Limits of Argumentation: A Wittgensteinian Approach

MSc Thesis *(Afstudeerscriptie)*

written by

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ABSTRACT

Knowing the limits of argumentation, and thereby avoiding useless reason-givings is an important real-life problem. Our aim in this thesis is to find out the ramifications of the later works of Wittgenstein, especially of his *On Certainty*, concerning this problem. Although our discussion concerns the issue of the limits of argumentation in general, we focus on one aspect of it, namely the deep disagreements (DD). We present a critical discussion of Fogelin's account of deep disagreements and try to develop it. We claim that a deep disagreement involves a confusion of a certainty with a knowledge-claim and also a difference in practices or forms of life among the arguers in an argumentation. We propose some criteria to recognize DD and discuss limitations of our criteria. We also examine some other accounts of DD in light of the conception of DD that we propose. Finally, we try to find some examples that could both illustrate and justify our conception of the limits of argumentation, and of DD. We argue that the disagreement between Wittgenstein (or a Wittgensteinian philosopher) and the traditional philosophers, and also that between a typical religious person and non-religious one, could justly be considered as examples of deep disagreements.

Keywords: Argumentation, Deep disagreement (DD), Rules, Form of life (Fol), Practices, Certainty

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A *reason* can only be given *within* a game. The links of the chain of reasons come to an end, at the boundary of the game (Ludwig Wittgenstein; in *Philosophical Grammar* 55)

Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (Ludwig Wittgenstein; in *On Certainty* 204)

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Abbreviations of Works by L. Wittgenstein

LC: Wittgenstein, L. (1967). *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

OC: Wittgenstein, L. (1969). *On Certainty*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

PG: Wittgenstein, L. (1974). *Philosophical Grammar*. Oxford: Blackwell.

CV: Wittgenstein, L. (1998). *Culture and Value*. Revised second edition. Oxford: Blackwell.

PI: Wittgenstein, L. (2009). *Philosophical Investigations*. 4th edition (trans. Anscombe, Hacker and Schulte). Chichester, West Sussex, U.K. ; Malden, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.

INTRODUCTION

An argument is a series of statements of which one or more (the premises) are used to establish the truth of another (the conclusion)[1]. The activity or process of using arguments by some people for some purpose can be called *argumentation.* Arguments are used in many areas of our life: in everyday conversation, TV talk shows, newspapers, journal articles, and so on. They are used for various purposes: to gain knowledge, to defeat the opposite party in a debate, to rationalize one's already existing beliefs, and so on. However, probably the most important use of arguments is to resolve disagreement. When A believes that S is the case and B believes that not-S is the case, they have a disagreement over the truth of S. They may exchange reasons to support their respective stands, and thereby try to reach an agreement. Disagreement among people is a very widespread phenomenon. Argumentation or the activity of exchanging reasons sometimes, but not always, succeeds to resolve a disagreement. Resolving a disagreement means having the same propositional attitude towards a disputed claim; i.e. when both the contending parties accept S (or not-S), we say that the disagreement has been resolved. Success of an argumentation does not necessarily lie in the resolution of a disagreement. An argumentation might be considered successful even when the arguers decide to suspend judgment about S (i.e. neither accept nor deny S), or agree to disagree. That is, having the same propositional attitude is not always the best result of an argumentative conversation. However, on many occasions, we really need to agree. Because we are social beings, we often work together, and we are very often in need of having something common (e.g. a common economic/political/legal system). Resolution of a disagreement is often crucial to our social life.

In our everyday life, when we engage in a debate, we sometimes feel that even the best arguments would not convince our opponent and we decide to stop arguing. This thesis concerns our real-life problem of knowing the limits of argumentation and thereby avoiding useless argumentation. The general question that guides our investigation is the following: (a) In concrete argumenatitive contexts, how does an arguer know that an argumentation would not yield an agreement among the arguers?

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[1] See Copi et al (2014, p. 6)

Fogelin (2005) first noted that fact that the writings of later Wittgenstein, especially his *OC*, contain valuable insights into the issue of the limits of argumentation. Fogelin coined the term "Deep Disagreement" (henceforth DD) and claimed that argumentation does not work in those contexts where the arguers *deeply* disagree, i.e. do not broadly share beliefs, preferences, and also do not agree on the procedure for resolving their disagreement. In this thesis, we will try to analyze and develop Fogelin's account of DD. To do this, we ask the following question: (b) How do we understand the notion of DD? (c) What are the ways to recognize a DD in concrete argumentative situations?

The three questions (a to c) we just mentioned embody our methods rather than the goal. Our goal is to see Wittgenstein's answer to these questions. To be more precise, we would like to know the ramifications of the writings of the later Wittgenstein for the problems expressed in questions a-c. Although we will discuss the implications of Wittgenstein's ideas for the general problem of the limits of argumentation, we will focus on the problem of DD. That is, we will focus on what could be the best Wittgensteinian answer to the questions b-c. Therefore, our central question in this thesis is:

What could we learn from the later Wittgenstein about the limits of argumentation in general and about the problem of characterizing DD in particular?

Our answer to this question is the following. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, argumentation would not yield agreement in those contexts where some of the arguers confuse a certainty with a knowledge-claim. In a DD, some (or all) of the arguers not only confuse a certainty with a knowledge-claim, they also differ among themselves in their practices or forms of life (which are related to the issue of disagreement). A DD is not resolvable by argumentation because it is not possible to change a whole practice or a form of life by simply refuting a certainty that is embedded in that practice or form of life.

What we just described are our main conclusions. Let's now describe, through the chapters of this thesis, how we reach these conclusions. In chapter 1, we discuss how Fogelin answered our central question. We point out where Fogelin's account of DD is incomplete or unclear. In chapter 2, we attempt to clarify two Wittgensteinian notions ('rule' and 'form of life') that Fogelin used in his account. In chapter 3, we discuss Wittgenstein's notion of certainty and claim that the notion of certainty is preferable to that of rule to come up with a Wittgensteinian notion of DD. We also develop some criteria

to recognize DD in actual argumentative contexts. In chapter 4, we discuss some other accounts of DD and criticize them in light of our ideas described in chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 are meant to show that there are disagreements in the real world that fit our conception of DD as described in chapter 3. In chapter 4, we argue that the way Wittgenstein sees his disagreement with the traditional philosophers fits our conception of DD. In other words, a *Wittgenteinian debate* is a good example of a DD. In chapter 5, we try to show that a typical disagreement between a religious and a non-religious person (with regard to some religious issues such as whether God exists or not) could also be considered as a DD.

C h a p t e r   1

INITIATION OF A DEBATE: FOGELIN

Rober J. Fogelin, a well-known Wittgenstein scholar, published a paper titled "The logic of deep disagreements" in 1985 (reprinted in 2005) which gave rise to a big debate about the limits of argumentation. Fogelin draws our attention to an interesting kind of disagreement (which he named *deep disagreement*) where argumentation cannot establish agreement among the arguers. The aim of this chapter is to present Fogelin's account of deep disagreement and also to point out where it appears to me to be unclear, incomplete, or problematic.

1.1 Normal vs. Deep Disagreements

Fogelin claims that some cases of disagreements are *deep,* i.e. they do not satisfy the conditions of argumentation. For Fogelin, the conditions of argumentation are shared beliefs, preferences, and also a consensus on the procedure for settling the relevant disagreement. If two arguers have broadly shared beliefs, preferences, and also have consensus on the procedures with respect to an argumentative context, then this is an instance of a normal argumentation. In one sense, preferences are also a kind of beliefs. However, preferences can also be distinguished as non-factual beliefs which might have the form of e.g. "a is better than b", or "I prefer a than b", "a is good/bad" etc. Beliefs that are not preferences might take the form e.g. "x is the case" or "x is y", etc. It seems that what Fogelin means by "procedure" for settling a disagreement is the evidence that is considered (by the arguers) as compelling to end the disagreement.

As an example, let's consider the following argumentative exchange between Tom and Bob:

> Tom: (S) *I think the temperature in Amsterdam is below 10^0C now*;
> (p) *I was outside a few minutes ago; and I felt it to be so.*
> Bob: (not-S) *I don't think the temperature in Amsterdam is below 10^0C now*. (q) *I also just arrived from outside and I felt it to be above 10^0C.*

Normally, in this situation, they would Google the temperature of Amsterdam, and whatever result Google shows would settle the debate. That

means, they share the procedure of how to settle the debate, i.e. what could be a compelling evidence to show whether p is true or false. Moreover, they share beliefs such as whatever is the overall temperature of Amsterdam is also the temperature of the particular place which they indicated by the word "outside". In addition, they share preferences such as Google is a more reliable source to know the temperature of a place than the way somebody feels the temperature. Thus, Tom and Bob are having a normal argumentation.

To clarify the conception of normal argumentation further, we can reconstruct an example provided by Fogelin (2005, p.5) in the following way:

> A: I would like to take road R.
> B: Why?
> A: I want to pick up the fish last.
> B: No, go to the Grand Union last; I don't want the ice cream to melt.
> A: The traffic that way is horrible this time of day and it would be better to wait a bit to let it clear out.
> B: But, today is Saturday.

The conversation between A and B is a case of argumentation because they are providing reasons to resolve a disagreement. Behind this argumentative exchange there lies "a detailed knowledge of local geography, preferences for frozen ice cream over melted ice cream and fresh fish over stinking fish, etc" shared by the arguers. Thus, the normal argumentation that is going on between A and B has been possible because a large number of beliefs and preferences are working in the background which both of them share.

Now, according to Fogelin, there are some cases of disagreements in which the arguers do not broadly share their beliefs, preferences, and procedures. That is, there are cases that do not satisfy the conditions for argumentation. Now, before we go to examples of such cases, let's look more closely at what could be a situation where parties do *not* broadly share beliefs, preferences, and procedures. It will take us to Wittgenstein's notion of a 'form of life' as it is understood by Fogelin. For Fogelin, a form of life is constituted by "a whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking)." (Fogelin, 2005, p.9) Moreover, "...a person participates in a variety of forms of life that overlap and crisscross in a variety of ways. Some of these forms of life that overlap have little to do with others." (Fogelin, 2005, p.9) Thus, in a case of disagreement, we say that broadly shared beliefs and preferences lack, when it involves two incompatible forms of life (henceforth FoL) that are *relevant* to the issue.

A schematic illustration of the root of deep disagreements may make Fogelin's idea more precise and clear. A and B disagree over m. A believes that m and her argument for m rests on the assumption n. On the other hand, B believes that not-m and her argument for not-m rests on the assumption n'. Now, n is part of one of A's form of life, namely Fol_1, whereas n' is part of one of B's forms of life, namely Fol_2. There is "clash" or a "conflict" between n and n'. And this amounts to an incompatibility between Fol_1 and Fol_2. Thus, the disagreement between A and B over m is a deep one.

We can instantiate this scheme with a concrete example of deep disagreements provided by Fogelin. We can reconstruct Fogelin's example in the following way. **Example 1.1**: Suppose A claims that (m) "affirmative action is morally acceptable", and B denies this. When we carefully examine the debate we find that there is an assumption or underlying principle n and A's argument for m rests on n. The underlying principle is the following: (n) "Social groups can have moral claims against other social groups." But, unlike A, B does not believe that m. B holds not-m and her argument for not-m rests on the assumption (n'): "only individuals have moral claims." The apparent conflict between n and n' are actually a conflict between two forms of life. n is part of Fol_1 and n' is part of Fol_2. The debate between A and B is deep because it involves two incompatible forms of life.

Fogelin also cites the example of a debate about abortion. The reconstruction of this would go as follows: **Example 1.2**: A's claim is (m): "Abortion is morally acceptable" and her argument for m rests on the assumption (n): "The fetus is not a person". The opponent B holds not-m and her argument for not-m rests on the assumption (n'): "The fetus is a person". The incompatibility between n and n' is actually an incompatibility between two forms of life. So, the disagreement is deep.

It is noteworthy that, in each of these examples, a deep disagreement is "generated by" a clash of assumptions. Since they are part of different forms of life, the clash amounts to a clash between two different forms of life. Fogelin's discussion seems to allow this interpretation. However, in a footnote, Fogelin says that the above examples illustrate deep disagreements that involve a conflict between "belief structures". However, he thinks that deep disagreements that involve a conflict between "preference scales" are also possible. This complicates the issue. How is the notion of form of life related to the notions of belief structures and preference scales? Fogelin says: "belief structures and preference scales are interrelated in important ways". Does it mean that they can jointly make a complex form of life? Or does it mean that every form of life has a mixture of belief structures and preference

scale in it? In chapters 2 and 3, we try to show that it is possible to characterize DD in a way that does not raise these questions.

1.2 Problem with "Assumption"

Let's now pay attention to Fogelin's use of "assumption". A crucial question is what the status of these "*n*"-s or "assumptions" is. Fogelin himself is not happy with this expression: "the word 'assumption' is too weak" (Fogelin, 2005, p. 8). He also uses the word "commitment" for this and says that argumentation in a deep disagreement is "carried on within the framework of such commitments" (Fogelin, 2005, p.8). Other synonyms that he uses are 'underlying principle', "framework proposition", "background proposition", and "rules". He says: "when I speak about underlying principles, I am thinking about what others (Putnam) have called framework propositions or what Wittgenstein was inclined to call rules." (Fogelin, 2005, p.8) In chapter 3, we will look more closely at how Fogelin's underlying principles or background propositions are connected to Wittgenstein's conception of rules and certainties. For now, suffice it to note that all the examples of underlying principle that Fogelin provides are declarative sentences or statements (viz, ""only individuals have moral claims", "The fetus is a person", etc). Moreover, two of the synonyms of underlying principles ("framework proposition", "background proposition") contain the word "proposition". Further, he also uses expressions such as "clash in underlying principles", "conflict between framework propositions". This suggests a possibility of logical relation among underlying principles (I use "possibility" because we sometimes use clash/conflict with things that could not have logical relations among themselves; for example, conflicting interests). Now, if underlying principles are propositions, they must, by standard definition, have truth-values. If they have truth-values, and if they are not logical truths (which they are not as we see from the examples), then, why is it impossible to establish them by arguments. Perhaps Fogelin's answer would be: an underlying priniciple in a deep disagreement is not a distinct proposition; rather it is part of a form of life where mutually supporting propositions are intermingled with styles of acting and thinking, etc. However, Fogelin also says that, in terms of our scheme mentioned above, the argument for *m* "rests on" the underlying principle (or assumption) *n*. It is not clear what Fogelin means by "rest on". How does *n*, as an underlying principle, support an argument for *m*. Is it an argumentative support? Does it make a new argument where *n* is a premise? If not, then what is the exact nature of the relationship between *n* and the argument for *m*? We get no clear answer from Fogelin's paper. Fogelin thinks that underlying principles are what Wittgenstein is inclined to call *rules*. When two players play chess, they assume the rules of chess. They

do not explicitly discuss the rules, they do not seem even to be conscious of them. But there could not be a chess game without some kind of rules. Likewise, when two parties engage in argumentation, there are shared rules or underlying principles working from the background. But, here, the problem is, in many cases of rule-following activities, we can, and in fact do, discuss our rules, agree on them and change them. To decide whether a rule should be accepted, the participants of a game (or a rule-governed activity) may provide reasons and then take their decision. That is, a rule can be fixed via argumentation. But an underlying principle, as conceived by Fogelin, cannot be decided to be acceptable (or unacceptable) via argumentation. This raises the question in what sense Fogelin equates underlying principles with Wittgenstein's rules. We will analyze Wittgenstein's conception of rule in chapter 2 which will clarify this issue.

