Whence this: ‘The Antichrist is colored’. If he concedes, *cedat tempus*. You have conceded a falsehood not obligated by that which has been conceded. Therefore [you have done] badly. If he denies, then this: ‘The Antichrist is not colored’. This is the opposite of what was previously denied. Therefore it must be conceded. From what has been conceded it may be inferred ‘therefore, the Antichrist is not white’. If he concedes, *cedat tempus*. You have conceded the opposite of the *dubitatum*. Therefore [you have done] badly. If he says to this, ‘The Antichrist is colored’, ‘prove it!’, *cedat tempus*. It was asked that you not respond doubtfully to something except for what you are obligated by the directions to doubt. But you have been obligated by the directions to doubt ‘Antichrist is colored’, seeing that it was following from what must be doubted, it must be held only for not false according to the preceding rules. Therefore you have responded badly, because it is contrary to the petition.

Solution. From the opposite of the aforesaid rules, namely of the general ones only, not, however, the special ones, it is evident that through they themselves, he is not bound directly to doubt ‘Antichrist is colored’. Whence following the first part [of the response] of the petition it is not required to respond doubtfully. But the second part of the petition prohibits responding affirmatively, however *dubitatio* prohibits responding negatively. Whence the parts of the petition are not able to both remain when in *dubitatio* the third [rule] is assumed with the first [two] rules. In truth it may be assumed with the special rules, a *dubitatio* is able to be received and both parts of the petition. And the response must be ‘Prove it!’ or doubtful, because according to the rules an obligation is directly made to doubt ‘Antichrist is colored’.

## 3 Pseudo-Sherwood’s *Obligationes*

*Dubitatio prout hic sumitur* is the prefixing of an enuntiable to be held as something doubtful. And for this reason, the rule of the *dubitatum* is this:

**Rule 3.1.** For every *dubitatum*, in the time of the *dubitatio propositum*, the response is doubtful.

Similarly for everything convertible with the *dubitatum* and for every contradictory of the *dubitatum*, the response is doubtful, seeing that it would be impossible to doubt one of a contradictory unless the remainder is [also] doubted.

And because we are able to doubt the antecedent and to know the consequent to be true – indeed in seeing something in a remote place, we know that it is a body and we doubt whether it may be an animal or not – for this reason a consequence of the *dubitatum*, if it is true, must be conceded. But if the consequence of the *dubitatum* is false, for that, the response is doubtful, because it need not be conceded, when it is false, nor denied, because in a denied consequent, it is necessary to deny the antecedent, and therefore it would be necessary to deny the *dubitatum*. And for this reason for a false consequence of the *dubitatum* the

response is doubtful. Similarly, in a doubtful consequence, it is not necessary to deny the antecedent, because we deny that a king sits and nevertheless we know it to be false that every animal sits. For this reason, if an antecedent of the *dubitatum* is false, it must be denied. If it is true, the response is doubtful for that; indeed it does not have to be denied, when it is true; nor conceded, because it is antecedent to the *dubitatum*, and in a conceded antecedent, it is necessary to concede the consequent, and in that way it is necessary to concede the *dubitatum*. And for this reason, if an antecedent of the *dubitatum* is true, for that, the response is doubtful.

Whence the rules are these:

**Rule 3.2.** for the *dubitatum* and for its convertible and for its contradictory and for its consequence, if it is false, and for its antecedent, if it is true, the response is doubtful. But if the antecedent is false, it must be denied, and the consequent, if it is true, must be conceded; and *hoc loquendo* of the antecedent and the consequent of things not convertible.

And for irrelevant things the response is according to its quality.

However it will be seen that the opposite of the *dubitatum* must be conceded, as in such a case: if Socrates is white in reality, and this you can correctly know. It is doubted whether Socrates is white. Next: You doubt whether Socrates is white. This is a falsehood known to be false, therefore it must be denied. Next: You know that Socrates is white. This must be denied, because it is antecedent to the *dubitatum*. Next: Socrates is not white. If you concede, you concede the opposite of the *dubitatum*, and the propositum is held. If you deny, *cedat tempus*, you deny something following from the opposite of something correctly denied. Indeed it follows: you do not doubt that Socrates is white, nor do you know that Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is not white. It is clear that this consequence is good, for from the opposite of the consequence with one part of the antecedent follows the opposite of the other part. Because, if Socrates is white, and you do not know that Socrates is white, you doubt that Socrates is white. And for this reason for this ‘you doubt that Socrates is white’ the response is doubtful; indeed it does not have to be conceded, when a falsehood is known to be false, nor denied, because, in denying, it is necessary to concede the opposite of the *dubitatum*, as was argued.

