PP-2014-14: Collective Rationality in Graph Aggregation

PP-2014-14: Endriss, Ulle and Grandi, Umberto (2014) Collective Rationality in Graph Aggregation. [Report]

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Suppose a number of agents each provide us with a directed graph
over a common set of vertices. Graph aggregation is the problem
of computing a single “collective” graph that best represents the
information inherent in this profile of individual graphs. We consider
this aggregation problem from the point of view of social choice
theory and ask what properties shared by the individual graphs
will transfer to the graph computed by a given aggregation
procedure. Our main result is a general impossibility theorem that
applies to a wide range of graph properties.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2014-14
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2014
Uncontrolled Keywords: computational social choice; impossibility theorems
Subjects: Computation
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/502

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