PP-2012-29: Complexity of Judgment Aggregation

PP-2012-29: Endriss, Ulle and Grandi, Umberto and Porello, Daniele (2012) Complexity of Judgment Aggregation. [Report]

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We analyse the computational complexity of three problems in judgment
aggregation: (1) computing a collective judgment from a profile of
individual judgments (the winner determination problem); (2) deciding
whether a given agent can influence the outcome of a judgment
aggregation procedure in her favour by reporting insincere judgments
(the strategic manipulation problem); and (3) deciding whether a given
judgment aggregation scenario is guaranteed to result in a logically
consistent outcome, independently from what the judgments supplied by
the individuals are (the problem of the safety of the agenda). We
provide results both for specific aggregation procedures (the quota
rules, the premise-based procedure, and a distance-based procedure)
and for classes of aggregation procedures characterised in terms of
fundamental axioms.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2012-29
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2012
Uncontrolled Keywords: judgment aggregation; computational complexity; computational social choice
Subjects: Computation
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/471

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