MoL-2015-24: Limits of Argumentation: A Wittgensteinian Approach

MoL-2015-24: Islam, Md. Shahidul (2015) Limits of Argumentation: A Wittgensteinian Approach. [Report]

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Abstract

Knowing the limits of argumentation, and thereby avoiding useless reasongivings is an important real-life problem. Our aim in this thesis is to find out the ramifications of the later works of Wittgenstein, especially of his On Certainty, concerning this problem. Although our discussion concerns the issue of the limits of argumentation in general, we focus on one aspect of it, namely the deep disagreements (DD). We present a critical discussion of Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements and try to develop it. We claim that a deep disagreement involves a confusion of a certainty with a knowledge-claim and also a difference in practices or forms of life among the arguers in an argumentation. We propose some criteria to recognize DD and discuss limitations of our criteria. We also examine some other accounts of DD in light of the conception of DD that we propose. Finally, we try to find some examples that could both illustrate and justify our conception of the limits of argumentation, and of DD. We argue that the disagreement between Wittgenstein (or a Wittgensteinian philosopher) and the traditional philosophers, and also that between a typical religious person and non-religious one, could justly be considered as examples of deep disagreements.

Item Type:	Report
Report Nr:	MoL-2015-24
Series Name:	Master of Logic Thesis (MoL) Series
Year:	2015
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Argumentation, Deep disagreement (DD), Rules, Form of life (Fol), Practices, Certainty
Date Deposited:	12 Oct 2016 14:38
Last Modified:	12 Oct 2016 14:38
URI:	https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/965

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