MoL-2025-19: Cornelius Van Til’s Presuppositional Epistemology as a New Model for Deep Disagreement: Relations to and Improvements on Quasi-Fideism

MoL-2025-19: du Toit, Simeon (2025) Cornelius Van Til’s Presuppositional Epistemology as a New Model for Deep Disagreement: Relations to and Improvements on Quasi-Fideism. [Report]

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Abstract

A new model for deep disagreement is derived from Presuppositional Epistemology. This is done by a critical appraisal of an attempt to unify Duncan Pritchard’s Quasi-Fideism with the Presuppositional Apologetic by Nicholas Smith. Quasi-Fideism is a version of Wittgenstein’s Hinge Epistemology. The result is a novel model for deep disagreement that satisfies all the criteria identified by an influential account of deep disagreement by Chris Ranalli. The resulting theory of deep disagreement includes a model for rational reasoning that distinguishes between world-view internal and world-view external reasoning, solving multiple puzzles surrounding how beliefs are rationally justified.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: MoL-2025-19
Series Name: Master of Logic Thesis (MoL) Series
Year: 2025
Subjects: Cognition
Logic
Philosophy
Depositing User: Dr Marco Vervoort
Date Deposited: 07 Oct 2025 15:03
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2025 15:03
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/2390

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