MoL-2024-33: Incompatible Objects and Possible Languages

MoL-2024-33: Hu, Ruiting (2024) Incompatible Objects and Possible Languages. [Report]

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Abstract

Eklund has put forward maximalism as an ontology for neo-Fregeanism (Eklund, 2006b). He claims this to be a promiscuous ontology that sanctions the existence of any object that is referred to by a singular term in a possible language. Like neo-Fregeanism, maximalism suffers a problem similar to the Bad Company problem. It is called the problem of incompatible objects. This thesis dives into the details of maximalism and seeks a solution for the problem of incompatible objects. Chapter 1 explores the cause for the problem of incompatible objects along with the metaonological principle that motivates maximalism. Chapter 2 considers Linnebo’s critical liberalism (Linnebo, 2024) and quantifier variance (Eklund, 2021) as solutions to the problem of incompatible objects and argues that it is inadequate. Chapter 3 puts forward our two solution to the problem with one appealing to the existence of similar but different objects and the other to pragmatic indeterminacy.

Item Type: Report
Report Nr: MoL-2024-33
Series Name: Master of Logic Thesis (MoL) Series
Year: 2024
Subjects: Language
Logic
Depositing User: Dr Marco Vervoort
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2026 14:30
Last Modified: 10 Nov 2026 14:30
URI: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/2464

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