PP-2006-01: Endriss, Ulle (2006) Monotonic Concession Protocols for Multilateral Negotiation. [Report]
Preview |
Text (Full Text)
PP-2006-01.text.pdf Download (136kB) | Preview |
![[thumbnail of Abstract]](https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text (Abstract)
PP-2006-01.abstract.txt Download (1kB) |
Abstract
The most natural way of thinking about negotiation is probably a
situation whereby each of the parties involved initially make a
proposal that is particularly beneficial to themselves and then
incrementally revise their earlier proposals in order to come to an
agreement. This idea has been formalised in the so-called monotonic
concession protocol, a set of rules defining the range of acceptable
moves during a negotiation process intended to follow this general
scheme. In the case of negotiation between just two agents, the
monotonic concession protocol has become a textbook example and its
formal properties are well-understood. In the case of multilateral
negotiation, where more than two agents need to come to an agreement,
on the other hand, it is not at all clear how to set up a monotonic
concession protocol. As it turns out, the design of such a protocol
boils down to the question of what constitutes a multilateral
concession. In this paper, we make several proposals as to what might
be an appropriate definition and analyse the properties of the
proposed concession criteria.
| Item Type: | Report |
|---|---|
| Report Nr: | PP-2006-01 |
| Series Name: | Prepublication (PP) Series |
| Year: | 2006 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | negotiation, protocols, game theory |
| Depositing User: | Ulle Endriss |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Oct 2016 14:36 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Oct 2016 14:36 |
| URI: | https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/176 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
