PP-2020-16: Majority-Strategyproofness in Judgment Aggregation

PP-2020-16: Botan, Sirin and Endriss, Ulle (2020) Majority-Strategyproofness in Judgment Aggregation. [Pre-print]

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By a combination of well-known results in judgment aggregation, it is essentially impossible to design an aggregation rule that simultaneously satisfies two crucial requirements: to always return an outcome that is logically consistent, and to be immune to strategic manipulation. To address this dilemma, we put forward a novel notion of strategyproofness, which requires immunity to strategic manipulation only in certain well-defined situations—namely when either the truthful profile of individual judgments or the profile a would-be manipulator is trying to reach are majority-consistent.We argue that this constitutes an attractive compromise for aggregation rules one may want to use in practice, and we prove that several important rules are strategyproof in this sense. This includes, in particular, all rules belonging to the family of additive majority rules, such as the Kemeny rule and the Slater rule.

Item Type: Pre-print
Report Nr: PP-2020-16
Series Name: Prepublication (PP) Series
Year: 2020
Uncontrolled Keywords: Judgment Aggregation; Social Choice Theory; Strategic Manipulation
Subjects: Logic
Depositing User: Ulle Endriss
Date Deposited: 06 Sep 2020 06:46
Last Modified: 06 Sep 2020 06:46
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1751

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