1.3 Other Issues

According to Fogelin, deep disagreements are not resolvable by argumentation, from which he concludes that there is no rational means to resolve deep disagreements. This implies that he considers argumentation as the only rational means for resolving disagreements. This is a questionable opinion. The irrational means that Fogelin suggests for the resolution of deep disagreements is *persuasion*. Here, it is noteworthy that there is no clear demarcation between the normal and deep disagreements. Fogelin says: "*...to the extent* that the argumentative context becomes less normal, argument, *to that extent*, become impossible." (Fogelin, 2005, p.7) [emphasis added]. One may ask: is every argument either deep or normal? The implication of the above quote seems to be that there is no such exclusive disjunction. The question arises: is it *always* possible to recognize a disagreement as deep if it is in fact deep? Fogelin did not give any clear answer in his paper. However, he seems to believe that there are some cases of disagreements that are clearly deep. The question is: how could one recognize them? Fogelin says:

> An argument on any subject can be question begging, biased, flanted, vague, and so on. It is characteristic of deep disagreements that they persist even when normal criticisms have been answered. Another feature of deep disagreements is that they are immune to appeals to facts." (Fogelin, 2005, p.8)

We can read the above remark in the following way: Suppose you are debating with somebody over an issue. At some point, you ask yourself: does this debate involve a deep disagreement? If it is deep, shouldn't we stop arguing just because argumentation wouldn't establish agreement? Now, how

can you be convinced that this agreement is really deep? Well, imagine that you and your opponent have no normal criticisms against each other (i.e. criticisms such as "you committed such-and-such fallacy," "you are biased", "you are pig-headed", "you used a vague term" etc). In addition, imagine that you and your opponent agree on all facts that are relevant to the issue of the debate. Does the disagreement still persist? If so, then this is a case of deep disagreement.

Herein, we get two principles or clues to determine a deep disagreement. But, they also raise some questions. First, how to separate pigheadedness from an attachment to a belief that is linked to a particular FoI that conflicts with another FoI to create a DD? According to Fogelin, somebody in an argumentation is pigheaded if "he continues to cling to a positions despite the fact that compelling reasons have been brought against it". (Fogelin, 2005, p.7). Here, "compelling reasons" are compelling for the very pigheaded person. And a person is biased when "he has willfully suppressed certain facts that support the side of the issue he opposes or that he has suppressed facts that bear against his own position." (Fogelin, 2005, p.7). Now, in a DD, the arguers also might stick to a position in the face of any facts or might suppress some facts. And more importantly, how could we be sure that all DDs do not always involve biasness/pigheadedness? This problem arises when we take "biasedness"/"pigheadedness" in its ordinary meaning. One way to avoid the problem is to differentiate between those biasness/pigheadedness that are rooted in a deep disagreement and those that are not. To do this, we need to clarify the exact nature of the biasness/pigheadedness that works in deep disagreements. That is, we need a clarification about how people get biased/pigheaded to a belief that is so certain that no reasoning can make them to quit it. In chapter 3, we discuss Wittgenstein's notion of "certainty" which will shed light on this issue. The second principle to determine a deep disagreement also raises a question. It seems that a vast, and perhaps, indeterminate amount of known or unknown facts might be relevant to a particular argumentative context. An arguer may not be able to bring a fact or proposition when she needs it, but still the fact or proposition might be relevant to the issue of debate. Thus, in practice, it seems impossible to check whether an issue is immune to all facts. However, we can check whether an arguer remains uninfluenced even when she faces some compelling facts. From this, we can inductively decide that she is probably immune to all facts. But this makes the principle for determining a deep disagreement rather weak and uncertain. An arguer might make mistakes or even be biased to decide which reasons are compelling in an argumentation. That is why we need to supplement Fogelin's second principle with other principles or clues. In chapter 3, we will get back to the

issue of what could be our criteria to determine a case of disagreement as deep.

To sum up, we have seen that Fogelin raises an interesting issue about the limitation of argumentation. He defines the condition of argumentation as shared beliefs, preferences, and procedures. Then he provides some examples of deep disagreements that involve a conflict between different forms of life. Fogelin later considers these examples as illustration of conflicts between different belief structures. He also talks about deep disagreements that arise by conflicts between different preference scales. He does not clarify how the notions of "form of life", "belief structure", and "preference scale" are connected to one another which is necessary if we want to analyze any case of deep disagreement in the way Fogelin did. Moreover, we noted a problematic notion in Fogelin's paper, namely, the notion of underlying principle. This notion is crucial for understanding Fogelin's conception of deep disagreements. In Fogelin's examples, the arguments of the two parties rest on their respective underlying principles. This keeps unclear the exact nature of the underlying principles and what kind of relation they have to the arguements in a deep disagreement. Fogelin equates underlying principles with Wittgenstein's rules. But we saw that it requires clarification because sometimes some rules might be established by argumentation, whereas Fogelin's underlying principles can never be supported by arguments. We also raised a question concerning whether irresovability by argumentation could imply irresolvability by rational means (which Fogelin assumes). Furthermore, Fogelin's two principles to determine a deep disagreement raise some questions. It is because: first, there is no clear differentiation between biasness (or pigheadedness) as normal criticism, on the one hand, and biasness (or pigheadedness) generated by a particular form of life, on the other; second, it seems practically very difficult to decide whether the position of an arguer in a debate is immune to *all* facts. [2]

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[2] See Finnocchiaro 2011 for a discussion of some interesting criticisms against Fogelin's view.

RULES AND *FORMS OF LIFE*

In the previous chapter, we analyzed Fogelin's account of DD. We noted some unclear parts in his paper and raised some questions. To get answers to those questions, we need to go to the origin of Fogelin's ideas. Fogelin used some ideas of later Wittgenstein in order to develop his conception of DD. The question that we raised could be answered if we closely look at those notions of later Wittgenstein that Fogelin assumed. Not all the participants of the debate on DD explicitly mentioned Wittgenstein. In chapters 4, we will discuss some other accounts. Our purpose in this chapter and the next chapter is to see how far Fogelin's account could be developed.

As many of the interpreters now agree, Wittgenstein did not want to put forward any philosophical thesis in his later works (some interpreters make the same claim even with regard to his early work). Rather his therapeutic mission was to help people (perhaps including himself) to be free from certain philosophical pictures. His method does not consist in constructing sophisticated argumentation to establish some philosophical thesis, rather it is to assemble reminders of ordinary facts that can help to adopt a new perspective. Thus, in our analysis of some of the Wittgensteinian notions, we are not presenting any philosophical thesis of Wittgenstein. Rather we are presenting some useful observations related to the issue of DD that we get from Wittgenstein's later writings, especially from his *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty*. In this chapter, we explore two Wittgensteinian notions that Fogelin mentioned in his paper, namely 'rules' and 'forms of life'. We explain how Wittgenstein used these notions in his works, and at the same time, address some of the issues related to these notions that we raised in chapter one.

2.1 Rules

2.1.1 Wittgensteinian sense of "rule"
In *PI* 138-242, Wittgenstein talks about rules and rule-following. What does Wittgenstein have in mind when he talks about rules? What is a rule? As with other key terms of Wittgenstein, we have no definition of a rule. In his discussion on rules, Wittgenstein talks about normative rules of various activities, especially about grammatical rules. The rule is a relative notion. A rule is always a rule in relation to an activity such as a game. There are

linguistic rules such as rules of the use of a word; also, there are rules of games such as the rules of chess. We can consider the linguistic sign 'cube' as an expression of a rule. The dictionary meaning of 'cube' is an alternative expression of this rule. A signpost on a road (e.g. an arrow sign) is also an expression of a rule. When I explain the meaning of the signpost to a friend, I am actually engaged in the act of explaining the rule. And when both of us start to walk in accordance with the direction of the signpost, we are following the rule. Glock provides a list of different kinds of grammatical rules that are available in Wittgenstein's writings:

1. definitions, whether in formal (' "Bachelor" means "unmarried man"') or material mode ('Bachelors are unmarried men')
2. analytical propositions ('All bachelors are unmarried')
3. colour-charts and conversion-tables
4. ostensive definitions
5. explanations by exemplification
6. expressions of the 'geometry' of colour like 'Nothing can be red and green all over'
7. propositions of arithmetic and geometry
   (Glock, 1996, p.152)

However, this list is not exhaustive; there might be other types of rules. The list makes it clear that the grammatical rules of Wittgenstein are not identical with the rules of school-grammar (see Glock, 1996, p.153). A school-grammar would consider a sentence structure (e.g. Subject-verb-object) as a grammatical rule, but never a sentence like "This is red". According to Wittgenstein, many of our activities are rule-governed. Language is a paradigm example of a rule-governed activity. An activity is rule-governed *not* in the sense that we actually consciously consult rules while engaged in it. Rather it is rule-governed because, if required, one can justify an action with reference to some rule(s). Grammatical rules of a particular language determine the correct or incorrect use of that language. They provide the justification of language use. If I feel unsure about whether my use of a particular word is appropriate, I look up it in a dictionary which provides me with the rules of the word. If I feel unsure about a particular arrangement of my words in a sentence, I check a grammar book. The dictionary or the grammar book plays the role of a source that gives the rules for justifying my language use.

While talking about Wittgenstein's rules, we are actually talking about constitutive rules, not of strategic ones. Constitutive rules of a game define the game. The correctness of the moves in a game is justified in reference to

the constitutive rules. "The king moves one square in any direction" is a constitutive rule of chess because each player must move the king in accordance with this rule. If we change any of the constitutive rules of chess, the game would not be chess any more. On the other hand, strategic rules are tactics to play better and to achieve the goal of the game more easily. In the same game, different players might have different strategic rules. Unlike constitutive rules, strategic rules are not precondition for playing a game. The players may develop their own strategic rules over time as they gain more and more experience of playing the game or they could also learn some strategic rules from other more experienced players. "Try to control the centre", "Take extra care not to lose the queen" are examples of strategic rules in chess.

2.1.2 Justification of rules

Having clarified Wittgenstein's notion of rule, we can now talk about the possibility of justifying a rule. The notion of rule has a sense in the context of a rule-governed activity or a game. It is fair to say that the act of argumentation is also a rule-governed activity or can be considered as a game. In a particular game of argumentation, the arguers make their moves i.e. provide reasons to justify their conclusion. What could be a rule that work from the background in a game of argumentation? "You cannot put forward your main conclusion without giving any reason for it", "You cannot contradict yourself", etc play the role of rules in an argumentative context. Their constitutive nature is clear from the fact that if somebody denies them, she cannot engage in the activity of argumentation any more. All the parties in an argumentation normally tacitly agree on these rules, although they rarely mention it. However, in an argumentation such as example 1.1 (see chapter 1, section 1.1), the underlying principle n is something that has been accepted by only one of the parties. The root of their disagreement lies in the fact that both of them do *not* share n. Thus, here n is not at least an agreed or established rule. However, A is firmly committed to n. All the moves that A makes in that context are operating within the framework of such commitment. That is, in the context of the game of example 1.1, n can be considered as a rule, but only for A. Now the question is: if a rule is not a rule for both the parties of a game, can we call it a 'rule' in the first place? In a normal game both the parties agree on the rules; so the game goes smoothly. A game might be interrupted in various ways. For example, a chess game might need to be stopped because one player became ill or a football match might be interrupted because of rain. But herein the game is still normal because there is no quarrel between the players with respect to the constitutive rules of the game. However, a game might be interrupted

because the players cannot agree on some constitutive rule of the game. One player wants to play with rule R_1, but the other player wants a different rule R_2 in place of R_1. Usually a game will start only when the common constitutive rules are already in place. But we can imagine a game in which the players start the game and at some point realize that they are playing differently, i.e. although they have some common rules, there are some rules at work that are not shared. This might happen when a move which is quite normal (i.e. in accordance with a rule) to one party seems weird to another. For example, if one player of a chess game moves the bishop like a queen and the queen like a bishop, then she is following a rule which is different from the normal one. In this scenario, as soon as the other player notices this, she would stop the game and start to talk about the rule of moving the bishop and the queen. Now, in our example 1.1, we have a similar situation. A is trying to play the game of argumentation within a framework in which n is a rule for him. Unlike A, the framework of B does not have n as its rule. A and B are trying to play the same game of argumentation using different rules. It is difficult to imagine that a chess game ends successfully when the two parties played with different rules (the situation is worse when they have difference concerning e.g. the rule about when a party wins or lose). Similarly, a game of argumentation would not end successfully if the rules of the players differ. They would not able to carry the game smoothly.

Now, in a game like chess, it is easy to notice when the players differ in their rules. When first time I move the bishop like a queen, my opponent would probably notice and remind me of the relevant standard rule. I can now state my rule and argue over why I think the rule I am following is right. My opponent might bring a book on chess and show me a rule in order to justify that my rule is not acceptable. However, in a game of argumentation like example 1.1, it is not easy to identify that the arguers are using different rules. A might never mention n in the conversation. A herself might be unaware that n is a rule for her. Now the question is: if A or B notice that there is a rule n which A adopts and B does not adopt, what could they do? Like the chess players, they would stop the game and start to talk about n.

In some cases, challenging a rule and starting to talk about it is normal. In other cases, it would be weird. Suppose some children invent a new game. Once they start playing, some of them feel that the rules are not good or the game would become more exciting if they change some of the rules. So they propose to change the existing rules. This discussion for changing the rules would be considered normal in this context. But the debate that we mentioned in the last paragraph concerning a change in the rule of chess is not something so common.

In many games, the players are not conscious of the rules. Most ordinary language users use language easily without having the ability to recognize and formulate the rules of the grammar of the language. To justify a rule, we need to be conscious of it and recognize it as a rule. But using a rule (consciously or unconsciously) within a game and justifying it cannot take place in the same game. Discussing and settling the rules of a game is different from playing the game. When I discuss the rules of chess in order to settle them, I am not playing chess. Measuring the length of the furniture in my room is an activity that I can do with my measuring scale. Using the scale to measure, say, my chair is one thing, and comparing different types of scales to decide which one is the best scale is another thing. Comparing different scales and choosing one of them is *not* using a scale for measuring something. Wittgenstein says: "A reason can only be given within a game. The links of the chain of reasons come to an end, at the boundary of the game" (PG, 55)

One may ask: is it really impossible to conceive a game in which justification of the rules takes place within the game? Suppose G is a game in which S= $\{S_1, S_2, ...\}$ is the set of the moves within the game and R=$\{R_1, R_2, ...\}$ is the set of the rules of the game. Is it possible to justify say R_1 within G? By 'justification' we mean the justification of a move in a game with reference to some rule(s). So, to justify R_1 means to consider it as a move in a game and to have a rule that can support the claim that the move is correct. R_1 cannot be justified within G because G has already been defined and R_1 is a member of the set of rules R, and *not* a member of the set of the moves S. Now, to make the justification of R_1 possible, we need to think of another game G′ in which R_1 is a move within G′ and is justified by a rule say X. Now, suppose for G′, the set of the moves is S′ and the set of the rules is R′. Thus, R_1 belongs to S′ (because R_1 is a move within the new game G′) and X belongs to R′ (because X is a rule that justifies R_1). Let's assume that G and G′ have no common rules, i.e. R and R′ are disjoint. That means: X is *not* a member of R. Can X justify R_1? Suppose G and G′ represents two language-systems (e.g. object-language and meta-language). According to Glock's interpretation, Wittgenstein would say that X cannot justify R_1 because a justification in G′ is incommensurable with G. "A different grammatical system defines different concepts, hence a statement in a different system can neither justify nor refute grammatical propositions of our system." (Glock, 1996, p.47). Let's consider now the other possibilities. What if X belongs to both R and R′? This means: R and R` are not disjoint. As long as X is a rule that belongs to R′ and justifies some R_1, we gain nothing in saying that X also belongs to R. What we actually have is two different rules of two different systems/games under the name "X". It is because, on the one hand we have 'X as a rule of G′ that justifies a move R_1 within G′ and 'X as a rule in G that

justifies some move(s) within G, on the other. When X has two different roles of justification in two different systems/games, we better think that two different rules (instead of one) are at work here. In other words, when I use a rule to justify something, I am playing the game in which the rule belongs to the set of the rules of that game. Now, when I use X to justify R_1, and X belongs to R, I am actually playing the game G. But as soon as I am in need of justifying R_1, I have to stop playing G because one of the rules of G is under the need of justification and a game can run only when the rules are already settled. When I question a rule of a game, I stop playing the game. When I stop playing a game, I am no more using the rules of the game. That is why, it is impossible to justify a rule of R by another rule of the same set of R. R and R′ cannot overlap; they have to be disjoint. Put differently, a rule is always a rule of a game. As long as X belongs to R, any justification by means of X should be considered as something within G. Thus, when I use X to justify R_1 and when X belongs to R, what I am actually doing is assuming G to justify a rule of G. Obviously, this has the flaw of circularity. Now, how about X being identical with R_1? This is more clearly circular. One cannot assume R_1 to justify R_1.

