PP-2009-37: Preference Aggregation over Restricted Ballot Languages: Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness

PP-2009-37: Endriss, Ulle and Pini, Maria Silvia and Rossi, Francesca and Venable, K. Brent (2009) Preference Aggregation over Restricted Ballot Languages: Sincerity and Strategy-Proofness. [Report]

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Voting theory can provide useful insights for multiagent preference
aggregation. However, the standard setting assumes voters with
preferences that are total orders, as well as a ballot language that
coincides with the preference language. In typical AI scenarios, these
assumptions do not hold: certain alternatives may be incomparable for
some agents, and others may have their preferences encoded in a format
that is different from how the preference aggregation mechanism wants
them. We study the consequences of dropping these assumptions. In
particular, we investigate the consequences for the important notion
of strategy-proofness. While strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed
in the classical setting, we are able to show that there are
situations in our more general framework where this is possible. We
also consider computational aspects of the problem.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2009-37
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2009
Uncontrolled Keywords: voting theory; computational social choice; multiagent systems
Subjects: Computation
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/367

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