PP-2007-12: Apt, Krzystof and Witzel, Andreas (2007) A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation. [Report]
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Abstract
We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation by focusing on
partial preference relations between partitions of a grand
coalition. Coalition formation is modelled by means of simple merge
and split rules that transform partitions. We identify conditions
under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique
partition. The main conceptual tool is the notion of a stable
partition. The results naturally apply to coalitional TU-games and to
some classes of hedonic games.e
| Item Type: | Report |
|---|---|
| Report Nr: | PP-2007-12 |
| Series Name: | Prepublication (PP) Series |
| Year: | 2007 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | cooperative game theory; coalition formation |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Oct 2016 14:36 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Oct 2016 14:36 |
| URI: | https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/246 |
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