DS-2020-15: Tales of Similarity and Imagination. A modest epistemology of possibility

DS-2020-15: Schoonen, Tom (2020) Tales of Similarity and Imagination. A modest epistemology of possibility. Doctoral thesis, University of Amsterdam.

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Abstract

This dissertation advances the debate on how we have justified beliefs about non-actual possibilities. It evaluates imagination-based and similarity-based approaches to the epistemology of possibility, develops novel accounts of each of them, and examines the role of possibility-judgements in philosophy itself. This is done over the course of three parts. A common theme throughout this work is modal modesty: even though we can come to justifiably believe ordinary possibility claims (e.g., that this cup could break), this ability is limited when it comes to more exotic possibilities (e.g., that there could be an unconscious physical duplicate of me).

Part I explores imagination-based epistemologies of possibility -- i.e., the suggestion that being able to imagine something provides us with justification for believing its possibility. Different prominent interpretations of imagination are evaluated for their potential as a foundation for an imagination-based epistemology of possibility. It is concluded that these theories are unable to (ultimately) explain our knowledge of non-actual possibilities. A new interpretation of imagination, as sensori-motor simulation, is proposed, which does not succumb to the issues raised against the other theories and can provide us with some knowledge of non-actual possibilities.

Part II assesses the suggestion that we justify beliefs about possibilities by extending our beliefs about the actual world through similarity reasoning. First, the notion of relevant similarity is critically evaluated and many interpretations of it are argued to be problematic. A new similarity-based epistemology of possibility is proposed, which relies on the notion of (natural) kind, our ability to categorise objects as being of a particular kind, and our ampliative reasoning skills related to this. The resulting epistemology of possibility is argued to be cognitively plausible, in line with empirical findings, and modally modest.

Part III discusses the reliance of philosophy itself on possibility-judgements. It extends an important objection against non-exceptionalist theories of thought experiments. A solution is proposed, raising the question of whether humans can come to justifiably believe philosophically interesting possibilities. It is argued, pace experimental philosophers, that we do in fact can reliably judge whether philosophically significant possibilities are true. However, exotic philosophical cases remain out of our epistemic reach.

Item Type:	Thesis (Doctoral)
Report Nr:	DS-2020-15
Series Name:	ILLC Dissertation (DS) Series
Year:	2020
Subjects:	Philosophy
Depositing User:	Dr Marco Vervoort
Date Deposited:	14 Jun 2022 15:17
Last Modified:	14 Jun 2022 15:17
URI:	https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/2184

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