PP-2009-37: Preference Aggregation over Restricted Ballot Languages: Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness

PP-2009-37: Endriss, Ulle and Pini, Maria Silvia and Rossi, Francesca and Venable, K. Brent (2009) Preference Aggregation over Restricted Ballot Languages: Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness. [Report]

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Voting theory can provide useful insights for multiagent preference aggregation. However, the standard setting assumes voters with preferences that are total orders, as well as a ballot language that coincides with the preference language. In typical AI scenarios, these assumptions do not hold: certain alternatives may be incomparable for some agents, and others may have their preferences encoded in a format that is different from how the preference aggregation mechanism wants them. We study the consequences of dropping these assumptions. In particular, we investigate the consequences for the important notion of strategy-proofness. While strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed in the classical setting, we are able to show that there are situations in our more general framework where this is possible. We also consider computational aspects of the problem.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2009-37
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2009
Uncontrolled Keywords: voting theory; computational social choice; multiagent systems
Subjects: Computation
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/367

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