Previously specified rules in *positio* and in *depositio* must here be sustained, namely: All responses have to refer back to the same instant. Similarly, in the art of *obligatoria* greatest attention is to the order. Similarly, the question of disciplinability here need not be made known. Similarly, in a *dubitatum* proving to be true, this proposition must be conceded: The *dubitatum* is true. Nevertheless of the same, that is the *dubitatum*, never must it be conceded that it itself is true. Similarly, in a false contingent *dubitatum*, *contingit* to doubt anything false *sibi compossibile*. For example: you will doubt you are in Rome, and it is put down: ‘you are in Rome’ and ‘you are a bishop’ are similar. This must be conceded, because it is true and irrelevant. Next: You are a bishop. For this the response is doubtful, because it it was conceded, it is necessary to concede the *dubitatum* and if it was denied, it is necessary to deny the *dubitatum*.

One rule is:

**Rule 3.3.** no matter how it may be doubted whether a truth contingent thing must be conceded or a false contingent thing must be denied, *concesso isto* what

was doubted must be denied, or *negato isto* what was doubted must be denied, it is necessary to respond doubtful for this ‘only this is obligated’, *demonstrato* to you *dubitato*.

Because otherwise a *dubitatum* would have been conceded or denied. For example: it is doubted that ‘you sit’ must be conceded. And it is put down: You sit. This must be conceded, because it is true and not antecedent to the *dubitatum*. It is seen that this must be conceded, when it is true in reality. With what has been conceded it is put down that ‘you sit’ must be conceded. If you concede, you concede the *dubitatum*. If you deny, you deny something following, because this follows: you sit, and only ‘that you sit must be conceded’ is obligated, therefore that you sit must be conceded.

The solution of this is clear, because for this ‘only this is obligated’ the response is doubtful.

Another rule is:

**Rule 3.4.** Whenever it is doubted of an impossible that it must be denied, or of a necessity that it must be conceded, the response is doubtful for this: ‘only this is obligated’ (*demonstrato dubitato*).

For example: it is doubted that a man is an ass must be denied. And it is put down: Only this is obligated (*demonstrato dubitato*). If it is conceded, an antecedent of the *dubitatum* is conceded, because if only that is obligated, then only a possible is obligated, and in addition therefore, whatever is impossible must be denied, and thus, a man is an ass must be denied. If it is deny that ‘only this is obligated’, something true and known to be true is denied, of which the opposited is not obliged.

The solution is clear: for this ‘only this is obligated’ the response is doubtful.

## 4 Commentary

### 4.1 Some roadmaps

#### 4.1.1 Types of Obligations 1

#### 4.1.2 Types of Obligations 2

### 4.1.3 Types of Positio

## 4.2 Formalization of the rules

Here is a formal representation of rules 2.1 and 2.2.

Let  $p_0$  be the *positum*.

$$\Pi_0 = \{p_0\} \quad (1)$$

$$\Pi_{n+1} = \begin{cases} \Pi_n \cup \{p_{n+1}\} & \text{if } p_{n+1} \text{ is true and } \bigwedge \Pi_n \rightarrow \neg p_{n+1} \text{ is false or} \\ & \text{if } p_{n+1} \text{ is false and } \bigwedge \Pi_n \rightarrow p_{n+1} \text{ is true.} \\ \Pi_n \cup \{\neg p_{n+1}\} & \text{if } p_{n+1} \text{ is true and } \bigwedge \Pi_n \rightarrow p_{n+1} \text{ is true or} \\ & \text{if } p_{n+1} \text{ is false and } \bigwedge \Pi_n \rightarrow \neg p_{n+1} \text{ is false.} \\ \Pi_n & \text{if neither } \bigwedge \Pi_n \rightarrow p_{n+1} \text{ nor } \bigwedge \Pi_n \rightarrow \neg p_{n+1} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

## 4.3 Commentary on rule 2.4

If you have a possible *positum* which is false in the present instant, than from this it must be denied that the present instant is (the present instant). This is because if the *positum* is false now, the negation of the *positum* is true now, so it must be denied that ‘now’ is ‘now’, because otherwise the respondent would be required to concede that the *positum* is both true and false now.

## 4.4 Sophism 1

General notes: A false possible statement may always be put down as a *positum*. Per rule 2.4, if an f.p. is put down, ‘A is’ must be denied. If ‘A is’ must be denied, ‘A is not’ must be conceded. (As with the example following rule 2.4, A is the name of the present instant.)

Analysis: Let  $S$  = ‘You are obliged to concede ‘A is not’’. Let  $S$  be put down, and accepted. The obligation ends.

$S$  was either true or false.

If it was true, then ‘A is’ was true. Since two truths are never repugnant (and by assumption ‘A is’ is true), then you didn’t have to deny ‘A is’. But if

you didn't have to deny 'A is', then you weren't required to concede 'A is not'. But then *S* is false.

Since *S* is a false possible (that it is possible was argued earlier), it may be put down as a *positum*. By rule 2.4, 'A is' must be denied. But then you are required to concede 'A is not'. But this is *S*, so *S* was true.