We can now try to summarize the lesson that can be drawn from the above discussion about the justification of the rules in order to see how it can be utilized for the problem of deep disagreements. As long as a rule is a rule it cannot be justified within a game in which it is a rule. In many cases, when we justify a rule, we either beg the question (circular reasoning) or enter into a different game and the rule that is being justified becomes a move in a new game, i.e. its identity gets changed. In example 1.1, A and B are engaged in a game of argumentation. For A, *n* is such a rule that lies in the background for *any* game of argumentation for A. For A, challenging and starting to discuss *n* may amount to entering a *new* game. However, when B challenges *n*, she considers herself to be in the same game of argumentation. That means the same rule *n* is at work here from the background least for A. That is why, it is impossible to establish *n* by means of argumentation. It involves circularity. At this point, one may ask: how could it be the case that a statement like *n* be a rule of the act of argumentation of example 1.1 or 1.2? Apparently, the content of *n* has nothing to do with argumentation. For this we need Wittgenstein's conception of certainty which we will analyze in the next chapter.

Let's now talk more about what it means to say that "*n* is a rule for A" in the contexts such as example 1.1 or 1.2. We have mentioned before that the activity for which *n* is a rule is the act of argumentation in which both A and B are involved. But that does not mean that *n* could not be a rule for other

activities of A. A rule could be so general that it covers a broad category of activities. A rule could also be a rule for a particular subset of the set of all the possible moves of a particular activity. "The king moves one square in any direction" is a rule that mainly regulates the moves of the king. However, it might regulate some other moves indirectly. For example, I may want to move my pawn to a particular square, but the position of the king and my awareness of the rule for the movement of the king stops me. But there are rules that regulate all moves, or that are at work behind all moves of a game. For example, "You win when you place the opponent's kind in check and there is no legal move left for her to save her king." – this is a very general rule of chess that regulates, so to speak, all the moves of a normal chess game. Thus, when we are talking about rules with regard to the problem of DD, we are dealing with very general rules of the later kind. In example 1.1 or 1.2, although n is working as a rule for the act of argumentation, it could be considered as a more general rule that involves a broader category of activities of which argumentation is a part. We can think of a rule that regulates the lives of the people of a particular culture. Our n in example 1.1 (or 1.2) is such a general rule for the group of people of which A is a member. In other words, n is a rule for the community of A in the sense that the people of this community follow the rule n in all of their activities. This brings us to Wittgenstein's analysis of the notion of rule-following.

2.1.3 More clarification of the notion of rule

Let's take the example of the word "cube" which Wittgenstein discusses in *PI* 138-142. I know the word "cube" means I know the rule for using "cube". All the occasions when I correctly and smoothly use "cube" are actually instances of my following the rule for using this word. Now, one may ask: what is the source of the rule-following activities concerning "cube". What could explain the fact that I can correctly use the word in many occasions? Is it something called "meaning" of the word that compels my correct use? We are able to grasp the meaning of "cube" at a stroke. But the *use* of "cube" is extended in time. Does this imply that the meaning consists of something different from the use? Let's imagine that the meaning of "cube" consists of my mental picture of a cube. So when I hear the word "cube", a drawing of a cube comes before my mind. Does this picture compel my use of "cube"? Do I use "cube" when my mental picture fits a real cube? It is imaginable that a mental picture may even fit e.g. a prism. There is nothing inherent in the picture that can compel me to a particular use. It is always imaginable that I use the picture one way rather than another. The same mental picture might lead to different applications. A rule could be interpreted and applied in very different, even contradictory, ways. In *PI* 201 Wittgenstein says:

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule. The answer was: if every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule, then it can also be brought into conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

However, in practice, we normally do not see such chaos. The explanation by Wittgenstein is that it is basically in our actions that we 'agree', not in our opinion, not in any formulation of a rule. Our rule-following activities show that we have succeeded to grasp a rule.

There is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call "following the rule" and "going against it (*PI* 201)

Thus, our activity of correctly using "cube" cannot be explained by postulating mental ideas that consists of the rules or usage of "cube". Our rule-following activity with regard to "cube" makes sense only when we see it as part of a practice of a community. A particular use of "cube" is correct or incorrect only in the background of a practice in which a group of people are already engaged in. We need to be trained in this practice. A blind acceptance of a practice is a logical prerequisite for us to be engaged in a game of using "cube".

In *PI*, Wittgenstein gives another example in which a child is being taught how to add 2 with natural numbers. The child has been given the formula and some examples. But it starts to make mistakes after 1000; it says: 1000, 1004, 1008,…. However, the child could justify its mistaken calculation in reference to its understanding/interpretation of the formula. It could say that it understood the formula as saying that it should add 2 until 1000 and then add 4 from 1000 and so on. However, in practice, normally no such confusion occurs. The child easily gets trained in an existing practice of calculation. It shows that understanding and interpretation of a rule (herein, the formula) come after an existing practice and training and are logically dependent on it (what we mean by 'logically dependent' is that the former cannot be conceived without the later). A rule or an interpretation of a rule does not contain all the steps that consist of the correct application of a rule. Practices are the foundation of the rules. In brief, rules are embedded in the practice of a community. The implication of this for the problem of DD seems the following. In our example 1.1 (or 1.2), being a rule the statement n cannot be reduced to an ordinary statement of fact; rather n is something

embedded in practice. That is why we cannot deal with *n* in the way we do with other ordinary statements in an argumentative exchange. In short, our explanation of the Wittgensteinian notion of rule makes it clear why a sentence that works as a rule in an argumentation cannot be justified.

2.2 Forms of Life

We now focus on the second Wittgensteinian notion that Fogelin used. In a recent paper titled "Wittgenstein on Forms of Life, Patterns of Life and Ways of Living" Moyal-Sharrock (2015; forthcoming) made an attempt to clarify the notion. She notes that the concept of *form of life* is one of the "framework concepts" of Wittgenstein. It is difficult to draw sharp boundary of this concept as well as other related concepts such as 'patterns of life', 'certainty', 'language-game', 'ways of living', and 'facts of living'. If there is the *most fundamental* concept among all these, then probably 'form of life' deserves this status. It is the "ultimate rock bottom". Wittgenstein says: "What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life." (*PI* 345)

Moyal-Sharrock discusses some competing interpretations of Wittgenstein's "form of life". She gives her support to the distinctions made by Gertrude Conway (1989) and Stanley Cavell (1996) (which are almost similar). For them, there are two senses of form of life:

1. vertical (or biological)
2. horizontal (or ethnological)

In the first sense, human form of life is different from other lower forms of life, say, canine form of life (the name 'vertical' comes from the hierarchy of higher and lower animals). All human beings are participants of the human form of life. Our human form of life consists of "shared biology, behaviour and environment". Translation from one language to another is possible because of this common human form of life. On the other hand, the horizontal sense accounts for "socio-cultural differences within a form of life"

Moyal-Sharrock also mentions an alternative formulation of this classification, viz. generic versus specific forms of life:

> [T]he generic being the human, canine, leonine, and all non-human forms of life - forms of life being, as I will argue, refer to communities of individuals and their environment, characterized by shared ways of living, being and acting, they cannot include

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vegetal or mineral forms of life, including alien forms of life; the *specific* referring to the various forms of life generated by a generic form of life. For example, the specific forms of human life generated by the human form of life would be the religious, the nomadic, the academic, etc. (2015, p.4)

For our purpose, the specific forms of life are specially important. We are interested in whether different specific forms of life might be in clash or what does it mean to say that two (specific) form of life are in clash. We need Wittgenstein's notion of certainty for this which we discuss in the next chapter.

Moyal-Sharrock discusses and rejects two "unilateral reading of form of life", i.e. readings which are "exclusively either vertical or horizontal". First, in Newton Garver's vertical reading, "a form of life is uniquely something organic or biological" (Moyal-Sharrock, 2015, p.5). Thus, for Garver, human, canine, bovine, piscine, reptilian etc. are proper examples of form of life. Garver equated the form of human life "with the common behaviour of mankind". However, Moyal-Sharrock finds this view problematic because of "Wittgenstein's multiple references to general facts of nature that are not part of the common behavior of mankind but of the natural world, such as: mountain don't sprout up in half an hour; cats don't grow on trees; and the world has existed for a very long time." (Moyal-Sharrock, 2015, p.5). These general facts of nature, she argues, are "the natural conditions in which human exists" and thus, part of Wittgenstein's conception of human form of life.

She also criticizes Baker and Hacker's conception of form of life that excludes (or more precisely, makes insignificant) the biological aspect. Baker and Hacker think that there is no significantly distinguishable category of *human* form of life in Wittgenstein's writings. Their reason is: in Wittgenstein's notion of form of life, the cultural component and language have essential places, whereas the concept of *human* form of life is biological. However, against this, Moyal-Sharrock argues that, Wittgenstein treats language as something that is "an extension of primitive behaviour". Also, biological and cultural are not clearly distinguishable in the case of human being. That is why, unlike Baker and Hacker, Moyal-Sharrock thinks that Wittgenstein would really accept the existence of a human form of life.

There is a broad agreement (among e.g. Baker and Hacker, Moyal-Sharrock, Glock) that every culture that has its own language (e.g. Dutch culture) can be considered as a form of life. One may ask whether there are smaller forms

of life. Moyal-Sharrock mentions religious, nomadic, academic forms of life. But they are not necessarily smaller than say a culture. They might be extended across more than one culture. For example, there are religious people in almost all cultures. We need a precise definition to decide whether a phenomenon could be regarded as a form of life.

Moyal-Sharrock makes an attempt in the following:

> [A] 'form of life' is not a *single* way of acting characteristic of a group of organisms (such as speaking, calculating or eating animals), but must include innumerable other such shared ways of acting that cohesively form the necessary background or context or foundation of meaning. (2015, p.3)

In *PI* 19, Wittgenstein says "to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life". This suggests that a language is "logically connected" to a form of life and can emerge only from that. Our form of life is the foundation which makes it possible for us to learn a language.

In light of what we discussed before, we can now try to come up with a list of the features of a typical form of life within the human form of life:

1. a group of humans
2. shared ways of living, being, and acting that are countless in number
3. a unity of these ways of living, being, and acting
4. (3) providing the basis of language and meaning

We will also use the term "practice" to refer to a phenomenon that has the features just mentioned (in some cases, "practice" sounds better than "form of life"). So far we have tried to characterize a typical form of life. But, as we suggested before, Wittgenstein himself would probably not allow a definite characterization of this notion. Moyal-Sharrock agrees with the following remark made by Baker and Hacker (2009, p.223):

> Of course, in advance of a particular question and a specific context it would be quite pointless to draw hard-and-fast distinctions between what counts as the same and what as a different form of life. Such distinctions depend upon the purpose and context of different kinds of investigations. (cited in: Moyal-Sharrock, 2015, forthcoming, p.4-5)

This suggests that a strict definition of the notion of form of life is not possible. Whether a phenomenon could be distinguished as a form of life could only be decided with respect to the context and purpose of different kinds of investigations.

To conclude, our discussion in this chapter clarifies how Fogelin's use of 'rules' and 'forms of life' could be understood in order to find the roots of DD. We also noted that the notion of 'rule' can, to some extent, explain why Fogelin's underlying principles are not justifiable; but it cannot explain why the arguers often confuse the underlying principles with ordinary facts. We will discuss Wittgentein's notion of certainty in the next chapter where we will also discuss its connection with the notion of *rules* and *form of life*.

C h a p t e r   3

CERTAINTIES

In this chapter, we look at another important notion of Wittgenstein - viz. *certainty*. Fogelin's paper that initiated the debate about DD was inspired by Wittgenstein's *OC,* and 'certainty' is the central notion of *OC*. Although Fogelin mentioned 'rules' and 'forms of life' to discuss DD, he never talks about 'certainties' in his paper. However, to really make sense of the notions of *rules* and *forms of life* in relation to DD, one cannot avoid the notion of certainty because of the close connection of all these notions. This is why we need to look at this notion more closely. More importantly, we argue in this chapter that 'certainty' not 'rule' should be the central notion in an account of DD. We will also try to come up with some clues to recognize certainties in concrete argumentative situations.

3.1 Certainties in the guise of empirical statements

We are interested in the question why some debates or disagreements seem irresolvable by argumentation. Are they really irresolvable by argumentation? If so, how do we know that and what could explain that?

In a typical argumentation or debate in ordinary life, there exists a standpoint (or contention or motion). The arguers provide premises for or against the standpoint. Suppose, in a debate, A is supporting S and B is denying it. A provides some statements such as p_1, p_2, etc to establish S, whereas B provides q_1, q_2, etc to refute S. Diagrammatically:
Standpoint: S

(A premise can provide support to a conclusion independently, or in conjunction with some other premise(s). Moreover, any premise can further be supported by other premise(s). For the sake of clarity, we avoided these complexities in the diagram.)

A precondition for this debate to be an instance of argumentation is that all the sentences (S, not-S, p_1, p_2, q_1, q_2, ...) in it should belong to the category of knowledge-claim[3] (or disputed claim). In other words, in an argumentative conversation, any argument put forward by an arguer is a set of statements in which one statement is the conclusion and the others that support the conclusion are premises. All of the statements of an argument must be knowledge-claims (or disputed claim) that says something. Being a knowledge-claim, each of the statements of an argument is either true or false. Thus, as far as it concerns argumentation, all arguers must provide some disputed statement(s) to establish some other statement. The statements should be knowledge-claims that might have truth-values. Now, the problem arises when one or both of the arguers make a mistake by treating a sentence as a statement of fact which it actually isn't. How could that be possible? Wittgenstein draws our attention to the fact that human language is a complex phenomenon. Sometimes similarities on the surface level of our language deceive us. We mistakenly put two expressions of two different categories within a single category, i.e. we commit category mistake. In this chapter, we will concentrate on the category mistakes concerning the categories of 'certainties' and 'empirical statements'. Wittgenstein says:

> It is clear that our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since one can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm of description. (*OC* 167)

Let's look at the following table 3.1:

I[4]	II
The earth is the densest planet in the solar system	The Earth has existed for many years
The cat is a carnivorous animal	Cats don't grow on trees
Some notable people were beheaded in the past	If someone's head is cut off, the person will be dead and not live again
Newton's three laws are applied to the physics of most motion	There are physical objects
Trees are the source of many of the world's best known fleshy fruits	Trees do not gradually change into men and men into trees

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[3] A knowledge-claim need not be a claim that *is* knowledge.

[4] The sentences in column (I) have been collected from Wikipedia.

On the surface level, statements in column (I) and (II) look similar in kind. All of them appear to be empirical statements. But Wittgenstein argues that there is a fundamental difference between them with respect to their logical status. In normal circumstances, people do not doubt or try to justify the statements in column (II). By contrast, in normal cases, any sentence from (I) can be explicitly stated, doubted, or justified. We use the term 'certainties' to refer to something that is involved with the sentences similar to column (II).

The column (II) suggests that some seemingly *empirical statements* are actually disguised certainties. 'Certainty' here does not refer to a mental state; it is not the feeling of certainty with regard to the truth of some proposition. It indicates the different logical status of some of our beliefs which are different from ordinary beliefs.

