X-2011-01: Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference - Truth, Meaning, and Normativity

X-2011-01: Crespo, María Inés and Gakis, Dimitris and Weidman-Sassoon (editors), Galit (2011) Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference - Truth, Meaning, and Normativity. [Report]

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Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference --- Truth, Meaning, and Normativity --- María Inés Crespo, Dimitris Gakis, and Galit Weidman-Sassoon (eds.) Abstract: The 3rd Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference on "Truth, Meaning, and Normativity" was organised by the Department of Philosophy and the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation of the Universiteit van Amsterdam. The conference invited submissions from graduate researchers conducting novel philosophical research into any of the three conference topics. Some of the papers in this volume inform the discussion about truth, meaning, and/or normativity by offering a philosophical interpretation of results from other fields such as logic, cognitive psychology and formal semantics. A typical example for this is Cova and Égré's paper, including experimental results about the semantics of 'many' as a gradable adjective and their variety of philosophical implications. Another area of interest is semantic normativity with respect to meaning, use, content, and context. This topic was taken up by Belleri's work on predicates of personal taste. Other dominant topics included formal theories of truth and deflationism, dealt with in the majority of papers in this volume including those by Gruber, McKinnon and Speck. Since the topics of truth, meaning, and normativity naturally feed into each other, some contributions explore several of the intricate ways in which these notions relate to one another. We include here Wieland and Turbanti as representative authors. Contents Florian Cova and Paul Égré (Institut Jean-Nicod (CNRS-ENS-EHESS)) Moral asymmetries and the semantics of many Delia Belleri (University of Bologna) Relative Truth, Lost Disagreement and Invariantism on Predicates of Personal Taste Monika Gruber (Universität Salzburg) Does Tarski's critique of the Redundancy Theory apply to all Deflationary Theories of Truth? Rhys McKinnon (University of Waterloo) Giving Warrant Credit in Warranted Assertibility: Against Wright's Inflationary Argument Jönne Speck (University of St Andrews and Birkbeck, University of London) Note on Horsten's Inferentialist Deflationism Giacomo Turbanti (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa) Modality in Brandom's Incompatibility Semantics Jan Willem Wieland (Ghent University) Rules Regresses

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: X-2011-01
Series Name: Technical Notes (X) Series
Year: 2011
Uncontrolled Keywords: Philosophy; Amsterdam; Meaning; Truth; Normativity
Depositing User: mcrespo1
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:38
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:38
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/682

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