MoL-2020-03: The nature of referential intentions

MoL-2020-03: Maden, Rachel (2020) The nature of referential intentions. [Pre-print]

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This thesis provides solutions for a number of theoretical problems associated with ‘referential intentions’, which are frequently supposed to play a part in the semantics of demonstrative expressions (e.g. Perry 2009; Åkerman 2009; Stokke 2010; King 2014; Speaks 2016). Particular issues addressed are the relationship between referential and (Gricean) communicative intentions, the ‘problem of conflicting intentions’ that arises when a speaker has a number of intentions that may be called ‘referential’, and the accusation that the very idea of a referential intention is irrevocably circular. I argue that the most feasible notion of a referential intention is characterised by two primary features: it is an intention-in-action rather than a prior intention, and it amounts to an intention to establish joint attention on a particular object.

Item Type: Pre-print
Report Nr: MoL-2020-03
Series Name: Master of Logic Thesis (MoL) Series
Year: 2020
Subjects: Logic
Depositing User: Dr Marco Vervoort
Date Deposited: 17 Aug 2020 12:48
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2020 12:48

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