#### 4.5 *Dubitatio* rules

1. Everything antecedent to the *dubitatum* must be held true or doubtful, that is [not] false. (*Omne antecedens ad dubitatum habendum est pro vero vel dubio, idest pro [non] falso.*)
2. Everything following from the *dubitatum* must be held not false, that is true or doubtful. (*Omne sequens ad dubitatum, habendum est pro non falso, idest pro vero vel dubio.*)
3. Certain things antecedent to the *dubitatum* are true, certain are false. (*Antecedens ad dubitatum quoddam est verum, quoddam est falsum.*)
4. Of enuntiables, some are antecedent to the *dubitatum* through themselves (*per se*), some are antecedent to the *dubitatum* with a conceded thing or conceded things or the opposite of a denied thing or opposites of denied things. (*Enuntiabilium quoddam est antecedens per se ad dubitatum, quoddam cum concessio vel concessis vel opposito negati vel oppositis negati [sic] vel negatorum ad dubitatum.*)
5. Everything convertible with the *dubitatum* and every opposite of the *dubitatum* must be doubted. (*Omne convertible cum dubitato et omne oppositum dubitati est dubitandum.*)
6. Every false antecedent of the *dubitatum* the opposite of which is not a true thing being doubted must be denied. (*Omne falsum antecedens ad dubitatum cuius oppositum non est verum dubitatum, est negandum.*)
7. Of things following from the *dubitatum*, some are true, some are false. However every truth following from the *dubitatum* must be conceded, but every falsehood following from the *dubitatum* must be doubted. (*Sequentium ad dubitatum aliud est verum, aliud est falsum. Omne autem verum sequens ad dubitatum est concedendum, sed omne falsum sequens ad dubitatum est dubitandum.*)
8. Of things repugnant to the *dubitatum*, some are repugnant through themselves, some through an accident, such as through a consequence of the *dubitatum*. (*Repugnantium dubitato quoddam est repugnans per se, quoddam per accidens, ut per consequens dubitati.*)
9. Of things repugnant to the *dubitatum*, some are contradictory opposites or convertible with them, some are contraries. (*Repugnantium dubitato quoddam est oppositum contradictorie vel convertibile cum illo, quoddam contrarium.*)
10. Everything repugnant to the *dubitatum* through itself and contradictorily must be doubted, repugnant in truth through itself and contrary must be

held to be not true, as false, if it is known to be false, and as doubtful, if it is doubted. Also everything repugnant *per accidens* and contradictorily similarly must be held to be not true, also similarly for things repugnant *per accidens* and contrarily. (*Omne repugnans dubitato per se et contradictorie est dubitandum, repugnans vero per se at contrarie habendum est pro non vero, ut pro falso, si sciatur esse falsum, et pro dubio, si dubitetur. Omne autem repugnans per accidens et contradictorie similiter habendum est pro non vero, repugnans autem per accidens et contrarie similiter.*)

## 4.6 Formalization

Let  $V$  be a function from propositions to truth values such that  $V(p) = T$  if the proposition is true *in rei veritas* and  $V(p) = F$  otherwise. We now construct a function  $\phi$  which when given an  $O$ -statement returns an  $A$ -action. Let  $d$  be the *dubitatum*.

We explicitly make the assumption that ‘hold to be true’ is equivalent to ‘concede’, ‘hold to be false’ equivalent to ‘deny’ or ‘negate’, and ‘hold to be doubtful’ equivalent to ‘doubt’. (This is a not unrealistic assumption, but it is an assumption: No such equation is given by our author.) We then use the following shorthand to denote  $A$ -actions:  $C$  = ‘concede’,  $D$  = ‘doubt’, and  $N$  = ‘negate’ (or ‘deny’). From constraints 1-10 above, we can get the following constraints on  $\phi$ .

1.  $\phi(d) = D$  (definitional).
2. if  $p \rightarrow d$ , if  $V(p) \neq F$ , then  $\phi(p) \neq N$  (rule 1).
3. if  $d \rightarrow p$ , then  $\phi(p) \neq N$  (rule 2).
4. if  $p \rightarrow d$ , then  $V(p) = T$  or  $V(p) = F$  (rule 3).
5. if  $d \leftrightarrow p$ , then  $\phi(p) = D$  (rule 5).
6. if  $p = \neg d$ , then  $\phi(p) = D$  (rule 5).
7. if  $p \rightarrow d$ , if  $V(p) = F$ , if  $\phi(\neg p) \neq D$ , then  $\phi(p) = N$  (rule 6).
8. if  $d \rightarrow p$  and  $V(p) = T$ , then  $\phi(p) = C$  (rule 7).
9. if  $d \rightarrow p$  and  $V(p) = F$ , then  $\phi(p) = D$  (rule 7).
10. if  $p \perp d$  (read ‘ $p$  is repugnant to  $d$ ’), then it is one of these:

	<i>per se</i>	<i>per accidens</i>
contradictory	$R_1$	$R_2$
contrary	$R_3$	$R_4$

if  $r \in R_1$ ,  $\phi(r) = D$ . If  $r \in R_2, R_3, R_4$ , if  $V(r) = F$ ,  $\phi(r) = N$  and if  $V(r) \neq F$ , then  $\phi(r) = D$  (rule 10).

Rule 4 doesn’t appear to require any sort of formalization. It’s just a fact.

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