3.2 Features of Certainties

Certainties are not descriptions or empirical statements in the sense that they do not describe the world; neither are they hypotheses since they are not refutable. They constitute the bedrock or the foundation of our rational thought. With an ordinary empirical proposition, we can check whether it agrees with the world and thereby check if it is true or false. But, with a certainty, we cannot do this. It is because the very notion of "agreement" consists of our certainties. "At the very best, it shows us what "agreement" means." (OC 203). No epistemic properties can be attributed to the certainties: they cannot be true/false, known/not known, etc. (Moyal-Sharrock, 2005, p.7). One way of describing them could be to regard them not grounds but background of our knowledge. Certainties provide the background for making knowledge-claims possible. We do not learn certainties as such, but we acquire them while we learn other things. Nobody ever teach a child that "there is a world". In its learning to walk, in its acting in the world it acquires the certainty that there is a world. Certainties are never taught; we are conditioned to them through repeated exposure or drill.

Moyal-Sharrock claims that there is no gradation or differences of depth among certainties: we either hold them or not (2004, p.151). The certainties that are in my bedrock are interconnected in such a way that shaking one of them shakes all others. Wittgenstein says:

> I believe that I have forebears, and that every human being has
> them. I believe that there are various cities, and, quite generally,
> in the main facts of geography and history. I believe that the

earth is a body on whose surface we move and that it no more suddenly disappears or the like than any other solid body: this table, this house, this tree, etc. If I wanted to doubt the existence of the earth long before my birth, I should have to doubt all sorts of things that stand fast for me. (*OC* 234)

All certainties have the character of rules, but not the other way round. Thus, the class of certainties is a subclass of the class of grammatical rules ('grammatical' in the sense we mentioned in section 2.1.1, chapter 2).

For our purpose, the issue of justification of certainties is important. Would it be possible to justify the certainties? Since certainties themselves are not statements of fact, they cannot support a statement of fact. "One does not infer how things are from one's own certainty." (*OC* 30)

A certainty is not a knowledge-claim because it is groundless. 'I know x' usually implies that 'I have right ground to claim x'. In normal circumstances, we do not utter a certainty such as 'I am a human being'. And the negation of a certainty would sound weird in a normal situation. This impossibility of negation shows that a certainty is not a hypothesis; neither is a knowledge-claim. It explains nothing, nothing follows from it. "Certainty is *as it were* a tone of voice in which one declares how things are, but one does not infer from the tone of voice that one is justified." (*OC* 30) If x is a certainty for me, there is no statement p that can support x. It is because any such p is already grounded on x in the sense that the very act of considering or thinking of p itself is constituted by certainties like x.

Another feature of the certainties is that they make judgment/testing/hypothesizing possible. Wittgenstein says:

> I say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation for…research and as such also goes unmentioned. (*OC* 167)

> I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting. (*OC* 162)

> But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. (*OC* 94)

It is noteworthy here that Wittgenstein's word for the system of certainties is world-picture or *Weltbild.*

3.3 Certainties in argumentation

Now, the question arises: how do the certainties work in an argumentation? How are they connected to the statements of an argumentation? Wittgenstein says:

> All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis take place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life. (*OC* 105)

We can try to relate Wittgenstein's conception of certainty to argumentation. Argumentation, in the traditional sense, is usually an attempt, at least in principle, to start from a common ground in order to reach a resolution of the difference of opinion:

S (issue of debate)

↑

p (assumed common ground)

If p proves to be not a common ground, then p becomes the new issue of debate:

p (new issue of debate)

↑

p_1 (assumed common ground)

A complex argument used in an argumentation is linked to a certainty entirely, not partially. It is because certainties encompass everything we say (and do) including all of our premises. The following diagram shows this point:

We have noted earlier that C does not support any p or S in the way a premise supports a conclusion. In the diagram above, the circle that encompasses all the statements of the argument indicates how the certainty C is related to those statements. The support of a premise to a conclusion has been shown by an arrow. C is linked to p or S as the provider of sense or as background. How certainties work as background would be clear if we consider the connection between certainties and forms of life.

Wittgenstein notices important connection between certainties and forms of life. In one remark, he even seems to take them as identical:

> Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.) (*OC* 358)

However, considering Wittgenstein's hesitation in the above remark and also what he says about certainties in other places, Moyal-Sharrock thinks that certainties are *part* of a form of life.

> [T]he extremely general facts of nature that belongs to our human form of life are certainties for all human, whereas the facts that frame the various forms of human life are certainties for only some humans depending on culture, society, education, interest etc. (Moyal-Sharrock, 2015, forthcoming, p. 4)

That is, a certainty is not a part of a form of life in the way a set could be a subset of one of its supersets. A certainty is something that is embedded in a form of life or, put differently, could be reconstructed from it. Certainties lie in our ways of acting/behaving/living. One may ask: what is "ways of acting/behaving/living"? How are they related to the notion of form of life? Thoughtlessness is important to understand Wittgenstein's notion of ways of acting/behaving/living (see Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, p.64). It becomes clearer when we look at the behaviour of lower animals like fishes or cats. The way they act, behave, and live is spontaneous and, in some sense, thoughtless. Behind our thoughts and reasoning there lies a basis which consists of this kind of thoughtless ways of acting/behaving/living. And a form of life, as we mentioned in chapter two, consists of a unity of shared ways of acting, behaving and living of a community. According to Moyal-Sharrock (2015, forthcoming), what is common in both the notions of certainty and form of life is that they are "ungrounded foundations on which doubt can occur". They are beyond the possibility of doubting.

One may ask: do certainties vary from person to person? Could a certainty be attached only to an individual? Apparently, "My name is L.W." was a certainty for Ludwig Wittgenstein, not for me. However, this certainty was shared by his family members, friends, and many other people. He himself learnt it from other people. A community of people that has a shared ways of acting and behaving is the basic thing associated with certainties. In absence of a better word, we can call this "shared ways of acting and behaving" a form of life. But we need to keep in mind that, a form of life in this sense is not necessarily associated with a distinct language such as English, Dutch, and Bengali. However, the group of people that shows a form of life also shows minimally some distinctive commonality in their language.

Moyal-Sharrock recognizes two different ways of characterizing certainties: one as doxastic *category* and another as doxastic *attitude*. 'Hinges', 'ways of acting and speaking', etc are descriptions of certainties as doxastic attitude, whereas "foundation", "background", "world-picture" are terms to describe certainties as doxastic category. They are just two ways of seeing the same thing. Thus, in a particular situation, one of our attitude or stance or standing may express a certainty. "I want to say: it's not that on some points men know the truth with perfect certainty. No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude." (*OC* 404)

Certainties concern our fundamental attitudes, not ordinary ones. "Smoking is not bad" expresses an ordinary attitude towards smoking. It is ordinary because I may come to know some fact(s) that can change it, for example the fact that "smoking causes cancer". By contrast, if someone says: "The earth did not exist before my birth", this is neither a factual statement nor an expression of an ordinary attitude. Rather it is a signal of a fundamental attitude. What makes it different from an ordinary attitude is its immunity to facts, at least to a large extent. Wittgenstein says:

> I might therefore interrogate someone who said that the earth did not exist before his birth, in order to find out which of my convictions he was at odds with. And then it *might* be that he was contradicting my fundamental attitudes. (*OC* 238)

In *OC* 238, Wittgenstein says that when we find that we differ in fundamental attitudes, what we could do is to accept the fact, i.e. to live with it. If I really want to have the other person accept my fundamental attitude, I need to try to 'persuade' her.

> I can imagine a man had grown up in quite special circumstances and been taught that the earth came into being 50 years ago, and therefore believed this. We might instruct him: the earth has long ...etc. – We should be trying to give him our picture of the world. //This would happen through a kind of *persuasion*. (*OC* 262)

Some differences of attitude can be resolved by citing facts. Having an attitude towards something amounts to ascribing a value (good, right, etc.) to that thing. This ascription might be based on some facts. But an attitude that is a certainty is not based on a fact. They cannot be influenced by citing facts.

It is not impossible to make a person give up a particular certainty, and accept another. But this could not be done by means of reasoning. It would be a conversion of the person, an initiation to look at the world in a different way.

> However, we can ask: May someone have telling grounds for believing that the earth has only existed for a short time, say since his own birth? - Suppose he had always been told that,- would he have any good reason to doubt it? Men have believed that they could make rain; why should not a king be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way. (*OC* 92)

Is it possible to come up with a general characterization of *all* certainties? Wittgenstein does not give any common characteristics of them. Like *game*, *certainty* is a family-resemblance concept. That is, it is not possible to give a general characterization of it. Of certainties Wittgenstein says: "I can enumerate various cases, but not give any common characteristic." (*OC* 674) There are different groups of certainties. The members of each group have some common characteristics. But the groups are not clearly distinct from one another; rather they overlap.

We can now try to find some clues for recognizing certainties that might be at work in ordinary argumentation-games.

Suppose, in an argumentation between A and B, x is being treated as a knowledge-claim. We suspected it to be a disguised certainty. How do we

become more certain? X might be a certainty if one or more of the following applies to it:

1. Either A or B (or both) cannot imagine a situation in which x is false.
2. For A or B (or both), being doubtful about x amounts to being doubtful about many other important and basic beliefs which ultimately results in being incapable to act normally in the world.
3. Either A or B (or both) strongly reluctant to engage in a debate over x.
4. A (or B) feels extremely insecure when x gets challenged by the other party. (OC 492)
5. A believes x, whereas B believes not-x. Moreover, A holds all the beliefs that made B to be convinced of not-x. Still, A feels incapable to deny x.
6. A supports x. B's arguments against x create strong negative emotion (e.g. anger) in A. They might even make A aggressive towards B without any clear reason. (OC 611)
7. A verbal expression of x invokes a feeling of saying something funny in A or B (or both). (OC 233)
8. A (or B) cannot find a proposition that she thinks is more certain than x and thereby can justify x.

None of these characteristics provide a necessary or sufficient condition to determine a certainty. However, the more of them are present in an expression of a belief the higher is the chance of its being a certainty.

To determine the certainties that are at work in a particular argumentation, we can ask the following questions:

1. Who are the arguers? Do their identities (e.g. culture, religion, etc) indicate some certainties that might be operating in this particular argumentation?
2. What is the topic of the argumentation? Does it provide any indication of some certainty that is probably at work in this particular argumentation?

It is easily possible to distinguish two categories of statements: empirical statements and certainties. But it is not always easy to put a particular statement in one of these categories. It seems that, for Wittgenstein, there is a

gray area between certainties and empirical propositions. That is, for some propositions, it is difficult to decide whether they are certainties or empirical propositions. Wittgenstein says:

> Is it not difficult to distinguish between the cases in which I cannot and those in which I can *hardly* be mistaken? Is it always clear to which kind a case belongs? I believe not. (OC 673)

> The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. (OC 97)

The river-metaphor shows that the distinction between the categories of certainty and empirical propositions is not clear. A sentence which is now regarded as empirical proposition may become a certainty with time. This may suggest that an empirical proposition may *transform* into a certainty. Moyal-Sharrock argues that what is common in the two elements of the transformation is nothing but a string of words or a sentence. An empirical evidence cannot transform an empirical proposition into a certainty. "Drill, repetition and all sorts of nonpropositional assimilation" change the status of a sentence to make it a certainty, i.e. change its use as an empirical proposition into a use as a certainty or hinge. More precisely, what gets changed is not a proposition but our attitude towards a sentence. (see Moyla-Sharrock, 2004, p.142)

So far we have seen that Wittgenstein's notions of rules and certainties provide two different perspectives to understand those disagreements where argumentation wouldn't help. They are like different paths to reach the same destination or different tools to clarify the same phenomenon. We can recall what Wittgenstein tells in the preface of *PI* about the nature of his investigation:

> The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches...The same or almost same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made.

Wittgenstein does not use the notion of 'certainty' in *PI*, but he uses the other two notions. Neither does he discuss DD directly. His goal was probably to show the roots of philosophical confusions from different directions.

However, our analysis in chapter two and three suggests the roots of deep disagreements in general. This is why it is quite natural that we have found that all of the three notions we discussed illuminate the landscape of DD from different directions.

However, for some reasons it is fair to claim that the notion of 'certainty' probably has some advantages over 'rules' (it makes sense because the notion of 'certainty' is developed at the last or most matured stage of Wittgenstein's thinking. Some people even regard this as the *third Wittgenstein*.). First, a certainty is also a rule so all the roles that are played by rules could also be played by certainties. Second, certainty can explain how Fogelin's underlying principles, which have no content connected to argumentation, could work as rules in the context of argumentative exchange. We know that many, if not all, ordinary empirical propositions can become certainties through repeated exposure and training. Third, certainties can explain better why we sometimes engage in argumentation that involves DD. A certainty often appears, like a rule, in the guise of an empirical statement. The foundational character (there being foundation of our thoughts and actions) of certainties clarifies why we very often fail to recognize a certainty as a certainty in actual argumentation. For these reasons, in our analysis of seemingly irresolvable disagreements, we will use the notion of certainty.

Having discussed Wittgenstein's notion of certainty, we can now make a claim concerning how certainties are linked to the limits of argumentation. Our claim is as follows: sometimes argumentation does not work because some of the arguers mistakenly treat one or more certainties as ordinary factual statements or knowledge-claims. Certainties are embedded in practices or FoI. Thus, those cases are DDs where there involves a significant difference of practices or FoI in addition to confusing a certainty with a knowledge-claim. The plausibility of our claim will be clearer in chapters 6 and 7 where we analyze the roots of religious and philosophical disagreements in terms of certainties and practices/FoI.

3.4 Reconsideration in light of Exegetical Differences

We have presented an account of DD which is actually a development of what Fogelin attempts to do in the paper that initiated the debate concerning DD. This account is based on a certain interpretation of *OC*. So far we have overlooked the disagreements among scholars concerning the interpretation of *OC*. It is time now to clarify our place among the exegetical differences of *OC*.

Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner (2005) recognizes four kinds of readings of *OC*: framework, transcendental, epistemic, and therapeutic. All of the first three readings find some kind of epistemological theory in *OC*. The framework reading finds a nonconventional foundationalism[5] in *OC*. This is nonconventional because, unlike traditional foundationalism, the basic beliefs or certainties are not universal, specifiable, autonomous, and rationlly adequate[6]. In spite of that, the framework reading is in a certain sense foundational because it considers the certainties as background or a kind of foundation of our inquires. We have, at least to some extent, followed Moyal-Sharrock's framework reading in our charecterization of certainties by attributing a kind of non-traditional foundational role to them. We also followed Kober's (1996, 1997) epistemological reading in our explanation concerning how the certainties are linked to the premises in actual argumentation. For our purpose, what we take from the framework and the epistemological readings can happily coexist because there is no inconsistency among them. This is also true with the transcendental reading which finds similarities between Kant's *concepts* and Wittgenstein's *rules*. But all of these three readings provide some kind of theoretical interpretation of *OC*. They assume that it is possible to come up with the general features of certainties and to recognize them by using those general features. For Moyal-Sharrock (2004, p.72), "[certainties] are all:

(1) *indubitable*: doubt and mistake are logically meaningless

(2) *foundational*: they do not result from justification

(3) *nonempirical*: they are not derived from the senses

(4) *grammatical*: they are rules of grammar

(5) *ineffable*: they cannot be *said*

(6) *enacted*: they can only *show* themselves *in* what we say and do."

And herein, they go against the fourth reading, namely the therapeutic reading. On the therapeutic reading, Wittgenstein does not intend to put forward any thesis regarding any philosophical issues. His purpose is therapeutic, i.e. to find ways to get rid of philosophical confusions. The therapeutic readers see *OC* as Wittgenstein's attempt to provide tools to

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[5] Marie McGinn (2009) characterizes Avrum Stroll's position with this phrase. And Avrum stroll is one of the framework readers in Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner (2005).

