PP-2006-16: How Equitable is Rational Negotiation?

PP-2006-16: Estivie, Sylvia and Chevaleyre, Yann and Endriss, Ulle and Maudet, Nicolas (2006) How Equitable is Rational Negotiation? [Report]

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Abstract

Notions of fairness have recently received increased attention in the context of resource allocation problems, pushed by diverse applications where not only pure utilitarian efficiency is sought. In this paper, we study a framework where allocations of goods result from distributed negotiation conducted by autonomous agents implementing very simple deals. Assuming that these agents are strictly self-interested, we investigate how equitable the outcomes of such negotiation processes are. We first discuss a number of methodological issues raised by this study, pertaining in particular to the design of suitable payment functions as a means of distributing the social surplus generated by a deal amongst the participating agents. By running different experiments, we finally identify conditions favouring equitable outcomes.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2006-16
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2006
Uncontrolled Keywords: Multiagent Resource Allocation; Negotiation; Social Welfare; Fair Division
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:36
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:36
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/191

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