PP-2018-03: Tool Auctions

PP-2018-03: Döcker, Janosch and Dorn, Britta and Endriss, Ulle and de Haan, Ronald and Schneckenburger, Sebastian (2018) Tool Auctions. [Pre-print]

[thumbnail of DoeckerEtAlAAAI2018.pdf]

Download (259kB) | Preview


We introduce tool auctions, a novel market mechanism for constructing a cost-efficient assembly line for producing a desired set of products from a given set of goods and tools. Such tools can be used to transform one type of good into a different one. We then study the computational complexity of tool auctions in detail, using methods from both classical and parameterized complexity theory. While solving such auctions is intractable in general, just as for the related frameworks of combinatorial and mixed auctions, we are able to identify several special cases of practical interest where designing efficient algorithms is possible.

Item Type: Pre-print
Report Nr: PP-2018-03
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2018
Uncontrolled Keywords: combinatorial auctions, computational complexity
Subjects: Computation
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 24 Jan 2018 08:10
Last Modified: 24 Jan 2018 08:10
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1595

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item