PP-2002-03: Axiomatising Nash-Consistent Coalition Logic

PP-2002-03: Hansen, Helle Hvid and Pauly, Marc (2002) Axiomatising Nash-Consistent Coalition Logic. [Report]

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Abstract

We add a rule for Nash-consistency to Coalition Logic, a modal logic for reasoning about the abilities and rights of groups in multi-agent systems. Rights of agents (constitutions) can be formalised using Coalition Logic, and the additional inference rule of Nash-consistency will guarantee that any multi-agent system implementing these rights will be stable, i.e., for any preferences the agents might have, there will be rights they can exercise such that no individual deviation will be profitable. We apply this logic to obtain a formal analysis of Gibbard's paradox, and we provide meta-theoretic results, in particular a complete axiomatisation.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: PP-2002-03
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2002
Uncontrolled Keywords: modal logic, game theory, social choice theory
Subjects: Logic
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2016 14:36
Last Modified: 12 Oct 2016 14:36
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/67

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