PP-2010-03: Multiagent Resource Allocation with Sharable Items: Simple Protocols and Nash Equilibria

PP-2010-03: Airiau, Stéphane and Endriss, Ulle (2010) Multiagent Resource Allocation with Sharable Items: Simple Protocols and Nash Equilibria. [Report]

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We study a particular multiagent resource allocation problem with
indivisible, but sharable resources. In our model, the utility of an
agent for using a bundle of resources is the difference between the
valuation of that bundle and a congestion cost (or delay), a figure
formed by adding up the individual congestion costs of each resource
in the bundle. The valuation and the delay can be
agent-dependent. When the agents that share a resource also share the
resource’s control, the current users of a resource will require some
compensation when a new agent wants to use the resource. We study the
existence of distributed protocols that lead to a social
optimum. Depending on constraints on the valuation functions (mainly
modularity), on the delay functions (e.g., convexity), and the
structural complexity of the deals between agents, we prove either the
existence of some sequences of deals or the convergence of all
sequences of deals to a social optimum. When the agents do not have
joint control over the resources (i.e., they can use any resource they
want), we study the existence of pure Nash equilibria. We provide
results for modular valuation functions and relate them to results
from the literature on congestion games.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2010-03
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2010
Uncontrolled Keywords: multiagent resource allocation; congestion games
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/382

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