PP200940: Grandi, Umberto and Endriss, Ulle (2009) FirstOrder Logic Formalisation of Arrow's Theorem. [Report]

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Abstract
Arrow's Theorem is a central result in social choice theory. It states that, under certain natural conditions, it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a finite set of individuals into a social preference ordering. We formalise this result in the language of firstorder logic, thereby reducing Arrow's Theorem to a statement saying that a given set of firstorder formulas does not possess a finite model. In the long run, we hope that this formalisation can serve as the basis for a fully automated proof of Arrow's Theorem and similar results in social choice theory. We prove that this is possible in principle, at least for a fixed number of individuals, and we report on initial experiments with automated reasoning tools.
Item Type:  Report 

Report Nr:  PP200940 
Series Name:  Prepublication (PP) Series 
Year:  2009 
Uncontrolled Keywords:  social choice theory; computational social choice; automated reasoning 
Subjects:  Computation 
Depositing User:  Ulle Endriss 
Date Deposited:  12 Oct 2016 14:37 
Last Modified:  12 Oct 2016 14:37 
URI:  https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/370 
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