PP-2012-17:
Endriss, Ulle and Grandi, Umberto
(2012)
*Graph Aggregation.*
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## Abstract

Suppose a number of agents each provide us with a directed graph over

a common set of vertices. Graph aggregation is the problem of

computing a single graph that best represents the information inherent

in this profile of individual graphs. We introduce a simple formal

framework for graph aggregation and then focus on the notion of

collective rationality, which asks whether a given property of graphs,

such as transitivity, can be guaranteed to hold for the collective

graph whenever it is satisfied by all individual graphs. We refine the

ultrafilter method for proving impossibility theorems in social choice

theory to arrive at a clear picture relating axiomatic properties of

aggregation procedures, properties of graphs with respect to which we

want to ensure collective rationality, and properties of ultrafilters.

Item Type: | Report |
---|---|

Report Nr: | PP-2012-17 |

Series Name: | Prepublication (PP) Series |

Year: | 2012 |

Uncontrolled Keywords: | Computational Social Choice; Combinatorial Domains; Arrow's Theorem |

Depositing User: | ugrandi1 |

Date Deposited: | 12 Oct 2016 14:37 |

Last Modified: | 12 Oct 2016 14:37 |

URI: | https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/459 |

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