MoL-2012-02: Boicheva, Sylvia (2012) Mechanism Design without Money. [Report]
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Abstract
Mechanism design is a field that deals with designing algorithms for
making decisions based on the preferences of the agents in such a way
that the outcome is guaranteed to be good for society and the agents
are not incentivised to misreport their preferences. An appropriate
mechanism manages to turn a group of self-interested agents into a
group collectively satisfied with the decision. Most of the research
on the subject is based on enforcing taxes and subsidies to compensate
agents, but monetary transactions are not always applicable - for
instance, buying and selling organs for transplantation is
illegal. Therefore, it is important to know what can be achieved
without utilizing payments. This thesis provides a broad survey of
both classic and recent results in the field and points out the most
important challenges and achievements.
| Item Type: | Report |
|---|---|
| Report Nr: | MoL-2012-02 |
| Series Name: | Master of Logic Thesis (MoL) Series |
| Year: | 2012 |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Oct 2016 14:38 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Oct 2016 14:38 |
| URI: | https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/868 |
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