PP-2014-15: Eliciting a Suitable Voting Rule via Examples

PP-2014-15: Cailloux, Olivier and Endriss, Ulle (2014) Eliciting a Suitable Voting Rule via Examples. [Report]

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We address the problem of specifying a voting rule by means
of a series of examples. Each example consists of the answer
to a simple question: how should the rule rank two alternatives,
given the positions at which each voter ranks the two alternatives?
To be able to formalise this elicitation problem, we develop a
novel variant of classical social choice theory in terms of
associations of alternatives with vectors of ranks rather than the
common associations of voters with preference orders. We then
define and study a class of voting rules suited for elicitation using
such answers. Finally, we propose and experimentally evaluate
several elicitation strategies for arriving at a good approximation
of the target rule with a reasonable number of queries.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2014-15
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2014
Uncontrolled Keywords: computational social choice; voting theory
Subjects: Computation
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/503

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