PP-2009-39: Iterated Majority Voting

PP-2009-39: Airiau, Stéphane and Endriss, Ulle (2009) Iterated Majority Voting. [Report]

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Abstract

We study a model in which a group of agents make a sequence of
collective decisions on whether to remain in the current state
of the system or switch to an alternative state, as proposed by one of
them. Examples for instantiations of this model include the step-wise
refinement of a bill of law by means of amendments to be voted on, as
well as resource allocation problems, where agents successively alter the
current allocation by means of a sequence of deals. We specifically focus
on cases where the majority rule is used to make each of the collective
decisions, as well as variations of the majority rule where different
quotas need to be met to get a proposal accepted. In addition, we allow
for cases in which the same proposal may be made more than once. As
this can lead to infinite sequences, we investigate the effects of
introducing a deadline bounding the number of proposals that can be made.
We use both analytical and experimental means to characterise situations
in which we can expect to see a convergence effect, in the sense that the
expected payoff of each agent will become independent from the initial
state of the system, as long as the deadline is chosen large enough.

Item Type:	Report
Report Nr:	PP-2009-39
Series Name:	Prepublication (PP) Series
Year:	2009
Uncontrolled Keywords:	computational social choice
Subjects:	Computation
Depositing User:	Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited:	12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified:	12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI:	https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/369

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