PP-2012-15: The Common Structure of Paradoxes in Aggregation Theory

PP-2012-15: Grandi, Umberto (2012) The Common Structure of Paradoxes in Aggregation Theory. [Report]

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In this paper we analyse some of the classical paradoxes in Social
Choice Theory (namely, the Condorcet paradox, the discursive dilemma,
the Ostrogorski paradox and the multiple election paradox) using a
general framework for the study of aggregation problems called binary
aggregation with integrity constraints. We provide a definition of
paradox that is general enough to account for the four cases
mentioned, and identify a common structure in the syntactic properties
of the rationality assumptions that lie behind such paradoxes. We
generalise this observation by providing a full characterisation of
the set of rationality assumptions on which the majority rule does not
generate a paradox.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2012-15
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2012
Uncontrolled Keywords: Computational Social Choice; Judgment Aggregation; Condorcet Paradox
Depositing User: ugrandi1
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/457

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