PP-2012-20: Automated Analysis of Social Choice Problems: Approval Elections with Small Fields of Candidates

PP-2012-20: Endriss, Ulle (2012) Automated Analysis of Social Choice Problems: Approval Elections with Small Fields of Candidates. [Report]

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Abstract

Automated Analysis of Social Choice Problems: Approval Elections with Small Fields of Candidates Ulle Endriss Abstract: We analyse the incentives of a voter to vote insincerely in an election conducted under the system of approval voting. Central to our analysis are the assumptions we make on how voters deal with the uncertainty stemming from the fact that a tie-breaking rule may have to be invoked to determine the unique election winner. Because we only make very weak assumptions in this respect, it is impossible to obtain general positive results. Instead, we conduct a fine-grained analysis using an automated approach that reveals a clear picture of the precise conditions under which insincere voting can be ruled out. At the methodological level, this approach complements other recent work involving the application of techniques originating in computer science and artificial intelligence in the domain of social choice theory.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2012-20
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2012
Uncontrolled Keywords: voting theory; ranking sets of objects; automated reasoning
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:37
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/462

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