[6] This has been pointed out by Michael Williams in Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner (2005). Certaitnties are not universal because a certainty could be only of a certain community; it need to be necessarily of human kind. They are not specifiable in the sense that it is not possible to specify their essence. They are not autonomous because they are not fully independent of the ordinary beliefs (see OC 248). Lastly, they are not rationally adequate because they cannot "offer a basis for rationally adjudicating any (empirically) significant dispute."(Moyal-Sharrock & Brenner, 2005, p.55)

overcome the tendency to ask skeptical questions. Thus, on this reading, it is wrong to look for a theory of certainty in *OC*. It is also wrong to treat the notion of form of life as a technical term or jargon (see Read, 2005). Wittgenstein uses this kind of notions as ladders that are to be abandoned once they have been used for therapeutic purpose. If there is anything to learn from *OC*, then that would be some kind of tools that we can use (after modifying them if needed) in other contexts for some therapeutic purpose. This appears to be against what we did so far. Did we formulate a theory of certainty that could help to recognize DD and stop pointless argumentation? It is true that we formulated some criteria to identify certainties in argumentations. But we do not claim that they are necessary or sufficient conditions for recognizing certainties. We consider them as tools taken from Wittgenstein to find other kinds of certainties. We do not claim to find general features of certainties. Thus, we are consistent with the therapeutic reading as long as we do not claim to find a theory of DD. The insight[7] that we get from *OC* might help us to see the limits of arguments in some contexts. But, for us, finding the relevant certainties or ways of overcoming the limitation of argumentation is still crucially context-dependent. The ideas that we adopted from the framework and the epistemological reading are not theories but ordinary facts. For example, it is an ordinary fact that some sentences are not justifiable in certain contexts because they work like rule and do not work as ordinary empirical judgments. Another could be: different practices have different such non-justifiable certainties (for certain people) embedded in them.

Thus, the ramification of later Wittgenstein concerning the issue of limit of argumentation is the following. It is not possible to give a general characterization of DD because it is not possible to do it neither for certainties nor for the forms of life. And for this very reason, it is not possible to find a definite way of resolving deep disagreements. The most important lesson that we learn from later Wittgenstein is the necessity to overcome the temptation to find such a generalization. However, it is possible to use some of the tools (namely the notion of certainty, form of life, and practices) in actual argumentative contexts to avoid useless argumentation.

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[7] By *insight* I simply mean reminders of interesting ordinary facts.

SOME ACCOUNTS OF DD

In the previous chapter, we discussed the key notions for understanding why some disagreements are deep. In this chapter, we look at some accounts of DD and examine them in order to make a more comprehensive picture of the roots of deep disagreements. We will draw lessons from these accounts and also pinpoint the differences with Fogelin's account and with the development that we proposed in the chapter 3.

4.1 Godden and Brenner

Fogelin's paper initiated a vast amount of literature on DD, though not all of them adopted a Wittgensteinian approach. David M Godden and William H. Brenner in their paper titled "Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement"(2010) try to come up with a truly Wittgensteinian account of DD.   Their paper is one of the latest and probably the most elaborate discussion on DD from a Wittgensteinian point of view.

4.1.1 Exclusion of procedures

Let's first try to recognize what we may get from Godden and Brenner that adds to our picture concerning the roots of DD. In chapter one, we mentioned that, for Fogelin, a normal or near-normal argumentation would be possible when the disputants 1) largely share beliefs and preferences and also 2) share the procedure for resolving the dispute. To establish a standpoint S if I use a premise p, then it might be the case that I consider P_r as a procedure (for example, a piece of evidence presented in a court, a test result, etc) to support p. And for the argumentation to be normal or near-normal, my opponent needs to agree that P_r is an acceptable procedure to decide whether p is true. The procedure can be directly connected to a set of premises (figure 1 below) or to one particular premise (figure 2 below), or even to the standpoint. Diagrammatically:

1) S

p1   p2
P_r

2) S

$$\begin{array}{cc} & S \\ p1 & p2 \\ & \overline{P_r} \end{array}$$

[S=standpoint
p, p_1, p_2=premises
P_r= procedure]

Fogelin's idea of normal and near-normal argumentation implies that if the arguers do not agree on the procedure, the disagreement is deep. One may ask: is it possible that, in a debate, I largely share beliefs and preferences but still disagree on the procedure with my opponent? If this is possible, then would it be a deep disagreement? Herein, Godden and Brenner fill in a gap in Fogelin's picture in drawing our attention to the ground of the procedures (i.e. the C's in our diagrams):

> While Fogelin does not explicitly state this, it seems reasonable to suppose that these resolution-procedure are at least grounded in, if not articulated among, these shared background commitments. (Godden and Brenner, 2010, p.43)

Thus, in our preferred terminology[8], the procedures themselves are grounded in certainties and can even be "articulated" among them (i.e. can even be identical with some certainties). Thus, our picture concerning how certainties are linked to the premises of an argumentation would be more comprehensive if we put the procedures (or bases) in it. Diagrammatically:

1)

$$\begin{array}{c} S \\ \uparrow \\ p \\ \overline{P_r} \\ C \end{array}$$

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
[8]Godden and Brenner do not use the notion of certainties in their analysis of DD. However, they used the other close notions such as *Weltbild*, forms of life, language-game, and concepts. We will say more about the comparative usefulness of these notions later on in this chapter.

2)

[S=standpoint
p, p₁, p₂=premises
Pᵣ = procedure
C=certainty]

The second diagram above shows that a procedure itself might be a certainty. An example of a certainty (C) that is also a procedure (P_r) in a particular debate could be the following: "our disagreement should be resolved by means of reason-givings, not by force or other irrational means."

The procedure might be based on some certainty or it might be based on some fact that is ultimately grounded in a certainty. If there is a difference among the disputants concerning the procedure, they can resolve it by citing facts (as long as there is no scope for other normal criticisms on which we discussed in chapter 1). If it is say immune to appeal to facts, etc., there is a strong possibility that it is grounded in a certainty. The fact that procedures themselves, like any premises, are grounded in certainties makes it unnecessary to characterize the root of DD in terms of lack of agreement about procedure. Thus, we can easily exclude the procedure part from Fogelin's account of DD in order to make it simpler.

4.1.2 Possibility of disjoint forms of life

Godden and Brenner emphasize that it is important to have a common form of life even for a meaningful deep disagreement. The notion of disagreement presupposes the possibility of agreement. And agreement is possible where understanding is possible. The precondition for mutual understanding is the possibility of communication. And we can communicate with somebody only when there is a common form of life. They think:

> Meaningful deep disagreements seem to occur either at the intersection of two different but overlapping forms of life, or within a single but heterogeneous *Weltbild.* (Godden and Brenner, 2010, p.47)

So, here we have two alternative settings in which a deep disagreement might occur:

1. An intersection of two different but overlapping forms of life
2. A single but heterogeneous *Weltbild*

To make sense of these alternatives we need to know how Godden and Brenner see the relationship between a form of life and a *Weltbild*. The following quote clarifies this:

> Roughly, for Wittgenstein, in learning our mother tongue we become enculturated into a form of life which is comprised of a rich set of ways-of-doing and an attendant *Weltbild*. (Godden and Brenner, 2010, p.45)

> The *Weltbild* and the way of life are connected through the very grammar of language. (Godden and Brenner, 2010, p. 45)

These quotes suggest that form of life and *Weltbild* are two distinguishable entities – the latter is probably a part of the former. By contrast, Judith Genova clarifies the relationship in the following way:

> I take the concept of a form of life to be synonymous with a *Weltbild*. The latter provides a more subjective way of speaking of what the former hopes to name more objectively. Yet, the dimension "subjective/objective" is a poor way of trying to name their difference. For all practical purposes, they are interchangeable. (Genova, 1995, p.208, n. 13)

Following Genova's view, I would like to reformulate the second alternative mentioned above:

2′. A single but heterogeneous *form of life*

As soon as we pay attention to this new formulation, it becomes clear that we actually have a third alternative. In our discussion of form of life in chapter two, we concluded that all humans participate in a human form of life, but as a member of various groups (e.g. a culture, etc) they also participate in

various other forms of life simultaneously. A religious/academic/political, etc form of life is an aspect of a general form of life. To meaningfully disagree, we don't need a single but heterogeneous form of life because we already participate in a human form of life. Thus, the third alternative is:

3. Two different forms of life operating within a larger common (human) form of life.

This amounts to saying: to explain the root of DD between A and B, we are not bound to assume that A's form of life that is relevant to the issue of disagreement overlaps with B's relevant form of life. That is, we need not assume that any form of life necessarily overlaps any other form of life. Some forms of life might well be disjoint.

4.1.3 Concept-formation

Godden and Brenner's position regarding the root of DD seems somewhat ambiguous. They sometimes use statements such as "...deep disagreements are disagreements across language-games" or "...deep disagreements are really intra-framework disagreements arising from different form of life and world-pictures." (p. 46) in contexts where it is difficult to be sure whether they are giving their own opinion or not. However, in their concluding remarks, they clearly announce the following:

> Deep disagreements are rooted in differences in concepts (measures, understood as the determination of sense or conceptual content) rather than judgments or opinions (measurements, understood as the application of concepts) (Godden and Brenner, 2010, p.76)

> In deep disagreements this shared conceptual apparatus is not established. (Godden and Brenner, 2010, p.76)

Therefore, we can take Godden and Brenner to hold that the roots of DD lie in the differences of concepts. To decide whether concepts are useful tools to analyze DD, we need to be clear what Godden and Brenner mean by concepts. The following quote suggests that concepts are taken to be rules by Godden and Brenner:

> Resolving such a disagreement will consist, not in getting one party to reject a false or improbable opinion, but in one party being persuaded to accept a new concept-formation–i.e., to

acknowledge a new rule about what it does or doesn't make sense
to say and do. (Godden and Brenner, 2010, p.68)

We have discussed in the previous chapter that the notion of certainty has the character of rules but it has some additional advantages. We can add one more advantage here. One important feature of certainties is that we do not learn them explicitly. "I do not explicitly learn the proposition that stand fast for me, I can discover them subsequently..." (*OC* 152)

On the other hand, I can explicitly learn a rule or a concept. For example, I can learn that n x 0 = 0 (where n is any integer) in an algebra class. What I explicitly learn, I can question or doubt. Doubting or questioning makes more sense in the contexts where the rules are not certainties. That is why the notion of certainty is more useful than rules or concepts to understand the roots of DD.

4.1.4 Remedies of DD

Godden and Brenner disagree with Fogelin's claim that there is no rational means to resolve DD. On their view, the resolvability of DD "needn't be either irrational or nonrational. Instead, it involves a kind of "persuasion" which we have explained as a form of rhetoric in the service of concept-formation. While the type of reasoning and argumentation involved here is dialectical rather than demonstrative, amorphous rather than uniform, indeterminate rather than binary, it is neither fraudulent nor relativistic nor arbitrary." (2010, p.77)

They call this special kind of persuasion as "rational persuasion". They think that "reasons operate differently" in the resolution of DD. To illustrate the idea of rational persuasion Godden and Brenner cites "John Wisdom's story in *Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics* of how his tutor persuaded him that 3 x 0 equals 0. It struck the young pupil as more "logical" to say that it equals 3. His tutor persuaded him otherwise, not by intimidation (pressing his authority as teacher), but by way of an argument by analogy:

Three multiplied by three = three threes (3 x 3 = 3 + 3 + 3),
Three multiplied by two = two threes (3 x 2 = 3 + 3),
Three multiplied by one = one three (3 x 1 = 3),
Therefore, by analogy,
Three multiplied by zero = zero threes (3 x 0 = 0).

The young Wisdom had an argument too: that if you multiply 3 *x's* by 0, that would be equivalent to *not* multiplying them at all ("multiplying them by nothing")–not a bad argument, abstractly considered! He was led to abandon it by being given a perspicuous representation of the math he was being taught, so he could understand how – not "3 x 0 =3" – but "3 x 3 = 0" fits into the system he was being taught. Had he not been persuaded but persisted in going his own way, his elders might have been forced to conclude that he was unteachable when it comes to arithmetic." (2010, p.69)

One may ask why using an "argument by analogy" here is not argumentation but persuasion. A possible answer could be that it is not aimed at establishing the truth of 3 x 0 =0; rather its aim is to make the young Wisdom accept the rule and follow it, i.e. to enable him to play the game of arithmetic. Godden and Brenner's explanation of the different role of rationality in the resolution of DD can be considered a remarkable contribution to the discussion about DD. Now the question is: do they suggest that "rational persuasion" is the only remedy for DD? If so, we need to keep in mind that Wittgenstein did not give a definite characterization of certainties. Moreover, he thinks that it is hard to determine certainties irrespective of contexts; rather being within a context puts one in a better position to be able to identify certainties related to those contexts. If certainties cannot be predetermined, then the remedies of DD can also not be predetermined. Thus, "rational persuasion" could be just one of the possible remedies.

4.2 Chris Campolo

Chris Campolo devoted a number of[9] of his papers to discuss DD. Unlike Godden and Brenner, Campolo's main purpose is not to improve on Fogelin's account, but to develop a new account[10]. In what follows, I discuss two points of his account where I disagree.

4.2.1 DD in terms of Abilities/Expertise

Instead of "shared beliefs", "form of life", etc., Campolo's key terms are "understanding", "expertise", "ability", "capacity", etc which he uses as

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[9] The total number of writings (including a commentary) related to DD that I have found is seven. See bibliography.

[10] Campolo does not say explicitly anything about why he is not happy with Fogelin's account of DD.

synonyms. For Campolo, the condition for argumentation to be possible is shared understanding or expertise. We can successfully interact with other people because we share a vast amount of understanding with them. Campolo says: "Having an understanding amounts to having an expertise at something, even if the something is mundane." (Campolo, 2009, p.2). A simple example would be the understanding of an ATM machine: "If you understand the ways of ATM machines, then you know how to work them, you know what to expect from them, you know what people mean when they mention them, and so on." (Campolo, 2009, p.2).

In our everyday life, we are able to engage in reason-givings or argumentation because we share relevant understanding or expertise. When we lack this, arguments do not work. Campolo wants to place the notions of agreement/ disagreement in the context of human interaction. He recognizes that arguments have various uses and the main use is to establish smooth interaction when it goes wrong or "to continue to be related to each other in whatever ways we are" (Campolo, 2009, p.4). In other words, the primary use of arguments is to remedy a breakdown of intersubjectivity. Let's consider some examples from Campolo. The following is a 'safe' argumentation where the arguers share enough to argue and agree.

> Several students drop by a professor's office during scheduled office hours to ask about a quiz. The professor's door is open but she is not in the office. One student suggests that she is gone for the day, but another points out that she just saw the instructor in class and that there is a steaming cup of coffee on her desk. The students jointly conclude that the instructor is around somewhere and will be back shortly. (Campolo, 2002, p.6)

Here what is shared by the students is their understanding of "the behavior of professors, the everyday workings of university corridors, the set-up of a typical academic office, the way people treat coffee, how doors work, and a great deal more" (Campolo, 2002, p.9).

On the other hand, the following is a 'dangerous' reasoning where the parties do not have the relevant expertise but still argue:

> Jeff and Catherine visit an art museum for the first time just to see what all the commotion over museum art is all about and agree that none of the impressionist works display any great skill. Their primary reason: none of the figures in the paintings looks at all 'realistic'. (Campolo, 2002, p.10)

Obviously, the understanding that is lacking here is Jeff and Cathrine's expertise to evaluate impressionist works. The above examples make clear what Campolo means by shared understanding or lacking thereof. Now Campolo claims that a deep disagreement arises when the two parties do not share understanding or expertises that are relevant to the issue of their disagreement. The problem is to see how it helps to understand e.g. the cases of disagreements cited by Fogelin where the disputants disagree over the issue of abortion or affirmative action. Could Fogelin's underlying principles be reduced to some abilities or expertise? On the framework that we prefer, this amounts to ask: could the certainties be reduced to abilities or expertise?

