PP-2016-24: Strategic Voting with Incomplete Information

PP-2016-24: Endriss, Ulle and Obraztsova, Svetlana and Polukarov, Maria and Rosenschein, Jeffrey S. (2016) Strategic Voting with Incomplete Information. [Report]

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Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding the preferences of the other voters. In reality, however, voters only have incomplete information, which limits their ability to manipulate. We explore how these limitations affect both the manipulability of voting rules and the dynamics of systems in which voters may repeat- edly update their own vote in reaction to the moves made by others. We focus on the Plurality, Veto, k-approval, Borda, Copeland, and Maximin voting rules, and consider several types of information that are natural in the context of these rules, namely information on the current front-runner, on the scores obtained by each alternative, and on the majority graph induced by the individual preferences.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2016-24
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2016
Uncontrolled Keywords: voting theory
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/560

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