PP-2012-20: Endriss, Ulle (2012) Automated Analysis of Social Choice Problems: Approval Elections with Small Fields of Candidates. [Report]
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Abstract
Automated Analysis of Social Choice Problems:
Approval Elections with Small Fields of Candidates
Ulle Endriss
Abstract:
We analyse the incentives of a voter to vote insincerely in an
election conducted under the system of approval voting. Central to our
analysis are the assumptions we make on how voters deal with the
uncertainty stemming from the fact that a tie-breaking rule may have
to be invoked to determine the unique election winner. Because we only
make very weak assumptions in this respect, it is impossible to obtain
general positive results. Instead, we conduct a fine-grained analysis
using an automated approach that reveals a clear picture of the
precise conditions under which insincere voting can be ruled out. At
the methodological level, this approach complements other recent work
involving the application of techniques originating in computer
science and artificial intelligence in the domain of social choice
theory.
| Item Type: | Report |
|---|---|
| Report Nr: | PP-2012-20 |
| Series Name: | Prepublication (PP) Series |
| Year: | 2012 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | voting theory; ranking sets of objects; automated reasoning |
| Depositing User: | Ulle Endriss |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Oct 2016 14:37 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Oct 2016 14:37 |
| URI: | https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/462 |
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