This raises a further question: is an ability/expertise a know-how? There might be know-hows that cannot be reduced to know-thats. But it is not clear whether Campolo's know-hows are like those. Now, Moyal-Sharrock describes certainties as a know-how, but they are not ordinary know-how; rather they are "flawless", "objective" know-hows: "know-how in which there is no room for improvement" (2004, 65). By contrast, Campolo's abilities/expertise includes (if not exhausts) ordinary know-hows. They can be improved; for example a doctor's expertise in medical treatment always grows with time as she treats more and more patients. Moreover, an ability/expertise is something that is attributable to an individual, whereas a certainty is actually a way of speaking of a group-practice. There might be understanding/expertise (in Campolo's sense) that is negative or undesirable such as racism. An expertise is usually inherited or acquired from other people who have the same expertise. A person becomes a racist because there are other racists and there is an existing practice of racism[11]. The individualistic connotation of abilities/expertises makes it inappropriate for analyzing DD adopting a Wittgenteinain approach. I am doubtful whether a disagreement that arises from a lack of shared understanding/expertise is always a deep disagreement. It is because a lack of shared understanding might not be necessarily "immune to appeal to facts". The fact that the arguers lack relevant understanding may make them convinced that they actually have no opinion regarding the issue, and thereby the disagreement may disappear. Thus, the set of disagreements which Fogelin would consider as deep are not identical with that set of Campolo.

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[11] In her lecture (titled "Narratives, Social Movements, and Social Justice") in the Philosophical Festival DRIFT (Amsterdam, 2015) I heard Sally Haslanger claiming that it is not possible to cure racism in a society as long as we see it as a problem of individuals. She thinks that what we practice as a group is more fundamental than what we practice as an individual.

4.2.2 Dealing with DD

Another element in Campolo's account concerns the way of dealing with a DD. Like Fogelin, Campolo is a pessimist regarding the effectiveness of argumentation for resolving DD. Fogelin claims that not argumentation but persuasion would work for the resolution of DD. But he has no explicit recommendation that we should not try argumentation in the contexts of DD. By contrast, Campolo seems to recommend that we should avoid argumentation in a deep disagreement because it may harm our reasoning skill and "threaten the very reason-giving process". "Employing our reasoning skills in risky cases ... is like trying to play tennis with a baseball bat. Using a bat for tennis is not only a way to lose a tennis match, it's a way to ruin one's skills with a tennis racquet." (Campolo, 2002, p.14)

To examine this view, let's consider an example from Campolo:

"Rick and Sue, with only the most meager knowledge of the workings of automobiles, have the following exchange:

> Rick: I wonder if these two problems are related – first of all my car is making very loud exhaust sounds. On top of that, this parking brake lever has been getting extremely hot – too hot even to touch.
> Sue: Oh – you must have a big hole in your exhaust pipe right here under the brake lever – they are indeed both caused by the same thing.
> Rick: That would explain it – must be right." (Campolo, 2002, p.10)

Campolo recognizes it as a 'dangerous' type of reasoning-together. It is because "they apparently believe that a few argumentative moves can compensate for wholesale incompetence. By making those moves they not only reveal damaged judgment – they also damage it further." (Campolo, 2002, p.11) But, is it really so? We depend on our common-sense knowledge to acquire more advanced knowledge. To acquire understanding of an expert, we ask questions and start reasoning from our common-sense knowledge. Couldn't the exchange between Rick and Sue be a form of a hypothesizing based on the available common-sense knowledge they already have? And more importantly, couldn't that exercise prepare them for acquiring genuine expertise in automobile principles? Couldn't the above exchange be a small step towards a long learning process? It might be the case that their hypothesis would be proved to be wrong later on. But making mistakes is an essential part of learning.

A little consideration of history seems also to make Campolo's claim dubious. It seems that we should keep open the possibility of some people arguing even when the disagreement is deep and the possible result might be dangerous. It is because: had there not been such courageous and wrong argumentation, there would not have been a Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King (assuming that they sometimes used arguments in their persuasion). Moreover, throughout history, great leaders sometimes used arguments not to "re-establish harmony", but to break an existing harmony and establish a *new* one.

The short-term effect of reasoning in DD might be bad, but the long-term effect might well be good. So it seems that a discussion of DD should not involve any *definite recommendation* concerning whether people should engage in argumentation when the disagreement is deep. Only somebody in a particular context of argumentation may decide for herself whether to use arguments or not. Our analysis of DD may only result in some insight regarding when argumentation works in inducing agreement and when it does not work.

4.3 Finocchiaro

Finnocchiaro provides a different and clearly non-Wittgensteinian way of dealing with DD. Unlike Fogelin and Campolo, he is somewhat optimistic regarding the resolvability of DD. He thinks that "deep disagreements are resolvable to a greater degree than usually thought" (Finnocchiaro, 2011, p.1). Instead of discussing his entire approach, we would just comment on one of his points that seem to threaten our characterization of DD. This concerns whether the process of acquiring certainties could be considered as "learning and mastering complex argumentation" Finocchiaro thinks that what the pessimists actually show is that deep disagreements cannot be resolved by simple argumentation. But they may be solved by complex argumentation[12]. It seems that, for Finnocchiaro, Fogelin's "persuasion" or Godden and Brenner's "rational persuasion" should be considered as nothing but "learning and mastering complex argumentation". The question is whether it makes sense. It seems to me, from a Wittgensteinian point of view, this is implausible. The way we learn certainties is not the same as the way we learn various facts of the world that could be expressed in factual

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[12]Although Finnocchiaro directs this criticism mainly against Campolo and Turner & Wright, we assume here that it applies to our conception of DD.

statements. Certainties are not sayable like ordinary beliefs. Our activities *show* the certainties that we have, but that does not mean that we use them as reasons. Mastering an argument (simple or complex whatever) means being able to use it or *say* it in argumentative contexts. But initiation to a new practice or FoI does not make one capable of *saying* the certainties that are embedded in that practice or FoI. Therefore using non-argumentative methods to resolve a DD cannot be regarded as a process of learning and mastering complex arguments.

C h a p t e r   5

DEEP DISAGREEMENTS IN PHILOSOPHY

In the previous chapters, we have developed some tools to understand the phenomenon of DD in light of the later Wittgenstein. Our tools are meant to be useful in concrete argumentative contexts for deciding not to engage in argumentation when arguments would not work. The conclusions that we drew in the previous chapters are the following. An argumentation would not work if the arguments put forward by one of the arguers involve the acceptance of a certainty that is not recognized or accepted by the other arguers. In addition to this confusion with certainties, if a disagreement involves a difference in practices or FoL, we call it a deep disagreement (DD). It is not possible to resolve a DD by argumentation because some confusing certainty (or certainties) is at work there. So far our conclusions were based on our interpretation of Wittgenstein's later works. In the current and the next chapters we will try both to illustrate our conclusions with concrete examples and also further justify them by those examples. Since we don't have empirical data to check our account of the limits of argumentation, we will analyze examples of disagreements that are linked to Wittgenstein's own works, i.e. those examples that could be supported by Witttgenstein's remarks[13].

In the current chapter, our topic is a special kind of philosophical disagreement, namely the disagreement between a *Wittgensteinian philosopher* and a traditional philosopher. A Wittgensteinian philosopher thinks that all the big questions of philosophy are something that needs to be *dissolved*. They cannot be *solved* in that they cannot be answered by producing philosophical theories. Rather what a philosopher can do is to use therapeutic tools to get people be freed from the tendency to ask meaningless philosophical questions. In *The Big Typescript* Wittgenstein says*:*

> Roughly speaking, according to the old conception – for instance that of the (great) western philosophers – there have been two kinds of intellectual problems; the essential, great, universal ones, and the non-essential, quasi-accidental problems. We, on the other hand, hold that there is no such

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[13] This should make sense because our purpose in this thesis is to understand the limits of argumentation, especially the character of DD, on the basis of Wittgenstein's writings.

thing as a great, essential problem in the intellectual sense. (p.301e)

About his goal in philosophy Wittgenstein says:

> [T]he clarity that we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear.
>
> The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question.-Instead, a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off. - Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem. (*PI* 133)

On the other hand, a traditional philosopher considers the big questions of philosophy as genuine. She thinks that those questions could be answered by developing philosophical theories. As we mentioned earlier in the third chapter, there are various interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy. We cannot go into the details of assessing the relative plausibility of different interpretations here. However, we do think that a Wittgensteinian philosopher takes seriously Wittgenstein's remarks about the nature of philosophy and about his own goal and methods in philosophy, especially the remarks from *PI* 89 to *PI* 133. Of course, we assume that Wittgenstein himself belongs to the group of Wittgensteinian philosophers. In what follows, we will often use *Wittgenstein* to mean the Wittgenstein philosophers as defined just now. But sometimes we would also use it to refer only the individual Wittgenstein, especially when his biographical facts would be relevant for us. The context would make clear when we mean what. We will use the term *Wittgensteinian debate* to refer to the debate between a Wittgensteinian philosopher and a traditional philosopher about whether traditional philosophy asks genuine questions. One problem with this term is that it may suggest that Wittgenstein holds some kind of thesis. At the centre of every debate there is a proposition (S): one party argues for S and the opposite party argues against S. If we conceive a Wittgensteinian debate as something like this, then the S or not-S that Wittgenstein argues for may appear to be a thesis. However, we need to keep in mind that Wittgenstein claims the impossibility of *philosophical* theses, i.e. those theses that answer to some big questions of traditional philosophy. But this keeps room for a *meta*philosophical thesis such as "The big questions of traditional philosophy are pseudo-questions". We assume here that meta-philosophy is not a part of traditional philosophy, at least not

the traditional philosophy that Wittgenstein attacks. So a Wittgensteinian debate is something that can be reformulated as a meta-philosophical debate. However, it is different from ordinary debate in an important aspect. One party of the debate (the Wittgensteinian philosophers) is already aware that the debate arises from a deep disagreement and thus does not solely depend on argumentative devices to resolve the disagreement. We will expand on the issue of Wittgenstein's non-argumentative techniques for resolving DDs in the third section of this chapter. Our discussion here will be centered around the following questions:

1. Does the disagreement between Wittgenstein (or the Wittgensteinian philosophers) and the traditional philosophers involve a confusion regarding some certainties?
2. Does the disagreement between Wittgenstein (or the Wittgensteinian philosophers) and the traditional philosophers involve a difference of practices or forms of life?
3. If Wittgenstein's philosophical project can be characterized as an endeavour to resolve his deep disagreements with the traditional philosophers, *how* did he try to do this? Does he use non-argumentative methods?
4. Could the disagreement between Wittgenstein (or the Wittgensteinian philosophers) and the traditional philosophers justly be regarded as a deep disagreement on the basis of the answers to the questions 1-3?

We will address each of the questions by turns in the following sections. In the last section, we will consider the philosophical debate among the traditional philosophers themselves in light of our conception of the limits of argumentation.

5.1 Certainties in Wittgensteinian debates

To decide whether a Wittgensteinian debate arises from a deep disagreement, we first need to know if it involves confusion with regard to some certainty. Let's first consider a Wittgensteinian debate on scepticism or, more specifically, the question of the possibility of knowledge. The point of departure of this debate is the following issue:

"Is there any knowledge?"- is it a genuine question?

A traditional philosopher (who is interested in the problem of the possibility of knowledge) would answer "yes". But Wittgenstein's position is the

opposite. He would say: "No, it is not a genuine question." This is a debate because the two parties here have opposite propositional attitudes with regard to the truth of the same proposition:

(S) "Is there any knowledge?" is a genuine question.

A traditional philosopher assents to S whereas a Wittgensteinian philosopher assents to not-S. However, if we look at the arguments that a traditional philosopher might offer to justify her position, we will discover that one of her basic beliefs for her support for S is the following:

(p) "Everything can be doubted" is a disputed claim.

In her argumentation, the traditional philosopher may or may not mention p. But his position is based on p[14]. Now, p is actually the negation of the following which Wittgenstein endorses:

(not-p) "Everything can be doubted" is not a disputed claim.

Now let's assume (p_1)= Everything can be doubted.
And $(not\text{-}p_1)$ = It is not the case that everything can be doubted.
　　　　　　=There are things that cannot be doubted.

For a Wittgenstein philosopher, $not\text{-}p_1$ is a certainty, not a knowledge-claim or disputed claim. That is why p_1 does not *say* anything for her. On the other hand, the attitude of our traditional philosopher towards p_1 and $not\text{-}p_1$ is like the attitude that we might have to a statements such as "Obama is the president of the US" or "Yesterday the temperature was above 30 degree". Our traditional philosopher might be Descartes or Moore or a radical skeptic but both p_1 and $not\text{-}p1$ are knowledge-claims for him/her. How do we know that this is really so? It can be easily tested by asking a traditional philosopher whether she thinks that p_1 is true (or false) and $not\text{-}p_1$ is false (or true).

Now how do we know that $not\text{-}p_1$ is a certainty for Wittgenstein? We argue that it actually implies from his discussion in *OC*. We can easily put $not\text{-}p_1$ in the list of universal certainties[15] of *OC*. The list includes: 'The earth exists',

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[14] See Moyal-Sharrock 2004, p. 157

[15] Moyal-Sharrock (2004) uses the term "universal hinges" to refer to the certainties that are part of the human form of life and thereby shared by all humans.

'There are physical objects','Things don't systematically disappear when we're not looking', 'If someone's head is cut off, the person will be dead and not live again', 'Trees do not gradually change into men and men into trees', etc. Moreover, Wittgenstein clearly says: "If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty." (*OC* 115). This remark is not a justification for not-p_1; rather it is an articulation of not-p_1. If not-p_1 is a certainty, then p_1 does not *say* anything. It is noteworthy here that not-p_1 is a certainty not only for a Wittgensteinian philosopher but also for common people. In ordinary life, the way we act and behave shows our belief that not everything can be doubted.

We can consider here another example of a Wittgensteinian debate. The topic is now the philosophical question regarding the possibility of freedom of will. Wittgenstein did not address this issue in detail in his writing[16]. The issue of the debate is the following:

"Is there free will?" -is it a genuine question?

Wittgenstein's answer to this is negative while the answer of the traditional philosopher is positive. The disagreement that is rooted in this debate is deep. One of the reasons is that

(*f*) There is free will

is a certainty for Wittgenstein but not for the traditional philosophers. The traditional philosophers, broadly speaking, are divided into determinist and indeterminist camps with regard to the problem of free will. That *f* is a disputed claim for the traditional philosopher is obvious from the fact that

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[16] The only primary source that we have concerning Wittgenstein's treatment of the problem of free will is the collection of some notes taken by Yorick Smythies at a lecture delivered in Cambridge by Wittgenstein "probably in 1945-1946, or 1946-1947" (Wittgenstein, 1989, p.85) . According to these notes, Wittgenstein claims that the question whether free will is compatible with determinism is a question that does not make sense. In the lecture, Wittgenstein discusses how we use words such as "natural law", "compulsion", "inevitability", "moving freely", etc. Interestingly, Wittgenstein wrote the remarks of *OC* during the last year and a half of his life (he died in February 1951) which is quite a few years distant from the time when he delivered the lecture on free will. One might say that the notion of certainty provides a more powerful tool (that comes from most matured writings of Wittgenstein) for dissolving the problem of free will. In fact, Wittgenstein's lecture on free will at some point anticipates the idea that our belief in free will is a certainty because it is groundless. See the quote from Wittgenstein's "A Lecture on Freedom of Will" cited in this chapter (see p.53).

they claim the truth of f and try to justify f by means of sophisticated philosophical arguments. On the other hand, one might say that, for Wittgenstein, f is a certainty (see section 3.2). One of the reasons is that it is groundless. That Wittgenstein treats our conviction of having free will as groundless is clear from the following conversation between Wittgenstein and Lewy cited in Wittgenstein's "A Lecture on Freedom of Will":

> *Lewy.* Suppose I ask: what are the grounds for his conviction of being free?
> *Witt.* I might say: There are no grounds.
> (Wittgenstein, 1989, p.95)

So far we have considered two Wittgensteinian debates: one about the problem of the possibility of knowledge and another about the problem of free will. Our discussion makes it clear that both of these debates involve confusing some certainties with factual statements. We now turn to the question whether these disagreements involve significant differences of practices between the parties of the debate.

