MoL-2011-20: "|": Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke

MoL-2011-20: Rombout, Floor (2011) "|": Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke. [Report]

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Frege is highly valued as a logician by Russell and Wittgenstein, the
latter nonetheless concludes in his Tractatus that one of Frege's
central notions, the judgment stroke, is "logically quite
meaningless". In order to see why Wittgenstein thinks so, we will
investigate the 'indirect interpretation thesis', which says that
Wittgenstein's interpretation of Frege was strongly influenced by the
reading Russell gives of the Begriffsschrift in Principia Mathematica
and Principles of Mathematics. This is done by analyzing the different
conceptions of logic, focusing on the representations of judgment and
assertion in Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein. Stong
similarities can be found between the interpretations of Russell and
Wittgenstein, this makes the indirect interpretation thesis plausible,
although Russell's influence cannot be the only reason why
Wittgenstein rejected the judgment stroke as a logical symbol.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: MoL-2011-20
Series Name: Master of Logic Thesis (MoL) Series
Year: 2011
Uncontrolled Keywords: Begriffsschrift, Frege, indirect interpretation, judgment stroke, Russell, Wittgenstein, Tractatus. Keywords:
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:38
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:38

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