PP-2003-06: Rational Dynamics and Epistemic Logic in Games

PP-2003-06: van Benthem, Johan (2003) Rational Dynamics and Epistemic Logic in Games. [Report]

	Text (Full Text (PS)) PP-2003-06.text.ps.gz Download (288kB)
Preview	Text (Full Text (PDF)) PP-2003-06.text.pdf Download (426kB) | Preview
	Text (Abstract) PP-2003-06.abstract.txt Download (969B)

Abstract

Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles
that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets
are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of
strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward
induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution
sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic models for a
given game, such as mutual knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we
propose a different perspective, analyzing solution algorithms as
processes of learning which change game models. Thus, strategic
equilibrium gets linked to fixed-points of operations of repeated
announcement of suitable epistemic statements. This dynamic stance
provides a new look at the current interface of games, logic, and
computation.

Item Type:	Report
Report Nr:	PP-2003-06
Series Name:	Prepublication (PP) Series
Year:	2003
Uncontrolled Keywords:	strategic game, epistemic model, update, iteration, fixed-point logic
Subjects:	Logic
Depositing User:	Johan van Benthem
Date Deposited:	12 Oct 2016 14:36
Last Modified:	12 Oct 2016 14:36
URI:	https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/90

Actions (login required)

View Item