5.2 Difference of Practice in the Wittgensteinian debates

To specify the differences of practices in the Wittgensteinian debates is hard because it actually requires a separate empirical investigation, especially when we would like to find the practices that are directly relevant to the particular issue of only a particular Wittgensteinian debate. However, for our purpose suffices it to note that throughout his life Wittgenstein was always trying to live differently and to engage himself in practices that are not so common in the life of a traditional philosopher. He gave away his entire fortune inherited from his father and tried to live the life of an ordinary person. He encouraged his students not to be academics and himself resigned his academic position in 1947 (Monk, 2015)[17]. Unlike a typical traditional philosopher, Wittgenstein read little of the classic works of traditional philosophy. His attitude towards traditional philosophical texts got expressed in his remark:

> "As little philosophy as I read, I have certainly not read too little, rather too much. I see that whenever I read a philosophical book: it doesn't improve my thoughts at all, it makes them worse."
> (Monk, 1990, p.496)

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[17] It is noteworthy here that some scholars think that biography is crucially relevant to understand Wittgenstein's philosophy. (see Conant, 2001)

Thus, Wittgenstein would say that it is only when we do traditional philosophy, we engage in a practice (namely, the practice of doing traditional philosophy) that moves us away from ordinary way of living and seeing the world. And the consequence is to view sentences such as not-p or f as knowledge-claims that could be doubted or justified. When we come back to the ordinary way of living, the seemingly big questions of traditional philosophy simply disappear.

5.3 Wittgenstein's strategies to resolve DD

In this section, we discuss Wittgenstein's philosophical method in order to support our claim that a Wittgensteinian debate does really involve a DD. It is a well-known fact that Wittgenstein's style of writing is different from that of the traditional academic philosophical writings. A typical piece of writing by Wittgenstein is not an argumentative prose centered around a philosophical thesis. Rather it is a collection of remarks. One may wonder whether his remarks could be reconstructed as traditional philosophical argumentation. Hanfling finds the following examples of kinds of arguments as typical of Wittgenstein's writings:

> 1. You maintain (he says to his imaginary opponent) that such and such *must* be the case; but here are various examples to show that it need not be so; hence your assumption is false. (This kind of argumentation occurs in his rejection of essentialism, and of various 'mental process' assumptions about meaning, thinking, etc.)
> 2. You think you can, and need to, *explain* how we are able to follow a rule, understand a word, etc. by invoking such and such a process or principle; but the questions that troubled you arise again with regard to any such process or principle; hence your quest for that kind of explanation is misconceived.
> 3. You think that such words as 'pain' are, or could be, given meaning by an 'inner' counterpart of ostensive definition. But the supposed mental act cannot provide a 'criterion of correctness', such as exists in the case of 'pain'. Hence, this is not how such words come to have meaning.
> 4. 'When Mr. N.N. dies, one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning, it would make no sense to say "Mr N.N. is dead"' (PI 40).
> (Hanfling , 2004, p.198)

It is noteworthy that, even in the type of arguments mentioned above, what Wittgenstein is attacking is either the question or some assumption of the traditional philosopher, not his thesis. And the premises that he uses are ordinary facts, examples, etc. Moreover, Wittgesntein's "arguments remain odd; they never conclude and often disappear into irony, epiphanies, and personal anecdotes." (Genova, 1995, p.132) Some philosophers especially at the early stages of the interpretation of Wittgenstein's writings did really consider his writing as essentially argumentative. However, it is now widely recognized that his writing cannot be reduced to purely argumentative texts. One obvious reason is the rarity of *statements* in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Kenny notes:

> It is, indeed, remarkable how little of Wittgenstein's text consists of statements of any kind. If we take, as a sample chosen more or less at random, sections 501–30 of the PI, we find that they contain 105 sentences. Less than half of these (43) are in the indicative mood at all: 35 sentences are questions, 17 are quotations (sentences for discussion) and 10 are commands (usually to carry out a thought-experiment). Of the indicative sentences many simply set the stage for an example, or expand upon targeted quotations. (Kenny, 2004, p.178)

In fact, ninety percent of the text of *PI* consist of truisms, questions, distinctions, comparisons, etc. (Kenny, 2004, p.181)

Wittgenstein has no intention to make any claim that could be subject to dispute. He says: "If someone were to advance *theses* in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them." (*PI* 128). However, the very act of argumentation requires that the possibility of dispute with regard to the main claims is open . Thus, the activity in which Wittgenstein engages himself could not be argumentation, or at least, not *primarily* argumentation. Some scholars even think that *how* Wittgenstein says (i.e. his style) might be more important than *what* he says (see Read, 2007, p.2). Wittgenstein sees the role of a Wittgensteinian philosopher similar to that of a therapist. He says: "The philosopher treats a question; like an illness." (*PI* 255). For him "the worth of philosophy is not in what it says, not in the content of its propositions, but in what it does. Philosophy has become pure performance." (Genova, 1995, p.127)

Another interesting feature of Wittgenstein's writing is that he did not expect that he would be able to convince his readers solely by means of the content of his writings. The first sentence of the *Tractatus* is an indication[18]:

> Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it—or at least similar thoughts. (Preface, *Tractatus*)

Another more clear indication is available in the *Culture and Value:*

> Each sentence that I write is trying to say the whole thing, that is, the same thing over and over again and it is as though they were views of one object seen from different angles.
> I might say: if the place I want to reach could only be climbed up to by a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place to which I really have to go is one that I must actually be at already.
> Anything that can be reached with a ladder does not interest me.
>
> (*CV*, p.22)

We can easily read the word "ladder" as referring to argumentation. The above quote probably suggests that Wittgenstein did not reach his philosophical insights (which are not philosophical theses) by means of argumentation. Thus, it is quite natural that his writings are not primarily argumentative either.

5.4 DD or Not DD

Our main concern in this chapter is to see whether a Wittgensteinian debate could be considered as rooted in a deep disagreement. In section 5.1, we have found that a Wittgensteinian debate involves a confusion with regard to some certainty. The traditional philosophers take certainties as disputed claims and tend to debate over them. In section 5.2, we point out that a Wittgensteinian debate also involves a difference of practices. In section 5.3, we noted that Wittgenstein does not employ typical philosophical argumentation in order to resolve his disagreement with the traditional philosopher. Although his remarks contain arguments, the role that is played by those arguments in his writings is not as central as is typical in traditional philosophy. This suggests

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[18] Although our main concern is to see the ramifications of the *later* Wittgenstein for the issue of the limits of argumentation, we can sometimes justly quote from the *Tractatus* because there is no significant difference between early and later Wittgenstein as long as Wittgenstein's fundamental philosophical position is concerned.

that Wittgenstein is conscious of the nature of the disagreement between him and the traditional philosopher. His style is aimed to persuade them to get rid of the philosophical picture they are entrapped in. All these lead us to the conclusion that a disagreement that is rooted in a Wittgensteinian debate is really a deep disagreement.

We now turn to another related issue, namely whether a debate between two traditional philosophers could be regarded as rooted in DD. Our discussion of philosophical disagreement actually shed light on an important aspect of the problem of the limits of argumentation. It is the distinction between a DD and other disagreements that are rooted in a confusion with certainties but still not deep. If Wittgenstein is right, then a disagreement between two traditional philosophers with regard to some traditional philosophical problem is also irresolvable by argumentation. But this disagreement is not deep because they do not fulfill our criteria to recognize a DD. Irresolvability by argumentation is not a sufficient condition for DD. Being deep is one of the many possible reasons that could make a disagreement irresolvable by argumentation. One necessary feature of a DD is that it involves a difference of practices among the arguers. But there need not be significant difference of practices between two traditional philosophers who are arguing e.g. for/against the possibility of knowledge/free will. Their ordinary ways of living probably do not get affected significantly because of their belief or disbelief in the possibility of knowledge or free will. A radical skeptic continues to make knowledge-claims in her day to day affairs. A determinist continues to accuse other people or herself of their wrong actions. So both the parties participate in a practice in which sentences such as not-p or f are certainties. Moreover, they also participate in a kind of practice that is typical of a traditional philosopher. We can call this 'the traditional philosophical practice'. This practice includes, so to speak, asking traditional philosophical questions, using ordinary words and phrases in special ways, treating a certainty as an empirical judgment and so on. The main difference between Wittgenstein and a traditional philosopher (regarding their practices) is *not* that the former participates in the ordinary way of living and the later does not do so. Rather the difference is that the latter, unlike the former, participates in the 'traditional philosophical practice'. It is noteworthy here that, if our understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy is correct, then a debate between two traditional philosophers fits Fogelin's criteria for recognizing a DD; i.e. their debate may continue even when they do not have any normal criticism (see chapter 1, section 1.3) against each other and also when the debate is immune to appeal to facts. So, according to Fogelin's criteria, their disagreement is deep. However, as far as their issue of debate is concerned, the two traditional philosophers do not have any difference in

their practices; they broadly share beliefs and preferences. But, according to Fogelin's conception of DD, when the arguers broadly share (relevant) beliefs and preferences, the disagreement is not deep. This gives rise to an inconsistency. Our account of DD avoids this inconsistency because we do not consider Fogelin's criteria as necessary features of all DDs.

So both the parties of a traditional philosophical debate participate in the practice of traditional philosophizing. Wittgenstein's writings help us to see that the root of many traditional philosophical problems lies in the confusion of certainties with knowledge-claim. But this is a kind of impasse that is not DD. This is not DD because this does not involve a difference of practices. Thus, DD occurs between a Wittgensteinian philosopher and a traditional philosopher, not between two traditional philosophers.

Chapter 6

RELEGIOUS DISAGREEMENTS

Like the previous chapter (5), this chapter is an attempt both to illustrate and justify our main conclusions regarding the limits of argumentation. We now focus on religious disagreements in which people disagree over a religious issue such as whether God exists or not, etc. Philosophy of religion, which is a branch of philosophy, also discusses religious issues. But we are interested here in the kind of religious disagreements that need not always be between two philosophers. Religious disagreements might well occur between two non-philosophers. For our discussion, whether the arguers are philosophers or not is not relevant. We are mainly concerned here with the religious disagreements among ordinary people. Now, our main questions are: is a religious disagreement irresolvable by argumentation? If so, why? Is a religious disagreement deep? An exploration of the last question may provide answers to the other questions as well. So let's first focus on that. Our answer to this question is affirmative. That is, a typical religious disagreement is indeed a kind of deep disagreement. To justify this claim we need support from the writings of later Wittgenstein. We also need to show that a religious disagreement involve a confusion regarding some certainties and also involve a difference between two forms of life or practices. The most familiar type of religious disagreement is probably the disagreement between a theist and an atheist. Their issue of debate is about whether there is a God or not. A religious person e.g. a Christian would say:

(g) There is a God

But an atheist would claim:

(not-g) There is no God

A religious disagreement could be centred around other claims such as

(l) There will be a Last Judgment

Or (c) God created man

In what follows, we will refer to the sentences g, l, c while talking about their status in religious debates.

6.1 Certainties in Religious Disagreements

In a typical debate between a believer and a non-believer, both of them treat sentences like *g (*or *l* or *c)* as a factual statement or a disputed claim. However, the believer assents to *g (*or *l* or *c)* whereas the non-believer denies

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g. An arguer may treat a sentence as a knowledge-claim but still it might *function* as a certainty in her life. To know whether this really happens in a religious disagreement, we need to look at the features of certainties and the criteria for recognizing certainties in concrete argumentative contexts that we described in the third chapter. One important feature of a certainty is that it does not work in the same way as a factual statement works, i.e. it does not describe the world (although it appears to do so). That a sentence like *c* does not work as a factual statement for a religious person has been clarified by Wittgenstein in the following quote:

> Take "God created man'. Pictures of Michelangelo showing the creation of the world. In general, there is nothing which explains the meanings of words as well as a picture, and I take it that Michelangelo was as good as anyone can be and did his best, and here is the picture of the Deity creating Adam.
> If we ever saw this, we certainly wouldn't think this the Deity. The picture has to be used in an entirely different way if we are to call the man in that queer blanket 'God', and so on. You could imagine that religion was taught by means of these pictures. "Of course, we can only express ourselves by means of picture." This is rather queer . . . . I could show Moore the pictures of a tropical plant. There is a technique of comparison between picture and plant. If I showed him the picture of Michelangelo and said : "Of course, I can't show you the real thing, only the picture" . . . . The absurdity is, I've never taught him the technique of using this picture. (LC, p. 63)

We have techniques to know whether a particular picture of a tropical plant is true to the actual plant. But we do not have such techniques to know whether Michelangelo's famous picture "The Creation of Adam" is true to fact. The latter is an artwork and has a very different use than a photograph intended to be true to some fact. Thus, Wittgenstein observes that, like the language of art, the language of religion is different from the language which we use to describe facts of the world. However, that does not mean that religious language is simply the language of art. The comparison with art is only meant to clarify the difference between religious language and factual language. In addition to the difference from factual language, religious sentences have other features that bring them close to certainties. Like certainties, religious utterances have no intellectual foundation. Although religious people sometimes may try to justify their beliefs by means of reasons, they actually do not hold their beliefs because of those reasons. Wittgenstein says:

A proof of God's existence ought to be something by means of which one could convince oneself that God exists. But I think that what *believers* who have furnished such proofs have wanted to do is give their 'belief' an intellectual analysis and foundation, although they themselves would never have come to believe as a result of such proofs. (CV, p. 116)

Wittgenstein also notes that in a debate between a religious and non-religious person, the arguers actually talk past each other. They appear to contradict each other, though, they actually do not contradict, at least not always[19].

"Suppose that someone believed in the Last Judgment, and I don't, does this mean that I believe the opposite to him, just that there won't be such a thing? I would say: "not at all, or not always.
Suppose I say that the body will rot, and another says "No. Particles will rejoin in a thousand years, and there will be a Resurrection of you".
If someone said: "Wittgenstein, do you believe in this?" I'd say: "No." "Do you contradict the man?" I'd say: "No". (LC, p. 53)

It may appear strange that, in the debate just mentioned, Wittgenstein denies *l* whereas an ordinary religious person assents to *l*, but still Wittgenstein thinks that he does not contradict the religious person. However, the puzzle disappears when we try to understand it in terms of certainties. For the religious person *l* is a certainty, not a knowledge-claim about a future event. The sentence *l* does not say anything in the way a weather forecast says something about e.g. whether there will be a storm in some place in future. Only a knowledge-claim could be contradicted by another knowledge-claim. That is why a non-religious person cannot contradict a religious person. That a sentence like *l* is a certainty for a religious person becomes clearer when we tell her to imagine a state of affairs that could convince her to give up her religious beliefs. Interestingly, although sometimes religious people engage

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[19] A debate between two philosophers of religion might be (but not necessarily so) a debate where the arguers really contradict among themselves regarding a religious issue. This debate is irresolvable because of the reasons we discussed in chapter 5. But it need not be a deep disagreement because there might be no difference with regard to the practices of the two philosophers. This will be further clarified in section 6.2 of this chapter.

in debates about religious issues, they normally cannot imagine a possible state of affairs that could disprove their beliefs. Moreover, we also notice that most ordinary religious people are actually reluctant to engage in a debate over religious issues. Some of them even get angry or aggressive when their beliefs are challenged by a non-religious person. We see all these in our everyday experience. These features of religious beliefs match our criteria for recognizing certainties as formulated in chapter three (section 3.3). Another interesting feature of religious beliefs is that they are kept in the face of seemingly incompatible scientific knowledge. Wittgenstein notices the following:

> [D]ogma is expressed in the *form* of an assertion, and it is unshakable, but at the same time any practical opinion *can* be made to accord with it; admittedly this is easier in some cases, more difficult in others. (*CV*, p.47-48).

