PP201217: Endriss, Ulle and Grandi, Umberto (2012) Graph Aggregation. [Report]

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Abstract
Suppose a number of agents each provide us with a directed graph over a common set of vertices. Graph aggregation is the problem of computing a single graph that best represents the information inherent in this profile of individual graphs. We introduce a simple formal framework for graph aggregation and then focus on the notion of collective rationality, which asks whether a given property of graphs, such as transitivity, can be guaranteed to hold for the collective graph whenever it is satisfied by all individual graphs. We refine the ultrafilter method for proving impossibility theorems in social choice theory to arrive at a clear picture relating axiomatic properties of aggregation procedures, properties of graphs with respect to which we want to ensure collective rationality, and properties of ultrafilters.
Item Type:  Report 

Report Nr:  PP201217 
Series Name:  Prepublication (PP) Series 
Year:  2012 
Uncontrolled Keywords:  Computational Social Choice; Combinatorial Domains; Arrow's Theorem 
Depositing User:  ugrandi1 
Date Deposited:  12 Oct 2016 14:37 
Last Modified:  12 Oct 2016 14:37 
URI:  https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/459 
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