PP-2006-42: Modal Logics of Negotiation and Preference

PP-2006-42: Endriss, Ulle and Pacuit, Eric (2006) Modal Logics of Negotiation and Preference. [Report]

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We develop a dynamic modal logic that can be used to model scenarios where agents negotiate over the allocation of a finite number of indivisible resources. The logic includes operators to speak about both preferences of individual agents and deals regarding the reallocation of certain resources. We reconstruct a known result regarding the convergence of sequences of mutually beneficial deals to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources, and discuss the relationship between reasoning tasks in our logic and problems in negotiation. For instance, checking whether a given restricted class of deals is sufficient to guarantee convergence to a Pareto optimal allocation for a specific negotiation scenario amounts to a model checking problem; and the problem of identifying conditions on preference relations that would guarantee convergence for a restricted class of deals under all circumstances can be cast as a question in modal logic correspondence theory.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2006-42
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2006
Uncontrolled Keywords: Modal Logic; Negotiation; Multiagent Resource Allocation; Social Software; Preference Representation
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:36
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:36
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/217

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