Interestingly, there is empirical evidence that supports this observation. Legare et al. (2012) shows that the coexistence of natural and supernatural explanation of the same event in a single mind is more pervasive than usually thought[20]. And it often increases as people grow in age, i.e. it does not, as the usual understanding holds, decrease with the gaining of knowledge, education, and technology. If Wittgenstein is right, then the reason of the coexistence of natural and supernatural explanation is that they play different roles in the life of a person. When a religious person claims that God created the world, she is not giving God a causal role. If a thief believes that there is a policeman in a place from where she wants to steal something, then in normal cases she will not steal. But probably all ordinary religious persons are more or less sinners – they commit sin in spite of believing in a God. Believing in the existence of God does not add a new entity to the picture of the world of a religious person[21]. To see this, we need to carefully notice the *use* of "God" in the life of a religious person. Wittgenstein says: "The way you use the word "God" does not show *whom* you mean, but what you mean." (CV, p.74). Believing in God amounts to looking at the world in a certain way, and making life meaningful. Believing in the existence of God is comparable to throwing

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[20] An example of such coexistence is the following. A religious person may believe that God created man and also that Darwin's theory of evolution is true.

[21] Here Wittgenstein is talking about that religion (or that aspect of religion) which is not doctrinized (i.e. does not make knowledge-claims) and which does not compete with science. That is the true religion for Wittgenstein. But he does not deny the existence of religion (aspect of religion) that has become polluted by doctrinization.

light in a dark room. The light itself adds no new object in the collection of objects of the room. It just enables one to see all the objects in a certain way. Religious beliefs are also a matter of perspective. To hold some religious beliefs is to see life and the world from a certain point of view. This idea of Wittgenstein could be illustrated by citing the famous duck-rabbit picture from the *Philosophical Investigations*[22]:

In one sense, this picture is actually some black marks on a white background. But when we look at the black marks, we normally see either a duck or a rabbit. That is, we see the marks *as* a duck or *as* a rabbit. Most people are capable of switching their perspective and see the duck at one time and the rabbit at another. We can see the meaningless curves as meaningful pictures of familiar objects. Now there might be a person who never saw a duck or rabbit. For this person, Wittgenstein's diagram would probably appear to be just some black marks on white background and nothing else. She will probably not be able to find any meaning in the marks. Now the non-believer is like this person who sees a meaningless and mechanistic world before her eyes. By contrast, the believer sees a meaningful world.[23] However, one may say: the believer sees the duck (or the rabbit) and the non-believer sees the other picture. As long as the facts are concerned, there is no disagreement between the two viewers because they agree on the issues such as the length of the curve lines, the presence of a dot in the middle, etc. But their way of seeing is different. One or both of the parties of a religious disagreement might also be what Wittgenstein calls "aspect-blind": they might be able to see the duck but not the rabbit. A religious perspective is not a psychological phenomenon. This is just another way of talking about religious way of living (it will further be clarified in the next section). In chapter three (section 3.3) we mentioned

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[22] See Clack, 1999, p. 73-74

[23] Wittgenstein's respectful attitude to religion would make sense if we describe the difference between a religious and non-religious person in this way.

that certainties could be described both as a doxastic attitude and a doxastic category: the former elucidates the phenomenological nature of the certainty, i.e. describes "what it is to be objectively certain", whereas the latter elucidates its categorical status, i.e. seeks "to find out what *kind* of certainty objective certainty is; where it fits into our epistemic and doxastic categories". (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, p.53). We have seen that religious beliefs have a similar ways of description: one as perspective and another as belief.

So far our discussion shows that religious beliefs could justly be considered as beliefs that play the role of certainties in the life of a religious person. One possible objection to this view may come from Kober (see Kober 2007). Kober would agree that, like the linguistic expression of a certainty, there is something odd in the depiction of a religious belief by means of a proposition.(Kober, 2005, p. 242) He also agrees that a religious belief is not necessarily based on reasons. However, he would not consider a religious belief as a certainty for the following reasons. For Kober, a certainty is a constitutive rule of our *epistemic practice* and it shows an epistemic stance whereas a religious belief shows our *religious stance*. On Kober's view (2005, p. 246-7), a religious stance is comparable to a mood. We are always in some mood – elated, depressed, cheerful, downcast, neutral, etc. Similarly we are always in some religious stance; even irreligiousness is also a kind of religious stance that pervades all our acting and thinking. Being the basis of epistemic practice, a certainty, unlike a religious belief, plays the role of *defining truth.* The second difference is that a certainty must be "acquired" whereas a religious stance "usually turns up or happens to be there".

Let's now focus on the first difference. What does Kober mean when he says that certainties define truth. According to Kober, certainties "establish the (back)ground against which the truth or correctness of genuine knowledge-claims Ki gets measured in P[24], and they provide P's 'standards of rationality'. Therefore, a constitutively defining, hence normative certainty C, cannot be false, cannot be doubted or justified, and error concerning C is impossible within P" (2005, 229) Now the question is how do we know that a certainty C lies in the background of a practice. I think the answer would be as follows. When we cannot doubt C, and when we cannot find a belief that is more certain than C and thereby justify or disprove C within a particular practice, that actually shows that C lies in the background of that practice. Now, for a typical religious person, doubting her religious

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[24] P stands for a practice

beliefs does not make sense as well, and there is no other belief that is more certain than the religious beliefs. If a religious person were to give up her religious belief, she would not know what to count as a knowledge-claim. For a believer, the non-existence of God amounts to loosing the sense of everything including all the knowledge-claims. This shows that a religious practice may well overlap with the epistemic practice. In fact, on Wittgenstein's view, religion pervades the entire life. This suggests that religious practice is not disconnected from epistemic practice. Thus, religious beliefs do not seem to be different from certainties. For a religious person they also constitute the background for knowledge-claims.

It is noteworthy here that Kober (1997) himself extends the scope of certainties and claims that there are moral certainties within our moral practice. His examples of moral certainties are: 'Killing people is evil', and 'Helping others is right'. The main similarities he notices between epistemic and moral certainties are the following. Neither of the kinds of certainties can be justified within the practice; they serve as the rationality standards for participants in the practice, and they determine something. Kober notes: "the epistemic certainties determines truth, and the moral certainties determine– one may say- goodness" (Kober, 1997, p. 377). Now we see the same with regard to the religious beliefs. Religious beliefs cannot be justified within religious practice, they themselves are neither rational nor irrational but determines what is rational or not in a religious practice, and lastly, one might say, they determine *meaning* (i.e. what is meaningful to do in life). Thus, it seems that the way Kober makes room for moral certainties also permits the religious certainties. Moreover, for Wittgenstein, morality and religiousity is basically the same (which is widely recognized by Wittgenstein scholars). This also supports our claim that if there are moral certainties there are religious certainties as well.

Let's now look at the second difference between a certainty and a religious belief that Kober recognizes, namely: certainties are *acquired* whereas a religious stance happens to be there. This can be taken as an attempt to point out the difference between a certainty and *a religious belief* because, for Kober, a religious stance gets its expression in religious beliefs. Kober provides the following quote from *Culture and Value* as his support:

> Life can educate you to "believing in God." And experiences
> too are what do this…e.g., sufferings of various sorts. And they
> do not show us God as a sense experience does an object … –
> life can force this concept on us' (CV, p. 116).

That is, we cannot force ourselves to have a religious belief. It does not come because of a sense experience of an object. It occurs in us without our conscious effort and we gradually become aware of it. We are more or less passive in having a religious stance. But how could it make a religious belief different from certainties? Certainties could be acquired in various ways which we discussed in chapter three (see Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, p.104). First, they may originate instinctively. For example, a child, in its spontaneous movement and interaction with others, may show that it has certainties such as "I have a body" (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, p.104). Secondly, we may acquire a certainty when we learn ways of acting. For example, a child in learning to sit in a chair unconsciously acquires certainties such as "there is a chair". Thirdly, acquiring a certainty may also start with a conscious learning of a proposition. For example, a teacher may explicitly teach a child the proposition that "the earth is round" which later, through repeated exposure, loses its status as a proposition and becomes part of the ways of acting and behaving of a practice or form of life (even here the proposition is not learnt *as* certainty; rather it gets the status of a certainty with time). Now religious beliefs originate mainly in the first and second way we just mentioned. That is, they may arise naturally (we expand it in the next section) or they might be acquired: a would-be-convert is gradually initiated to a form of life which results in having the religious beliefs. Thus, we think that both of Kober's objections could be answered. Vasiliou (2001) also notices basic similarities between certainties (what he calls Moore-propositions) and religious beliefs which support our claim that religious beliefs actually function as certainties in the lives of religious people. Not all Wittgenstein scholars would agree that religious beliefs are a kind of certainties. But it seems that they would unanimously agree that these two kinds of beliefs are similar in important respects and also that Wittgenstein's conception of religious beliefs could best be understood in light of what he says about certainties. We mentioned in chapter three that certainty is a family-resemblance concept for Wittgenstein. That is why even a close resemblance between the religious beliefs and certainties is enough for our purpose because this resemblance makes it clear why religious disagreements are not resolvable by argumentation.

6.2 Difference of Practices in Religious Disagreement

A disagreement between a religious and a non-religious person not only involves a confusion regarding some certainty, it also crucially involves a difference of practices. A religious person lives a religious life which may consist of praying to God, performing certain rituals, etc. On the other hand, a non-religious person lives differently: prayer or religious rituals have no

place in her life. Now the question is whether this difference of practices is relevant to understand the nature of religious disagreement. Does this difference make a religious disagreement irresolvable by argumentation? Wittgenstein's conception of religious beliefs seems to suggest that the nature of the connection between religious beliefs and practices is responsible for making a religious disagreement irresolvable by argumentation. The question is how Wittgenstein sees the connection between the religious beliefs and practices.

On Wittgenstein's view, religious practices are *not* based on religious beliefs. Many of our activities are actually based on our ordinary beliefs. For example, I have some beliefs regarding healthy and unhealthy diet. These beliefs influence me to go to e.g. an organic market rather than an ordinary food-market, to buy certain foods and avoid others, and to cook my food in a certain way, etc. My shopping and cooking practices are based on my beliefs about healthy/unhealthy diet. If somebody gives me good reasons to believe that the organic shops are probably not any better than the ordinary shop (e.g. they are facing trial on fraud charges), this may stop me going to those shops (which are more expensive and far away from my house). However, religious beliefs do not give support or determine religious practices in this way. Wittgenstein notes:

> Christianity is not based on a historical truth, but presents us with a (historical) narrative and says: now believe! But not believe this report with the belief that is appropriate to a historical report,--but rather: believe, through thick and thin and you can do this only as the outcome of a life. *Here you have a message!--don't treat it as you would another historical message! Make a quite different place for it in your life*. (CV, p. 52)

Ordinary beliefs are prior to the activities that are determined by them. But the above quote suggests that religious beliefs, like certainties, come after practice. They are the outcome of a religious life. For Wittgenstin, a religious "belief as formulated on the evidence can only be the last result—in which a number of ways of thinking and acting crystallize and come together."(*LC,* p. 56)

Clack (1999) notes that, for Wittgenstein, religious practices have a kind of naturalness, animality, or spontaneity that is rooted in our human nature. Religious beliefs, or the expressions of religious beliefs, are refined and consolidated form of this natural religiosity. He compares this with

Wittgenstein's discussion of pain-language. "I am in pain" is not an description of an inner state; rather it is a refined and consolidated form of our natural, spontaneous pain-behaviour. Similarly, religious beliefs are not descriptions of a supernatural reality. They are internally connected to religious way of living. One might say: religious life is an example of a form of life and religious beliefs are certainties that are embedded in this form of life[25]. Wittgenstein says:

> It appears to me as though a religious belief could only be (something like) passionately committing oneself to a system of coordinates. Hence although it's belief, it is really a way of living, or a way of judging life. Passionately taking up *this* interpretation. (CV, p.91)

From the discussion above, it is clear that a religious disagreement crucially involves the practices of the arguers. Providing compelling reasons to refute the claims of a religious person would be ineffective because religious beliefs are embedded in the religious way of living. That is why a typical religious disagreement can be considered as a deep disagreement.

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[25] Moyal-Sharrock (2015, p. 4) considers religious life as an example of a specific form of life.

CONCLUSION

This thesis is an attempt to find out the ramifications of the writings of the later Wittgenstein, especially of *OC,* for the problem of the limits of argumentation. More specifically, we wanted to see what could be learnt from the later Wittgenstein about those argumentative contexts where argumentation would not yield an agreement between the contending parties. In our survey of Fogelin's account of DD, we tried to figure out Fogelin's answer to our main problem. We noted that, for Fogelin, argumentation would not work in those contexts where the arguers do not share (beliefs, preferences, procedure for resolving disagreement) enough, i.e. when they deeply disagree. Fogelin's characterization of DD suggests the following ways for identifying the contexts where argumentation would not work: 1) the disagreement persists even when the arguers do not have any normal criticism ("you are begging the question", "you are biased", "your use of such-and-such word is vague", etc.) against each other. 2) the disagreement is immune to appeal to facts. We noted that although Fogelin's characterization of DD is an important contribution, it is incomplete in that it does not capture all the ramification of Wittgenstein's ideas with regard to the limits of argumentation. More specifically, Fogelin's ways for identifying a DD cannot help an arguer much in concrete argumentative contexts. We have explored the key Wittgensteinian notions related to our problem and argued that *certainty* is preferable to *rule* for understanding DD. We also recognized the usefulness of both the notions of *form of life* and *practices* for our purpose. We argue that a deep disagreement is irresolvable by argumentation because the arguers try to refute a certainty by means of argumentation. Trying to refute a certainty is useless because a certainty, being a certainty, is embedded in a practice or form of life in such a way that only a change in the relevant practice/form of life could result in the abandonment of the certainty. And one needs non-argumentative strategies for this. One of the contributions of this thesis is to come up with a list of ways to recognize certainties in argumentative situations (which, we argued, follows from the features of certainties discussed by Wittgenstein). We also argued that to identify a DD, we need to check whether there is a confusion with regard to some certainty, and also whether there is a significant difference in practices or forms of life among the arguers (related to the topic of argumentation). We noted that certainty is a family-resemblance concept and, a truly Wittgensteinian consideration of the limits of argumentation would not be too optimistic about finding a context-independent way of recognizing DD. That is, our criteria for recognizing DD might be helpful but they do not guarantee

anything. We are in the best position for recognizing a DD only when we are in a concrete argumentative context.

To illuminate and justify our main conclusions about DD and also about the limits of argumentation in general, we discussed deep disagreements with regard to philosophical and religious issues. We showed that the disagreement between a Wittgensteinian philosopher and a traditional philosopher involves confusing a certainty with a knowledge-claim, and also involves a significant difference of practices. We also found the same with regard to the typical religious disagreements concerning religious issues. We then conclude that a Wittgensteinian debate (which occurs between a Wittgensteinian philosopher and a traditional philosopher) or a typical religious debate (between a religious and a non-religious person) can be considered as examples of DDs.

Throughout the thesis, we used Wittgenstein's remarks to support our conclusions because our aim is to see the implications of *his* ideas to understand the limits of argumentation, especially to recognize DD. To come up with an independent assessment of our main conclusions was not within the scope of this thesis. For such an assessment, we need empirical data and research. An empirical investigation based on our findings in this thesis may ask the following questions.

Are the disagreements between, say, a leftist and a liberal DDs? Are there certainties that are at work in those disagreements? Do those disagreements involve a significant difference in practices? What kind of strategies (argumentative/non-argumentative) people usually adopt to resolve such disagreements? What are the effects of these various strategies? Is argumentation really ineffective in those disagreements? Which non-argumentative strategies work best to induce agreement among the arguers?

We think that answers to this kind of empirical questions would make clearer how far the implications of Wittgenstein's ideas concerning the limits of argumentation are really acceptable.

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